Incentive effects favor nonconsolidating queues in a service system: The principal-agent perspective

Management Science

Volumn 44, Issue 12 PART 1, 1998, Pages 1662-1669

  Gilbert, Stephen M ^a   Weng, Z Kevin ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Capacity Allocation; Competitive Equilibrium; Incentives; Risk Pooling

Indexed keywords

CONSTRAINT THEORY; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; COSTS; DECISION THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OPTIMIZATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; STRATEGIC PLANNING; VALUE ENGINEERING;

CAPACITY ALLOCATIONS; COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUMS; RISK-POOLING BENEFITS;

QUEUEING THEORY;

EID: 0032304649     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.44.12.1662     Document Type: Review

References (8)

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