The optimal initial allocation of pollution permits: A relative performance approach

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 265-282

  Mackenzie, Ian A ^a   Hanley, Nick ^a   Kornienko, Tatiana ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Auctions; Initial allocation; Pollution permits; Rank order contests; Relative performance

Indexed keywords

MARKETING; PARTICULATE EMISSIONS;

ALLOCATION MECHANISMS; EMISSIONS TRADING;

POLLUTION;

EMISSIONS TRADING; MARKET DEVELOPMENT; PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT; POLLUTION; TRADE-ENVIRONMENT RELATIONS;

EID: 38849127557     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-007-9125-4     Document Type: Article

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