Heterogeneity and representation: The Senate and free trade

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 524-544

  Bailey, Michael ^a   Brady, David W ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032392852     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2991769     Document Type: Article

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