The Dayton Accord: The Balkan Peace Agreement

Cornell International Law Journal

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 757-767

  Szasz, Paul C ^a,b,c,d,e  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

^b INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY   (Austria)

^c WORLD BANK   (United States)

^d UNITED NATIONS   (United States)

^e Cornell University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346047299     PISSN: 00108812     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (35)

1. Remarks Announcing the Bosnia-Herzegovina Peace Agreement and an Exchange with Reporters, 1995:2 PUB. PAPERS 1776 (Nov. 21, 1995).
2. Keynote Remarks by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the Initialing of the Balkan Proximity Peace Talks Agreement, reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 342 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1997).
3. For a somewhat more detailed presentation of the Accord's structure, see P.C. Szasz, Introductory Note to Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia: General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, 35 I.L.M. 75, 77-80 (1996). The texts of the Dayton Accord itself: the GFA and its Annexes, as well as numerous related documents, are set out in volume 35 of International Legal Materials immediately following the above-cited Introductory Note.
4. Henceforth, I shall refer to these three as the "GFA Parties."
5. These might be considered, perhaps together with the entities that created the BH Federation, as the "Intermediate Sovereigns" to which the subtitle of this Symposium refers.
6. Henceforth, I shall refer to these three as the "BH Parties." The Federation itself has a complex internal structure and is still not functional three years after it was established in March 1994 in Washington. The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is reprinted at 33 I.L.M. 743 (1994).
7. They do not, however, establish these occupying forces-that was done by the outside powers by means of the arrangements referred to below.
8. Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4 to the General Framework Agreement For Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 117 (1996).
9. Human Rights, Annex 6 to the General Framework Agreement For Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 130 (1996).
10. Refugees and Displaced Persons, Annex 7 to the General Framework Agreement For Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 136 (1996).
11. It is not clear to what extent these are international agreements? Consider whether the U.S. Constitution is an international agreement because it originally constituted a compact between 13 independent states. How about the agreements between West and East Germany under which the latter merged into the former?
12. Hereinafter the "Sponsoring Powers."
13. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1026, U.N. SCOR, at 7-11, U.N. Doc. S/1995/1031 (1995).
14. S.C. Res. 1035, U.N. SCOR, 50th Year, Res. & Dec. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1035 (1995). The mandate for the IPTF was extended by S.C. Res. 1088, U.N. SCOR, 51st Year, Res. & Dec. at 27, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1088 (1996).
15. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Year, Res. & Dec. at 26, U.N. Doc. S/ RES/1031 (1995).
16. Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference Held at Lancaster House, London, on 8 and 9 December 1995, reprinted in 35 I.L.M 225 (1996).
17. For a very brief listing of the successive steps in this process, see P.C. Szasz, The Protection of Human Rights Through the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement on Bosnia, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 301, 301-03 (1996).
18. The three "ethnic" groups constituting most of Bosnia's population are: the Muslims constituting some 44% of the 1991 population, the Serbs (33%) and the Croats (17%). Although commonly called "ethnic" groups, in fact, they are differentiated more by religion than by any other factor.
19. The Muslims renamed themselves "Bosniacs" in 1994, presumably to de-emphasize their sectarian nature.
20. International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Statement on Bosnia, Document Adopted at the London Conference, Doc. No. LC/C5 (Final), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1537 (1992).
21. See, e.g., THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 2, at 342.
22. This arrangement had been agreed to on August 29, 1995, by an instrument that is referred to in the preamble to the GFA, but has not been published. See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 89 (1996).
23. Annex 1A to the GFA did not specify the IFOR mandate but only stated the outer limits of the consent of the BH Parties to the occupation of their territories. The actual mandate was set later by the competent NATO organs. Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, Annex 1A to the General Framework Agreement For Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 91 (1996).
24. Annex 3 to the GFA merely empowered OSCE to conduct the elections. Elections, Annex 3 to the General Framework Agreement For Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 136 (1996).
25. This was a unilateral undertaking by the United States, in opposition to the desires of most of the other Sponsoring Powers. In actually implementing this undertaking, the United States unexpectedly added another condition: that the Muslims send home a number of Iranian troops and advisers. Delays in complying with this new requirement initially delayed the flow of U.S. military assistance. Also, as the United States could not supply such assistance officially, this was done through specially established private enterprises set up by ex-military officers. Still another complication is that the United States is actually trying to strengthen all of the practically inoperative BH Federation armed forces, rather than just the Muslim component thereof.
26. The GFA and its Annexes are less than pellucid as to this matter and even the Security Council resolutions adopted in the wake of Dayton do not provide clear directions. See Szasz, supra note 17, at 313-14.
27. See opening quotes above.
28. The Concluding Statement of the Dayton Conference provided that by initialling "the Framework Agreement and its Annexes, [the heads of the delegations of the GFA and BH Parties established] the initialled documents as definitive, and [signified] their consent to be bound thereby and their commitment to sign the Framework Agreement and its Annexes without delay." Concluding Statement by the Participants in the Bosnia Proximity Peace Talks, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 168, 169 (1996).
29. For example, consider the de facto unanimity requirement of the three-member Presidency. See Constitution, supra note 8, art. V.2(b)-(c).
30. Refugees and Displaced Persons, Annex 7 to the General Framework Agreement For Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 136 (1996).
31. Inter-Entity Boundary, Annex 2 to the General Framework Agreement For Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 111 (1996).
32. Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, Annex 1A to the General Framework Agreement For Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 91 (1996).
33. Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides for "[t]ermination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its [material] breach." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 346.
34. Id. art. 52.
35. See David Wippman, International Law and Ethnic Conflict on Cyprus, 31 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 141, 150 (1996).