Chapter 10 Experimental evaluations of policy instruments

Handbook of Environmental Economics

Volumn 1, Issue , 2003, Pages 437-460

  Bohm, Peter ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

C9; climate change policy; D44; emissions trading; environmental policy; experimental economics; market power; Q25; Q28

Indexed keywords

EID: 66049140759     PISSN: 15740099     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0099(03)01015-5     Document Type: Chapter

References (58)

1. Bjornstad D.J., Elliott S.R., and Hale D.R. Understanding experimental economics and policy analysis in a federal agency: the case of marketable emissions trading. In: Holt C.A., and Isaac R.M. (Eds). Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 7, Emissions Permit Experiments (1999), JAI Press, Cheltenham, UK 163-180
2. Nord 1997:8. Bohm P. Are tradable carbon emission quotas internationally acceptable? An inquiry with diplomats as country representatives (1997), Nordic Council of Ministers, Greenwich, CT
3. Bohm P. Determinants of the benefits of international carbon emissions trading: theory and experimental evidence. In: Fisher B. (Ed). Emissions Trading, Proceedings of the Conference on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading (1998), ABARE, Copenhagen
4. abbreviated version of "Joint implementation as emission quota trade: an experiment among four nordic countries", Nord 1997:4 (Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen). Bohm P. An emission quota trade experiment among four Nordic countries. In: Sorrell S., and Skea J. (Eds). Pollution for Sale: Emissions Trading and Joint Implementation (1999), Edward Elgar, Canberra 299-321
5. 2002 Chapter 10. Bohm P. Pitfalls in experimental economics. In: Andersson F., and Holm H. (Eds). Experimental Economics: Financial Markets, Auctions, and Decision Making (2002), Kluwer, Cheltenham
6. Bohm P., and Carlén B. Emission quota trade among the few: laboratory evidence of joint implementation among committed countries. Resource and Energy Economics 21 1 (1999) 43-66
7. Bohm P., and Carlén B. A cost-effective approach to attracting low-income countries to international emissions trading: Theory and experiments. Environmental and Resource Economics 23 (2002) 187-211
8. Carlén, B. (forthcoming), "Market power in international carbon emissions trading: a labaratory test", Energy Journal.
9. Cason T.N. An experimental investigation of the seller incentives in EPA's emission trading auction. American Economic Review 85 4 (1995) 905-922
10. Cason T.N., and Plott C.R. EPA's new emissions trading mechanism: a laboratory evaluation. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 30 2 (1996) 133-160
11. Cason T.N., and Gangadharan L. An electronic bulletin board trading for emission permits. Journal of Regulatory Economics 14 1 (1998) 55-73
12. Coase R. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1960) 1-31
13. Crocker T. The structuring of atmospheric pollution control systems. In: Wolozin H. (Ed). The Economics of Air Pollution (1966), Norton, Dordrecht 61-86
14. Davis D.D., and Holt C.A. Experimental Economics (1993), Princeton University Press, New York
15. Dales J.H. Pollution, Property and Prices (1968), University of Toronto, Princeton, NJ
16. Franciosi R., Isaac R.M., Pingry D.E., and Reynolds S.S. An experimental investigation of the Hahn-Noll revenue neutral auction for emissions licenses. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24 1 (1993) 1-24
17. Godby R.W. Market power in emissions permit double auctions. In: Holt C.A., and Isaac R.M. (Eds). Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 7, Emissions Permit Experiments (1999), JAI Press, Toronto 121-162
18. Godby R.W. Market power and emission trading: theory and laboratory results. Pacific Economic Review 5 3 (2000) 349-363
19. Godby R.W., Mestelman S., and Muller R.A. Experimental tests of market power in emission trading markets. In: Petrakis E., Sartzetakis E., and Xepapadeas A. (Eds). Environmental Regulation and Market Structure (1999), Edward Elgar, Greenwich, CT 67-94
20. Godby R.W., Mestelman S., Muller R.A., and Welland J.D. Emission trading with shares and coupons when control over discharges is uncertain. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 32 (1997) 359-381
21. Hahn R.W. Promoting efficiency and equity through institutional design. Policy Sciences 21 (1988) 41-66
22. Harrison G.W. Theory and misbehavior of first-price auctions. American Economic Review 79 4 (1989) 749-762
23. Harrison G.W. Theory and misbehavior of first-price auctions: reply. American Economic Review 82 5 (1992) 1426-1443
24. Harrison G.W. Expected utility theory and the experimentalists. Empirical Economics 19 2 (1994) 43-74
25. Harrison G.W., and McKee M. Experimental evaluation of the Coase theorem. Journal of Law and Economics 28 3 (1985) 653-670
26. Harrison G.W., Hoffman E., Rutström E.E., and Spitzer M.L. Coasian solutions to the externality problem in experimental markets. Economic Journal 97 (1987) 388-402
27. Hey J.D. Experiments in Economics (1991), Blackwell, Cheltenham
28. Hizen Y., and Saijo T. Designing GHG emissions trading institutions in the Kyoto Protocol: an experimental approach. Environmental Modelling and Software 16 6 (2001) 533-543
29. Hoffman E., and Spitzer M.L. The Coase theorem: some experimental tests. Journal of Law and Economics 25 (1982) 73-98
30. Hoffman E., and Spitzer M.L. Entitlements, rights and fairness: An experimental examination of subjects' concepts of distributive justice. Journal of Legal Studies 14 (1985) 259-297
31. Joskow P.L., Schmalensee R., and Bailey E.M. The market for sulphur dioxide emissions 88 4 (1998) 669-685
32. International Panel on Climate Change. Second Assessment Report (1995), Working Group III, Oxford
33. In: Kagel J., and Roth A. (Eds). Handbook of Experimental Economics (1995), Princeton University Press
34. Kunreuther H., Kleindofer P., and Knez P.J. A compensation mechanism for siting noxious facilities. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 14 (1987) 371-383
35. Ledyard J.O., and Szakaly-Moore K. Designing organizations for trading pollution rights. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 25 (1994) 167-196
36. Loewenstein G. Experimental economics from the Vantage-point of behavioural economics. Economic Journal 109 453 (1999) 25-34
37. Loomes G. Experimental economics: introduction. Economic Journal 109 453 (1999) 1-4
38. Mestelman S., Moir R., and Muller R.A. A laboratory test of Canadian proposals for an emission trading program. In: Holt C.A., and Isaac R.M. (Eds). Research in Experimental Economics Vol. 7 (1999), JAI Press, Princeton, NJ 45-92
39. Mestelman S., and Muller R.A. The choice of instruments for pollution emission permit trading: designing a laboratory environment. In: Loehman E.T., and Kilgour D.M. (Eds). Designing Institutions for Environmental and Resource Management, New Horizons in Environmental Economics (1998), Edward Elgar, Greenwich, CT
40. Misolek W.S., and Elder H.W. Exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 16 (1989) 156-166
41. Muller R.A., and Mestelman S. Emission trading with shares and coupons: a laboratory experiment. Energy Journal 15 2 (1994) 185-211
42. Muller R.A., and Mestelman S. What have we learned from emissions trading experiments. Managerial and Decision Economics 19 4-5 (1998) 225-238
43. forthcoming. Muller R.A., Mestelman S., Spraggon J., and Godby R. Can double auctions control market power in emissions markets?. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (2003)
44. Plott C.R. Externalities and corrective policies in experimental markets. Economic Journal 93 (1983) 106-127
45. Plott C.R. Dimensions of parallelism: some policy applications of experimental methods. In: Roth A.E. (Ed). Laboratory Experimentation in Economics (1987), Cambridge University Press, Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA
46. Applied Research, December. Rhoads T.A., and Shogren J.F. On Coasean bargaining with transaction costs (1999)
47. Shogren J.F. An experiment on Coasean bargaining over ex ante lotteries and ex post rewards. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 17 1 (1992) 153-169
48. Shogren J.F. Experimental markets and environmental policy. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 3 2 (1993) 117-129
49. Shogren J.F. Coasean bargaining with symmetric delay costs. Resource and Energy Economics 20 4 (1998) 309-325
50. Shogren J.F., and Nowell C. Economics and ecology: a comparison of experimental methodologies and philosophies. Ecological Economics (1991)
51. Shogren J., and Kask S. Exploring the boundaries of the Coase theorem: efficiency and rationality given imperfect contract enforcement. Economics Letters 39 (1992) 155-161
52. Shogren J.F., and Hurley T.M. Experiments in environmental economics. In: van den Bergh J. (Ed). Handbook of Environmental and Resource Economics (1999), Edward Elgar, Cambridge, UK
53. Smith V.L. Microeconomic systems as an experimental science. American Economic Review 72 5 (1982) 923-955
54. Smith V.L., and Williams A.W. The effects of rent asymmetries in experimental auction markets. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3 1 (1982) 99-116
55. Smith V.L., and Williams A.W. The boundaries of competitive price theory: convergence, expectations, and transactions costs. In: Green L., and Kagel J. (Eds). Advances in Behavioral Economics Vol. 2 (1989), Ablex Publishing, Cheltenham
56. Soeberg M. Price expectations and international quota trading: an experimental evaluation. Environmental & Resource Economics 17 (2000) 259-276
57. Stavins R.N. Transaction costs and tradable permits. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 29 (1995) 133-148
58. UN FCCC. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997), United Nations, Norwood, NJ