Ideology, culture, and ambiguity: The revolutionary process in Iran

Theory and Society

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 349-388

  Burns, Gene ^a  

^a MARSHALL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21344446697     PISSN: 03042421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00158262     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. See, e.g., the discussion in John Foran, "Theories of revolution revisited: Toward a fourth generation?" Sociological Theory 11 (1993): 12-13.
2. Sewell, "Ideologies and social revolutions: Reflections on the French case," Journal of Modern History 57 (1985): 57-85;
3. Goldstone, "Ideology, cultural frameworks, and the process of revolution," Theory and Society 20 (1991): 405-453.
4. This latter article also appears (with minor changes) as chapter 5 of Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), and is the part of the book most relevant to the analysis of revolutionary ideology.
5. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
6. See especially Goldstone, "Ideology, cultural frameworks, and the process of revolution";
7. John Foran and Jeff Goodwin, "Revolutionary outcomes in Iran and Nicaragua: Coalition fragmentation, war, and the limits of social transformation," Theory and Society 2/2(1993): 210.
8. Goldstone, ibid. "Revolutionary outcomes in Iran and Nicaragua: Coalition fragmentation, war, and the limits of social transformation," Theory and Society 2/2(1993): 210.;
9. Foran and Goodwin, ibid. "Revolutionary outcomes in Iran and Nicaragua: Coalition fragmentation, war, and the limits of social transformation," Theory and Society 2/2(1993): 210.; On the role of culture in revolutionary process, cf. also
10. Charles Tilly, "Singular models of revolution: Impossible but fruitful," Working Paper No. 138, New School for Social Research, Center for Studies of Social Change, 14-15.
11. Foran and Goodwin, ibid., "Singular models of revolution: Impossible but fruitful," Working Paper No. 138, New School for Social Research, Center for Studies of Social Change, 14-15. especially, emphasize the unity in opposition against the old regime. Also see
12. Goldstone's passing references (ibid., 448, n.19; "An analytical framework," in Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri, editors, Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century [Boulder: Westview, 1991], 46).
13. However, there is little if any connection made to the ideological dynamics of revolution. Concerning the appeal to shared cultural images, it is possible in some cases that such images or symbols are reinforced because collective action repertoires (i.e., rituals and tactics) associated with them are so familiar. Thus a number of observers have emphasized the fact that Iranian protestors against the Shah used Islamic practices of commemorating deaths (of fellow protestors), prayer days, etc., as bases of mobilization; see, e.g., David A. Snow and Susan E. Marshall, "Cultural imperialism, social movements, and the Islamic revival," in Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, vol. 7 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 1984), 140-141.
14. This point is consistent with my argument that dominant factions are united by common images and concepts; thus they are free to interpret each ritual, each rally, etc., according to the meaning they attach to those images and concepts. In this article, then, considering such repertoires separately would likely make the argument more complex without adding much substantively. For more on collective action repertoires, see Charles Tilly's numerous studies, including "Collective violence in European perspective," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, editors, Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (New York: Bantam, 1969), 4-45;
15. From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978), 143-166;
16. and The Contentious French (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).
17. See also Sidney Tarrow, "Modular collective action and the rise of the social movement: Why the French revolution was not enough," Politics & Society 21 (1993): 69-90.
18. Modern Revolutions, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 236.
19. Again, Foran and Goodwin, "Revolutionary outcomes in Iran and Nicaragua," very appropriately refocuses studies of revolution on the fragmentation of coalitions and consequent bloody struggle after the fall of the old regime. (See also
20. James DeFronzo, Revolution and Revolutionary Movements [Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1991], 49;
21. Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining revolutions in the contemporary Third World," Politics & Society 17 [1989]: 492.)
22. However, despite brief reference to ideology (pp. 236-237), Foran and Goodwin explain the factional struggle for power in terms consistent with Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions (see, e.g., pp. 212, 240) and thus do not emphasize ideology.