Putnam's intuition

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 109, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 143-170

  Polger, Thomas W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746404698     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1016236415052     Document Type: Article

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