Using contests to allocate pollution rights

Energy Policy

Volumn 37, Issue 7, 2009, Pages 2798-2806

  MacKenzie, Ian A ^a   Hanley, Nick ^b   Kornienko, Tatiana ^c  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Initial allocation; Pollution permits; Rank order contests

Indexed keywords

ALLOCATION MECHANISMS; EXTERNAL ACTIONS; INITIAL ALLOCATION; PERMIT ALLOCATIONS; POLICY OBJECTIVES; RANK-ORDER CONTESTS; TRADABLE PERMITS;

POLLUTION;

EMISSIONS TRADING; ENERGY PLANNING; ENERGY POLICY; PLANNING METHOD; RANKING;

EID: 67349180572     PISSN: 03014215     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2009.03.030     Document Type: Article

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