Mathematics and Reality

Mathematics and Reality

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-288

  Leng, Mary ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Fictionalism; Indispensability; Mathematics; Naturalism; Objects; Ontology; Philosophy; Realism; Science; Truth

Indexed keywords

EID: 66749188788     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280797.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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