Multilevel constitutionalism and the treaty of Amsterdam: European constitution-making revisited?

Common Market Law Review

Volumn 36, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 703-750

  Pernice, Ingolf ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033411267     PISSN: 01650750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1018744426756     Document Type: Article

References (255)

1. Florence European Council, 21 and 22 June 1996, Presidency Conclusions (SN 300/96 EN), point V (p. 8-10). See also the Conclusions of the European Council of March 1996 at http://www.europa.eu.int/en/record/turin.html.
2. For the "patchwork" characterization, see Dehousse, "European institutional architecture after Amsterdam: Parliamentary system or regulatory structure?", 35 CML Rev. (1998), 595 at 596.
3. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
4. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
5. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
6. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
7. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
8. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
9. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
10. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
11. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
12. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
13. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
14. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
15. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
16. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
17. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
18. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
19. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997),
20. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
21. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
22. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
23. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
24. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
25. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
26. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
27. Similarly, the position of Manin, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 1 at 3 and 25. Further comments (positive): Barents, "Some Observations on the Treaty of Amsterdam", 4 MJ (1997), 332 at 345; critical: Dehousse, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam, Reflet de la Nouvelle Europe", 33 CDE (1997), 265: "résurgence sourde des nationalismes . . . dégradation générale des ambitions . . . retour en arrière . . ."; Favret, "Le Traité d'Amsterdam: Une révision a minima de la charte constitutionnelle de l'Union européenne", 33 CDE (1997), 555 at 556: "les résultats de la CIG sont décevants, en dépit de certaines avancées". See also Langrish, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected highlights", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 3 at 18: "results appear rather mixed"; Weiler, "Bread and circus: The state of the European Union", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law (1998), 223 at 224: "an Intergovernmental Conference which, arguably, should never have started". For other commentaries on the Treaty of Amsterdam cf., inter alia, Berg and Karpenstein, "Änderungen der rechtlichen Grundlagen der EU durch den Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts-und Steuerrecht (1998), 77; Bothe and Lohmann, "Verfahrensfragen der deutschen Zustimmung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam", 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 1; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751; de Areilza, "Enhanced Cooperations in the Treaty of Amsterdam: some critical remarks", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 13/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-13.html); Des Nerviens, "Les relations extérieures", 33 RTDE (1997), 801; Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", 32 EuR (1997), 362; Hilf, "Amsterdam - Ein Vertrag für die Bürger?" 32 EuR (1997), 347; Hilf and Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 51 NJW (1998), 705; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", 33 RTDE (1997), 903; Kortenberg, "La négociation du Traité. Une vue cavalière", 33 RTDE (1997), 709; Labayle, "Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice", 33 RTDE (1997), 813; Lecheler, "Die Fortentwicklung des Rechts der EU durch den Amsterdam-Vertrag", 38 Juristische Schulung (1998), 392; Pechstein, "Amsterdamer Vertrag und Grundgesetz", 51 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1998), 569; Petite, "The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 2/98 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-02-.html); Reich, "Le traité d'Amsterdam et le champ d'application de la procédure de codécision", RMC (1997), 665; Shaw, "Constitutional Settlements and The Citizen After The Treaty of Amsterdam", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/1998 (http://www.harvard.edu./Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-07-.html); Shaw, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy", 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Silvestro and Fernandez-Fernandez, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: une évaluation critique", RMC (1997), 662; Streinz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam", 9 EuZW (1998), 137.
28. According to Langrish, op. cit. supra note 3, at 7 et seq. and 19, it is only the revision of these provisions that comes close to a "fundamental reconstruction". For detailed comments see: Hailbronner, "Amsterdam - Vergemeinschaftung der Sachbereiche Freier Personenverkehr, Asylrecht und Einwanderung sowie Überführung des Schengen-Besitzstands auf EU-Ebene", 33 EuR (1998), 583 et seq.
29. See Preuss, "The relevance of the concept of citizenship for the political and constitutional development of the EU", in Preuss and Requejo (Eds.), European Citizenship, Multiculturalism, and the State (1998), at p. 11.
30. For the historical background of the division between the supranational structure of the Community and the intergovernmental structure of the Union since the Fouchet plans, see Everling, "Folgerungen aus dem Amsterdamer Vertrag für die Einheit der Europäischen Union und Gemeinschaften - Zusammenfassende Bewertung der Tagungsbeiträge", in von Bogdandy and Ehlermann (Eds.), Konsolidierung und Kohärenz des Primärrechts nach Amsterdam, (EuR Beiheft 2/1998), p. 185, at 187.
31. Art. 34(2) lit (b) TEU (ex Art. K.6, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam) expressly excludes any direct effect of the "framework decisions" taken by the Council, Art. 35 TEU (ex Art. K.7, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam) gives the Court jurisdiction on measures taken in the third pillar with regard to the Member States which declare their acceptance to such jurisdiction. Individuals have no locus standi.
32. For the concept of divided sovereignty, see Pernice, "The framework revisited: Constitutional, federal and subsidiarity issues", in 2nd Frankfurt-Columbia Symposion on Comparative Law, Harmonization of Laws in Federal Systems: A Comparative Perspective, 2 Columbia Journal of European Law (1996), 403 at 418, with more references. The idea of divided sovereignty stems from the description of the American federal system, the notion can be traced back to Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique (1835), chapter VIII ("partager la souveraineté") and to Hamilton/Madison/Jay, The Federalist Papers (1787/88), e.g. Hamilton, Federalist No. 32, ("division of the sovereign powers"). See also O'Keeffe, "Sovereignty of Parliament in the Constitution of Europe: Foundations of legitimacy in the divided power systems of the European Union", in Kloepfer and Pernice (Eds.), Entwicklungsperspektiven der europäischen Verfassung im Lichte des Vertrages von Amsterdam, forthcoming 1999, see also Walter Hallstein-Institut, Symposion 1998, http://www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/WHI/deutsch/index.htm looking for "multiple sources" of legitimacy in the EC "multi-level system of governance".
33. For the concept of divided sovereignty, see Pernice, "The framework revisited: Constitutional, federal and subsidiarity issues", in 2nd Frankfurt-Columbia Symposion on Comparative Law, Harmonization of Laws in Federal Systems: A Comparative Perspective, 2 Columbia Journal of European Law (1996), 403 at 418, with more references. The idea of divided sovereignty stems from the description of the American federal system, the notion can be traced back to Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique (1835), chapter VIII ("partager la souveraineté") and to Hamilton/Madison/Jay, The Federalist Papers (1787/88), e.g. Hamilton, Federalist No. 32, ("division of the sovereign powers"). See also O'Keeffe, "Sovereignty of Parliament in the Constitution of Europe: Foundations of legitimacy in the divided power systems of the European Union", in Kloepfer and Pernice (Eds.), Entwicklungsperspektiven der europäischen Verfassung im Lichte des Vertrages von Amsterdam, forthcoming 1999, see also Walter Hallstein-Institut, Symposion 1998, http://www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/WHI/deutsch/index.htm looking for "multiple sources" of legitimacy in the EC "multi-level system of governance".
34. For the concept of divided sovereignty, see Pernice, "The framework revisited: Constitutional, federal and subsidiarity issues", in 2nd Frankfurt-Columbia Symposion on Comparative Law, Harmonization of Laws in Federal Systems: A Comparative Perspective, 2 Columbia Journal of European Law (1996), 403 at 418, with more references. The idea of divided sovereignty stems from the description of the American federal system, the notion can be traced back to Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique (1835), chapter VIII ("partager la souveraineté") and to Hamilton/Madison/Jay, The Federalist Papers (1787/88), e.g. Hamilton, Federalist No. 32, ("division of the sovereign powers"). See also O'Keeffe, "Sovereignty of Parliament in the Constitution of Europe: Foundations of legitimacy in the divided power systems of the European Union", in Kloepfer and Pernice (Eds.), Entwicklungsperspektiven der europäischen Verfassung im Lichte des Vertrages von Amsterdam, forthcoming 1999, see also Walter Hallstein-Institut, Symposion 1998, http://www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/WHI/deutsch/index.htm looking for "multiple sources" of legitimacy in the EC "multi-level system of governance".
35. For the concept of divided sovereignty, see Pernice, "The framework revisited: Constitutional, federal and subsidiarity issues", in 2nd Frankfurt-Columbia Symposion on Comparative Law, Harmonization of Laws in Federal Systems: A Comparative Perspective, 2 Columbia Journal of European Law (1996), 403 at 418, with more references. The idea of divided sovereignty stems from the description of the American federal system, the notion can be traced back to Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique (1835), chapter VIII ("partager la souveraineté") and to Hamilton/Madison/Jay, The Federalist Papers (1787/88), e.g. Hamilton, Federalist No. 32, ("division of the sovereign powers"). See also O'Keeffe, "Sovereignty of Parliament in the Constitution of Europe: Foundations of legitimacy in the divided power systems of the European Union", in Kloepfer and Pernice (Eds.), Entwicklungsperspektiven der europäischen Verfassung im Lichte des Vertrages von Amsterdam, forthcoming 1999, see also Walter Hallstein-Institut, Symposion 1998, http://www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/WHI/deutsch/index.htm looking for "multiple sources" of legitimacy in the EC "multi-level system of governance".
36. For the concept of divided sovereignty, see Pernice, "The framework revisited: Constitutional, federal and subsidiarity issues", in 2nd Frankfurt-Columbia Symposion on Comparative Law, Harmonization of Laws in Federal Systems: A Comparative Perspective, 2 Columbia Journal of European Law (1996), 403 at 418, with more references. The idea of divided sovereignty stems from the description of the American federal system, the notion can be traced back to Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique (1835), chapter VIII ("partager la souveraineté") and to Hamilton/Madison/Jay, The Federalist Papers (1787/88), e.g. Hamilton, Federalist No. 32, ("division of the sovereign powers"). See also O'Keeffe, "Sovereignty of Parliament in the Constitution of Europe: Foundations of legitimacy in the divided power systems of the European Union", in Kloepfer and Pernice (Eds.), Entwicklungsperspektiven der europäischen Verfassung im Lichte des Vertrages von Amsterdam, forthcoming 1999, see also Walter Hallstein-Institut, Symposion 1998, http://www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/WHI/deutsch/index.htm looking for "multiple sources" of legitimacy in the EC "multi-level system of governance".
37. For the concept of divided sovereignty, see Pernice, "The framework revisited: Constitutional, federal and subsidiarity issues", in 2nd Frankfurt-Columbia Symposion on Comparative Law, Harmonization of Laws in Federal Systems: A Comparative Perspective, 2 Columbia Journal of European Law (1996), 403 at 418, with more references. The idea of divided sovereignty stems from the description of the American federal system, the notion can be traced back to Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique (1835), chapter VIII ("partager la souveraineté") and to Hamilton/Madison/Jay, The Federalist Papers (1787/88), e.g. Hamilton, Federalist No. 32, ("division of the sovereign powers"). See also O'Keeffe, "Sovereignty of Parliament in the Constitution of Europe: Foundations of legitimacy in the divided power systems of the European Union", in Kloepfer and Pernice (Eds.), Entwicklungsperspektiven der europäischen Verfassung im Lichte des Vertrages von Amsterdam, forthcoming 1999, see also Walter Hallstein-Institut, Symposion 1998, http://www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/WHI/deutsch/index.htm looking for "multiple sources" of legitimacy in the EC "multi-level system of governance".
38. Pernthaler, "Europäische Integration und nationales Verfassungsrecht in Österreich", in Battis, Tsatsos and Stephanou (Eds.), Europäische Integration und nationales Verfassungsrecht (1995), pp. 437 at 444: "Gesamtänderung der Bundesverfassung". Cf. Art. 44 III of the Austrian constitution, for more details on the concept of "Gesamtänderung", see Seidl-Hohenveldern, "Constitutional Problems Involved in Austria's Accession to the EU", 32 CML Rev. (1995), 727 at 729; Adamovich et al., Österreichisches Staatsrecht Vol. 1 (1997), p. 246.
39. Pernthaler, "Europäische Integration und nationales Verfassungsrecht in Österreich", in Battis, Tsatsos and Stephanou (Eds.), Europäische Integration und nationales Verfassungsrecht (1995), pp. 437 at 444: "Gesamtänderung der Bundesverfassung". Cf. Art. 44 III of the Austrian constitution, for more details on the concept of "Gesamtänderung", see Seidl-Hohenveldern, "Constitutional Problems Involved in Austria's Accession to the EU", 32 CML Rev. (1995), 727 at 729; Adamovich et al., Österreichisches Staatsrecht Vol. 1 (1997), p. 246.
40. Pernthaler, "Europäische Integration und nationales Verfassungsrecht in Österreich", in Battis, Tsatsos and Stephanou (Eds.), Europäische Integration und nationales Verfassungsrecht (1995), pp. 437 at 444: "Gesamtänderung der Bundesverfassung". Cf. Art. 44 III of the Austrian constitution, for more details on the concept of "Gesamtänderung", see Seidl-Hohenveldern, "Constitutional Problems Involved in Austria's Accession to the EU", 32 CML Rev. (1995), 727 at 729; Adamovich et al., Österreichisches Staatsrecht Vol. 1 (1997), p. 246.
41. See for more details Pernice, "Constitutional law implications for a State participating in a process of regional integration. German Constitution and 'Multilevel Constitutionalism'", in Riedel (Ed.), German Reports on Public Law Presented to the XV. International Congress on Comparative Law (1998), at 40-65 and "Die Dritte Gewalt im europäischen Verfassungsverbund" , 31 EuR (1996), 27.
42. See for more details Pernice, "Constitutional law implications for a State participating in a process of regional integration. German Constitution and 'Multilevel Constitutionalism'", in Riedel (Ed.), German Reports on Public Law Presented to the XV. International Congress on Comparative Law (1998), at 40-65 and "Die Dritte Gewalt im europäischen Verfassungsverbund" , 31 EuR (1996), 27.
43. Grimm, "Does Europe Need a Constitution?", 1 ELJ (1995), 282, commented on by Habermas, "Remarks on Dieter Grimm's 'Does Europe Need a Constitution?'", 1 ELJ (1995), 303. See also Reich, "A European Constitution for Citizens: Reflections on the Rethinking of Union and Community Law", 3 ELJ (1997), 131 at 132.
44. Grimm, "Does Europe Need a Constitution?", 1 ELJ (1995), 282, commented on by Habermas, "Remarks on Dieter Grimm's 'Does Europe Need a Constitution?'", 1 ELJ (1995), 303. See also Reich, "A European Constitution for Citizens: Reflections on the Rethinking of Union and Community Law", 3 ELJ (1997), 131 at 132.
45. Grimm, "Does Europe Need a Constitution?", 1 ELJ (1995), 282, commented on by Habermas, "Remarks on Dieter Grimm's 'Does Europe Need a Constitution?'", 1 ELJ (1995), 303. See also Reich, "A European Constitution for Citizens: Reflections on the Rethinking of Union and Community Law", 3 ELJ (1997), 131 at 132.
46. For the expression see Stein, "On Divided Power Systems: Adventures in Comparative Law", (1983) LIEI, 27; Bermann, "Taking subsidiarity seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States", 94 Columbia Law Review (1994), 331 at 335.
47. For the expression see Stein, "On Divided Power Systems: Adventures in Comparative Law", (1983) LIEI, 27; Bermann, "Taking subsidiarity seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States", 94 Columbia Law Review (1994), 331 at 335.
48. Walter Hallstein, quoted by Steinberger, "Die Europäische Union im Lichte der Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 12. Okt. 1993", in Festschrift für Rudolf Bernhardt (1995) p. 1313 at 1326.
49. See also Klein, "Die Erweiterung des Grundrechtsschutzes auf die universelle Ebene -Auswirkungen auf den Grundrechtsschutz in Europa", in Kreutzer et al. (Eds.), Europäischer Grundrechtsschutz (1998), p. 39 at 42: the protection of human rights has been taken away from the exclusive competence of the States - a basic change in the concept of national sovereignty.
50. For the theoretical foundations see H. Heller, Allgemeine Staatslehre (1934), p. 228 et seq.
51. Häberle, "Die Europäische Verfassungsstaatlichkeit", 78 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (1995), 298 at 300.
52. For a comparative analysis of this principle, see Häberle, "Das Prinzip der Subsidiarität aus der Sicht der vergleichenden Verfassungslehre", 119 AöR (1994), 169; see also Bermann, supra note 12, at 331.
53. The concept was developed first in Pernice, supra note 10, at 43 et seq.
54. For the opposite view: Randelzhofer, "Souveränität und Rechtsstaat: Anforderungen an eine Europäische Verfassung", in Noske (Ed.), Der Rechtsstaat am Ende? (1995), p. 123 at 124 et seq., although he does admit the use of the term "constitution" for the EU in a specific sense (ibid., p. 129 et seq.). Koenig, "Ist die Europäische Union verfassungsfähig?", 51 DÖV (1998), 268, even denies the possibility that the Union can have a constitution.
55. For the opposite view: Randelzhofer, "Souveränität und Rechtsstaat: Anforderungen an eine Europäische Verfassung", in Noske (Ed.), Der Rechtsstaat am Ende? (1995), p. 123 at 124 et seq., although he does admit the use of the term "constitution" for the EU in a specific sense (ibid., p. 129 et seq.). Koenig, "Ist die Europäische Union verfassungsfähig?", 51 DÖV (1998), 268, even denies the possibility that the Union can have a constitution.
56. For the opposite view: Randelzhofer, "Souveränität und Rechtsstaat: Anforderungen an eine Europäische Verfassung", in Noske (Ed.), Der Rechtsstaat am Ende? (1995), p. 123 at 124 et seq., although he does admit the use of the term "constitution" for the EU in a specific sense (ibid., p. 129 et seq.). Koenig, "Ist die Europäische Union verfassungsfähig?", 51 DÖV (1998), 268, even denies the possibility that the Union can have a constitution.
57. For the theoretical basis see already Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers (1787/88), Federalist No. 46, "The federal and state Governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers, and designated for different purposes".
58. For another approach to overcome this conflict, see Weiler, "Epilogue. The European Courts of Justice: Beyond 'Beyond Doctrine' or the Legitimacy Crisis of European Constitutionalism", in Slaughter et al. (Eds.), The European Court and National Courts - Doctrine and Jurisprudence (1998), p. 365 at 366.
59. In this sense Vignes, "Contribution to the Table Ronde sur l'Etat et l'Union", in Labouz (Ed.), Les accords de Maastricht et la constitution de l'Union européenne (1992), p. 203; Constantinesco, "Les noms de l'Europe (Des Communautés européennes à l'Union européenne)" in Flauss and Wachsmann (Eds.), Le Droit des Organisations Internationales. Receuil à la mémoire de Jaques Schwob (1997), p. 309 at 329.
60. In this sense Vignes, "Contribution to the Table Ronde sur l'Etat et l'Union", in Labouz (Ed.), Les accords de Maastricht et la constitution de l'Union européenne (1992), p. 203; Constantinesco, "Les noms de l'Europe (Des Communautés européennes à l'Union européenne)" in Flauss and Wachsmann (Eds.), Le Droit des Organisations Internationales. Receuil à la mémoire de Jaques Schwob (1997), p. 309 at 329.
61. This notion is used by Weiler, "The State 'über alles'", in Due et al. (Eds.), Festschrift fur Ulrich Everling (1995), 1651 at 1678.
62. See also Weiler, "'. . . We will do. And Hearken'. Reflections on a Common Constitutional Law for the European Union", in Bieber and Widmer (Eds.), The European Constitutional Area (1995), p. 413 at 439; Pernice, op. cit. supra note 8, at 419; Mestmäcker, "Risse im europäischen Contrat Social", in Hanns Martin Schleyer-Preis 1996 und 1997, 48 Veröffentlichungen der Hanns Martin Schleyer-Stiftung, p. 53 at 54.
63. See also Weiler, "'. . . We will do. And Hearken'. Reflections on a Common Constitutional Law for the European Union", in Bieber and Widmer (Eds.), The European Constitutional Area (1995), p. 413 at 439; Pernice, op. cit. supra note 8, at 419; Mestmäcker, "Risse im europäischen Contrat Social", in Hanns Martin Schleyer-Preis 1996 und 1997, 48 Veröffentlichungen der Hanns Martin Schleyer-Stiftung, p. 53 at 54.
64. See also Weiler, "'. . . We will do. And Hearken'. Reflections on a Common Constitutional Law for the European Union", in Bieber and Widmer (Eds.), The European Constitutional Area (1995), p. 413 at 439; Pernice, op. cit. supra note 8, at 419; Mestmäcker, "Risse im europäischen Contrat Social", in Hanns Martin Schleyer-Preis 1996 und 1997, 48 Veröffentlichungen der Hanns Martin Schleyer-Stiftung, p. 53 at 54.
65. For this view, see Kirchhof, "Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht", in Kirchhof and Ehlermann (Eds.), Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, (EuR Beiheft 1/1991), p.11 at 14: "Die Gemeinschaft hat ihre Rechtsgrundlage in einem völkerrechtlichen Gesamtakt"; see also Kokott, "Deutschland im Rahmen der Europäischen Union - zum Vertrag von Maastricht", 119 AöR (1994), 207 at 212; rather purist: Schilling, "The autonomy of the Community legal order: An analysis of possible foundations" 37 Harv. Int'l L.J. (1996), 389; crit.: Weiler and Haltern, "The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order - Through the looking glass", 37 Harv. Int'l L.J. (1996), 411.
66. For this view, see Kirchhof, "Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht", in Kirchhof and Ehlermann (Eds.), Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, (EuR Beiheft 1/1991), p.11 at 14: "Die Gemeinschaft hat ihre Rechtsgrundlage in einem völkerrechtlichen Gesamtakt"; see also Kokott, "Deutschland im Rahmen der Europäischen Union - zum Vertrag von Maastricht", 119 AöR (1994), 207 at 212; rather purist: Schilling, "The autonomy of the Community legal order: An analysis of possible foundations" 37 Harv. Int'l L.J. (1996), 389; crit.: Weiler and Haltern, "The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order - Through the looking glass", 37 Harv. Int'l L.J. (1996), 411.
67. For this view, see Kirchhof, "Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht", in Kirchhof and Ehlermann (Eds.), Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, (EuR Beiheft 1/1991), p.11 at 14: "Die Gemeinschaft hat ihre Rechtsgrundlage in einem völkerrechtlichen Gesamtakt"; see also Kokott, "Deutschland im Rahmen der Europäischen Union - zum Vertrag von Maastricht", 119 AöR (1994), 207 at 212; rather purist: Schilling, "The autonomy of the Community legal order: An analysis of possible foundations" 37 Harv. Int'l L.J. (1996), 389; crit.: Weiler and Haltern, "The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order - Through the looking glass", 37 Harv. Int'l L.J. (1996), 411.
68. For this view, see Kirchhof, "Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht", in Kirchhof and Ehlermann (Eds.), Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, (EuR Beiheft 1/1991), p.11 at 14: "Die Gemeinschaft hat ihre Rechtsgrundlage in einem völkerrechtlichen Gesamtakt"; see also Kokott, "Deutschland im Rahmen der Europäischen Union - zum Vertrag von Maastricht", 119 AöR (1994), 207 at 212; rather purist: Schilling, "The autonomy of the Community legal order: An analysis of possible foundations" 37 Harv. Int'l L.J. (1996), 389; crit.: Weiler and Haltern, "The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order - Through the looking glass", 37 Harv. Int'l L.J. (1996), 411.
69. Case BVerfGE 73, 339 (367, 375) Solange II; case BVerfGE 89, 155 (174, 190) Maastricht. For the opposite view: Zuleeg, "The European constitution under constitutional constraints: The German scenario", 22 EL Rev. (1997), 19. See also the 1962 statement in a House of Lords Committee of the Lord Chancellor on the legal implications of British membership in the EC, Public Record Office LCO 19/108, quoted by Chalmers, European Union Law, vol. I, Law and EU Government (1998), at 273. More moderate: the Danish Supreme Court, Carlsen et al./Rasmussen, Judgment of 6 April 1998 No. I 361/1977, UfR 1998, 800, para 9.6 (for an English version cf. http://www.um.dk/udenrigspolitik/europa/domeng/); for comments on this decision, cf. Ring and Olsen-Ring, "Souveränitätsübertragung nach dänischem Verfassungsrecht", 9 EuZW (1998), 589; Thomas, "Das Maastricht-Urteil des dänischen Obersten Gerichtshofes vom 6.4.1998", 58 ZaöRV (1998), 879; Hofmann, "Der Oberste Gerichtshof Dänemarks und die europäische Integration", 26 EuGRZ (1999), 1; Hoegh, "The Danish Maastricht Judgment", 24 EL Rev. (1999), 80.
70. Case BVerfGE 73, 339 (367, 375) Solange II; case BVerfGE 89, 155 (174, 190) Maastricht. For the opposite view: Zuleeg, "The European constitution under constitutional constraints: The German scenario", 22 EL Rev. (1997), 19. See also the 1962 statement in a House of Lords Committee of the Lord Chancellor on the legal implications of British membership in the EC, Public Record Office LCO 19/108, quoted by Chalmers, European Union Law, vol. I, Law and EU Government (1998), at 273. More moderate: the Danish Supreme Court, Carlsen et al./Rasmussen, Judgment of 6 April 1998 No. I 361/1977, UfR 1998, 800, para 9.6 (for an English version cf. http://www.um.dk/udenrigspolitik/europa/domeng/); for comments on this decision, cf. Ring and Olsen-Ring, "Souveränitätsübertragung nach dänischem Verfassungsrecht", 9 EuZW (1998), 589; Thomas, "Das Maastricht-Urteil des dänischen Obersten Gerichtshofes vom 6.4.1998", 58 ZaöRV (1998), 879; Hofmann, "Der Oberste Gerichtshof Dänemarks und die europäische Integration", 26 EuGRZ (1999), 1; Hoegh, "The Danish Maastricht Judgment", 24 EL Rev. (1999), 80.
71. Case BVerfGE 73, 339 (367, 375) Solange II; case BVerfGE 89, 155 (174, 190) Maastricht. For the opposite view: Zuleeg, "The European constitution under constitutional constraints: The German scenario", 22 EL Rev. (1997), 19. See also the 1962 statement in a House of Lords Committee of the Lord
72. Case BVerfGE 73, 339 (367, 375) Solange II; case BVerfGE 89, 155 (174, 190) Maastricht. For the opposite view: Zuleeg, "The European constitution under constitutional constraints: The German scenario", 22 EL Rev. (1997), 19. See also the 1962 statement in a House of Lords Committee of the Lord Chancellor on the legal implications of British membership in the EC, Public Record Office LCO 19/108, quoted by Chalmers, European Union Law, vol. I, Law and EU Government (1998), at 273. More moderate: the Danish Supreme Court, Carlsen et al./Rasmussen, Judgment of 6 April 1998 No. I 361/1977, UfR 1998, 800, para 9.6 (for an English version cf. http://www.um.dk/udenrigspolitik/europa/domeng/); for comments on this decision, cf. Ring and Olsen-Ring, "Souveränitätsübertragung nach dänischem Verfassungsrecht", 9 EuZW (1998), 589; Thomas, "Das Maastricht-Urteil des dänischen Obersten Gerichtshofes vom 6.4.1998", 58 ZaöRV (1998), 879; Hofmann, "Der Oberste Gerichtshof Dänemarks und die europäische Integration", 26 EuGRZ (1999), 1; Hoegh, "The Danish Maastricht Judgment", 24 EL Rev. (1999), 80.
73. Case BVerfGE 73, 339 (367, 375) Solange II; case BVerfGE 89, 155 (174, 190) Maastricht. For the opposite view: Zuleeg, "The European constitution under constitutional constraints: The German scenario", 22 EL Rev. (1997), 19. See also the 1962 statement in a House of Lords Committee of the Lord Chancellor on the legal implications of British membership in the EC, Public Record Office LCO 19/108, quoted by Chalmers, European Union Law, vol. I, Law and EU Government (1998), at 273. More moderate: the Danish Supreme Court, Carlsen et al./Rasmussen, Judgment of 6 April 1998 No. I 361/1977, UfR 1998, 800, para 9.6 (for an English version cf. http://www.um.dk/udenrigspolitik/europa/domeng/); for comments on this decision, cf. Ring and Olsen-Ring, "Souveränitätsübertragung nach dänischem Verfassungsrecht", 9 EuZW (1998), 589; Thomas, "Das Maastricht-Urteil des dänischen Obersten Gerichtshofes vom 6.4.1998", 58 ZaöRV (1998), 879; Hofmann, "Der Oberste Gerichtshof Dänemarks und die europäische Integration", 26 EuGRZ (1999), 1; Hoegh, "The Danish Maastricht Judgment", 24 EL Rev. (1999), 80.
74. Case BVerfGE 73, 339 (367, 375) Solange II; case BVerfGE 89, 155 (174, 190) Maastricht. For the opposite view: Zuleeg, "The European constitution under constitutional constraints: The German scenario", 22 EL Rev. (1997), 19. See also the 1962 statement in a House of Lords Committee of the Lord Chancellor on the legal implications of British membership in the EC, Public Record Office LCO 19/108, quoted by Chalmers, European Union Law, vol. I, Law and EU Government (1998), at 273. More moderate: the Danish Supreme Court, Carlsen et al./Rasmussen, Judgment of 6 April 1998 No. I 361/1977, UfR 1998, 800, para 9.6 (for an English version cf. http://www.um.dk/udenrigspolitik/europa/domeng/); for comments on this decision, cf. Ring and Olsen-Ring, "Souveränitätsübertragung nach dänischem Verfassungsrecht", 9 EuZW (1998), 589; Thomas, "Das Maastricht-Urteil des dänischen Obersten Gerichtshofes vom 6.4.1998", 58 ZaöRV (1998), 879; Hofmann, "Der Oberste Gerichtshof Dänemarks und die europäische Integration", 26 EuGRZ (1999), 1; Hoegh, "The Danish Maastricht Judgment", 24 EL Rev. (1999), 80.
75. Case BVerfGE 73, 339 (367, 375) Solange II; case BVerfGE 89, 155 (174, 190) Maastricht. For the opposite view: Zuleeg, "The European constitution under constitutional constraints: The German scenario", 22 EL Rev. (1997), 19. See also the 1962 statement in a House of Lords Committee of the Lord Chancellor on the legal implications of British membership in the EC, Public Record Office LCO 19/108, quoted by Chalmers, European Union Law, vol. I, Law and EU Government (1998), at 273. More moderate: the Danish Supreme Court, Carlsen et al./Rasmussen, Judgment of 6 April 1998 No. I 361/1977, UfR 1998, 800, para 9.6 (for an English version cf. http://www.um.dk/udenrigspolitik/europa/domeng/); for comments on this decision, cf. Ring and Olsen-Ring, "Souveränitätsübertragung nach dänischem Verfassungsrecht", 9 EuZW (1998), 589; Thomas, "Das Maastricht-Urteil des dänischen Obersten Gerichtshofes vom 6.4.1998", 58 ZaöRV (1998), 879; Hofmann, "Der Oberste Gerichtshof Dänemarks und die europäische Integration", 26 EuGRZ (1999), 1; Hoegh, "The Danish Maastricht Judgment", 24 EL Rev. (1999), 80.
76. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] ECR 585; prepared already by case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administrate der Belastingen, [1963] ECR 1.
77. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, cited supra note 27.
78. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, cited supra note 27.
79. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos , cited supra note 27.
80. This is called "European Monism" by Kumm, "Who is the final arbiter of constitutionality in Europe?", 36 CML Rev., 351-386. Nevertheless the CFI recently stressed the international character of the Treaties in view of a non-contractual liability alleged to result from the SEA in case T-113/96, Dubois, [1998] ECR II-125, noted in 33 EuR (1998), 350.
81. Case C-104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg, [1982] ECR I-3641 at 3662, para 13.
82. Kupferberg, cited supra, at 3665, paras 22-27; for the conditions of direct effect see Case C-469/93, Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v. Chiquita Italia SpA, [1995] ECR I-4533 at 4565, paras. 24-37, for provisions of the Lomé Convention as opposed to the GATT.
83. Opinion 1/91, European Economic Area, [1991] ECR I-6079. For more references see Pernice supra note 10, at 43 note 22.
84. Opinion 2/94, ECHR, [1996] ECR I-1759 at 1788 et seq.
85. Case BVerfGE 22, 293 (296).
86. With an excellent overview of the discussion: Chalmers, supra note 26, at 271-335. See also the analysis of Weiler, supra note 21, at 378 et seq.
87. See e.g. case BVerfGE 89, 155 Maastricht. For a comprehensive overview see de Berranger, Constitutions nationales et construction communautaire (1995), p. 251-340; Rothley, "Europa alla tedesca. Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, das Grundgesetz, die Gemeinschaft", in FIDE (Ed.), National constitutional law vis-à-vis European integraton (1996), p. 22 at 36-42.
88. See e.g. case BVerfGE 89, 155 Maastricht. For a comprehensive overview see de Berranger, Constitutions nationales et construction communautaire (1995), p. 251-340; Rothley, "Europa alla tedesca. Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, das Grundgesetz, die Gemeinschaft", in FIDE (Ed.), National constitutional law vis-à-vis European integraton (1996), p. 22 at 36-42.
89. See, most recently, Kumm, supra note 31; Kaufmann, "Permanente Verfassungsgebung und verfassungsrechtliche Selbstbindung im europäischen Staatenverbund", 36 Der Staat (1997), 521; Schilling, "Zum Verhältnis von Gemeinschafts-und nationalem Recht", 39 Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 149.
90. See, most recently, Kumm, supra note 31; Kaufmann, "Permanente Verfassungsgebung und verfassungsrechtliche Selbstbindung im europäischen Staatenverbund", 36 Der Staat (1997), 521; Schilling, "Zum Verhältnis von Gemeinschafts-und nationalem Recht", 39 Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung (1998), 149.
91. This is the view of the Court of Justice in Costa/ENEL, supra note 27, stressing the "special and original nature" of the Treaty as "an independent source of law". This view is taken as almost undisputed by von Bogdandy, "Europäische Union als einheitlicher Verband", in EuR Beiheft 2/1998, p. 165 at 173; sec also the references at Pernice, "Art. 23", note 20, in Dreier (Ed.), Grundgesetz Kommentar (1998). The opposite view was adopted by the Constitutional Court in the Maastricht judgment, case BVerfGE 89, 155 Maastricht, and Kirchhof, "Der deutsche Staat im Prozeß der europäischen Integration", in Isensee and Kirchhof (Eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. VIII (1992), §183 note 66 and seq.
92. This is the view of the Court of Justice in Costa/ENEL, supra note 27, stressing the "special and original nature" of the Treaty as "an independent source of law". This view is taken as almost undisputed by von Bogdandy, "Europäische Union als einheitlicher Verband", in EuR Beiheft 2/1998, p. 165 at 173; sec also the references at Pernice, "Art. 23", note 20, in Dreier (Ed.), Grundgesetz Kommentar (1998). The opposite view was adopted by the Constitutional Court in the Maastricht judgment, case BVerfGE 89, 155 Maastricht, and Kirchhof, "Der deutsche Staat im Prozeß der europäischen Integration", in Isensee and Kirchhof (Eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. VIII (1992), §183 note 66 and seq.
93. This is the view of the Court of Justice in Costa/ENEL, supra note 27, stressing the "special and original nature" of the Treaty as "an independent source of law". This view is taken as almost undisputed by von Bogdandy, "Europäische Union als einheitlicher Verband", in EuR Beiheft 2/1998, p. 165 at 173; sec also the references at Pernice, "Art. 23", note 20, in Dreier (Ed.), Grundgesetz Kommentar (1998). The opposite view was adopted by the Constitutional Court in the Maastricht judgment, case BVerfGE 89, 155 Maastricht, and Kirchhof, "Der deutsche Staat im Prozeß der europäischen Integration", in Isensee and Kirchhof (Eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. VIII (1992), §183 note 66 and seq.
94. See Grussmann, "Grundnorm und Supranationalität - Rechtsstrukturelle Sichtweisen der europäischen Integration", in von Dannwitz et ai. (Eds.), Auf dem Wege zu einer Europäischen Staatlichkeit (1993), p. 47 at 58, who accepts two basic norms in conflict, and Kaufmann, op. cit. supra note 39 at 538, finding the rule of conflict in the German Constitution (id. at 543 et seq.). Schilling, supra note 39, at 151 et seq., takes the principle of effectiveness as decisive factor, stating that there may be primacy of European law when in fact (as in the Netherlands) the primacy is recognized by the relevant actors.
95. See Grussmann, "Grundnorm und Supranationalität - Rechtsstrukturelle Sichtweisen der europäischen Integration", in von Dannwitz et ai. (Eds.), Auf dem Wege zu einer Europäischen Staatlichkeit (1993), p. 47 at 58, who accepts two basic norms in conflict, and Kaufmann, op. cit. supra note 39 at 538, finding the rule of conflict in the German Constitution (id. at 543 et seq.). Schilling, supra note 39, at 151 et seq., takes the principle of effectiveness as decisive factor, stating that there may be primacy of European law when in fact (as in the Netherlands) the primacy is recognized by the relevant actors.
96. See Heintzen, "Die 'Herrschaft' über die Europäischen Verfassungsverträge - Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europäischer Gerichtshof auf Konfliktkurs?", 119 AöR (1994), 564 at 587. See also MacCormick, "Das Maastricht-Urteil: Souveränität heute", 50 JZ (1995), 797 at 800 ("The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now", 1 ELJ (1995), 259 at 265), who admits that not all problems of conflict can be resolved on legal criteria.
97. See Heintzen, "Die 'Herrschaft' über die Europäischen Verfassungsverträge - Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europäischer Gerichtshof auf Konfliktkurs?", 119 AöR (1994), 564 at 587. See also MacCormick, "Das Maastricht-Urteil: Souveränität heute", 50 JZ (1995), 797 at 800 ("The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now", 1 ELJ (1995), 259 at 265), who admits that not all problems of conflict can be resolved on legal criteria.
98. See Heintzen, "Die 'Herrschaft' über die Europäischen Verfassungsverträge - Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europäischer Gerichtshof auf Konfliktkurs?", 119 AöR (1994), 564 at 587. See also MacCormick, "Das Maastricht-Urteil: Souveränität heute", 50 JZ (1995), 797 at 800 ("The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now", 1 ELJ (1995), 259 at 265), who admits that not all problems of conflict can be resolved on legal criteria.
99. See Weiler, "The European Union Belongs to its Citizens: Three Immodest Proposals", 22 EL Rev. (1997), 150 at 155, proposing the creation for these questions of a new Constitutional Council consisting of judges from all the national constitutional courts as well as from the ECJ.
100. See the finally dualistic approach of Kaufmann, supra note 41, at 543-545; and Kumm, supra note 31, at 374 et seq.
101. See Costa/ENEL, supra note 27; Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finalize dello Stato v. Simmenthal, [1978] ECR 629.
102. See, on that basis, the attempt to resolve the problem through new procedural steps, like the institution of a "conciliation court", proposed by Schmid, "From Pont d'Avignon to Ponte Vecchio. The resolution of constitutional conflicts between the European Union and the Member States through principles of public international law", EUI Working Papers Law No. 98/7, p. 49 et seq. It is difficult, however, to see how conciliation should be a remedy in a situation where a serious breach of national constitutional law has been established by the Constitutional Court, and how the decision of a conciliation body under international law may be more binding for a Member State than a judgment of the ECJ: to talk about "limping monism" in this context (ibid., p. 57) is not a solution.
103. See, on that basis, the attempt to resolve the problem through new procedural steps, like the institution of a "conciliation court", proposed by Schmid, "From Pont d'Avignon to Ponte Vecchio. The resolution of constitutional conflicts between the European Union and the Member States through principles of public international law", EUI Working Papers Law No. 98/7, p. 49 et seq. It is difficult, however, to see how conciliation should be a remedy in a situation where a serious breach of national constitutional law has been established by the Constitutional Court, and how the decision of a conciliation body under international law may be more binding for a Member State than a judgment of the ECJ: to talk about "limping monism" in this context (ibid., p. 57) is not a solution.
104. For the interpretation of the constitution as a contractual process see Häberle, supra note 16, at 301; see also Pernice, "Gemeinschaftsverfassung und Grundrechtsschutz - Grundlagen, Bestand und Perspektiven", 43 NJW (1990), 2409 at 2410 et seq.
105. See Kirchhof, "Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht", in EuR Beiheft 1/1991, p. 11 at 13; Zuleeg, "What holds the nation together? Cohesion and democracy in the United States of America and in the European Union", 45 AJCL (1997), 505 at 507; Rodriguez Iglesias, "Gedanken zum Entstehen einer Europäischen Rechtsordnung", 52 NJW (1999), 1 at 2, stating that the constitution-making power in the EU remains with the Member States.
106. See Kirchhof, "Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht", in EuR Beiheft 1/1991, p. 11 at 13; Zuleeg, "What holds the nation together? Cohesion and democracy in the United States of America and in the European Union", 45 AJCL (1997), 505 at 507; Rodriguez Iglesias, "Gedanken zum Entstehen einer Europäischen Rechtsordnung", 52 NJW (1999), 1 at 2, stating that the constitution-making power in the EU remains with the Member States.
107. See Kirchhof, "Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht", in EuR Beiheft 1/1991, p. 11 at 13; Zuleeg, "What holds the nation together? Cohesion and democracy in the United States of America and in the European Union", 45 AJCL (1997), 505 at 507; Rodriguez Iglesias, "Gedanken zum Entstehen einer Europäischen Rechtsordnung", 52 NJW (1999), 1 at 2, stating that the constitution-making power in the EU remains with the Member States.
108. Van Gend en Loos, supra note 27, emphasis added.
109. Art. 88-1 of the French Constitution: "la République", Art. 88-2: "La France"; Art. 29 III and IV of the Irish Constitution: "The state"; Art. 11 of the Italian Constitution: "Italy . . . with other states"; Art. 7 VI of the Portugese Constitution: "Portugal".
110. Art. 93 of the Spanish Constitution: "mediante la ley orgánica", Art. 9 II of the Austrian Constitution: "by law or agreement", idem: Art. 34 of the Belgian Constitution, Art. 28 §2 of the Greek Constitution, Art. 69 I of the Finish Parliamentary Act, §20 I and II of the Danish Constitution with the distinction of the "bill" which delegates powers, and the "agreement" by which "the international authorities" are set up, Chapt. 10 §5 I of the Swedish Constitution: "The Riksdag may entrust".
111. Art. 49bis of the Luxembourg Constitution.
112. Art. 92 of the Duch Constitution: "krachtens verdrag".
113. See Arts. 11 II of the Italian, 28 III of the Greek Constitution; Para 15 of the Preamble to the French Constitution.
114. Art. 9 II of the Austrian Constitution.
115. See Art. 92 of the Dutch Constitution (1983), §20 I of the Danish and Art. 34 of the Belgian Constitution (1993/94), Art. 49 of the Luxembourg Constitution, Art. 93 of the Spanish Constitution.
116. See Art. 49 of the Luxembourg Constitution, §201 of the Danish Constitution, Art. 93 of the Spanish Constitution.
117. See Art. 23 of the German Constitution, Art. 7 VI of the Portugese Constitution, Art. 88-1 of the French Constitution, Chapt. 10 §5 of the Swedish Constitution.
118. See Art. 11 of the Italian Constitution.
119. For details see Pernice, supra note 40, at note 10. For further references see the contributions in FIDE (Ed.), Le droit constitutionnel national et l'intégration européenne (1996).
120. See for the position of the French Conseil Constitutionnel on the Treaty of Amsterdam (Decision No. 97-394 of 31 Dec. 1997, Recueil 1997, 344) Gundel, "Die Kontrolle der europäischen Integration durch den französischen Verfassungsrat", 33 EuR (1998), 371; comparing with the German Constitutional Court's position, see Hecker, "Die europäische Integration vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht", 123 AöR (1998), 577, and Graf Vitzthum, "Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsvergleichende Aspekte", 53 JZ (1998), 161 at 163 et seq.; Dutheil de la Rochère, "Les implications constitutionnelles pour un Etat de la participation à un processus d'intégration régionale", 50 Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé (1998), 577 at 591 et seq., and "The French Conseil Constitutionnel and the Constitutional Development of the European Union" in Kloepfer and Pernice (Eds.) op. cit. supra note 8. For the revision of the French Constitution dated 25 Jan. 1999 cf. Journal Officiel No. 21 du 26 Janvier 1999, p. 1343.
121. See for the position of the French Conseil Constitutionnel on the Treaty of Amsterdam (Decision No. 97-394 of 31 Dec. 1997, Recueil 1997, 344) Gundel, "Die Kontrolle der europäischen Integration durch den französischen Verfassungsrat", 33 EuR (1998), 371; comparing with the German Constitutional Court's position, see Hecker, "Die europäische Integration vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht", 123 AöR (1998), 577, and Graf Vitzthum, "Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsvergleichende Aspekte", 53 JZ (1998), 161 at 163 et seq.; Dutheil de la Rochère, "Les implications constitutionnelles pour un Etat de la participation à un processus d'intégration régionale", 50 Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé (1998), 577 at 591 et seq., and "The French Conseil Constitutionnel and the Constitutional Development of the European Union" in Kloepfer and Pernice (Eds.) op. cit. supra note 8. For the revision of the French Constitution dated 25 Jan. 1999 cf. Journal Officiel No. 21 du 26 Janvier 1999, p. 1343.
122. See for the position of the French Conseil Constitutionnel on the Treaty of Amsterdam (Decision No. 97-394 of 31 Dec. 1997, Recueil 1997, 344) Gundel, "Die Kontrolle der europäischen Integration durch den französischen Verfassungsrat", 33 EuR (1998), 371; comparing with the German Constitutional Court's position, see Hecker, "Die europäische Integration vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht", 123 AöR (1998), 577, and Graf Vitzthum, "Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsvergleichende Aspekte", 53 JZ (1998), 161 at 163 et seq.; Dutheil de la Rochère, "Les implications constitutionnelles pour un Etat de la participation à un processus d'intégration régionale", 50 Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé (1998), 577 at 591 et seq., and "The French Conseil Constitutionnel and the Constitutional Development of the European Union" in Kloepfer and Pernice (Eds.) op. cit. supra note 8. For the revision of the French Constitution dated 25 Jan. 1999 cf. Journal Officiel No. 21 du 26 Janvier 1999, p. 1343.
123. See for the position of the French Conseil Constitutionnel on the Treaty of Amsterdam (Decision No. 97-394 of 31 Dec. 1997, Recueil 1997, 344) Gundel, "Die Kontrolle der europäischen Integration durch den französischen Verfassungsrat", 33 EuR (1998), 371; comparing with the German Constitutional Court's position, see Hecker, "Die europäische Integration vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht", 123 AöR (1998), 577, and Graf Vitzthum, "Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsvergleichende Aspekte", 53 JZ (1998), 161 at 163 et seq.; Dutheil de la Rochère, "Les implications constitutionnelles pour un Etat de la participation à un processus d'intégration régionale", 50 Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé (1998), 577 at 591 et seq., and "The French Conseil Constitutionnel and the Constitutional Development of the European Union" in Kloepfer and Pernice (Eds.) op. cit. supra note 8. For the revision of the French Constitution dated 25 Jan. 1999 cf. Journal Officiel No. 21 du 26 Janvier 1999, p. 1343.
124. See for the position of the French Conseil Constitutionnel on the Treaty of Amsterdam (Decision No. 97-394 of 31 Dec. 1997, Recueil 1997, 344) Gundel, "Die Kontrolle der europäischen Integration durch den französischen Verfassungsrat", 33 EuR (1998), 371; comparing with the German Constitutional Court's position, see Hecker, "Die europäische Integration vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht", 123 AöR (1998), 577, and Graf Vitzthum, "Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsvergleichende Aspekte", 53 JZ (1998), 161 at 163 et seq.; Dutheil de la Rochère, "Les implications constitutionnelles pour un Etat de la participation à un processus d'intégration régionale", 50 Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé (1998), 577 at 591 et seq., and "The French Conseil Constitutionnel and the Constitutional Development of the European Union" in Kloepfer and Pernice (Eds.) op. cit. supra note 8. For the revision of the French Constitution dated 25 Jan. 1999 cf. Journal Officiel No. 21 du 26 Janvier 1999, p. 1343.
125. See for the position of the French Conseil Constitutionnel on the Treaty of Amsterdam (Decision No. 97-394 of 31 Dec. 1997, Recueil 1997, 344) Gundel, "Die Kontrolle der europäischen Integration durch den französischen Verfassungsrat", 33 EuR (1998), 371; comparing with the German Constitutional Court's position, see Hecker, "Die europäische Integration vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht", 123 AöR (1998), 577, and Graf Vitzthum, "Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsvergleichende Aspekte", 53 JZ (1998), 161 at 163 et seq.; Dutheil de la Rochère, "Les implications constitutionnelles pour un Etat de la participation à un processus d'intégration régionale", 50 Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé (1998), 577 at 591 et seq., and "The French Conseil Constitutionnel and the Constitutional Development of the European Union" in Kloepfer and Pernice (Eds.) op. cit. supra note 8. For the revision of the French Constitution dated 25 Jan. 1999 cf. Journal Officiel No. 21 du 26 Janvier 1999, p. 1343.
126. Rodriguez Iglesias, supra note 48, at 3.
127. See Pernice, "Die Dritte Gewalt im europäischen Verfassungsverbund, 31 EuR (1996), 27 at 30 et seq., and supra note 40, at point 21, with further references in point 128; see also Kadelbach, "Einheit der Rechtsordnung als Verfassungsprinzip der Europäischen Union", in von Bogdandy and Ehlermann, op. cit. supra note 6, p. 51 at 58; using the term "Gesamtakt" with regard to the European citizens see also von Bogdandy, supra note 40, at 173 et seq. When Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (1972), p. 58, uses the term "Gesamtakt mitgliedstaatlicher Integrationsgewalt", he still puts too much emphasis on the State instead of the peoples.
128. See Pernice, "Die Dritte Gewalt im europäischen Verfassungsverbund, 31 EuR (1996), 27 at 30 et seq., and supra note 40, at point 21, with further references in point 128; see also Kadelbach, "Einheit der Rechtsordnung als Verfassungsprinzip der Europäischen Union", in von Bogdandy and Ehlermann, op. cit. supra note 6, p. 51 at 58; using the term "Gesamtakt" with regard to the European citizens see also von Bogdandy, supra note 40, at 173 et seq. When Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (1972), p. 58, uses the term "Gesamtakt mitgliedstaatlicher Integrationsgewalt", he still puts too much emphasis on the State instead of the peoples.
129. See Pernice, "Die Dritte Gewalt im europäischen Verfassungsverbund, 31 EuR (1996), 27 at 30 et seq., and supra note 40, at point 21, with further references in point 128; see also Kadelbach, "Einheit der Rechtsordnung als Verfassungsprinzip der Europäischen Union", in von Bogdandy and Ehlermann, op. cit. supra note 6, p. 51 at 58; using the term "Gesamtakt" with regard to the European citizens see also von Bogdandy, supra note 40, at 173 et seq. When Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (1972), p. 58, uses the term "Gesamtakt mitgliedstaatlicher Integrationsgewalt", he still puts too much emphasis on the State instead of the peoples.
130. See supra note 24.
131. See also de Witte, "Sovereignty and European Integration: the Weight of Legal Tradition", in Slaughter, Stone, Sweet and Weiler (Eds.), The European Court and National Courts - Doctrine and Jurisprudence (1998), p. 277 at 285.
132. Ipsen, supra note 63, at 58; for the expression "mutiert" see also Ipsen, "Als Bundesstaat in der Gemeinschaft", in Caemmerer et al. (Eds.), Probleme des europäischen Rechts. Festschrift Walter Hallstein (1966), p. 248 at 264; equally Tomuschat, "Die staatsrechtliche Entscheidung für die internationale Offenheit", in Isensee and Kirchhof (Eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. VII (1995), §172 point 72: "Mutation der Staatsverfassung durch Integration". Examples regarding the German Constitution are given in Pernice, supra note 10, at 54 et seq.
133. Ipsen, supra note 63, at 58; for the expression "mutiert" see also Ipsen, "Als Bundesstaat in der Gemeinschaft", in Caemmerer et al. (Eds.), Probleme des europäischen Rechts. Festschrift Walter Hallstein (1966), p. 248 at 264; equally Tomuschat, "Die staatsrechtliche Entscheidung für die internationale Offenheit", in Isensee and Kirchhof (Eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. VII (1995), §172 point 72: "Mutation der Staatsverfassung durch Integration". Examples regarding the German Constitution are given in Pernice, supra note 10, at 54 et seq.
134. As recently required by the French Constitutional Court for the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 61.
135. Further developed with references in Pernice, supra note 40, at point 22.
136. BVerfGE 89, 155 Maastricht. This judgment has been strongly criticized. See the recent comments by Ehmke, "Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europa", 21 Integration (1998), 168; Graf Vitzthum, "Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsvergleichende Aspekte", 54 JZ (1998), 161, comparing this jurisprudence with the much more appropriate concept of the French Conseil Constitutionnel (at 163 et seq.); Steinberger, supra note 13, at 1316, 1324, 1330; Hirsch, "Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht - Kooperation oder Konfrontation?", 49 NJW (1996), 2457; with the perspective that this jurisprudence could apply only in very unlikely extreme situations, Hirsch, "Kompetenzverteilung zwischen EuGH und nationaler Gerichtsbarkeit", 17 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (1998), 907 at 909; similarly Schwarze, "Das schwierige Geschäft mit Europa und seinem Recht", 53 JZ (1998), 1077 at 1082 et seq. More restrictively, with specific procedural requirements, see Pernice, supra note 40, at point 29; see also Everson, "Beyond the Bundesverfassungsgericht: On the necessary cunning of constitutional reasoning", 4 ELJ (1998), 389 at 391 et seq.; see also the overview of Grimm, "The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German Constitutional Perspective after the Maastricht Decision", 3 Columbia Journal of European Law (1997), 229 at 235, where Grimm, judge at the Constitutional Court (though not at the senate that decided Maastricht), states that "constitutional complaints and references to the German Constitutional Court by lower courts alleging a violation of fundamental rights by the Community in an individual case are, for the moment, inadmissible". For the quite destructive conclusions drawn from the judgment see the comments on the judgment in Case C-170/96 Commission v. Council, [1997] ECR I-2763, of Pechstein, 53 JZ (1998), 1008 at 1009: "ultra vires" and void; as to the judgment in Case C-24/95, Alcan, [1997] ECR I-1591, see the comments of Scholz, "Zum Verhältnis von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht", 51 DÖV (1998), 261 at 264 et seq.: void and inapplicable in Germany (commented by Frowein, "Kritische Bemerkungen zur Lage des deutschen Staatsrechts aus rechtsvergleichender Sicht", 51 DÖV (1998), 807 at 808, as "contempt of court"). Supporting the Maastricht Decision and developing further the concept of "cooperation" between the ECJ and national Courts with regard to the question of supremacy Kirchhof, "Die Gewaltenbalance zwischen staatlichen und europäischen Organen", 53 JZ (1998), 965.
137. BVerfGE 89, 155 Maastricht. This judgment has been strongly criticized. See the recent comments by Ehmke, "Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europa", 21 Integration (1998), 168; Graf Vitzthum, "Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsvergleichende Aspekte", 54 JZ (1998), 161, comparing this jurisprudence with the much more appropriate concept of the French Conseil Constitutionnel (at 163 et seq.); Steinberger, supra note 13, at 1316, 1324, 1330; Hirsch, "Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht - Kooperation oder Konfrontation?", 49 NJW (1996), 2457; with the perspective that this jurisprudence could apply only in very unlikely extreme situations, Hirsch, "Kompetenzverteilung zwischen EuGH und nationaler Gerichtsbarkeit", 17 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (1998), 907 at 909; similarly Schwarze, "Das schwierige Geschäft mit Europa und seinem Recht", 53 JZ (1998), 1077 at 1082 et seq. More restrictively, with specific procedural requirements, see Pernice, supra note 40, at point 29; see also Everson, "Beyond the Bundesverfassungsgericht: On the necessary cunning of constitutional reasoning", 4 ELJ (1998), 389 at 391 et seq.; see also the overview of Grimm, "The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German Constitutional Perspective after the Maastricht Decision", 3 Columbia Journal of European Law (1997), 229 at 235, where Grimm, judge at the Constitutional Court (though not at the senate that decided Maastricht), states that "constitutional complaints and references to the German Constitutional Court by lower courts alleging a violation of fundamental rights by the Community in an individual case are, for the moment, inadmissible". For the quite destructive conclusions drawn from the judgment see the comments on the judgment in Case C-170/96 Commission v. Council, [1997] ECR I-2763, of Pechstein, 53 JZ (1998), 1008 at 1009: "ultra vires" and void; as to the judgment in Case C-24/95, Alcan, [1997] ECR I-1591, see the comments of Scholz, "Zum Verhältnis von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht", 51 DÖV (1998), 261 at 264 et seq.: void and inapplicable in Germany (commented by Frowein, "Kritische Bemerkungen zur Lage des deutschen Staatsrechts aus rechtsvergleichender Sicht", 51 DÖV (1998), 807 at 808, as "contempt of court"). Supporting the Maastricht Decision and developing further the concept of "cooperation" between the ECJ and national Courts with regard to the question of supremacy Kirchhof, "Die Gewaltenbalance zwischen staatlichen und europäischen Organen", 53 JZ (1998), 965.
138. BVerfGE 89, 155 Maastricht. This judgment has been strongly criticized. See the recent comments by Ehmke, "Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europa", 21 Integration (1998), 168; Graf Vitzthum, "Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsvergleichende Aspekte", 54 JZ (1998), 161, comparing this jurisprudence with the much more appropriate concept of the French Conseil Constitutionnel (at 163 et seq.); Steinberger, supra note 13, at 1316, 1324, 1330; Hirsch, "Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht - Kooperation oder Konfrontation?", 49 NJW (1996), 2457; with the perspective that this jurisprudence could apply only in very unlikely extreme situations, Hirsch, "Kompetenzverteilung zwischen EuGH und nationaler Gerichtsbarkeit", 17 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (1998), 907 at 909; similarly Schwarze, "Das schwierige Geschäft mit Europa und seinem Recht", 53 JZ (1998), 1077 at 1082 et seq. More restrictively, with specific procedural requirements, see Pernice, supra note 40, at point 29; see also Everson, "Beyond the Bundesverfassungsgericht: On the necessary cunning of constitutional reasoning", 4 ELJ (1998), 389 at 391 et seq.; see also the overview of Grimm, "The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German Constitutional Perspective after the Maastricht Decision", 3 Columbia Journal of European Law (1997), 229 at 235, where Grimm, judge at the Constitutional Court (though not at the senate that decided Maastricht), states that "constitutional complaints and references to the German Constitutional Court by lower courts alleging a violation of fundamental rights by the Community in an individual case are, for the moment, inadmissible". For the quite destructive conclusions drawn from the judgment see the comments on the judgment in Case C-170/96 Commission v. Council, [1997] ECR I-2763, of Pechstein, 53 JZ (1998), 1008 at 1009: "ultra vires" and void; as to the judgment in Case C-24/95, Alcan, [1997] ECR I-1591, see the comments of Scholz, "Zum Verhältnis von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht", 51 DÖV (1998), 261 at 264 et seq.: void and inapplicable in Germany (commented by Frowein, "Kritische Bemerkungen zur Lage des deutschen Staatsrechts aus rechtsvergleichender Sicht", 51 DÖV (1998), 807 at 808, as "contempt of court"). Supporting the Maastricht Decision and developing further the concept of "cooperation" between the ECJ and national Courts with regard to the question of supremacy Kirchhof, "Die Gewaltenbalance zwischen staatlichen und europäischen Organen", 53 JZ (1998), 965.
139. BVerfGE 89, 155 Maastricht. This judgment has been strongly criticized. See the recent comments by Ehmke, "Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europa", 21 Integration (1998), 168; Graf Vitzthum, "Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsvergleichende Aspekte", 54 JZ (1998), 161, comparing this jurisprudence with the much more appropriate concept of the French Conseil Constitutionnel (at 163 et seq.); Steinberger, supra note 13, at 1316, 1324, 1330; Hirsch, "Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht - Kooperation oder Konfrontation?", 49 NJW (1996), 2457; with the perspective that this jurisprudence could apply only in very unlikely extreme situations, Hirsch, "Kompetenzverteilung zwischen EuGH und nationaler Gerichtsbarkeit", 17 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (1998), 907 at 909; similarly Schwarze, "Das schwierige Geschäft mit Europa und seinem Recht", 53 JZ (1998), 1077 at 1082 et seq. More restrictively, with specific procedural requirements, see Pernice, supra note 40, at point 29; see also Everson, "Beyond the Bundesverfassungsgericht: On the necessary cunning of constitutional reasoning", 4 ELJ (1998), 389 at 391 et seq.; see also the overview of Grimm, "The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German Constitutional Perspective after the Maastricht Decision", 3 Columbia Journal of European Law (1997), 229 at 235, where Grimm, judge at the Constitutional Court (though not at the senate that decided Maastricht), states that "constitutional complaints and references to the German Constitutional Court by lower courts alleging a violation of fundamental rights by the Community in an individual case are, for the moment, inadmissible". For the quite destructive conclusions drawn from the judgment see the comments on the judgment in Case C-170/96 Commission v. Council, [1997] ECR I-2763, of Pechstein, 53 JZ (1998), 1008 at 1009: "ultra vires" and void; as to the judgment in Case C-24/95, Alcan, [1997] ECR I-1591, see the comments of Scholz, "Zum Verhältnis von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht", 51 DÖV (1998), 261 at 264 et seq.: void and inapplicable in Germany (commented by Frowein, "Kritische Bemerkungen zur Lage des deutschen Staatsrechts aus rechtsvergleichender Sicht", 51 DÖV (1998), 807 at 808, as "contempt of court"). Supporting the Maastricht Decision and developing further the concept of "cooperation" between the ECJ and national Courts with regard to the question of supremacy Kirchhof, "Die Gewaltenbalance zwischen staatlichen und europäischen Organen", 53 JZ (1998), 965.
140. BVerfGE 89, 155 Maastricht. This judgment has been strongly criticized. See the recent comments by Ehmke, "Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europa", 21 Integration (1998), 168; Graf Vitzthum, "Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsvergleichende Aspekte", 54 JZ (1998), 161, comparing this jurisprudence with the much more appropriate concept of the French Conseil Constitutionnel (at 163 et seq.); Steinberger, supra note 13, at 1316, 1324, 1330; Hirsch, "Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht - Kooperation oder Konfrontation?", 49 NJW (1996), 2457; with the perspective that this jurisprudence could apply only in very unlikely extreme situations, Hirsch, "Kompetenzverteilung zwischen EuGH und nationaler Gerichtsbarkeit", 17 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (1998), 907 at 909; similarly Schwarze, "Das schwierige Geschäft mit Europa und seinem Recht", 53 JZ (1998), 1077 at 1082 et seq. More restrictively, with specific procedural requirements, see Pernice, supra note 40, at point 29; see also Everson, "Beyond the Bundesverfassungsgericht: On the necessary cunning of constitutional reasoning", 4 ELJ (1998), 389 at 391 et seq.; see also the overview of Grimm, "The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German Constitutional Perspective after the Maastricht Decision", 3 Columbia Journal of European Law (1997), 229 at 235, where Grimm, judge at the Constitutional Court (though not at the senate that decided Maastricht), states that "constitutional complaints and references to the German Constitutional Court by lower courts alleging a violation of fundamental rights by the Community in an individual case are, for the moment, inadmissible". For the quite destructive conclusions drawn from the judgment see the comments on the judgment in Case C-170/96 Commission v. Council, [1997] ECR I-2763, of Pechstein, 53 JZ (1998), 1008 at 1009: "ultra vires" and void; as to the judgment in Case C-24/95, Alcan, [1997] ECR I-1591, see the comments of Scholz, "Zum Verhältnis von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht", 51 DÖV (1998), 261 at 264 et seq.: void and inapplicable in Germany (commented by Frowein, "Kritische Bemerkungen zur Lage des deutschen Staatsrechts aus rechtsvergleichender Sicht", 51 DÖV (1998), 807 at 808, as "contempt of court"). Supporting the Maastricht Decision and developing further the concept of "cooperation" between the ECJ and national Courts with regard to the question of supremacy Kirchhof, "Die Gewaltenbalance zwischen staatlichen und europäischen Organen", 53 JZ (1998), 965.
141. BVerfGE 89, 155 Maastricht. This judgment has been strongly criticized. See the recent comments by Ehmke, "Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europa", 21 Integration (1998), 168; Graf Vitzthum, "Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsvergleichende Aspekte", 54 JZ (1998), 161, comparing this jurisprudence with the much more appropriate concept of the French Conseil Constitutionnel (at 163 et seq.); Steinberger, supra note 13, at 1316, 1324, 1330; Hirsch, "Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht - Kooperation oder Konfrontation?", 49 NJW (1996), 2457; with the perspective that this jurisprudence could apply only in very unlikely extreme situations, Hirsch, "Kompetenzverteilung zwischen EuGH und nationaler Gerichtsbarkeit", 17 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (1998), 907 at 909; similarly Schwarze, "Das schwierige Geschäft mit Europa und seinem Recht", 53 JZ (1998), 1077 at 1082 et seq. More restrictively, with specific procedural requirements, see Pernice, supra note 40, at point 29; see also Everson, "Beyond the Bundesverfassungsgericht: On the necessary cunning of constitutional reasoning", 4 ELJ (1998), 389 at 391 et seq.; see also the overview of Grimm, "The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German Constitutional Perspective after the Maastricht Decision", 3 Columbia Journal of European Law (1997), 229 at 235, where Grimm, judge at the Constitutional Court (though not at the senate that decided Maastricht), states that "constitutional complaints and references to the German Constitutional Court by lower courts alleging a violation of fundamental rights by the Community in an individual case are, for the moment, inadmissible". For the quite destructive conclusions drawn from the judgment see the comments on the judgment in Case C-170/96 Commission v. Council, [1997] ECR I-2763, of Pechstein, 53 JZ (1998), 1008 at 1009: "ultra vires" and void; as to the judgment in Case C-24/95, Alcan, [1997] ECR I-1591, see the comments of Scholz, "Zum Verhältnis von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht", 51 DÖV (1998), 261 at 264 et seq.: void and inapplicable in Germany (commented by Frowein, "Kritische Bemerkungen zur Lage des deutschen Staatsrechts aus rechtsvergleichender Sicht", 51 DÖV (1998), 807 at 808, as "contempt of court"). Supporting the Maastricht Decision and developing further the concept of "cooperation" between the ECJ and national Courts with regard to the question of supremacy Kirchhof, "Die Gewaltenbalance zwischen staatlichen und europäischen Organen", 53 JZ (1998), 965.
142. BVerfGE 89, 155 Maastricht. This judgment has been strongly criticized. See the recent comments by Ehmke, "Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europa", 21 Integration (1998), 168; Graf Vitzthum, "Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsvergleichende Aspekte", 54 JZ (1998), 161, comparing this jurisprudence with the much more appropriate concept of the French Conseil Constitutionnel (at 163 et seq.); Steinberger, supra note 13, at 1316, 1324, 1330; Hirsch, "Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht - Kooperation oder Konfrontation?", 49 NJW (1996), 2457; with the perspective that this jurisprudence could apply only in very unlikely extreme situations, Hirsch, "Kompetenzverteilung zwischen EuGH und nationaler Gerichtsbarkeit", 17 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (1998), 907 at 909; similarly Schwarze, "Das schwierige Geschäft mit Europa und seinem Recht", 53 JZ (1998), 1077 at 1082 et seq. More restrictively, with specific procedural requirements, see Pernice, supra note 40, at point 29; see also Everson, "Beyond the Bundesverfassungsgericht: On the necessary cunning of constitutional reasoning", 4 ELJ (1998), 389 at 391 et seq.; see also the overview of Grimm, "The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German Constitutional Perspective after the Maastricht Decision", 3 Columbia Journal of European Law (1997), 229 at 235, where Grimm, judge at the Constitutional Court (though not at the senate that decided Maastricht), states that "constitutional complaints and references to the German Constitutional Court by lower courts alleging a violation of fundamental rights by the Community in an individual case are, for the moment, inadmissible". For the quite destructive conclusions drawn from the judgment see the comments on the judgment in Case C-170/96 Commission v. Council, [1997] ECR I-2763, of Pechstein, 53 JZ (1998), 1008 at 1009: "ultra vires" and void; as to the judgment in Case C-24/95, Alcan, [1997] ECR I-1591, see the comments of Scholz, "Zum Verhältnis von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht", 51 DÖV (1998), 261 at 264 et seq.: void and inapplicable in Germany (commented by Frowein, "Kritische Bemerkungen zur Lage des deutschen Staatsrechts aus rechtsvergleichender Sicht", 51 DÖV (1998), 807 at 808, as "contempt of court"). Supporting the Maastricht Decision and developing further the concept of "cooperation" between the ECJ and national Courts with regard to the question of supremacy Kirchhof, "Die Gewaltenbalance zwischen staatlichen und europäischen Organen", 53 JZ (1998), 965.
143. BVerfGE 89, 155 Maastricht. This judgment has been strongly criticized. See the recent comments by Ehmke, "Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europa", 21 Integration (1998), 168; Graf Vitzthum, "Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsvergleichende Aspekte", 54 JZ (1998), 161, comparing this jurisprudence with the much more appropriate concept of the French Conseil Constitutionnel (at 163 et seq.); Steinberger, supra note 13, at 1316, 1324, 1330; Hirsch, "Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht - Kooperation oder Konfrontation?", 49 NJW (1996), 2457; with the perspective that this jurisprudence could apply only in very unlikely extreme situations, Hirsch, "Kompetenzverteilung zwischen EuGH und nationaler Gerichtsbarkeit", 17 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (1998), 907 at 909; similarly Schwarze, "Das schwierige Geschäft mit Europa und seinem Recht", 53 JZ (1998), 1077 at 1082 et seq. More restrictively, with specific procedural requirements, see Pernice, supra note 40, at point 29; see also Everson, "Beyond the Bundesverfassungsgericht: On the necessary cunning of constitutional reasoning", 4 ELJ (1998), 389 at 391 et seq.; see also the overview of Grimm, "The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German Constitutional Perspective after the Maastricht Decision", 3 Columbia Journal of European Law (1997), 229 at 235, where Grimm, judge at the Constitutional Court (though not at the senate that decided Maastricht), states that "constitutional complaints and references to the German Constitutional Court by lower courts alleging a violation of fundamental rights by the Community in an individual case are, for the moment, inadmissible". For the quite destructive conclusions drawn from the judgment see the comments on the judgment in Case C-170/96 Commission v. Council, [1997] ECR I-2763, of Pechstein, 53 JZ (1998), 1008 at 1009: "ultra vires" and void; as to the judgment in Case C-24/95, Alcan, [1997] ECR I-1591, see the comments of Scholz, "Zum Verhältnis von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht", 51 DÖV (1998), 261 at 264 et seq.: void and inapplicable in Germany (commented by Frowein, "Kritische Bemerkungen zur Lage des deutschen Staatsrechts aus rechtsvergleichender Sicht", 51 DÖV (1998), 807 at 808, as "contempt of court"). Supporting the Maastricht Decision and developing further the concept of "cooperation" between the ECJ and national Courts with regard to the question of supremacy Kirchhof, "Die Gewaltenbalance zwischen staatlichen und europäischen Organen", 53 JZ (1998), 965.
144. BVerfGE 89, 155 Maastricht. This judgment has been strongly criticized. See the recent comments by Ehmke, "Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europa", 21 Integration (1998), 168; Graf Vitzthum, "Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsvergleichende Aspekte", 54 JZ (1998), 161, comparing this jurisprudence with the much more appropriate concept of the French Conseil Constitutionnel (at 163 et seq.); Steinberger, supra note 13, at 1316, 1324, 1330; Hirsch, "Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht - Kooperation oder Konfrontation?", 49 NJW (1996), 2457; with the perspective that this jurisprudence could apply only in very unlikely extreme situations, Hirsch, "Kompetenzverteilung zwischen EuGH und nationaler Gerichtsbarkeit", 17 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (1998), 907 at 909; similarly Schwarze, "Das schwierige Geschäft mit Europa und seinem Recht", 53 JZ (1998), 1077 at 1082 et seq. More restrictively, with specific procedural requirements, see Pernice, supra note 40, at point 29; see also Everson, "Beyond the Bundesverfassungsgericht: On the necessary cunning of constitutional reasoning", 4 ELJ (1998), 389 at 391 et seq.; see also the overview of Grimm, "The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German Constitutional Perspective after the Maastricht Decision", 3 Columbia Journal of European Law (1997), 229 at 235, where Grimm, judge at the Constitutional Court (though not at the senate that decided Maastricht), states that "constitutional complaints and references to the German Constitutional Court by lower courts alleging a violation of fundamental rights by the Community in an individual case are, for the moment, inadmissible". For the quite destructive conclusions drawn from the judgment see the comments on the judgment in Case C-170/96 Commission v. Council, [1997] ECR I-2763, of Pechstein, 53 JZ (1998), 1008 at 1009: "ultra vires" and void; as to the judgment in Case C-24/95, Alcan, [1997] ECR I-1591, see the comments of Scholz, "Zum Verhältnis von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht", 51 DÖV (1998), 261 at 264 et seq.: void and inapplicable in Germany (commented by Frowein, "Kritische Bemerkungen zur Lage des deutschen Staatsrechts aus rechtsvergleichender Sicht", 51 DÖV (1998), 807 at 808, as "contempt of court"). Supporting the Maastricht Decision and developing further the concept of "cooperation" between the ECJ and national Courts with regard to the question of supremacy Kirchhof, "Die Gewaltenbalance zwischen staatlichen und europäischen Organen", 53 JZ (1998), 965.
145. BVerfGE 89, 155 Maastricht. This judgment has been strongly criticized. See the recent comments by Ehmke, "Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europa", 21 Integration (1998), 168; Graf Vitzthum, "Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsvergleichende Aspekte", 54 JZ (1998), 161, comparing this jurisprudence with the much more appropriate concept of the French Conseil Constitutionnel (at 163 et seq.); Steinberger, supra note 13, at 1316, 1324, 1330; Hirsch, "Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht - Kooperation oder Konfrontation?", 49 NJW (1996), 2457; with the perspective that this jurisprudence could apply only in very unlikely extreme situations, Hirsch, "Kompetenzverteilung zwischen EuGH und nationaler Gerichtsbarkeit", 17 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (1998), 907 at 909; similarly Schwarze, "Das schwierige Geschäft mit Europa und seinem Recht", 53 JZ (1998), 1077 at 1082 et seq. More restrictively, with specific procedural requirements, see Pernice, supra note 40, at point 29; see also Everson, "Beyond the Bundesverfassungsgericht: On the necessary cunning of constitutional reasoning", 4 ELJ (1998), 389 at 391 et seq.; see also the overview of Grimm, "The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German Constitutional Perspective after the Maastricht Decision", 3 Columbia Journal of European Law (1997), 229 at 235, where Grimm, judge at the Constitutional Court (though not at the senate that decided Maastricht), states that "constitutional complaints and references to the German Constitutional Court by lower courts alleging a violation of fundamental rights by the Community in an individual case are, for the moment, inadmissible". For the quite destructive conclusions drawn from the judgment see the comments on the judgment in Case C-170/96 Commission v. Council, [1997] ECR I-2763, of Pechstein, 53 JZ (1998), 1008 at 1009: "ultra vires" and void; as to the judgment in Case C-24/95, Alcan, [1997] ECR I-1591, see the comments of Scholz, "Zum Verhältnis von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht", 51 DÖV (1998), 261 at 264 et
146. The Danish Supreme Court, supra note 26, at point 9.6, restricts this reservation to an "extraordinary situation" only; the importance of the judgment is stressed by Rasmussen, "Denmark's Maastricht Ratification Case: The Constitutional Dimension", in Jyränki (Ed.), National Constitutions in the era of Integration (1999), p. 87, at 96, 111. For the position of other national (Constitutional) Courts see the analysis of de Witte, supra note 65, who concludes that a number of them found a "fine-tuned balance between the requirements of European integration and state sovereignty" looking like a "peaceful coexistance".
147. See also the Resolution of the European Parliament (Report Alber) on the status of Community and International Law in the EC, A4-0278/97. An interesting comparative study on the relationship between International Law, Community Law and Constitutional Law of the Member States was published in 1995 by the European Parliament, Working Document Law Series W-6, 1995.
148. The concept of a "status" for the citizen of the Union as a basis for the rights and obligations under the Treaty, including Art. 12 (ex 6) EC has been recognized by the Court in Case C-85/96, Sala, [1998] ECR I-2691 at para 62. For the description of citizenship as a "symbol for a politically active life" and a legal status, "a status of membership in a community'", from a historical point of view, see Preuss, supra note 5, at 13 et seq., 19 et seq. Also Shaw, "The many pasts and futures of citizenship in the European Union", 22 EL Rev. (1997), 554, at 556, stresses the importance of the concept of Union citizenship for the "development of the status of the individual under Community law . . . ."
149. Preuss and Requejo (Eds.), "Preface and Acknowledgements", in European Citizenship, Multiculturalism, and the State (1998), p. 8.
150. This seems to have been the argument of the German Constitutional Court in its Maastricht Decision, case BVerfGE 89, 155 at 186; for a very thoughtful criticism on this concept see Bryde, "Le Peuple European and the European People", in Auer and Flauss (Eds.), Le Référendum Européen, Actes du colloque international de Strasbourg (1997), p. 251, at 256, with further references.
151. See von Simson, "Was heißt in einer europäischen Verfassung 'Das Volk'?", 26 EuR (1991), 1 at 3 et seq.
152. On the necessity of such conditions for a "multitude of individuals to become a nation", see Preuss, supra note 5, at 18 et seq.; he rightly points out: "The citizens must somehow 'belong' together", citizenship is the "'privilege' to rule one's equals and to be ruled by them" (ibid., at 22), stressing however, that in the European Union citizenship "is much less dependent upon the social and cultural homogeneity of the group who form the citizenry than it is in the context of a nation-state" (at 24), and indicating, at the end, that a pre-existing homogeneity is not a condition for common institutions, but "sometimes successful institutions are able to generate a successful political culture".
153. For this, from the historical perspective, see Stolleis, "Das 'europäische Haus* und seine Verfassung", 78 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (l995), 275 at 281 et seq.
154. Similarly Zuleeg, supra note 48, at 522. See also Ehmke, supra note 69, at 172, stressing the common political convictions of the Europeans. A "constitutional patriotism" based on the socialization of "a common political culture" is the concept also of Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung (1992), p. 632 et seq., p. 642; see especially., p. 636: "Die Staatsbürgernation (im Gegensatz zur Abstammungsgemeinschaft) findet ihre Identität nicht in ethnischkulturellen Gemeinsamkeiten, sondern in der Praxis von Bürgern, die ihre demokratischen Teilnahmeund Kommunikationsrechte aktiv ausüben". It is worthwile to note in this context, that "to safeguard the common values . . . of the Union" is the first objective to be pursued by the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union according to Art. 11(1) TEU (ex Art. J.1, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam). Similarly, Art. 16 (ex 7d) EC speaks about "the shared values of the Union".
155. German Constitutional Court, decision of 31 March 1998, 9 EuZW (1998), 279 at 282 et seq. and BVerfGE 97, 350.
156. See Herdegen, "Price stability and budgetary restraints in the Economic and Monetary Union: The law as guardian of economic wisdom", 35 CML Rev. (1998), 9 at 21.
157. See supra note 24.
158. See 2.4 infra.
159. Weiler supra note 21, at 384 et seq., 386.
160. This is the qualification given to it by the German Constitutional Court in the Maastricht judgment, case BVerfGE 89, 155 (Staatenverbund).
161. See already Everling, "Das Maastricht-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der Europäischen Union", (1994) Integration, 165 at 167 and 169. See also Schwarze, "Rechtsgemeinschaft und Institutionalisierung", in Hrbek and Schwarz (Eds.), 40 Jahre Römische Verträge: Der deutsche Beitrag. Dokumentation der Konferenz anläßlich des 90. Geburtstags von Dr. h.c. Hans von der Groeben (1998), p. 214, at 217.
162. See already Everling, "Das Maastricht-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der Europäischen Union", (1994) Integration, 165 at 167 and 169. See also Schwarze, "Rechtsgemeinschaft und Institutionalisierung", in Hrbek and Schwarz (Eds.), 40 Jahre Römische Verträge: Der deutsche Beitrag. Dokumentation der Konferenz anläßlich des 90. Geburtstags von Dr. h.c. Hans von der Groeben (1998), p. 214, at 217.
163. Cf. also Preuss and Requejo, supra note 73, at 8. For a critical analysis of the relationship between citizenship and nationality, decoupling the two concepts and introducing the idea of "coexisting multiple demoi", cf. Weiler, supra note 3, at 236 et seq., 246 et seq.
164. See Shaw, supra note 72, at 561 for further references, looking for new new ways to ensure its cohesiveness.
165. G. Jellinek, System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte, 2nd ed. (1919), p. 86 et seq. For a modern revision of this concept, see Häberle, "Grundrechte im Leistungsstaat", in 30 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (1972), at 43, at 80 et seq. As far as I can see, the doctrine of "status" has been applied to European law for the first time by Reich, supra note 11, at 136 et seq., 163 et seq.
166. G. Jellinek, System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte, 2nd ed. (1919), p. 86 et seq. For a modern revision of this concept, see Häberle, "Grundrechte im Leistungsstaat", in 30 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (1972), at 43, at 80 et seq. As far as I can see, the doctrine of "status" has been applied to European law for the first time by Reich, supra note 11, at 136 et seq., 163 et seq.
167. For this aspect of judge-made law in the EC see Pernice, supra note 63, at 38 et seq.: "law-making as communicative process".
168. Case BVerfGE 89, 155 at 194 et seq. - Maastricht: "Mit der durch den Vertrag von Maastricht begründeten Unionsbürgerschaft wird zwischen den Staatsangehörigen der Mitgliedstaaten ein auf Dauer angelegtes rechtliches Band geknüpft, das zwar nicht eine der gemeinsamen Zugehörigkeit zu einem Staat vergleichbare Dichte besitzt, dem bestehenden Maß existentieller Gemeinsamkeit jedoch einen rechtlich verbindlichen Ausdruck verleiht".
169. Case BVerfGE 89, 155 at 195 et seq. - Maastricht. For the perspectives of development of the required conditions see Steinberger, supra note 13, at 1329.
170. Underlining the constitutive function of Art. 191 (ex 138a) EC compared with Art. 21 of the German Constitution, see Neßler, "Deutsche und europäische Parteien", 25 EuGRZ (1998), 191 et seq. See also Tsatsos, "Europäische politische Parteien?", 21 EuGRZ (1994), 45.
171. Underlining the constitutive function of Art. 191 (ex 138a) EC compared with Art. 21 of the German Constitution, see Neßler, "Deutsche und europäische Parteien", 25 EuGRZ (1998), 191 et seq. See also Tsatsos, "Europäische politische Parteien?", 21 EuGRZ (1994), 45.
172. Schwarze, supra note 69, at 1088: "symbiotische Verflechtung"; similarly Rodrigues Iglesias, supra note 48, at 8: "enge Verflechtung".
173. See for a description in detail Pernice, supra note 10, at 45 et seq.
174. For the German Constitutional Court, see its judgment in case BVerfGE 73, 339 -Solange II, at 366 et seq., stating that the constitutional guarantee of access to justice (Art. 101 §1 of the Constitution) extends to Art. 234 (ex 177) EC, thus acces to the ECJ is part of the German system of legal protection.
175. As was recently pointed out by Judge Hirsch, cf. Hirsch, supra note 69, at 910. See also Temple Lang, "The Duties of National Courts under Community Constitutional Law", 22 EL Rev. (1997), 3: "Every national court in the European Community is now a Community law court".
176. Kingreen and Störmer, "Die subjektiv-öffentlichen Recht des primären Gemeinschaftsrechts", 33 EuR (1998), 263 at 279.
177. For this parallel obligation regarding the direct effect of directives, see Case 103/88, Fratelli Costanzo, [1989] ECR 1839 at 1871.
178. See Cases 5/88, Wachauf, [1989] ECR 2609; C-260/89, ERT, [1991] ECR I-2925; Case C-351/92, Graff, [1994] ECR I-3361. For a recent overview on the subject, cf. Baumgartner, EU-Mitgliedschaft und Grundrechtsschutz (1997), p. 186 et seq.
179. As to the possible consequence of a double loyalty of the civil servants concerned, see Pernice, supra note 47, at 2417.
180. This is the view of the German Constitutional Court in case BVerfGE 89, 155, at 187 and 191 Maastricht. 102. See e.g. Art. 23 §2 and 3 of the German Constitution, Art. 6 §22 of the Danish Act of Accession (1972), and Art. 23e of the Austrian Constitution. More comparative references and details in Pernice, supra note 40, at point 13.
181. See Declaration No. 14 to the Treaty of Maastricht. After Amsterdam, the cooperation is adressed in part II of the Protocol No. 9 to the TEU.
182. Chapt. 10 §5 of the Swedish Constitution. Art. 28 §3 of the Greek Constitution excludes the possibility that human rights or the democratic system in Greece be affected.
183. Art. 7 §6 of the Constitution of Portugal: "tendo em vista a realização da coesão económica e social".
184. Art. 11 §2 of the Italian Constitution, Art. 28 III of the Greek Constitution.
185. Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity (14/15 Dec. 1973), (1974) EA, D 54; see also the criteria laid down by the Copenhagen Summit on 22 and 23 June 1993, EC Bulletin 1993, 13 et seq.
186. See also the statement of the French President Chirac in his speech at the World Congress for Nature in Fontainebleau, 3 Nov. 1998, http://www.ELYSEE.fr.discours/according to which the first obstacle to cope with the global environmental proplems is "la volonté des Etats de préserver, dans ce domaine, une conception dépassée de leur souveraineté. . . L'interdépendance appelle des mécanismes régulateurs universels, des dispositifs impartiaux et efficaces de mise en oeuvre et de contrôle des engagements pris".
187. A constitutional pressure with homogenizing effects seems to be exercised by the US Supreme Court on the States, cf. Briffault, "Paradoxes of Federalism", in Pernice (Ed.) Harmonization of Legislation in Federal Systems (1996), p. 53 et seq.
188. See also, as an expression of the underlying rule, Art. 175(4) (ex 130s) EC; for the comparison with the federal system of the U.S. where the resulting "commandeering" and unfunded mandates would be contrary to the guiding principles, see Briffault supra note 109, at 51, referring to the case New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992), and to the "Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995", P.L. 104-4. See also Bermann, "Constitution-making by jurisprudence: The role of the courts in divided power systems", in Walter Hallstein-Institut op. cit. supra note 8.
189. So developed by Kirchhof, supra note 69, at 973 et seq.
190. See section 2.3 supra. For the application of a specific procedure of political litigation in such a case of extreme hardship in analogy to Art. 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, see Pernice, supra note 40, points 29 and 31.
191. After its 1984 proposal of a constitution under the label of a treaty project for a European Union (Spinelli report), the European Parliament gave up this approach. For the (alternative) solution of a consolidation of the Treaties in order to create more coherence and transparency, see the proposals by Bieber (Centre de Droit Comparé, Lausanne), European Parliament Working Document Political Series W-16 and W-17; Ehlermann and von Bogdandy, A Unified and Simplified Model of the European Communities Treaties and the Treaty on European Union in Just One Treaty. Report for the European Parliament, Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute (1996), available at http://www.iue.it/RSC/TREATY/Welco-fr.html, both prepared at the request of the European Parliament; see also the report of CELS Cambridge, directed by Dashwood and Ward, "E.C. Treaty Project", 22 EL Rev. (1995), 395; for an overview and critical analysis:
192. After its 1984 proposal of a constitution under the label of a treaty project for a European Union (Spinelli report), the European Parliament gave up this approach. For the (alternative) solution of a consolidation of the Treaties in order to create more coherence and transparency, see the proposals by Bieber (Centre de Droit Comparé, Lausanne), European Parliament Working Document Political Series W-16 and W-17; Ehlermann and von Bogdandy, A Unified and Simplified Model of the European Communities Treaties and the Treaty on European Union in Just One Treaty. Report for the European Parliament, Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute (1996), available at http://www.iue.it/RSC/TREATY/Welco-fr.html, both prepared at the request of the European Parliament; see also the report of CELS Cambridge, directed by Dashwood and Ward, "E.C. Treaty Project", 22 EL Rev. (1995), 395; for an overview and critical analysis:
193. After its 1984 proposal of a constitution under the label of a treaty project for a European Union (Spinelli report), the European Parliament gave up this approach. For the (alternative) solution of a consolidation of the Treaties in order to create more coherence and transparency, see the proposals by Bieber (Centre de Droit Comparé, Lausanne), European Parliament Working Document Political Series W-16 and W-17; Ehlermann and von Bogdandy, A Unified and Simplified Model of the European Communities Treaties and the Treaty on European Union in Just One Treaty. Report for the European Parliament, Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute (1996), available at http://www.iue.it/RSC/TREATY/Welco-fr.html, both prepared at the request of the European Parliament; see also the report of CELS Cambridge, directed by Dashwood and Ward, "E.C. Treaty Project", 22 EL Rev. (1995), 395; for an overview and critical analysis:
194. Schmidt, "Konsolidierung und Vereinfachung des europäischen Primärrechts - wissenschaftliche Modelle, aktueller Stand und Perspektiven", in von Bogdandy and Ehlermann (Eds.), op cit. supra note 6, at p. 17.
195. The risks of such a step (backwards) are described by Weiler, "The case against the case for statehood", 4 ELJ (1998), 43.
196. See para 11 of the Preamble to the Treaty of Amsterdam. See also the reiteration of the objective in Art. 2(1) (ex B) TEU and Art. 2 and 3 lit.c) EC as a means for the promotion of economic and social progress, a high level of employment, a balanced and sustainable development etc. Monar, "Justice and Home Affairs in the Treaty of Amsterdam: Reform at the price of fragmentation", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 320 at 323, does not see that this new objective adds anything to the Treaty objective of free movement. For a general evaluation of the new provisions regarding pillar three, see Tezcan, "La coopération dans les domaines de la justice et des affaires intérieures dans le cadre de l'Union européenne et le traité d'Amsterdam", 34 CDE (1998), 661.
197. See para 11 of the Preamble to the Treaty of Amsterdam. See also the reiteration of the objective in Art. 2(1) (ex B) TEU and Art. 2 and 3 lit.c) EC as a means for the promotion of economic and social progress, a high level of employment, a balanced and sustainable development etc. Monar, "Justice and Home Affairs in the Treaty of Amsterdam: Reform at the price of fragmentation", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 320 at 323, does not see that this new objective adds anything to the Treaty objective of free movement. For a general evaluation of the new provisions regarding pillar three, see Tezcan, "La coopération dans les domaines de la justice et des affaires intérieures dans le cadre de l'Union européenne et le traité d'Amsterdam", 34 CDE (1998), 661.
198. For the importance of the change brought about by the transfer of these areas to pillar one see Hailbronner, "European immigration and asylum law under the Amsterdam Treaty", 35 CML Rev. (1998), 1047 et seq.
199. For details see Hailbronner, supra note 116, at 1062 et seq.
200. See also Hailbronner, supra note 116, at 1049.
201. For a restrictive interpretation see Hailbronner, supra note 116, at 1052 et seq
202. For a thorough analysis of the relevant provisions see Constantinesco, "Les clauses de 'coopération renforcée'. Le protocole sur l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité", 33 RTDE (1997), 751 at 752 et seq.
203. The situation is different in the case of Art. 4(2) of the Schengen Protocol, where the decision on the inclusion of the UK or Ireland to the Schengen area is to be taken by unanimity; for the risks of this provision see Monar, supra note 115, at 333, 334 et seq.
204. For a thoughtful evaluation of the new provisions on economic, social, environmental and moral policies of the Union after Amsterdam, see Gosalbo-Bono, "Les politiques et actions communautaires", 33 RTDE (1997), 769.
205. This seems to be the view of the German Constitutional Court, supra note 79, at 282 to 284, and also Herdegen, op. cit. supra note 80, at 13.
206. See Reg. 1466/97/EC on the Strenthening of the Surveillance and Coordination of Budgetary Positions; Reg. 1467/97/EC on Speeding up and Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, O.J. 1997, L 209/1 and 6; as well as the Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, O.J. 1997, C 263/1; see also Herdegen, op. cit. supra note 80, at 15, 21 on "Price stability as the new 'Grundnorm' of the European Union".
207. O.J. 1997, C 263/2.
208. For the Luxembourg "Employment Summit" 1997 and the establishment of a more effective "employment strategy", see European Commission, "From Guidelines to Measures: The National Action Plans for Employment", 1988, and the Conclusions of the Cardiff Summit, 15 and 16 June 1998 (SN 150/98), points 12-16. For the Commission's Joint Employment Report (1998) see http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg05/empl&esf/empl99/joint.en.htm.
209. For the German presidency's initiatives cf. http://www.eu-praesidentschaft.de/ also cf. points 7-17 of the Presidency conclusions of the Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999 (SN 150/99): European Employment Pact.
210. On the same line: Protocol 23 to the EC on public broadcasting stations.
211. See the Declaration of the IGC of Amsterdam on Art. 16 EC.
212. Similarly Gosalbo-Bono, supra note 122 at 772 et seq.
213. Cf. the catalogues contained in the Declaration of 12 April 1989 and in the Resolution of 10 Feb. 1994, Bieber et al. (Eds.), Au nom des peuples européens - in the name of the peoples of Europe (1996), p. 365 et seq.
214. Cf. the project of a European fundamental rights Charter suggested by the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, in a speech held at the European Parliament on 12 Jan. 1999 in Strasbourg, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6-archiv/index.htm. For a proposal of a Declaration on fundamental rights, prepared for the Green Party in Germany, Preuss, "Grundrechte in der Europäischen Union", 31 Kritische Justiz (1998), 1.
215. See section 2.5 supra. For the initiative to produce a "Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU", see point 44 of the Presidency Conclusions, supra note 127, and the decision referred to in the annex.
216. For an excellent overview, see Oeter, "Inspection in International Law. Monitoring compliance and the problem of implementation in international law", 28 NYIL (1997), 101, 130 et seq.
217. The Community practice, and its impact, on human rights and democracy clauses in EC agreements with third States has been thoroughly analysed by Hoffmeister, Menschenrechts-und Demokratieklauseln in den vertraglichen Außenbeziehungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (1998), English summary at p. 605 et seq.
218. See for a recent overview Besselink, "Entrapped by the maximum standard: on fundamental rights, pluralism and subsidiarity in the European Union", 35 CML Rev. (1998), 639 at 633 et seq.
219. For the importance of this guarantee see supra, section 2.3.
220. e.g. Art. 23 §1 of the German Constitution; Chapt. 10 §5 of the Swedish Constitution; Art. 28 §3 of the Greek Constitution. These provisions refer to the respect of human rights and democracy, while the Portuguese Constitution refers to the principle of subsidiarity and economic and social cohesion (Art. 7(6)).
221. For a very clear claim to achieve more democracy see German Constitutional Court, case BVerfGE 89, 155 (213) - Maastricht, with the request "that the democratic foundations of the Union are extended progressively with the process of integration. . .". The endless discussion on the democratic deficit of the Community and the Union cannot be described here, for some references see Pernice, "Maastricht, Staat und Demokratie", 26 Die Verwaltung (1993), 449, at 451.
222. See Brok, "Der Amsterdamer Vertrag: Etappe auf dem Weg zur europäischen Einigung", 20 Integration (1997), 211; Blumann, "Aspects institutionnels", 33 RTDE (1997), 721 at 736: "Le Parlement européen, principal gagnant"; Nickel, "Ein Kommentar zum Amsterdamer Vertrag aus Sicht des Europäischen Parlaments", 20 Integration (1997), 219 at 220; Barents, supra note 3 at 337: "The European Parliament: The Big Winner"; Dehousse, supra note 2, at 603.
223. See Brok, "Der Amsterdamer Vertrag: Etappe auf dem Weg zur europäischen Einigung", 20 Integration (1997), 211; Blumann, "Aspects institutionnels", 33 RTDE (1997), 721 at 736: "Le Parlement européen, principal gagnant"; Nickel, "Ein Kommentar zum Amsterdamer Vertrag aus Sicht des Europäischen Parlaments", 20 Integration (1997), 219 at 220; Barents, supra note 3 at 337: "The European Parliament: The Big Winner"; Dehousse, supra note 2, at 603.
224. See Brok, "Der Amsterdamer Vertrag: Etappe auf dem Weg zur europäischen Einigung", 20 Integration (1997), 211; Blumann, "Aspects institutionnels", 33 RTDE (1997), 721 at 736: "Le Parlement européen, principal gagnant"; Nickel, "Ein Kommentar zum Amsterdamer Vertrag aus Sicht des Europäischen Parlaments", 20 Integration (1997), 219 at 220; Barents, supra note 3 at 337: "The European Parliament: The Big Winner"; Dehousse, supra note 2, at 603.
225. Brok, "Verfassungsperspektiven der Europäischen Union auf dem Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert", in Kloepfer and Pernice, op. cit. supra note 8.
226. As to the position of the Court of Justice on transparency most recently see (through the eyes of the CFI) case T-124/96, Interporc, 33 EuR (1998), 362 et seq.
227. See Dehousse, supra note 2, at 617 et seq., 620.
228. As to their effective and timely information see Protocol No. 9 to the EC on the role of national parliaments in the European Union. On the possible role of the national Parliaments in the decision-making process of the EC, see Zuleeg, "National Parliamentary Control and European Integration", in Heukels, Blokker and Brus (Eds.), The European Union after Amsterdam (1998), p. 295, at 300 et seq.
229. Case BVerfGE 89, 155 (185) - Maastricht. 146. O.J. 1996, C 102/2.
230. For this appoach cf. O'Keeffe, supra note 8, after footnote 36. As to the provisions for participation of the social partners in the area of social policy: Betten, "The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Community Social Policy", 23 EL Rev. (1998), 20.
231. See also Arts. 33 TEU (ex Art. K.5, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam) and 64(1) EC (ex Art. 731, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam) (reservation for the responsibilities incumbent on the Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security), Art. 35(5) TEU (ex Art. K.7, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam) (no judicial review on the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon the Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security), Art. 68(2) EC and Art. 2(1) third para, last sentence, of Protocol No. 2 on the Schengen acquis (no jurisdiction of the ECJ on questions regarding the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security).
232. Art. 152(5) EC specifies national responsibility for the organization and delivery of health services, medical care and the donation or medical use of organs and blood.
233. Dehousse, supra, note 2, at 603 et seq.
234. For a more complete analysis see Dashwood, "External relations provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty", 35 CML Rev. (1998), 1019 at 1028 et seq.
235. See also the critical comments of Dashwood, supra note 151, at 1034 et seq., namely concerning the revival of the Luxembourg Compromise of 1967.
236. See also Dashwood, supra note 151, at 1040 et seq.; Zuleeg, "Die Organisationsstruktur der Europäischen Union - Eine Analyse der Klammerbestimmungen des Vertrags von Amsterdam", EuR Beiheft 2/1998), 151 at 153; De Witte, "The pillar structure and the nature of the European Union: Greek temple or French cathedral", in Heukels et al. (Eds.), op. cit. supra note 144, at 63; Langrish, supra note 3, at 14.
237. See also Dashwood, supra note 151, at 1040 et seq.; Zuleeg, "Die Organisationsstruktur der Europäischen Union - Eine Analyse der Klammerbestimmungen des Vertrags von Amsterdam", EuR Beiheft 2/1998), 151 at 153; De Witte, "The pillar structure and the nature of the European Union: Greek temple or French cathedral", in Heukels et al. (Eds.), op. cit. supra note 144, at 63; Langrish, supra note 3, at 14.
238. Arts. 14(4) (ex J.4), 18(4) (ex J.8), 20(1) (ex J. 10), 21(1) (ex J.11), 22 (ex J.12), 24 (ex J. 14), 27 (ex J. 17) TEU, and Declaration No. 6 to the EC.
239. Art. 33 TEU (ex Art. K.5, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam).
240. There are good reasons, however, for closer cooperation of the police, as may be concluded from the provisions and the Convention on EUROPOL, and for the harmonization of criminal law and a common criminal prosecution authority see Sieber, "Auf dem Weg zu einem europäischen Strafrecht, Einführung zum Corpus juris der strafrechtlichen Regelungen zum Schutz der finanziellen Interessen der EU", in Delmas-Arty (Ed.), Corpus Juris der strafrechtlichen Regelungen zum Schutz der finanziellen Interessen der Europäischen Union (1998), p. 1, at 3 and 7.
241. Monar, supra note 115 at 327: "Overall the new Treaty brings substantial progress in terms of the range, the legal quality and potential effectiveness of instruments in the areas of justice and home affairs".
242. See the proposals and reports referred to supra, note 113.
243. Florence European Council, 21 and 22 June 1996, Presidency Conclusions (SN 300/96 EN), point V, last paragraph.
244. Cf. for this notion, Curtin, "The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces", 30 CML Rev. (1993), 17.
245. In the light of multilevel constitutionalism the "overarching normative/constitutional order" advocated by Everson, supra note 69, at 403 (see also ibid, at 407: "search for a proceduralized constitutionalized European order") already exists and is progressively further developed by the sequence of Intergovernmental Conferences.
246. See Stolleis, supra note 77, at 281 et seq., 294.
247. See also De Witte, supra note 153, at 55, stating that "it is now the turn of the other pillars [i.e. two and three] to be eroded". On the contrary, Dashwood, supra note 151, at 1019 and 1020, concludes from the strengthening of the CFSP by the Amsterdam Treaty that hopes for a merger of the pillars are "misguided. No longer, it is submitted, can the division between EC external competence and the CFSP be regarded as merely temporary".
248. De Witte, supra note 153, at. 53, drawing his conclusions at 66 and 67.
249. For this conception of European citizenship see Shaw, supra note 72, at 564, 572.
250. For an early analysis of the implicit fundamental rights guarantees inherent in the provisions of the EEC Treaty as an expression of the common constitutional traditions of the Member States see Pernice, Grundrechtsgehalte im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht (1979).
251. European Parliament, "Resolution on the Amsterdam Treaty (CONF 4007/97 - C4-0538/97 (de Vigo and Tsatsos Report)", 19 HRJ (1998), 135, 138 et seq. For the procedural aspects, Tsatsos, "Zum Prinzip der Europäischen Verfassungsverantwortung - Am Beispiel der Vertragsrevisionsproblematik", lecture given at the Walter Haustein-Institute for European Constitutional Law, 28 Jan. 1999, 2 Forum Constitutionis Europae (1999), website supra note 8.
252. European Parliament, "Resolution on the Amsterdam Treaty (CONF 4007/97 - C4-0538/97 (de Vigo and Tsatsos Report)", 19 HRJ (1998), 135, 138 et seq. For the procedural aspects, Tsatsos, "Zum Prinzip der Europäischen Verfassungsverantwortung - Am Beispiel der Vertragsrevisionsproblematik", lecture given at the Walter Haustein-Institute for European Constitutional Law, 28 Jan. 1999, 2 Forum Constitutionis Europae (1999), website supra note 8.
253. For the actual existence of elements for a European-wide public discourse already now, as a basis for a functioning democracy, see Häberle, "Gibt es eine europäische Öffentlichkeit?", in Ehrenzeller et al. (Eds.), Der Verfassungsstaat vor neuen Herausfordeningen (1998), p. 1007, published also in (1998) Thüringer Verwaltungsblätter, 121.
254. For the actual existence of elements for a European-wide public discourse already now, as a basis for a functioning democracy, see Häberle, "Gibt es eine europäische Öffentlichkeit?", in Ehrenzeller et al. (Eds.), Der Verfassungsstaat vor neuen Herausfordeningen (1998), p. 1007, published also in (1998) Thüringer Verwaltungsblätter, 121.
255. Points 52-54 of the Presidency Conclusions, supra note 127.