Modeling implicit collusion using coevolution

Operations Research

Volumn 57, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 439-455

  Anderson, E J ^a,b   Cau, T D H ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CO EVOLUTIONS; CO-EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES; FINITE NUMBERS; IMPLICIT COLLUSIONS; LIMITED INFORMATIONS; MARKET MODELS; PAPER MODELS; REPEATED GAMES; SPOT MARKETS; STABLE EQUILIBRIUM; STATE-BASED; SUPPLY FUNCTIONS; WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS;

COMPETITION;

COMMERCE;

EID: 65349170139     PISSN: 0030364X     EISSN: 15265463     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1080.0631     Document Type: Article

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