What was revolutionary about the Iranian revolution? The power of possibility

Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 33-46

  Selbin, Eric ^a  

^a SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY; POLITICAL HISTORY; POPULAR PROTEST;

ASIA; EURASIA; IRAN; MIDDLE EAST;

EID: 64349116489     PISSN: 1089201X     EISSN: 1548226X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1215/1089201X-2008-042     Document Type: Article

References (205)

1. Robert Darnton, "What Was Revolutionary about the French Revolution?" New York Review of Books 35 (19 January 1989): 10.
2. Tracking down an authoritative source for this is elusive, perhaps because it never happened; see John Gittings, "A Historical View of Western Reporting on China," China Media Research 3 (2007): 61.
3. Most versions attribute the remark to Zhou, and some assign it to Mao Tse-tung; most versions include U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger, though some name French ambassador André Malraux. Unsourced accounts are rife, including by respected scholars in reputable journals. Gary Sick names Malraux and also invokes it with regard to Iran. See Gary Sick, "Iran: The Adolescent Revolution," Journal of International Affairs 49 (1995): 145.
4. See also Gwyn Prins, "The Four-Stroke Cycle in Security Studies," International Affairs 74 (1998): 793;
5. Tina Rosenberg, "The Unfinished Revolution of 1989," Foreign Policy 115 (1999): 91;
6. Michael Vatikiotis, "The Architecture of China's Diplomatic Edge," Brown Journal of World Affairs 12 (2005-6): 27;
7. John Fischer, "The Free Will Revolution (Continued)," Journal of Ethics 10 (2006): 340;
8. or Leon Aron, "Ideas of Revolutions and Revolutionary Ideas," Demokratizatsiya 14 (2006): 443.
9. See Charles Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 4-5;
10. Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6;
11. John Foran, Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 248-49;
12. and Eric Selbin, "Stories of Revolution in the Periphery," in Revolution in the Making of the Modern World: Social Identities, Globalization, and Modernity, ed. John Foran, David Lane, and Andreja Zivkovic (London: Routledge, 2008), 136-44.
13. But see Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: Penguin, 2002);
14. or Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 3.
15. The revolutions of France, Russia, and China seem to be more or less universally recognized by scholars, politicians, and regular people as the "great revolutions." As noted, this list is at times expanded to include Mexico, Cuba (more often), Nicaragua, and Iran, dubbed the "last" such revolution by Robin Wright. Wright, The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran (New York: Knopf, 2000).
16. A nice summation of the "France, Russia, China" perspective can be found in Michael Walzer, "Intellectuals, Social Classes, and Revolution," in Democracy, Revolution, and History, ed. Theda Skocpol (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 128.
17. While it is beyond the scope of this essay, a comparison might be made with these revolutions' other "twin," as it were. Nicaragua and Grenada have been explored somewhat in Eric Selbin, Modern Latin American Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999);
18. and Brian Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory: An Assessment of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2001).
19. Afghanistan's 1978 revolution has been examined with the Iranian case in Valentine Moghadam, "Revolution, the State, Islam, and Women: Gender Politics in Iran and Afghanistan," Social Text 22 (1989): 40-61;
20. Moghadam, "Gender and Revolutions," in Theorizing Revolutions, ed. John Foran (New York: Routledge, 1997), 137-65;
21. Moghadam, "Revolution, Religion, and Gender Politics: Iran and Afghanistan Compared," Journal of Women's History 10 (1999): 172-95;
22. Moghadam, Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003);
23. Moghadam, "A Tale of Two Countries: State, Society, and Gender Politics in Iran and Afghanistan," Muslim World 94 (2004): 449-67;
24. and Moghadam, "Revolution, Nationalism, and Global Justice: Towards Social Transformation with Women," in Foran et al., Revolution in the Making, 112-29.
25. On Cuba's importance, see, among many others, Eric Selbin, "Conjugating the Cuban Revolution," Latin American Perspectives 36 (forthcoming).
26. Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, updated ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 1.
27. John Foran and Jeff Goodwin, "Revolutionary Outcomes in Iran and Nicaragua: Coalition Fragmentation, War, and the Limits of Social Transformation," Theory and Society 22 (1993): 214.
28. On the event's distinctiveness, see Misagh Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 2;
29. and Fred Halliday, Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 188.
30. On its uniqueness, see Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 530;
31. and Mansour Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 256;
32. but see also Valentine Moghadam, "One Revolution or Two? The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic," in Revolution Today: Aspirations and Realities; Socialist Register, 1989, ed. Ralph Miliband, Leo Panitch, and John Saville (London: Merlin, 1989), 74.
33. On the event as "unthinkable," see Charles Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
34. Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution, 2;
35. Halliday, Revolution and World Politics, xv.
36. Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," Theory and Society 11 (1982): 265;
37. Eric Hobsbawm, "Revolution," in Revolution in History, ed. Roy Porter and Mikuláš? Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 37n21;
38. Gene Burns, "Ideology, Culture, and Ambiguity: The Revolutionary Process in Iran," Theory and Society 25 (1996): 358;
39. Misagh Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5.
40. Kurzman, Unthinkable Revolution, 5
41. Foran, Taking Power, 33.
42. Sophisticated and nuanced fine-tuning on this is found in the work of Valentine Moghadam. Moghadam has variously described it as, among other things, a populist political revolution, in Moghadam, "One Revolution or Two," 75; "a populist, anti-imperialist social revolution," in Moghadam, "Populist Revolution and the Islamic State in Iran," in Revolution in the World-System: Studies in the Political Economy of the World-System, ed. Terry Boswell (New York: Greenwood, 1989), 149
43. A populist but not social revolution, in Moghadam, "Introduction and Overview," in Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies, ed. Valentine Moghadam (London: Zed Books, 1994), 10-11;
44. and a "social transformation of a revolutionary type," in Moghadam, "Gender and Revolutionary Transformation: Iran 1979 and East Central Europe 1989," Gender and Society 19 (1995): 330.
45. John Foran, "How Might Revolutions of the Future Have Better Outcomes? Third Thematic Discussion," in The Future of Revolutions in the Context of Globalization, ed. John Foran (New York: Zed Books, 2003), 284-99.
46. On the inclusion of Jamaica, Guatemala, and Chile, see Foran, Taking Power;
47. John Foran, Jack A. Goldstone,
48. and Eric Selbin, Understanding Revolution (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge, forthcoming).
49. Halliday, Revolution and World Politics, 49.
50. Hobsbawm, "Revolution," 18.
51. But see Luciano Pellicani, "Was Fascism Revolutionary?" Telos 122 (2002): 79n123. Pellicani invokes Reich minister Joseph Goebbels to suggest that while fascism was not revolutionary, the Nazis were.
52. John Foran, "Introduction to the Future of Revolutions," in Foran, Future of Revolutions, 15n5.
53. Karen Kampwirth, "Marching with the Taliban or Dancing with the Zapatistas? Revolution after the Cold War," in Foran, Future of Revolutions, 239n1.
54. Among these see Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions;
55. Jerold Green, Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Countermobilization (New York: Praeger, 1982);
56. Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution;
57. John Foran, Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993);
58. Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology;
59. and Keddie, Modern Iran.
60. For those less familiar with the basics, James DeFronzo offers a concise narrative that manages both some depth and some breadth. See DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2007), 275-321.
61. Darnton, "What Was Revolutionary," 10.
62. Darnton is almost certainly standing on the shoulders here of the nineteenth-century French historian Jules Michelet, who said of France 1789: "On that day everything was possible... the future was present... that is to say time was no more, all a lightening flash of eternity." Cited in Michael Kimmel, Revolution: A Sociological Interpretation (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 186.
63. See also Hannah Arendt's compelling formulation "that an entirely new story, a story never known or told before, is about to unfold"; people, she goes on to argue, believe "that they are agents in a process which spells the end of the old order and brings the birth of the new world." Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin, 1965), 28 and 42, respectively.
64. Jack A. Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation," World Politics 23 (1980): 425-53.
65. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions;
66. Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991);
67. Goodwin, No Other Way Out.
68. On the authority of the third generation, see Timothy Wickham-Crowley, "Structural Theories of Revolution," in Foran, Theorizing Revolutions, 64;
69. Goodwin, No Other Way Out, 293;
70. and Stephen Sanderson, Revolutions: A Worldwide Introduction to Political and Social Change (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2005), 104-5.
71. The "fourth generation" was first posited in John Foran, "Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation?" Sociological Theory 11 (1993): 1-20;
72. see also Jack A. Goldstone, "Revolutions: Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 139-87.
73. But see Foran's somewhat curious embrace of Skocpol's definition "in full as my own," in Foran, Taking Power, 7.
74. Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology;
75. but see also Farideh Farhi, States and Urban-Based Revolutions: Iran and Nicaragua (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990).
76. Outstanding such analyses are already available; see Farhi, States and Urban-Based Revolutions;
77. Foran and Goodwin, "Revolutionary Outcomes in Iran and Nicaragua";
78. Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions;
79. and Foran, Taking Power.
80. I have argued elsewhere that "whatever the actually existing social, political, economic structures, the ideologies extant, international conditions, even the grand sweep of history - it seems clear that revolutions are fundamentally about people: created by people, led by people, fought and died for by people, and consciously and intentionally constructed by people (which is not to deny the profusion of unconscious and unintentional aspects that are inescapably part of the process)." Eric Selbin, "Elites, Intellectuals, and Revolutionary Leadership," in Revolutionary Movements in World History: From 1750 to the Present, ed. James DeFronzo (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006), 254.
81. See also Selbin, "Revolution in the Real World: Bringing Agency Back In," in Foran, Theorizing Revolutions, 123-36;
82. Selbin, Modern Latin American Revolutions;
83. Selbin, "Zapata's White Horse and Che's Beret: Theses on the Future of Revolution," in Foran, Future of Revolutions, 83-94;
84. and Selbin, "Stories of Revolution."
85. But see Mostofa Rejai, "Theory and Research in the Study of Revolutionary Personnel," in Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research, ed. Ted Gurr (New York: Free Press, 1980), 100-131;
86. and Foran et al., Understanding Revolution.
87. Theda Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
88. Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam," 267.
89. Lest any confusion lingers, a few years later she (with Goodwin) averred that revolutions "are ultimately 'made' by revolutionaries but not... within the political context they themselves have chosen, to paraphrase Karl Marx." Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," Politics and Society 1 (1989): 485.
90. Kurzman, Unthinkable Revolution, vii-viii.
91. Halliday, Revolution and World Politics, 49.
92. See also Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology, 201;
93. and Dariush Zahedi, The Iranian Revolution Then and Now: Indicators of Regime Instability (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 1.
94. Tim McDaniel, Autocracy, Modernization, and Revolution in Russia and Iran (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 111.
95. Said Amir Arjomand makes a similar point but argues that the workers were not involved. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 194.
96. Moghadam, "One Revolution or Two," 81.
97. On the revolution's broad base, see Farhad Kazemi and Ervand Abrahamian, "The Nonrevolutionary Peasantry of Modern Iran," Iranian Studies 11 (1978): 259-304;
98. Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam," 271;
99. Zahedi, Iranian Revolution Then and Now, 111;
100. and Kurzman, Unthinkable Revolution, 100.
101. Dariush Zahedi similarly suggests "the intelligentsia, the clerics, and the bazaaris." Zahedi, Iranian Revolution Then and Now, 40.
102. Even less attention has been paid to the shortlived 1934 revolutionary commune in Asturias that was a precursor of sorts to the revolutionary aspects (mainly in Catalonia).
103. Kurzman, Unthinkable Revolution, 148.
104. Ervand Abrahamian, "The Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963-1977," in Iran: Revolution in Turmoil, ed. Haleh Afshar (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 152.
105. Amir Taheri, The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution (Bethesda, MD: Adler and Adler, 1986), 254.
106. Valentine Moghadam, "The Left and the Revolution in Iran: A Critical Analysis," in Post-revolutionary Iran, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi and Manoucher Parvin (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988), 23-40;
107. Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions;
108. Kurzman, Unthinkable Revolution.
109. Valentine Moghadam and Ali Ashtiana, "The Left and Revolution in Iran," Race and Class 33 (1991): 88.
110. Mogahadam, "Left and the Revolution," 33.
111. Keddie, Modern Iran, 30.
112. Arang Keshavarzian, Bazaar and State in Iran: The Politics of the Tehran Marketplace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 40.
113. Lamenting that few have defined it or been vague, he argues it is "a bounded space containing a series of socially embedded networks that are mechanisms for the exchange of specific commodities" (ibid., 41)
114. Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions, 30, 201.
115. On bazaaris, see also Keddie, Modern Iran, 226-27;
116. on their role in political conflicts, see also Keshavarzian, Bazaar and State in Iran, 228.
117. Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions, 202-3, 209, 216.
118. Respectively, Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions, 216;
119. and Zahedi, Iranian Revolution Then and Now, 85.
120. Zahedi, Iranian Revolution Then and Now, 67.
121. Kurzman, Unthinkable Revolution, 49.
122. On the role of African American churches, see Aldon Morris, Origins of the Civil Rights Movements: Black Communities Organizing for Change (New York: Free Press, 1984);
123. Belinda Robnett, How Long, How Long: African American Women in the Struggle for Civil Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997);
124. and Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
125. I thank my colleague Maria Lowe for her counsel on this subject. On the role of the mosque, see Kurzman, Unthinkable Revolution, 33-49.
126. Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 531.
127. Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions, 291.
128. In Abrahamian's estimation, he was "a major innovator ... both because of his political theory and because of his religious-oriented populist strategy." Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 479.
129. On women and revolution in Iran, see Farideh Farhi, "Sexuality and the Politics of Revolution in Iran," in Women and Revolution in Africa, Asia, and the New World, ed. Mary Ann Tetreault (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 252-71;
130. Valentine Moghadam, "Islamic Populism, Class, and Gender in Post-revolutionary Iran," in A Century of Revolution: Social Movements in Iran, ed. John Foran (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 189-222;
131. Moghadam, "Gender and Revolutionary Transformation";
132. Moghadam, Modernizing Women, 98-101;
133. Parvin Paidar, Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997);
134. Kurzman, Unthinkable Revolution, 150-52;
135. and Keddie, Modern Iran, 229-30.
136. On scholars who forefront the working class, see Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 510-18, 535;
137. and Asef Bayat, Workers and Revolution in Iran (London: Zed Books, 1987).
138. On those who include it in the mix, see Kurzman, Unthinkable Revolution, 76-77;
139. and Keddie, Modern Iran, 232.
140. On those who largely dismiss it, see Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 107-8;
141. and McDaniel, Autocracy, Modernization, and Revolution, 137.
142. Zahedi, Iranian Revolution Then and Now, 111.
143. See also Keddie, Modern Iran, 228, 232;
144. and Kurzman, Unthinkable Revolution, 100-101.
145. Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 466;
146. Kurzman, Unthinkable Revolution, 149;
147. DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 293.
148. See also Zahedi, Iranian Revolution Then and Now, 43-44;
149. Ali Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, "The Crisis of Secular Politics and the Rise of Political Islam in Iran," Social Text, 38 (1994): 75-76;
150. and Keddie, Modern Iran, 200-208.
151. For a somewhat different view of Shariati's role, see Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2005), 108.
152. DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 293.
153. Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 301;
154. Keddie, Modern Iran, 195.
155. Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, 216.
156. Keddie, Modern Iran, 233;
157. Kurzman, Unthinkable Revolution, 162.
158. Moghadam, "One Revolution or Two," 81.
159. Selbin, "Elites, Intellectuals, and Revolutionary Leadership," 254.
160. Bahram Afrasiabi and Sa'id Dehqan, Taleqani and History (Tehran: Entesharat-e Nilufar, 1980), 371,
161. quoted in Suroosh Irfani, Iran's Islamic Revolution: Popular Revolution or Religious Dictatorship? (London: Zed Books, 1983), 161.
162. Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology, 2.
163. Farhi, States and Urban-Based Revolutions;
164. Foran, Fragile Resistance;
165. Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions;
166. Dabashi, Theology of Discontent.
167. DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 301;
168. see also Mohsen M. Milani, The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 75-90.
169. Keddie, Modern Iran, 219-20.
170. Kurzman, Unthinkable Revolution, 142.
171. At the airport upon his return, Khomeini said: "Our success, is the result of the unity of all the people in this country. They all follow one word, 'Islam,' and even the religious minorities are united with Islam" (ibid.).
172. Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology, 201;
173. Irfani, Iran's Islamic Revolution, 160-61.
174. Kurzman, Unthinkable Revolution, 142.
175. Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 475.
176. Dabashi goes further and inscribes Motahhari as the "chief ideologue of the Islamic Revolution." Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, 147. Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, "The Nature of the Islamic Revolution," in Afshar, Iran, 215. "Our revolution," Motahhari continues, "will not be a true revolution until families refuse to give their children new clothes on the days of religious festivities unless they are quite certain that the families of the poor have new clothes."
177. Motahhari, "Nature of the Islamic Revolution," 217.
178. Keshavarzian, Bazaar and State in Iran, 4.
179. Keddie, Modern Iran, 200-208, 226.
180. Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions, 291.
181. Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, Pira-mon-e-Enqelab-e-Eslami [On the Islamic revolution] (Tehran: Sadra, 1979),
182. quoted in Irfani, Iran's Islamic Revolution, 149.
183. Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 530.
184. Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions, 291.
185. Moghadam, "Populist Revolution," 149.
186. Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, "Crisis of Secular Politics," 78.
187. Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions, 291.
188. Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, "Crisis of Secular Politics," 79.
189. For an excellent précis of the 1979-82 period, see Foran and Goodwin, "Revolutionary Outcomes," 214-18;
190. see also Keddie, Modern Iran, 240-57.
191. This section draws heavily on Selbin, "Stories of Revolution," 135-44;
192. see also Selbin, Revolution, Rebellion, and Resistance: The Power of Story (London: Zed Books, forthcoming).
193. In the sense of noblesse oblige on the part of the elites.
194. Interestingly, this account may draw on early Persian versions of Arabian tales.
195. Familiar faces are not absent: France and Russia are here, albeit more as moments lost (such as Kronshtadt or Ukraine in the latter); Mexico's untold lost moments are cataloged.
196. McDaniel, Autocracy, Modernization, and Revolution, 3.
197. Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 312.
198. Moghadam, "Left and the Revolution," 37.
199. McDaniel, Autocracy, Modernization, and Revolution, 3. Liberation theologians in Central America and elsewhere might disagree.
200. Moaddel offers a harsh but succinct formulation of this: "Marx may have been correct when he stated that the French Revolution was a gigantic broom that swept away all the medieval rubbish of the Middle Ages.... the gigantic broom of the Iranian Revolution ... swept all the medieval rubbish back in." Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology, 264.
201. Farideh Farhi, "The Democratic Turn: New Ways of Understanding Revolution," in Foran, Future of Revolutions, 30-41.
202. Farhi argues that "the struggle over the meaning and the shape of power emerging from the country's volcanic revolution of more than twenty years ago is still in process. The democratic aspirations that were reflected in the multi-class coalition against a dictatorship and a monarchy were... immediately stunted in the name of Islam and war" (ibid., 36, emphasis in original).
203. Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, "Crisis of Secular Politics," 51.
204. Selbin, quoted in Foran, "How Might Revolutions," 136.
205. Adolfo Gilly, "Bolivia: A Twenty-First-Century Revolution," Socialism and Democracy 19 (2005): 51.