Two confusions concerning multiple realization

Philosophy of Science

Volumn 75, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 537-547

  Polger, Thomas W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 62749160786     PISSN: 00318248     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/594505     Document Type: Conference Paper

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