Incentives for quality through endogenous routing

Manufacturing and Service Operations Management

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 254-273

  Lu, Lauren Xiaoyuan ^a   Van Mieghem, J A ^b   Savaskan, R Canan ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Epsilon equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; Piece rate; Quality control; Queueing networks; Routing

Indexed keywords

BEST EFFORT; EPSILON EQUILIBRIUM; MULTI-CLASS QUEUEING NETWORKS; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; ON-DEMAND; PIECE RATE; PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL; PRISONER'S DILEMMA; QUALITY COSTS; QUALITY INSPECTION; ROUTING; ROUTING SCHEME; SELF-ROUTING; SELF-ROUTING SCHEME;

ECONOMICS; QUALITY ASSURANCE; QUALITY FUNCTION DEPLOYMENT; QUEUEING NETWORKS; QUEUEING THEORY; ROUTING ALGORITHMS; ROUTING PROTOCOLS; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS; TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT;

QUALITY CONTROL;

EID: 67650001499     PISSN: 15234614     EISSN: 15265498     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/msom.1080.0212     Document Type: Article

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