A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics: An empirical investigation

Economics and Politics

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 278-307

  Evans, Carolyn L ^a  

^a SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC IMPACT; ELECTORAL SYSTEM; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; POLITICAL ECONOMY; PROTECTIONISM; STATE ROLE; TARIFF STRUCTURE; THEORETICAL STUDY; TRADE POLICY; WELFARE IMPACT;

EID: 67049132458     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: 14680343     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00346.x     Document Type: Article

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