Can Peacebuilding Work?

Cornell International Law Journal

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 700-715

  Hampson, Fen Osler ^a  

^a CARLETON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346047304     PISSN: 00108812     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (96)

1. See Roy Licklider, The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 681, 685-87 (1995); Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1997, at 5; Chaim Kaufman, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars, INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1996, at 136; John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen Van Evera, Hateful Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1996, at A25; Roland Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1997, at 54. See also Benjamin Schwartz, The Diversity Myth: America's Leading Export, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1995, at 57, 66-67.
2. See Roy Licklider, The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 681, 685-87 (1995); Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1997, at 5; Chaim Kaufman, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars, INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1996, at 136; John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen Van Evera, Hateful Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1996, at A25; Roland Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1997, at 54. See also Benjamin Schwartz, The Diversity Myth: America's Leading Export, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1995, at 57, 66-67.
3. See Roy Licklider, The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 681, 685-87 (1995); Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1997, at 5; Chaim Kaufman, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars, INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1996, at 136; John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen Van Evera, Hateful Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1996, at A25; Roland Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1997, at 54. See also Benjamin Schwartz, The Diversity Myth: America's Leading Export, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1995, at 57, 66-67.
4. See Roy Licklider, The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 681, 685-87 (1995); Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1997, at 5; Chaim Kaufman, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars, INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1996, at 136; John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen Van Evera, Hateful Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1996, at A25; Roland Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1997, at 54. See also Benjamin Schwartz, The Diversity Myth: America's Leading Export, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1995, at 57, 66-67.
5. See Roy Licklider, The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 681, 685-87 (1995); Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1997, at 5; Chaim Kaufman, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars, INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1996, at 136; John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen Van Evera, Hateful Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1996, at A25; Roland Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1997, at 54. See also Benjamin Schwartz, The Diversity Myth: America's Leading Export, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1995, at 57, 66-67.
6. See Roy Licklider, The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 681, 685-87 (1995); Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1997, at 5; Chaim Kaufman, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars, INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1996, at 136; John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen Van Evera, Hateful Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1996, at A25; Roland Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1997, at 54. See also Benjamin Schwartz, The Diversity Myth: America's Leading Export, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1995, at 57, 66-67.
7. Ivo H. Daalder, Bosnia After SFOR: Options for Continued US Engagement, SURVIVAL, Winter 1997-98, at 5; see afso responses to Daalder from Carl Bildt, Pauline Neville-Jones and Robert A. Page in Id. at 19-28.
8. A useful review of these debates can be found in Pauline H. Baker, Conflict Resolution Versus Democratic Governance: Divergent Paths to Peace, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES OF AND RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 563-72 (Chester A. Crocker & Fen Osler Hampson eds., 1996).
9. An Agenda for Peace-Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR/SCOR, 47th Sess., Preliminary List Item 10, at 55, U.N. Docs. A/47/277 & S/24111 (1992).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 59.
12. GARETH EVANS, COOPERATING FOR PEACE: THE GLOBAL AGENDA FOR THE 1990s AND BEYOND 9-10 (1993).
13. Id. at 9.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 9-10.
16. Id. at 10.
17. Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. GAOR/SCOR, 50th Sess., at 55, U.N. Docs. A/50/60 & S/1995/1 (1995).
18. See FEN OSLER HAMPSON, NURTURING PEACE: WHY PEACE SETTLEMENTS SUCCEED OR FAIL 217-21 (1996).
19. See JOHN L. HIRSCH & ROBERT B. OAKLEY, SOMALIA AND OPERATION RESTORE HOPE: REFLECTIONS ON PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING 158-61 (1995).
20. William J. Durch, Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and "State-Building" in Somalia, in U.N. PEACEKEEPING, AMERICAN POLITICS, AND THE UNCIVIL WARS OF THE 1990s 311-66 (William J. Durch ed., 1996).
21. Chester A. Crocker & Fen Osler Hampson, Making Peace Solutions Work, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept. 1, 1996, at 15.
22. HAMPSON, supra note 13, at 218-21.
23. Paris, supra note 1, at 64-73.
24. On the important role played by the international community in advancing human rights in El Salvador, see Fen Osler Hampson, The Pursuit of Human Rights: The United Nations in El Salvador, in U.N. PEACEKEEPING, AMERICAN POLITICS, AND THE UNCIVIL WARS OF THE 1990s 69-102 (William J. Durch ed., 1996).
25. Denis McLean, Peace Operations and Common Sense, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS, supra note 3, at 321.
26. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Albright Says Consensus Is Emerging on the Future of U.S. Troops in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, at A8.
27. See generally THE EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING (William J. Durch ed., 1993).
28. See Brian S. Mandell, The Cyprus Conflict: Explaining Resistance to Resolution, in CYPRUS: A REGIONAL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION 201, 221 (Norma Salem ed., 1992).
29. See James H. Wolfe, The United Nations and the Cyprus Question, in CYPRUS: A REGIONAL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION 232 (Norma Salem ed., 1992); Adam Roberts, The Crisis in U.N. Peacekeeping, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS, supra note 3, at 300-02.
30. See James H. Wolfe, The United Nations and the Cyprus Question, in CYPRUS: A REGIONAL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION 232 (Norma Salem ed., 1992); Adam Roberts, The Crisis in U.N. Peacekeeping, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS, supra note 3, at 300-02.
31. THE WORLD BANK, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN AFRICA: THE EVIDENCE FROM SEVEN COUNTRY CASE STUDIES, Report No. IDP-130, at vi (1993).
32. Id. at viii.
33. See ERIC BERMAN, UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, MANAGING ARMS IN PEACE PROCESSES: MOZAMBIQUE 77-81 (1996).
34. For an excellent account of the failure of the Bicesse Accords and peace process, see MARGARET ANSTEE, ORPHAN OF THE COLD WAR: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF ANGOLAN PEACE PROCESS, 1992-93 (1996).
35. See Letter Dated 30 October 1991 From the Permanent Representative of France and Indonesia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR/ SCOR, 46th Sess., Annex 2, Agenda Item 24, art. v, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/46/608 & S/23277 (1991).
36. See Carl Kaysen & George W. Rathjens, Send in the Troops: A U.N. Foreign Legion, WASH. Q., Winter 1997, at 207.
37. See JANET E. HEININGER, PEACEKEEPING IN TRANSITION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN CAMBODIA 37-38 (1994).
38. See UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, MANAGING ARMS IN PEACE PROCESSES: CAMBODIA 22-30 (1996). Another reason for the failure to restore civilian rule in Cambodia was the inability of the two partners in the coalition government to work effectively together. Id. at 46-56.
39. See Crocker & Hampson, supra note 16, at 15.
40. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 25, at 95.
41. Such as a non-governmental organization (NGO) or an international agency such as the United Nations.
42. See Jarat Chopra, U.N. Civil Governance-in-Trust, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIVIL WARS 69, 80-81 (Thomas G. Weiss ed., 1995).
43. See TREVOR FINDLAY, CAMBODIA: THE LEGACY AND LESSONS OF UNTAC 15, 55-56 (1995).
44. Id. at 32.
45. Id. at 97.
46. See NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, NATION BUILDING: THE U.N. AND NAMIBIA 76-77 (1990).
47. See U.N. PEACEKEEPING, AMERICAN POLITICS, AND THE UNCIVIL WARS OF THE 1990s, supra note 15, at 88-95.
48. See HAMPSON, supra note 13, at 161, 232.
49. See Reed Brody, The United Nations and Human Rights in El Salvador's "Negotiated Revolution," 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 153, 160-61 (1995).
50. See Eva Betram, Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United Nations Peace Building, 39 J. CONFL. RES. 387, 390-93 (1995); Alvaro de Soto & Graciana del Castillo, Obstacles to Peacebuilding, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1994, at 69.
51. See Eva Betram, Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United Nations Peace Building, 39 J. CONFL. RES. 387, 390-93 (1995); Alvaro de Soto & Graciana del Castillo, Obstacles to Peacebuilding, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1994, at 69.
52. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1151, 1151-69 (1986); BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1993); Bruce Russett, And Yet It Moves (Bruce Russett on the Democratic Peace), INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1995, at 164, 164-67.
53. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1151, 1151-69 (1986); BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1993); Bruce Russett, And Yet It Moves (Bruce Russett on the Democratic Peace), INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1995, at 164, 164-67.
54. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1151, 1151-69 (1986); BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1993); Bruce Russett, And Yet It Moves (Bruce Russett on the Democratic Peace), INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1995, at 164, 164-67.
55. Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratization and the Danger of War, INT'L SECURITY, Summer 1995, at 5.
56. The classic exposition of this thesis is to be found in SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 140-91 (1968).
57. See HAMPSON, supra note 13, at 108-18.
58. See generally SUSAN WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR (1995).
59. See James A. Schear, Bosnia's Post-Dayton Traumas, FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1996, at 87, 96.
60. See, for example, Donald L. Horowitz, Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics for Ethnic Conflict Management, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES 451, 471 (Joseph V. Montville ed., 1991);
61. Arned Lijphart, The Power Sharing Approach, in id. 491 passim (1991).
62. See HAMPSON, supra note 13, at 89.
63. Id. at 199-200.
64. This is true even though the coalition later broke up when Hun Sen seized power and threw out his coalition partner Crown Prince Norodom Ranariddh Sihanouk. See Cambodia's Bitter Partnership, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 1997, at 37.
65. See TIMOTHY D. SISK, POWER SHARING AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN ETHNIC CONFLICTS 77-86 (1996).
66. See CHARLES FOLEY & W.I. SCOBIE, THE STRUGGLE FOR CYPRUS 160-63 (1975).
67. See HAMPSON, supra note 13, at 229.
68. See id. at 21.
69. See id. at 229.
70. See id. at 167.
71. See id. at 138-39.
72. See id. at 149.
73. See id. at 150; United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/23642 (1992).
74. See generally ELUSIVE PEACE: NEGOTIATING AN END TO CIVIL WARS (I. William Zartman ed., 1995); DONALD K. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985); SISK, supra note 55; David A. Lake & Donald Rothchild, Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1996, at 41.
75. See generally ELUSIVE PEACE: NEGOTIATING AN END TO CIVIL WARS (I. William Zartman ed., 1995); DONALD K. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985); SISK, supra note 55; David A. Lake & Donald Rothchild, Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1996, at 41.
76. See generally ELUSIVE PEACE: NEGOTIATING AN END TO CIVIL WARS (I. William Zartman ed., 1995); DONALD K. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985); SISK, supra note 55; David A. Lake & Donald Rothchild, Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1996, at 41.
77. See generally ELUSIVE PEACE: NEGOTIATING AN END TO CIVIL WARS (I. William Zartman ed., 1995); DONALD K. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985); SISK, supra note 55; David A. Lake & Donald Rothchild, Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1996, at 41.
78. See generally TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 82-103, 292-334, 375-438 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995). For a skeptical view of this model, see Timothy D. Mak, The Case Against an International War Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, 2 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 536 (1995).
79. See generally TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 82-103, 292-334, 375-438 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995). For a skeptical view of this model, see Timothy D. Mak, The Case Against an International War Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, 2 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 536 (1995).
80. See JANET E. HEINENGER, PEACEKEEPING IN TRANSITION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN CAMBODIA 39 (1994).
81. See id.
82. See FINDLAY, supra note 37, at 87.
83. See HAMPSON, supra note 13, at 138-40.
84. See id.
85. See United Nations Observer Mission, supra note 63.
86. See Mark Ensalaco, Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report and Assessment, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 656 (1994).
87. See HAMPSON, supra note 13, at 69.
88. See Accounting for War Crimes in Cambodia, PEACE WATCH, (United States Institute of Peace, Wash., D.C.), Oct. 1995, at 2.
89. See Nayan Chanda, Cambodia: Face the Facts: Interview, Inside Account Links Ieng Sary to Killings, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Sept. 26, 1996, at 22.
90. On the issue of how new societies can redress past abuses and develop the rule of law, see generally TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 65.
91. See NICOLE BALL & TIMOTHY HALEVY, MAKING PEACE WORK: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 81-102 (1996).
92. See id.
93. Id. at 83-84.
94. Nicole Ball, The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS, supra note 3, at 613.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 621-22.