Referendums and the political constitutionalisation of the EU

European Law Journal

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 423-445

  Shu, Min ^a  

^a FUDAN UNIVERSITY   (China)

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EID: 63849181491     PISSN: 13515993     EISSN: 14680386     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00420.x     Document Type: Article

References (143)

1. The countries committed to a referendum on the EU Constitution had included the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the UK. The Spanish vote was approved without much difficulty. However, after the double rejection of France and the Netherlands in late May and early June 2005, all other countries but Luxemburg shelved their referendum plans to allow a period of 'reflection'.
2. The political dynamics of the ECJ's legal activism is documented by several authors. See, for example, A-M. Burley and W. Mattli, 'Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration', (1993) 47(1) International Organization 41-76
3. K. Alter, 'Who Are the "Masters of the Treaty"?: European Governments and the European Court of Justice', (1998) 52(1) International Organization 121-147
4. L. Conant, Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union (Cornell University Press, 2002)
5. R. Cichowski, The European Court, Civil Society and European Integration (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
6. E. Stein, 'Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution', (1981) 75(1) American Journal of International Law 1-27
7. F. Mancini, 'The Making of a Constitution for Europe', (1989) 4(2) Common Market Law Review 262-275
8. J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1999)
9. P. Craig, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union', (2001) 7(2) European Law Journal 125-150.
10. Stein, op cit n 4 supra
11. J. H. H. Weiler, 'The Transformation of Europe', (1991) 100(8) Yale Law Journal 2403-2483
12. A. Stone Sweet and T. Brunell, 'Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community', (1998) 92(1) American Political Science Review 63-81.
13. J. H. H. Weiler, 'The Reformation of European Constitutionalism', (1997) 35(1) Journal of Common Market Studies 112-118.
14. For example, it was reported in 'Les Eurosceptiques' (The Economist, 30 October 2003) that Georges Berthu, a French right-wing MEP, strongly denied the status quo argument of the primacy of EU law over national laws. He contends that 'European governments accepted the primacy of EU law when the then European Economic Community dealt with a far narrower range of issues than it does today. It is one thing to go along with a principle established by the courts and applied to a restricted range of subjects such as customs duties; it is quite another to concede national sovereignty in an EU constitution whose writ covers everything from fiscal policy to immigration'.
15. See Weiler, op cit n 5 supra.
16. B. de Witte, 'Sovereignty and European Integration: The Weight of Legal Tradition', in A. Stone Sweet and J. H. H. Weiler (eds) The European Court of Justice and National Courts - Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in Its Social Context (Hart, 1998), 277-304
17. W. Wallace, 'The Sharing of Sovereignty: The European Paradox', (1999) 47(3) Political Studies 503-521.
18. T. König and S. Hug, 'Ratifying Maastricht: Parliamentary Votes on International Treaties and Theoretical Solution Concepts', (2000) 1(1) European Union Politics 93-124
19. S. Hug and T. König, 'In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference', (2002) 56(2) International Organization 447-476.
20. A. Moravcsik, 'References and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', (1993) 31 Journal of CommonMarket Studies 473-524
21. R. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', (1988) 42(3) International Organization 427-460.
22. Stein, op cit n 4 supra
23. Weiler, op cit n 4 supra
24. Craig, op cit n 4 supra.
25. I. Pernice, 'Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making Revisited?', (1999) 36(4) Common Market Law Review 703-750
26. I. Pernice, 'Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union', (2002) 27(5) European Law Review 511-529.
27. J. Shaw, 'Postnational Constitutionalism in the European Union', (1999) 6(4) Journal of European Public Policy 579-597
28. J. Shaw, 'Process and Constitutional Discourse in the European Union', (2000) 27(1) Journal of Law and Society 4-37.
29. Weiler, op cit n 4 supra
30. Craig, op cit n 4 supra.
31. A-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J. H. H. Weiler (eds), The European Court of Justice and National Courts - Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in Its Social Contest (Hart, 1998).
32. A. Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (Oxford University Press, 2004), 58.
33. Stein, op cit n 4 supra
34. Weiler, op cit n 4 supra
35. Stone Sweet and Brunell, op cit n 5 supra.
36. Weiler, op cit n 6 supra, at 107.
37. A. Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2000),
38. J. H. H. Weiler, 'Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision', (1995) 1(3) European Law Journal 219-258
39. S. Boom, 'The European Union after the Maastricht Decision: Will Germany Be the "Virginia of Europe"', (1995) 43(2) American Journal of Comparative Law 177-226.
40. N. MacCormick, 'Democracy, Subsidiarity, and Citizenship in the "European Commonwealth"', (1997) 16(4) Law and Philosophy 331-356.
41. Pernice, 'Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union', op cit n 13 supra, at 514.
42. ibid, at 517.
43. Weiler, op cit n 21 supra, at 514.
44. Pernice, 'Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union', op cit n 13 supra, at 519-520.
45. B. Kohler-Koch, 'A Constitution for Europe?', working paper, Mannheim Centre for European Studies, 1999.
46. The monist approach usually gives the juridical precedence of international law when there is a conflict between international law and national law. Multilevel constitutionalism denies the existence of such conflicts. Instead, its monist feature takes the form of a non-hierarchical and functional division between European and national law.
47. Kohler-Koch, op cit n 27 supra, at 8.
48. Stone Sweet and Brunell, op cit n 5 supra
49. Stone Sweet, op cit n 17 supra.
50. Stein, op cit n 4 supra
51. Weiler, op cit n 5 supra.
52. Alter, op cit n 3 supra
53. Conant, op cit n 3 supra
54. Cichowski, op cit n 3 supra.
55. The Commission later brought the dispute to the ECJ. The subsequent ECJ ruling recognised the suspension by the Council, and questioned only the procedures through which the Council decision was taken.
56. G. A. Bermann, 'Editorial: The European Union as a Constitutional Experiment', (2004) 4 European Law Journal 10, at 363.
57. Weiler, op cit n 5 supra
58. See also the 'Afterword' in Weiler, op cit n 4 supra, at 96-101.
59. Burley and Mattli, op cit n 3 supra
60. Stone Sweet and Brunell, op cit n 5 supra
61. G. Garrett, D. Kelemen and H. Schulz, 'The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union', (1998) 52(1) International Organization 149-176
62. R. Cichowski, 'Integrating the Environment: The European Court and the Construction of Supranational Policy', (1998) 5(3) Journal of European Public Policy 387-405
63. Alter, op cit n 3 supra
64. K. Alter, 'The European Union's Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash?', (2000) 54(3) International Organization 489-518
65. K. Alter and J. Vagras, 'Explaining Variation in the Use of European Litigation Strategies: European Community Law and British Gender Equality Policy', (2000) 33(4) Comparative Political Studies 452-482
66. Conant, op cit n 3 supra
67. R. Cichowski, 'Women's Rights, the European Court and Supranational Constitutionalism', (2004) 38 Law & Society Review 489-512
68. Cichowski, op cit n 3 supra.
69. S. Hug, Voices of Europe: Citizens, Referendums, and European Integration (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002)
70. A. Szczerbiak and P. Taggart (eds), EU Enlargement and Referendums (Routledge, 2005)
71. S. Hobolt, 'Direct Democracy and European Integration', (2006) 13(1) Journal of European Public Policy 153-166.
72. More than forty nationwide referendums were held in relation to European integration between 1972 and 2005.
73. D. Butler and A. Ranney (eds), Referendums around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy (Macmillan, 1994).
74. M. Mendelsohn and A. Parkin (eds), Referendum Democracy: Citizens, Elites and Deliberation in Referendum Campaigns (Palgrave, 2001), 1-2.
75. M. Shu, 'Choosing Referendums on the EU: A Two-Dimensional Spatial Model', paper presented at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, March 2004, Uppsala, Sweden.
76. M. Green Cowles, J. Caporaso and T. Risse, Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change (Cornell University Press, 2001)
77. C. Knill, The Europeanisation of National Administrations: Patterns of Institutional Change and Persistence (Cambridge University Press, 2001)
78. K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli, The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford University Press, 2003).
79. In 2003, the membership referendums conducted in Hungry, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have also scheduled voting dates according to the levels of public support for the EU in each country, see Szczerbiak and Taggart, op cit n 37 supra.
80. A list of nationwide EU referendums held between 1972 and 2005 is provided in the Appendix.
81. Mendelsohn and Parkin, op cit n 40 supra, at 1.
82. On utilitarian conerns, see R. Eichenberg and R Dalton, 'Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration', (1993) 47(4) International Organization 507-534
83. M. Gabel, Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and European Union (University of Michigan Press, 1998).
84. On political considerations, see C. Andersen, 'When in Doubt, Use Proxies: Attitude toward Domestic Politics and Support for European Integration', (1998) 31(5) Comparative Political Studies 569-601
85. I. Sanchez-Cuenca, 'The Political Basis of Support for European Integration', (2000) 1(2) European Union Politics 147-171.
86. On cultural identities, see L. Hooghe and G. Marks, 'Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration', (2005) 6(4) European Union Politics 419-443
87. L. McLaren, Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration (Palgrave, 2006).
88. Gabel, op cit n 46 supra.
89. Sanchez-Cuenca, op cit n 46 supra.
90. R. Cichowski, 'Western Dreams, Eastern Realities: Support for the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe', (2000) 33(10) Comparative Political Studies 1243-1278.
91. T. V. Tverdova and C. Anderson, 'Choosing the West? Referendum Choices on EU Membership in East-Central Europe', (2004) 23(2) Electoral Studies 185-208.
92. R. Markowski and J. Tucker, 'Pocketbooks, Politics, and Parties: The 2003 Polish Referendum on EU Membership', (2005) 24(3) Electoral Studies 425-426.
93. T. Wyller, 'Norway: Six Exceptions to the Rule', in M. Gallagher and P.V. Uleri (eds), The Referendums Experience in Europe (Macmillan Press, 1996), 139-152.
94. S. Banducci, J. Karp and P. Loedel, 'The Euro, Economic Interests and Multi-Level Governance: Examining Support for the Common Currency', (2003) 42(5) European Journal of Political Research 685-703.
95. L. Jonung, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Unification: The Swedish Euro Referendum on 2003', (2004) 24(1-2) Cato Journal 123-149.
96. M. Marcussen and M. Zolner, 'The Danish EMU Referendum 2000: Business as Usual', (2001) 36(3) Government and Opposition 379-402
97. M. Gabel and S. Hix, 'Understanding Public Support for British Membership of the Single Currency', (2005) 53(1) Political Studies 65-81.
98. The 'five tests' are as follows: Are business cycles and economic structures compatible so that Britain can live permanently with euro interest rates? If problems emerge is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them? Would joining the euro encourage investment? How would the City of London be affected if Britain joined the euro? Finally, will joining the euro promote higher growth, stability and a lasting increase in jobs? It is worth noting that these five criteria were put in such a vague way that they have left the British government (the Treasury in particular) substantial discretion on when to call a referendum on the euro.
99. K. Gilland, 'Ireland's (First) Referendum on the Treaty of Nice', (2002) 40(3) Journal of CommonMarket Studies 527-535
100. J. Garry, M. Marsh and R. Sinnott, '"Second Order" Versus "Issue Voting" Effects in EU Referendums: Evidence from the Irish Nice Treaty Referendums', (2005) 6(2) European Union Politics 223-242.
101. M. Oskarson and K. Ringdal, 'The Arguments', in A. Jenssen, P. Pesonen and M. Gilljam (eds), To Join or Not to Join: Three Nordic Referendums onMembership in the European Union (Scandinavian University Press, 1998), 149-167.
102. D. Arter, 'The EU Referendum in Finland on 16 October 1994: A Vote for the West, not for Maastricht', (1995) 33(3) Journal of Common Market Studies 361-388.
103. W. Downs, 'Election Report - Denmark's Referendum on the Euro: The Mouse that Roared ... Again', (2001) 24(1) West European Politics 222-226.
104. M. Shu, 'Nonseparable Preferences, Public Opinion and Referendums on European Integration', paper presented at the Institute for the Study of Europe, February 2004, Columbia University, New York.
105. K. Siune, 'The Danes said No to the Maasticht Treaty: The Danish EC Referendum of June 1992', (1993) 16(1) Scandinavian Political Studies 93-103.
106. R. Sinnott, Attitudes and Behaviour of the Irish Electorate in the Referendum on the Treaty of Nice (European Commission, 2001).
107. Most EU referendums were initiated by the Head of the State (eg French President), national governments, or the majority of the Parliament. See Shu, op cit n 41 supra.
108. See T. Romer and H. Rosenthal, 'Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo', (1978) 33(4) Public Choice 27-43
109. T. Romer and H. Rosenthal, 'Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy', (1979) 93(4) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 563-587.
110. M. Cini, 'ADivided Nation: Polarization and the Two-Party System in Malta', (2003) 7(1) South European Society and Politics 7-23
111. G. Baldacchino, 'A Nationless State? Malta, National Identity and the EU', (2002) 25(4) West European Politics 191-206.
112. Moravcsik, op cit n 11 supra.
113. Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) is convened by the member states to negotiate or amend the treaty(ies) of the EU.
114. Andersen, op cit n 46 supra.
115. Jenssen, Pesonen and Gilljam, op cit n 58 supra.
116. S. Hix and C. Lord, Political Parties in the European Union (Macmillan, 1997).
117. König and Hug, op cit n 10 supra
118. Hug and König, op cit n 10 supra.
119. G. Hogan, 'Ireland: The Nice Treaty and the Irish Constitution', (2001) 7(4) European Public Law 565-573.
120. The Supreme Court's decision in Crotty v an Taoiseach ((1987) IESC 4) effectively made a referendum on the SEA mandatory. During the referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty, the Irish Supreme Court's judgement in McKenna v an Taoiseach ((1995) IESC 11) made it illegal for the government to use public money to promote its preferred position in a referendum. Meanwhile, a High Court ruled against the RTE's (the state broadcasting service) policy of allocating air-time on the proportion of the seats in the Dail, the Irish Parliament.
121. See P. Roberts-Thomson, Democratic Governance, EU Referendums and the European Union, PhD thesis (Nottingham Trent University, 2000), 126. Details of these legal cases are available at http://www.ucc.ie/law/ irlii/index.php.
122. The eight membership referendums held in 2004, by contrast, attracted the EU institutions to play a role. Probably, it was the symbolic meaning - return to Europe - enhanced the importance of these votes. The popular poll in Slovakia is a good case in point. Dissatisfied with the campaign effort of the Slovakia government, the Slovakia office of the European Commission decided to organise its own referendum campaign to boost pro-EU sentiment in the country (EUobserver, 5 May 2003).
123. Downs, op cit n 60 supra, at 223.
124. The letter reads, 'We are extremely concerned that the European Commission, through its office in Dublin, is interfering in the Irish referendum process in a manner which is almost certainly unconstitutional and illegal under Irish Law, and may well be illegal also, and ultra vires the Commission's powers, under European Law'.
125. See Roberts-Thomson, op cit n 74 supra, 250.
126. Quoted from her personal blog 'The Constitution - what now?', which Ms Wallström wrote on 1 June 2005. The full text is available at http://weblog.jrc.cec.eu.int/comments/wallstrom/Weblog/ the_constitution_what_now.
127. K. Eliassen, N. Sitter, 'Ever Closer Cooperation?: The Limits of the "Norweigian Method" of European Integration', (2003) 26(2) Scandinavian Political Studies 125-144.
128. N. Walker, 'Constitutionalising Enlargement, Enlarging Constitutionalisation', (2003) 9(3) European Law Journal 365-385.
129. Wyller, op cit n 52 supra.
130. Treaty can only enter into force when it has been adopted by each of the signatory countries in accordance with its own constitutional procedures. In most cases, this means either parliamentary ratification or referendum ratification.
131. The 1989 Italian MEP referendum is a little different from this argument. The Italian government wanted to enhance the legal status for MEPs' decision against the nation state, and thus held this referendum. But other Member States did not follow the same suit. From the perspective of dual consitutionalisation, this Italian referendum can be considered as a contestation of intra-national interests in order to move ahead of the status quo of EU constitutionalisation. Therefore, it is still possible to discuss the relationship between this referendum and intra-national cleavages in Italy.
132. A. Warleigh, Flexible Integration: Which Model for the European Union? (Sheffield Academic Press, 2002)
133. A. Stubb, Negotiating Flexibility in the European Union: Amsterdam, Nice and Beyond (Palgrave, 2002).
134. A. Stubb, 'A Categorisation of Differentiated Integration', (1996) 34(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 283-295.
135. Stein, op cit n 4 supra
136. Mancini, op cit n 4 supra
137. Weiler, op cit n 4 supra
138. Stone Sweet and Brunell, op cit n 5 supra
139. Stone Sweet, op cit n 17 supra.
140. Craig, op cit n 4 supra, at 128.
141. R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione (eds), Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Blackwell, 1996).
142. Weiler, op cit n 5 supra.
143. Weiler, op cit n 4 supra, at 4, emphasis added.