The four-stroke cycle in security studies

International Affairs

Volumn 74, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 781-808

  Prins, Gwyn ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0042279702     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.00045     Document Type: Review

References (153)

1. Derivative because in practice the principal framework of explanation is historical (I am not persuaded that Fred Halliday's distinguishing criteria, which contrast factual and specific history with comparative and theoretical IR, are real: F. Halliday, Rethinking international relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994) p. 25); uncomfortable both because IR aspires to a more scientific status than history, yet has no distinct methodology, and because it has no generally agreed subject matter. It remains (still) fundamentally in debate how much more IR is than the study of war and peace. In Halliday's suggested research programme for IR, it is number 4 of 5; but that is not the subject of this article. See Halliday, Rethinking international relations, pp. 242-3; S. Guzzini, Realism in international relations and international political economy: the continuing story of a death foretold (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 7-12.
2. Derivative because in practice the principal framework of explanation is historical (I am not persuaded that Fred Halliday's distinguishing criteria, which contrast factual and specific history with comparative and theoretical IR, are real: F. Halliday, Rethinking international relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994) p. 25); uncomfortable both because IR aspires to a more scientific status than history, yet has no distinct methodology, and because it has no generally agreed subject matter. It remains (still) fundamentally in debate how much more IR is than the study of war and peace. In Halliday's suggested research programme for IR, it is number 4 of 5; but that is not the subject of this article. See Halliday, Rethinking international relations, pp. 242-3; S. Guzzini, Realism in international relations and international political economy: the continuing story of a death foretold (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 7-12.
3. Derivative because in practice the principal framework of explanation is historical (I am not persuaded that Fred Halliday's distinguishing criteria, which contrast factual and specific history with comparative and theoretical IR, are real: F. Halliday, Rethinking international relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994) p. 25); uncomfortable both because IR aspires to a more scientific status than history, yet has no distinct methodology, and because it has no generally agreed subject matter. It remains (still) fundamentally in debate how much more IR is than the study of war and peace. In Halliday's suggested research programme for IR, it is number 4 of 5; but that is not the subject of this article. See Halliday, Rethinking international relations, pp. 242-3; S. Guzzini, Realism in international relations and international political economy: the continuing story of a death foretold (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 7-12.
4. 'The central questions are concerned with international violence . . . A subject that is only remotely related to central political problems of threat perception and management among sovereign states would be regarded as peripheral' is the briefest shorthand, given by J. S. Nye and S. Lynn-Jones in 'International security studies: a report of a conference on the state of the field', International Security 12, 1988, pp. 6-7. It is endorsed and glossed in a spirited defence of the narrow reading, thus: '[Security studies] . . . explores the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states, and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent or engage in war': Stephen M. Walt, 'The Renaissance of security studies', International Studies Quarterly 35, 1991, p. 212. In fact, as will become clear, the reference to individuals is out of place; but the rest of the definition is illuminating.
5. 'The central questions are concerned with international violence . . . A subject that is only remotely related to central political problems of threat perception and management among sovereign states would be regarded as peripheral' is the briefest shorthand, given by J. S. Nye and S. Lynn-Jones in 'International security studies: a report of a conference on the state of the field', International Security 12, 1988, pp. 6-7. It is endorsed and glossed in a spirited defence of the narrow reading, thus: '[Security studies] . . . explores the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states, and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent or engage in war': Stephen M. Walt, 'The Renaissance of security studies', International Studies Quarterly 35, 1991, p. 212. In fact, as will become clear, the reference to individuals is out of place; but the rest of the definition is illuminating.
6. This framework may be usefully contrasted with Ken Booth's more precisely chronological account, with which it does not coincide. He proposes early (1945-55), high (1956-85), late (1985-91) and Post-Cold War phases: Ken Booth, 'Strategy', in A. J. R. Groom and Margot Light, eds, Contemporary international relations: a guide to theory (London: Pinter, 1994), pp. 109-27.
7. Among the most poignant witnesses to have forced this question forward was Primo Levi (especially in The drowned and the saved, New York: Little, Brown, 1993). The single most eloquent and continuing voice has been George Steiner ('The hollow miracle' [1959] and 'A note on Gunter Grass' [1964], in Language and silence, abr. edn, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970).
8. Among the most poignant witnesses to have forced this question forward was Primo Levi (especially in The drowned and the saved, New York: Little, Brown, 1993). The single most eloquent and continuing voice has been George Steiner ('The hollow miracle' [1959] and 'A note on Gunter Grass' [1964], in Language and silence, abr. edn, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970).
9. Among the most poignant witnesses to have forced this question forward was Primo Levi (especially in The drowned and the saved, New York: Little, Brown, 1993). The single most eloquent and continuing voice has been George Steiner ('The hollow miracle' [1959] and 'A note on Gunter Grass' [1964], in Language and silence, abr. edn, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970).
10. Among the most poignant witnesses to have forced this question forward was Primo Levi (especially in The drowned and the saved, New York: Little, Brown, 1993). The single most eloquent and continuing voice has been George Steiner ('The hollow miracle' [1959] and 'A note on Gunter Grass' [1964], in Language and silence, abr. edn, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970).
11. Made movingly apparent by Michael Howard in an anecdotal, autobiographical interview, interspersed with music, broadcast on BBC Radio 3, 18 July 1998.
12. E. H. Carr, The twenty years' crisis (London: Macmillan, 1939; 2nd edn 1946, repr. 1961), pp. 62, 53. It should be stressed that what Carr actually wrote about utopianism and realism was a lot less stark than the manner in which he has often been portrayed: 'Utopia and reality are thus the two facets of political science. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both have their place' (p. 10). See further Ken Booth, 'Security in anarchy: utopian realism in theory and practice, 'International Affairs 63: 3, July 1991, pp. 527-45. The most thoughtful and sensitive historical exploration of these questions is to be found in Michael Howard's 1977 Trevelyan Lectures, War and the liberal conscience (London:Temple Smith, 1978).
13. E. H. Carr, The twenty years' crisis (London: Macmillan, 1939; 2nd edn 1946, repr. 1961), pp. 62, 53. It should be stressed that what Carr actually wrote about utopianism and realism was a lot less stark than the manner in which he has often been portrayed: 'Utopia and reality are thus the two facets of political science. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both have their place' (p. 10). See further Ken Booth, 'Security in anarchy: utopian realism in theory and practice, 'International Affairs 63: 3, July 1991, pp. 527-45. The most thoughtful and sensitive historical exploration of these questions is to be found in Michael Howard's 1977 Trevelyan Lectures, War and the liberal conscience (London:Temple Smith, 1978).
14. E. H. Carr, The twenty years' crisis (London: Macmillan, 1939; 2nd edn 1946, repr. 1961), pp. 62, 53. It should be stressed that what Carr actually wrote about utopianism and realism was a lot less stark than the manner in which he has often been portrayed: 'Utopia and reality are thus the two facets of political science. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both have their place' (p. 10). See further Ken Booth, 'Security in anarchy: utopian realism in theory and practice, 'International Affairs 63: 3, July 1991, pp. 527-45. The most thoughtful and sensitive historical exploration of these questions is to be found in Michael Howard's 1977 Trevelyan Lectures, War and the liberal conscience (London:Temple Smith, 1978).
15. A. J. P. Taylor, The origins of the Second World War (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963 edn, containing 'Foreword: second thoughts').
16. Martin Wight, Power politics, 'Looking Forward' pamphlet no. 8 (London: RIIA, 1946). The essay was the kernel of Wight's posthumously published Power politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (RIIA/ Leicester University Press, 1978). Hans Morgenthau, Politics among nations (New York: Knopf, 1948).
17. Martin Wight, Power politics, 'Looking Forward' pamphlet no. 8 (London: RIIA, 1946). The essay was the kernel of Wight's posthumously published Power politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (RIIA/ Leicester University Press, 1978). Hans Morgenthau, Politics among nations (New York: Knopf, 1948).
18. Martin Wight, Power politics, 'Looking Forward' pamphlet no. 8 (London: RIIA, 1946). The essay was the kernel of Wight's posthumously published Power politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (RIIA/ Leicester University Press, 1978). Hans Morgenthau, Politics among nations (New York: Knopf, 1948).
19. Jerome D. Frank, Sanity and survival: psychological aspects of war and peace (London: Cresset Press, 1967), pp. 115-36; Daniel Yergin, Shattered peace: the origins of the Cold War and the national security state (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), pp. 171-4, 283-6.
20. Jerome D. Frank, Sanity and survival: psychological aspects of war and peace (London: Cresset Press, 1967), pp. 115-36; Daniel Yergin, Shattered peace: the origins of the Cold War and the national security state (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), pp. 171-4, 283-6.
21. The nub of the Long Telegram's message was: 'We have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken if Soviet power is to be secure': George Kennan ('X'), 'The sources of Soviet conduct', Foreign Affairs 25: 4, July 1947. pp. 566-83.
22. Yergin, Shattered peace, is prominent in making this case.
23. His essay, written in 1945, was published as two chapters of Bernard Brodie, ed., The absolute weapon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), pp. 21-110. Brodie reviewed the later career of nuclear strategy in 'The development of nuclear strategy', Working Paper 11 (Los Angeles: Center for Arms Control and International Security, UCLA, 1978; MS). A compendious narrative of these matters is Lawrence Freedman, The evolution of nuclear strategy (London: Macmillan, 1981).
24. His essay, written in 1945, was published as two chapters of Bernard Brodie, ed., The absolute weapon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), pp. 21-110. Brodie reviewed the later career of nuclear strategy in 'The development of nuclear strategy', Working Paper 11 (Los Angeles: Center for Arms Control and International Security, UCLA, 1978; MS). A compendious narrative of these matters is Lawrence Freedman, The evolution of nuclear strategy (London: Macmillan, 1981).
25. His essay, written in 1945, was published as two chapters of Bernard Brodie, ed., The absolute weapon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), pp. 21-110. Brodie reviewed the later career of nuclear strategy in 'The development of nuclear strategy', Working Paper 11 (Los Angeles: Center for Arms Control and International Security, UCLA, 1978; MS). A compendious narrative of these matters is Lawrence Freedman, The evolution of nuclear strategy (London: Macmillan, 1981).
26. F. H. Hinsley, Power and the pursuit of peace: theory and practice in the history of relations between states (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).
27. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and survival: choices about the bomb in the first fifty years (New York: Random House, 1988).
28. Indeed, for Nye and Lynn-Jones, it was deterrence theory that was the principal, perhaps sole, intellectual achievement of international security studies: Nye and Lynn-Jones, 'A report of a conference on the state of the field,' pp. 6-7); on that view, see also McGeorge Bundy, 'The unimpressive record of atomic diplomacy', in Gwyn Prins, ed., The choice: nuclear weapons versus security (London: Chatto & Windus, 1984), pp. 42-4; Michael Howard, 'The forgotten dimensions of strategy', Foreign Affairs 57: 5, Summer 1979, pp. 975-86.
29. Indeed, for Nye and Lynn-Jones, it was deterrence theory that was the principal, perhaps sole, intellectual achievement of international security studies: Nye and Lynn-Jones, 'A report of a conference on the state of the field,' pp. 6-7); on that view, see also McGeorge Bundy, 'The unimpressive record of atomic diplomacy', in Gwyn Prins, ed., The choice: nuclear weapons versus security (London: Chatto & Windus, 1984), pp. 42-4; Michael Howard, 'The forgotten dimensions of strategy', Foreign Affairs 57: 5, Summer 1979, pp. 975-86.
30. Indeed, for Nye and Lynn-Jones, it was deterrence theory that was the principal, perhaps sole, intellectual achievement of international security studies: Nye and Lynn-Jones, 'A report of a conference on the state of the field,' pp. 6-7); on that view, see also McGeorge Bundy, 'The unimpressive record of atomic diplomacy', in Gwyn Prins, ed., The choice: nuclear weapons versus security (London: Chatto & Windus, 1984), pp. 42-4; Michael Howard, 'The forgotten dimensions of strategy', Foreign Affairs 57: 5, Summer 1979, pp. 975-86.
31. Desmond Ball, Politics and force levels: the strategic missile programme and the Kennedy administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Stephen Shenfield, The nuclear predicament: explorations in Soviet ideology, Chatham House Paper 37 (London: RIIA/Roudedge & Kegan Paul, 1987); Michael MccGwire, Military objectives in Soviet foreign policy (Washington DC:Brookings Institution, 1987); Christopher Donnelly, Red banner: the Soviet military system in peace and war (London: Jane's Information Group, 1988).
32. Desmond Ball, Politics and force levels: the strategic missile programme and the Kennedy administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Stephen Shenfield, The nuclear predicament: explorations in Soviet ideology, Chatham House Paper 37 (London: RIIA/Roudedge & Kegan Paul, 1987); Michael MccGwire, Military objectives in Soviet foreign policy (Washington DC:Brookings Institution, 1987); Christopher Donnelly, Red banner: the Soviet military system in peace and war (London: Jane's Information Group, 1988).
33. Desmond Ball, Politics and force levels: the strategic missile programme and the Kennedy administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Stephen Shenfield, The nuclear predicament: explorations in Soviet ideology, Chatham House Paper 37 (London: RIIA/Roudedge & Kegan Paul, 1987); Michael MccGwire, Military objectives in Soviet foreign policy (Washington DC:Brookings Institution, 1987); Christopher Donnelly, Red banner: the Soviet military system in peace and war (London: Jane's Information Group, 1988).
34. Desmond Ball, Politics and force levels: the strategic missile programme and the Kennedy administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Stephen Shenfield, The nuclear predicament: explorations in Soviet ideology, Chatham House Paper 37 (London: RIIA/Roudedge & Kegan Paul, 1987); Michael MccGwire, Military objectives in Soviet foreign policy (Washington DC:Brookings Institution, 1987); Christopher Donnelly, Red banner: the Soviet military system in peace and war (London: Jane's Information Group, 1988).
35. Robert Keohane, ed., Neo-realism and its critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 164-5. Doubtless practitioners will protest that this is too harsh a judgement, and that exceptions abound. But they don't; and the exceptions - critical theory, for example - prove the rule. A revealing insight into the tenacity and reasonableness of Realism as it became the norm in security studies is to be found in an unusual autobiographical report from inside that world-view: Ken Booth, 'Security and self: reflections of a fallen Realist', in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds, Critical security studies: concepts and cases (London: UCL Press, 1997), pp. 92-3.
36. Robert Keohane, ed., Neo-realism and its critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 164-5. Doubtless practitioners will protest that this is too harsh a judgement, and that exceptions abound. But they don't; and the exceptions - critical theory, for example - prove the rule. A revealing insight into the tenacity and reasonableness of Realism as it became the norm in security studies is to be found in an unusual autobiographical report from inside that world-view: Ken Booth, 'Security and self: reflections of a fallen Realist', in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds, Critical security studies: concepts and cases (London: UCL Press, 1997), pp. 92-3.
37. The 'security dilemma' (that maximum security for A means minimum security for B, which therefore reacts in a way that makes A feel insecure, which therefore acts . . . etc.) is inescapable if the nature and amount of power are elements in a 'zero-sum' game; but this, as Wheeler and Booth observe, is a questionable view: Nicholas Wheeler and Ken Booth,'The security dilemma', in John Baylis and Nicholas Rengger, eds, Dilemmas of world politics: international issues in a changing world (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 57-8. See further Ken Booth, 'The interregnum: world politics in transition', in Ken Booth, ed., New thinking about strategy and international security (London: Unwin Hyman, 1991), pp. 1-28.
38. The 'security dilemma' (that maximum security for A means minimum security for B, which therefore reacts in a way that makes A feel insecure, which therefore acts . . . etc.) is inescapable if the nature and amount of power are elements in a 'zero-sum' game; but this, as Wheeler and Booth observe, is a questionable view: Nicholas Wheeler and Ken Booth,'The security dilemma', in John Baylis and Nicholas Rengger, eds, Dilemmas of world politics: international issues in a changing world (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 57-8. See further Ken Booth, 'The interregnum: world politics in transition', in Ken Booth, ed., New thinking about strategy and international security (London: Unwin Hyman, 1991), pp. 1-28.
39. Booth, 'The interregnum: world politics in transition', p. 21.
40. Whereas other accounts have employed judgements on fertility in thinking to discriminate between phases of security studies, I suggest that the presence or absence of challenge is a more objective, and therefore more useful cursor.
41. e.g. Robert McNamara, Blundering into disaster: surviving the first century of the nuclear age (London: Bloomsbury, 1987). The author of the Long Telegram also changed his views in the light of experience: George Kennan, The nuclear delusion: Soviet-American relations in the atomic age (New York: Pantheon, 1982), part II: 'The nuclear age in crisis'.
42. e.g. Robert McNamara, Blundering into disaster: surviving the first century of the nuclear age (London: Bloomsbury, 1987). The author of the Long Telegram also changed his views in the light of experience: George Kennan, The nuclear delusion: Soviet-American relations in the atomic age (New York: Pantheon, 1982), part II: 'The nuclear age in crisis'.
43. The Brandt Commission, Common crisis. North-South: co-operation for world recovery (London: Pan, 1983); André Gunder Frank, Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987); Robert Rhodes, ed., Imperialism and underdevelopment: a reader (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970).
44. The Brandt Commission, Common crisis. North-South: co-operation for world recovery (London: Pan, 1983); André Gunder Frank, Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987); Robert Rhodes, ed., Imperialism and underdevelopment: a reader (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970).
45. The Brandt Commission, Common crisis. North-South: co-operation for world recovery (London: Pan, 1983); André Gunder Frank, Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987); Robert Rhodes, ed., Imperialism and underdevelopment: a reader (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970).
46. Richard Ullman, 'Redefining security', International Security 8: 1, 1983, pp. 129-53.
47. As I have argued elsewhere, watch out when cruise missiles are deployed; the power of their political warheads far exceeds that of any explosive payload. See Gwyn Prins, 'Global security and military intervention', Security Dialogue 27: 1, 1996, pp. 7-16. An excellent place to start thinking about unmanned weapons is in Richard K. Betts, ed., Cruise missies: technology, strategy, politics (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981).
48. As I have argued elsewhere, watch out when cruise missiles are deployed; the power of their political warheads far exceeds that of any explosive payload. See Gwyn Prins, 'Global security and military intervention', Security Dialogue 27: 1, 1996, pp. 7-16. An excellent place to start thinking about unmanned weapons is in Richard K. Betts, ed., Cruise missies: technology, strategy, politics (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981).
49. The most articulate statement of Western deterrence theory at that time was given in an essay in the 1981 United Kingdom Defence White Paper, bearing signs of the thinking of the then Permanent Secretary, Sir Michael Quinlan.The main analogy used was that of chess-playing. Since retirement, Sir Michael has set out his views fully in Thinking about nuclear weapons (London: RUSI, 1997).
50. Paul Rogers, Malcolm Dando and Pieter van den Dungen, As lambs to the slaughter: the facts about nuclear war (London: Arrow, 1981); Robert Neild, How to make up your mind about the bomb (London: Deutsch, 1981); The church and the bomb: nuclear weapons and Christian conscience, Report of a working party chaired by the Bishop of Salisbury (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1982); Malcolm Dando and Paul Rogers, The death of deterrence (London: CND Publications, 1983); Nigel Blake and Kay Pole, eds, Dangers of deterrence: philosophers on nuclear strategy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983); Gwyn Prins, ed., Defended to death: a study of the nuclear arms race (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983). The episode is examined in David Dunn, 'Peace research versus strategic studies,' in Ken Booth, ed., New thinking about strategy and international security (London: Unwin Hyman, 1991), pp. 56-72.
51. Paul Rogers, Malcolm Dando and Pieter van den Dungen, As lambs to the slaughter: the facts about nuclear war (London: Arrow, 1981); Robert Neild, How to make up your mind about the bomb (London: Deutsch, 1981); The church and the bomb: nuclear weapons and Christian conscience, Report of a working party chaired by the Bishop of Salisbury (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1982); Malcolm Dando and Paul Rogers, The death of deterrence (London: CND Publications, 1983); Nigel Blake and Kay Pole, eds, Dangers of deterrence: philosophers on nuclear strategy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983); Gwyn Prins, ed., Defended to death: a study of the nuclear arms race (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983). The episode is examined in David Dunn, 'Peace research versus strategic studies,' in Ken Booth, ed., New thinking about strategy and international security (London: Unwin Hyman, 1991), pp. 56-72.
52. Paul Rogers, Malcolm Dando and Pieter van den Dungen, As lambs to the slaughter: the facts about nuclear war (London: Arrow, 1981); Robert Neild, How to make up your mind about the bomb (London: Deutsch, 1981); The church and the bomb: nuclear weapons and Christian conscience, Report of a working party chaired by the Bishop of Salisbury (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1982); Malcolm Dando and Paul Rogers, The death of deterrence (London: CND Publications, 1983); Nigel Blake and Kay Pole, eds, Dangers of deterrence: philosophers on nuclear strategy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983); Gwyn Prins, ed., Defended to death: a study of the nuclear arms race (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983). The episode is examined in David Dunn, 'Peace research versus strategic studies,' in Ken Booth, ed., New thinking about strategy and international security (London: Unwin Hyman, 1991), pp. 56-72.
53. Paul Rogers, Malcolm Dando and Pieter van den Dungen, As lambs to the slaughter: the facts about nuclear war (London: Arrow, 1981); Robert Neild, How to make up your mind about the bomb (London: Deutsch, 1981); The church and the bomb: nuclear weapons and Christian conscience, Report of a working party chaired by the Bishop of Salisbury (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1982); Malcolm Dando and Paul Rogers, The death of deterrence (London: CND Publications, 1983); Nigel Blake and Kay Pole, eds, Dangers of deterrence: philosophers on nuclear strategy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983); Gwyn Prins, ed., Defended to death: a study of the nuclear arms race (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983). The episode is examined in David Dunn, 'Peace research versus strategic studies,' in Ken Booth, ed., New thinking about strategy and international security (London: Unwin Hyman, 1991), pp. 56-72.
54. Paul Rogers, Malcolm Dando and Pieter van den Dungen, As lambs to the slaughter: the facts about nuclear war (London: Arrow, 1981); Robert Neild, How to make up your mind about the bomb (London: Deutsch, 1981); The church and the bomb: nuclear weapons and Christian conscience, Report of a working party chaired by the Bishop of Salisbury (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1982); Malcolm Dando and Paul Rogers, The death of deterrence (London: CND Publications, 1983); Nigel Blake and Kay Pole, eds, Dangers of deterrence: philosophers on nuclear strategy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983); Gwyn Prins, ed., Defended to death: a study of the nuclear arms race (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983). The episode is examined in David Dunn, 'Peace research versus strategic studies,' in Ken Booth, ed., New thinking about strategy and international security (London: Unwin Hyman, 1991), pp. 56-72.
55. Paul Rogers, Malcolm Dando and Pieter van den Dungen, As lambs to the slaughter: the facts about nuclear war (London: Arrow, 1981); Robert Neild, How to make up your mind about the bomb (London: Deutsch, 1981); The church and the bomb: nuclear weapons and Christian conscience, Report of a working party chaired by the Bishop of Salisbury (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1982); Malcolm Dando and Paul Rogers, The death of deterrence (London: CND Publications, 1983); Nigel Blake and Kay Pole, eds, Dangers of deterrence: philosophers on nuclear strategy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983); Gwyn Prins, ed., Defended to death: a study of the nuclear arms race (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983). The episode is examined in David Dunn, 'Peace research versus strategic studies,' in Ken Booth, ed., New thinking about strategy and international security (London: Unwin Hyman, 1991), pp. 56-72.
56. Paul Rogers, Malcolm Dando and Pieter van den Dungen, As lambs to the slaughter: the facts about nuclear war (London: Arrow, 1981); Robert Neild, How to make up your mind about the bomb (London: Deutsch, 1981); The church and the bomb: nuclear weapons and Christian conscience, Report of a working party chaired by the Bishop of Salisbury (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1982); Malcolm Dando and Paul Rogers, The death of deterrence (London: CND Publications, 1983); Nigel Blake and Kay Pole, eds, Dangers of deterrence: philosophers on nuclear strategy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983); Gwyn Prins, ed., Defended to death: a study of the nuclear arms race (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983). The episode is examined in David Dunn, 'Peace research versus strategic studies,' in Ken Booth, ed., New thinking about strategy and international security (London: Unwin Hyman, 1991), pp. 56-72.
57. E. P.Thompson and Dan Smith, eds, Protest and survive (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980); Mary Kaldor and Dan Smith, eds, Disarming Europe (London: Merlin, 1982); E. P. Thompson, The heavy dancers (London: Merlin, 1985).
58. E. P.Thompson and Dan Smith, eds, Protest and survive (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980); Mary Kaldor and Dan Smith, eds, Disarming Europe (London: Merlin, 1982); E. P. Thompson, The heavy dancers (London: Merlin, 1985).
59. E. P.Thompson and Dan Smith, eds, Protest and survive (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980); Mary Kaldor and Dan Smith, eds, Disarming Europe (London: Merlin, 1982); E. P. Thompson, The heavy dancers (London: Merlin, 1985).
60. Desmond Ball, Can nuclear war be controlled?, Adelphi Paper no. 169 (London: IISS, 1981); Paul Bracken, The command and control of nuclear forces (Princeton: Yale University Press, 1983); Bruce Blair, Strategic command and control: redefining the nuclear threat (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985). Variations on the theme are explored in A. Carter, J. Steinbrunner and C. Zraket, eds, Managing nuclear operations (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1987).
61. Desmond Ball, Can nuclear war be controlled?, Adelphi Paper no. 169 (London: IISS, 1981); Paul Bracken, The command and control of nuclear forces (Princeton: Yale University Press, 1983); Bruce Blair, Strategic command and control: redefining the nuclear threat (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985). Variations on the theme are explored in A. Carter, J. Steinbrunner and C. Zraket, eds, Managing nuclear operations (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1987).
62. Desmond Ball, Can nuclear war be controlled?, Adelphi Paper no. 169 (London: IISS, 1981); Paul Bracken, The command and control of nuclear forces (Princeton: Yale University Press, 1983); Bruce Blair, Strategic command and control: redefining the nuclear threat (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985). Variations on the theme are explored in A. Carter, J. Steinbrunner and C. Zraket, eds, Managing nuclear operations (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1987).
63. Desmond Ball, Can nuclear war be controlled?, Adelphi Paper no. 169 (London: IISS, 1981); Paul Bracken, The command and control of nuclear forces (Princeton: Yale University Press, 1983); Bruce Blair, Strategic command and control: redefining the nuclear threat (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985). Variations on the theme are explored in A. Carter, J. Steinbrunner and C. Zraket, eds, Managing nuclear operations (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1987).
64. 'Able Archer' is the code name of a regularly repeated command post exercise to rehearse nuclear release procedures. From 1981 to 1984, under Operation RYAN, initiated by its Chief, Yuri Andropov, the KGB had instructed operatives to keep special watch for signs of Western mobilization. It was top priority in 1982. Now General Secretary, Andropov's anxieties were further inflamed in 1983 by the combination of Reagan's Orlando speech about the Evil Empire on 8 March, his 'Star Wars'announcement on 23 March, and, on 1 September, the shooting down of the Korean airliner KAL-007 trespassing over a Soviet missile submarine bastion. RYAN was given further increased priority. The failing Andropov took a morbidly apocalyptic view. In November 1983, US bases were already on heightened alert following the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon. Russian expectation (conveyed in documents leaked by Oleg Gordievsky) was that a pre-emptive nuclear attack would most likely be initiated under cover of a military exercise. 'Able Archer' took place from 2-11 November 1983 in a context of high Soviet anxiety about American intentions. In response, major elements of Soviet forces in the GSFG and elsewhere, including nuclear forces, went onto alert. On 14 November, the first of the Cruise and Pershing II missile deployments to Europe arrived in the UK. Robert Gates (later Director of the CIA) reports all this and a British intelligence assessment, reviewing information supplied by its source, Oleg Gordievsky, that 'Able Archer' gave rise to exceptional anxiety within the Warsaw Pact and that they were not crying wolf. Yet at the time, US intelligence failed to grasp that fact. See Robert M. Gates, From the shadows (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 270-77; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: the inside story of its foreign operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990), pp. 499-501; Christopher Andrew, For the President's eyes only: secret intelligence and the American presidency from Washington to Bush (London: HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 475-7. 'Able Archer' plus RYAN plus US ignorance of the former's effect on Soviet paranoia made 1983 the most dangerous year, in Mr Gates' opinion. I am grateful to Christopher Andrew and Robert Gates for conversations on this subject and to Mary Bone and Paul Rogers for further assistance.
65. 'Able Archer' is the code name of a regularly repeated command post exercise to rehearse nuclear release procedures. From 1981 to 1984, under Operation RYAN, initiated by its Chief, Yuri Andropov, the KGB had instructed operatives to keep special watch for signs of Western mobilization. It was top priority in 1982. Now General Secretary, Andropov's anxieties were further inflamed in 1983 by the combination of Reagan's Orlando speech about the Evil Empire on 8 March, his 'Star Wars'announcement on 23 March, and, on 1 September, the shooting down of the Korean airliner KAL-007 trespassing over a Soviet missile submarine bastion. RYAN was given further increased priority. The failing Andropov took a morbidly apocalyptic view. In November 1983, US bases were already on heightened alert following the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon. Russian expectation (conveyed in documents leaked by Oleg Gordievsky) was that a pre-emptive nuclear attack would most likely be initiated under cover of a military exercise. 'Able Archer' took place from 2-11 November 1983 in a context of high Soviet anxiety about American intentions. In response, major elements of Soviet forces in the GSFG and elsewhere, including nuclear forces, went onto alert. On 14 November, the first of the Cruise and Pershing II missile deployments to Europe arrived in the UK. Robert Gates (later Director of the CIA) reports all this and a British intelligence assessment, reviewing information supplied by its source, Oleg Gordievsky, that 'Able Archer' gave rise to exceptional anxiety within the Warsaw Pact and that they were not crying wolf. Yet at the time, US intelligence failed to grasp that fact. See Robert M. Gates, From the shadows (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 270-77; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: the inside story of its foreign operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990), pp. 499-501; Christopher Andrew, For the President's eyes only: secret intelligence and the American presidency from Washington to Bush (London: HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 475-7. 'Able Archer' plus RYAN plus US ignorance of the former's effect on Soviet paranoia made 1983 the most dangerous year, in Mr Gates' opinion. I am grateful to Christopher Andrew and Robert Gates for conversations on this subject and to Mary Bone and Paul Rogers for further assistance.
66. 'Able Archer' is the code name of a regularly repeated command post exercise to rehearse nuclear release procedures. From 1981 to 1984, under Operation RYAN, initiated by its Chief, Yuri Andropov, the KGB had instructed operatives to keep special watch for signs of Western mobilization. It was top priority in 1982. Now General Secretary, Andropov's anxieties were further inflamed in 1983 by the combination of Reagan's Orlando speech about the Evil Empire on 8 March, his 'Star Wars'announcement on 23 March, and, on 1 September, the shooting down of the Korean airliner KAL-007 trespassing over a Soviet missile submarine bastion. RYAN was given further increased priority. The failing Andropov took a morbidly apocalyptic view. In November 1983, US bases were already on heightened alert following the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon. Russian expectation (conveyed in documents leaked by Oleg Gordievsky) was that a pre-emptive nuclear attack would most likely be initiated under cover of a military exercise. 'Able Archer' took place from 2-11 November 1983 in a context of high Soviet anxiety about American intentions. In response, major elements of Soviet forces in the GSFG and elsewhere, including nuclear forces, went onto alert. On 14 November, the first of the Cruise and Pershing II missile deployments to Europe arrived in the UK. Robert Gates (later Director of the CIA) reports all this and a British intelligence assessment, reviewing information supplied by its source, Oleg Gordievsky, that 'Able Archer' gave rise to exceptional anxiety within the Warsaw Pact and that they were not crying wolf. Yet at the time, US intelligence failed to grasp that fact. See Robert M. Gates, From the shadows (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 270-77; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: the inside story of its foreign operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990), pp. 499-501; Christopher Andrew, For the President's eyes only: secret intelligence and the American presidency from Washington to Bush (London: HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 475-7. 'Able Archer' plus RYAN plus US ignorance of the former's effect on Soviet paranoia made 1983 the most dangerous year, in Mr Gates' opinion. I am grateful to Christopher Andrew and Robert Gates for conversations on this subject and to Mary Bone and Paul Rogers for further assistance.
67. Desmond Ball, Controlling theater nuclear war, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 138 (Canberra: Australian National University, October 1987, pp. 25-6) records the incidents of known penetrations of US communications security by the USSR during the Yom Kippur War of 1973.
68. 'Three main fallacies in discussions of nuclear weapons', in Blake and Pole, eds, Dangers of deterrence; 'The military and political background of the nuclear age', in Gwyn Prins, ed., The choice: nuclear weapons versus security (London: Chatto & Windus, 1984), pp. 172-96; W. B. Gallie, Understanding war (London: Routledge, 1991).
69. 'Three main fallacies in discussions of nuclear weapons', in Blake and Pole, eds, Dangers of deterrence; 'The military and political background of the nuclear age', in Gwyn Prins, ed., The choice: nuclear weapons versus security (London: Chatto & Windus, 1984), pp. 172-96; W. B. Gallie, Understanding war (London: Routledge, 1991).
70. 'Three main fallacies in discussions of nuclear weapons', in Blake and Pole, eds, Dangers of deterrence; 'The military and political background of the nuclear age', in Gwyn Prins, ed., The choice: nuclear weapons versus security (London: Chatto & Windus, 1984), pp. 172-96; W. B. Gallie, Understanding war (London: Routledge, 1991).
71. W B. Gallie, 'The military and political background of the nuclear age', in Prins, ed., The choice, pp. 190-1; for a further, spirited discussion of this theme, see Mary Midgley, Science as salvation: a modern myth and its meaning (London: Routledge, 1990).
72. W B. Gallie, 'The military and political background of the nuclear age', in Prins, ed., The choice, pp. 190-1; for a further, spirited discussion of this theme, see Mary Midgley, Science as salvation: a modern myth and its meaning (London: Routledge, 1990).
73. John Keegan, The face of battle: a study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976).
74. Martin van Creveld, Supplying war: logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Command in war (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); The transformation of war (New York: Free Press, 1991).
75. Martin van Creveld, Supplying war: logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Command in war (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); The transformation of war (New York: Free Press, 1991).
76. Martin van Creveld, Supplying war: logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Command in war (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); The transformation of war (New York: Free Press, 1991).
77. Edward Luttwak, On strategy: the logic of war and peace (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1987).
78. John Keegan, War and our world: the Reith Lectures 1998 (London: Hutchinson, 1998). For an exploration of some of the implications of the transformation of war in the British context see Gwyn Prins, Strategy, force planning and diplomatic/military operations (DMOs) (London: RIIA, 1998); also The Strategic Defence Review (London: TSO, 1998), pp. 1-12.
79. John Keegan, War and our world: the Reith Lectures 1998 (London: Hutchinson, 1998). For an exploration of some of the implications of the transformation of war in the British context see Gwyn Prins, Strategy, force planning and diplomatic/military operations (DMOs) (London: RIIA, 1998); also The Strategic Defence Review (London: TSO, 1998), pp. 1-12.
80. John Keegan, War and our world: the Reith Lectures 1998 (London: Hutchinson, 1998). For an exploration of some of the implications of the transformation of war in the British context see Gwyn Prins, Strategy, force planning and diplomatic/military operations (DMOs) (London: RIIA, 1998); also The Strategic Defence Review (London: TSO, 1998), pp. 1-12.
81. John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: the obsolescence of major war (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
82. Donella Meadows, Dennis Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William Behrens, The limits to growth (London: Earth Island, 1972). The authors replied to their critics by modelling the learning response to crisis, which they called 'overshoot,' in Donella Meadows, Dennis Meadows and Jorgen Randers, Beyond the limits: global collapse or a sustainable future (London: Earthscan, 1992).
83. Donella Meadows, Dennis Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William Behrens, The limits to growth (London: Earth Island, 1972). The authors replied to their critics by modelling the learning response to crisis, which they called 'overshoot,' in Donella Meadows, Dennis Meadows and Jorgen Randers, Beyond the limits: global collapse or a sustainable future (London: Earthscan, 1992).
84. Information from Viktor Gelovani and Andrei Piontkowski, who did this work.
85. Thomas Homer-Dixon, 'On the threshold: environmental changes as causes of acute conflict', International Security 16: 2, Fall 1991, pp. 76-116; Thomas Homer-Dixon, Jeffrey Boutwell and George Rathjens, 'Environmental change and violent conflict', Scientific American 268: 2, 1993, pp. 38-45.
86. Thomas Homer-Dixon, 'On the threshold: environmental changes as causes of acute conflict', International Security 16: 2, Fall 1991, pp. 76-116; Thomas Homer-Dixon, Jeffrey Boutwell and George Rathjens, 'Environmental change and violent conflict', Scientific American 268: 2, 1993, pp. 38-45.
87. Walt, 'The Renaissance of security studies,' p. 213.
88. In addition to Walt's, another fighting defence comes from Sean Lynn-Jones, 'The future of international security studies', in Desmond Ball and David Horner, eds, Strategic studies in a changing world: global, regional and Australian perspectives, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 89 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1992), pp. 71-107; in similar vein, more recently, see Nils Petter Gleditsch, 'Armed conflict and the environment: a critique of literature', Environmental change and international security, proceedings international workshop, Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences (Groningen: University of Groningen, 1997), pp. 65-80.
89. In addition to Walt's, another fighting defence comes from Sean Lynn-Jones, 'The future of international security studies', in Desmond Ball and David Horner, eds, Strategic studies in a changing world: global, regional and Australian perspectives, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 89 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1992), pp. 71-107; in similar vein, more recently, see Nils Petter Gleditsch, 'Armed conflict and the environment: a critique of literature', Environmental change and international security, proceedings international workshop, Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences (Groningen: University of Groningen, 1997), pp. 65-80.
90. Daniel Deudney, 'The case against linking environmental degradation and national security', Millennium 19: 3, 1990, pp. 461-76.
91. Gwyn Prins, 'Politics and the environment', International Affairs 66: 4, 1990, pp. 711-30; Gwyn Prins,' A new focus for security studies', in Ball and Horner, eds, Strategic studies in a changing world, pp. 178-223, offers a point-by-point discussion of, and disagreement with, Lynn-Jones, 'The future of international security studies' in the same volume.
92. Gwyn Prins, 'Politics and the environment', International Affairs 66: 4, 1990, pp. 711-30; Gwyn Prins,' A new focus for security studies', in Ball and Horner, eds, Strategic studies in a changing world, pp. 178-223, offers a point-by-point discussion of, and disagreement with, Lynn-Jones, 'The future of international security studies' in the same volume.
93. Gwyn Prins, 'Politics and the environment', International Affairs 66: 4, 1990, pp. 711-30; Gwyn Prins,' A new focus for security studies', in Ball and Horner, eds, Strategic studies in a changing world, pp. 178-223, offers a point-by-point discussion of, and disagreement with, Lynn-Jones, 'The future of international security studies' in the same volume.
94. Julian Oswald, 'Defence and environmental security', in Gwyn Prins, ed., Threats without enemies (London: Earthscan, 1993), pp. 113-34.
95. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, 'Redefining security', Foreign Affairs 67: 3, Spring 1989.
96. Jan Urban, 'Czechoslovakia: the power and politics of humiliation', in Gwyn Prins, ed., Spring in winter: the 1989 revolutions (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990).
97. Gwyn Prins, 'CFSP, the enlargement of NATO and the ESDI', in G. Monar, ed., The Common Foreign and Security Policy after the IGC: potential and agenda for the eastern enlargement and the Mediterranean (Naples: Istituto per gli Studi Filosofici, forthcoming).
98. Petr Jehlicka, 'A comparative investigation into the dynamics of environmental policies in western and eastern Europe 1988-93, with special reference to the Czech Republic', PhD thesis, Cambridge University, 1998. The triggering role of environmental protest is clearly seen in Sarah Humphrey, 'A comparative chronology of revolution, 1988-1990', in Prins, ed., Spring in winter, pp. 211-41.
99. Petr Jehlicka, 'A comparative investigation into the dynamics of environmental policies in western and eastern Europe 1988-93, with special reference to the Czech Republic', PhD thesis, Cambridge University, 1998. The triggering role of environmental protest is clearly seen in Sarah Humphrey, 'A comparative chronology of revolution, 1988-1990', in Prins, ed., Spring in winter, pp. 211-41.
100. John Thompson, The media and modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); A. D. Smith, 'Towards a global culture?', Theory, Culture and Society 7, 1990.
101. John Thompson, The media and modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); A. D. Smith, 'Towards a global culture?', Theory, Culture and Society 7, 1990.
102. Francis Fukuyama, 'The end of history', The National Interest, Summer 1989.
103. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of international politics (London: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Barry Buzan, People, states and fear, 2nd edn (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).
104. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of international politics (London: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Barry Buzan, People, states and fear, 2nd edn (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).
105. Nicholas Rengger, 'Culture, society and order in world politics', in Baylis and Rengger, eds, Dilemmas of world politics, p. 85.
106. Gwyn Prins, 'Bonfire of the certainties', in Reiner Huber, ed., Military stability: prerequisites and analysis requirements for conventional stability in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1990).
107. Eric Hobsbawm, Age of extremes: the short twentieth century, 1914-1991 (London: Michael Joseph, 1994).
108. Security studies and the Realist international relations from which it sprang, were unquestioning children of that settlement: Max Weber, Theory of social and economic organisation (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft), ed. and intr. Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1947), pp. 329-41.
109. John Garnett, 'States, state-centric perspectives and interdependence theory', in Baylis and Rengger, eds, Dilemmas of world politics, p. 80. Michael Banks gives a captivating account of the snooker match in 'The inter-paradigm debate', in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom, eds, International relations: a handbook of current theory (London: Pinter, 1985), pp. 7-26.
110. John Garnett, 'States, state-centric perspectives and interdependence theory', in Baylis and Rengger, eds, Dilemmas of world politics, p. 80. Michael Banks gives a captivating account of the snooker match in 'The inter-paradigm debate', in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom, eds, International relations: a handbook of current theory (London: Pinter, 1985), pp. 7-26.
111. John Gray, False dawn: the illusions of global capitalism (London: Granta, 1998).
112. Benjamin Barbers, Jihad vs McWorld: how globalization and tribalism are reshaping the world (New York:Time Books, 1995).
113. John Keane, Reflections on violence (London: Verso, 1996); Michael Ignatieff, Blood and belonging: journeys into the new nationalism (London: Vintage, 1994).
114. John Keane, Reflections on violence (London: Verso, 1996); Michael Ignatieff, Blood and belonging: journeys into the new nationalism (London: Vintage, 1994).
115. Anthony Giddens, Consequences of modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
116. Anthony Giddens, Consequences of modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
117. Jessica T. Mathews, 'Power shift', Foreign Affairs 76: 1, January/February 1997, pp. 50-66.
118. Samuel Huntington, 'The clash of civilizations?', Foreign Affairs 72: 3, 1993.
119. Martin Wight, Power politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), pp. 168-9, 188-90, 107ff.
120. ibid., p. 105.
121. Hedley Bull, The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics (London: Macmillan, 1977). An illuminating reflection on the tensions within Bull's problematique is to be found in Hayward R. Alker, 'The presumption of anarchy in world politics: on recovering the historicity of world society', in Rediscoveries and reformulations: humanistic methodologies for international studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 355-93.
122. Hedley Bull, The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics (London: Macmillan, 1977). An illuminating reflection on the tensions within Bull's problematique is to be found in Hayward R. Alker, 'The presumption of anarchy in world politics: on recovering the historicity of world society', in Rediscoveries and reformulations: humanistic methodologies for international studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 355-93.
123. Robert Kaplan, 'The coming anarchy', Atlantic Quarterly 273:2, February 1994.
124. Keane, Reflections on violence, p. 126.
125. R. J.Vincent, Human rights and international relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
126. 'The culture of a society is the reality of society's reality - for
127. Ibid., 18.24, pp. 384-5.
128. Ibid., 18.25, p. 385.
129. Keane, Reflections on violence, pp. 65-6.
130. Allott, Eunomia, 13.109, p. 250.
131. J. Ann Tickner, 'Identity in international relations theory: feminist perspectives', in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds, The return of culture and identity in IR theory (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 155-6. However, as has often been the case. Ken Booth was among the first to register disquiet (arising from a different cause: the caricaturing of Soviet society and motives), in Strategy and ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979).
132. J. Ann Tickner, 'Identity in international relations theory: feminist perspectives', in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds, The return of culture and identity in IR theory (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 155-6. However, as has often been the case. Ken Booth was among the first to register disquiet (arising from a different cause: the caricaturing of Soviet society and motives), in Strategy and ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979).
133. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a new framework for analysis (London, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds, Critical security studies: concepts and cases (London: UCL Press, 1997), The editors' preface provides an acute statement of this challenge: p. ix.
134. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a new framework for analysis (London, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds, Critical security studies: concepts and cases (London: UCL Press, 1997), The editors' preface provides an acute statement of this challenge: p. ix.
135. See further, David Held, Democracy and the global order: from the modern state to cosmopolitan governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995) and Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Kohler, eds, Re-imagining political community: studies in cosmopolitan democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
136. See further, David Held, Democracy and the global order: from the modern state to cosmopolitan governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995) and Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Kohler, eds, Re-imagining political community: studies in cosmopolitan democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
137. V. G. Kiernan, The lords of humankind (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972); D. C. Dorward, 'Ethnography and administration: a study of Anglo-Tiv "working misunderstanding"', Journal of African History 15: 3, 1974, pp. 457-77; Gwyn Prins, The hidden hippopotamus. Reappraisal in African history: the early colonial experience in western Zambia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); J. C. Scott, Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
138. V. G. Kiernan, The lords of humankind (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972); D. C. Dorward, 'Ethnography and administration: a study of Anglo-Tiv "working misunderstanding"', Journal of African History 15: 3, 1974, pp. 457-77; Gwyn Prins, The hidden hippopotamus. Reappraisal in African history: the early colonial experience in western Zambia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); J. C. Scott, Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
139. V. G. Kiernan, The lords of humankind (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972); D. C. Dorward, 'Ethnography and administration: a study of Anglo-Tiv "working misunderstanding"', Journal of African History 15: 3, 1974, pp. 457-77; Gwyn Prins, The hidden hippopotamus. Reappraisal in African history: the early colonial experience in western Zambia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); J. C. Scott, Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
140. V. G. Kiernan, The lords of humankind (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972); D. C. Dorward, 'Ethnography and administration: a study of Anglo-Tiv "working misunderstanding"', Journal of African History 15: 3, 1974, pp. 457-77; Gwyn Prins, The hidden hippopotamus. Reappraisal in African history: the early colonial experience in western Zambia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); J. C. Scott, Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
141. This is the device of the prisoner too, displayed for Europeans in Alexandr Solzynitsyn, One day in the life of Ivan Denisovich, trans. R. Parker (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968).
142. Study of stereotypes forms a part of the new security research agenda being elaborated and undertaken in international collaboration at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
143. Quentin Skinner, The foundations of modern political thought, vol. 1: The Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 69-100.
144. He is not alone. See also Onora O'Neill, Towards justice and virtue: a constructive account of practical reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
145. 'Questions about security cannot be separated from the most basic questions of political theory, but they also cannot be left in the care of those who have allowed questions of political theory to curdle into caricature.' R. B. J. Walker, 'The subject of security', in Krause and Williams, eds, Critical security studies, p. 63. But do not hope for much help from many theorists; it is not prudent to trust them not to curdle also; compare the first and last paragraphs of John Dunn, 'Reconceiving the content and character of modern political community', in Interpreting political responsibility (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 193-215.
146. 'Questions about security cannot be separated from the most basic questions of political theory, but they also cannot be left in the care of those who have allowed questions of political theory to curdle into caricature.' R. B. J. Walker, 'The subject of security', in Krause and Williams, eds, Critical security studies, p. 63. But do not hope for much help from many theorists; it is not prudent to trust them not to curdle also; compare the first and last paragraphs of John Dunn, 'Reconceiving the content and character of modern political community', in Interpreting political responsibility (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 193-215.
147. It is doing so during 1998-9 in an internal RIIA seminar, involving all staff, on 'Millennium Issues'.
148. That case, and a more extensive discussion of the new agenda of power politics, are both given in Prins, Strategy, force planning and diplomatic/military operations (DMOs), in which the figure reproduced here appears on p. 16.
149. Terror by Assassins (Crusades), Thugs (medieval north India) or the Aum Shinrikyo cult (Japan in 1995) has usually been unconditional and intended to kill as many of the infidel as possible. Terror with negotiable objectives and self-constrained means of attack (IRA, PLO, etc.), which is therefore amenable to deterrence or bribery, has been historically the exception, not the rule. See further Gwyn Prins, 'Reflections on global terrorism' in Lockerbie ten years later (Syracuse, NY: University of Syracuse Maxwell School of Government, 1998).
150. Weber, Theory of social and economic organization, p. 328.
151. Sir Henry Maine, Ancient law [1861] (London: Dent, 1917).
152. Perhaps the area in which most hard thinking has been done already is that of the international political economy - a facet of formal power. See Susan Strange, The retreat of the state: the diffusion of power in the world economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
153. Carr, The twenty years' crisis, p. 10.