Adaptability of competitive electricity reforms a modular analysis

Energy Policy

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1213-1221

  Dubois, Ute ^a  

^a European Chair on Intellectual Capital and RITM University Paris Sud   (France)

Author keywords

Electricity reform; Institutional dynamics; Modularity

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; ELECTRIC INDUSTRY; POWER MARKETS;

AUTONOMOUS DECISION; CROSS-COUNTRY STUDIES; ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORMS; ELECTRICITY MARKET RESTRUCTURING; ELECTRICITY REFORM; INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS; INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE; MODULARITY;

LAWS AND LEGISLATION;

COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); ELECTRICITY; ENERGY POLICY; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; POLICY IMPLEMENTATION; POLICY REFORM; STAKEHOLDER;

EURASIA; EUROPE; NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 63149134860     PISSN: 03014215     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2008.10.052     Document Type: Article

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