Competing for ownership

Journal of the European Economic Association

Volumn 6, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1279-1308

  Legros, Patrick ^a   Newman, Andrew F ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

^b BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 65349113284     PISSN: 15424766     EISSN: 15424774     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.6.1279     Document Type: Article

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