Horizontal liability in EC law: Hybridization of remedies for compensation in case of breaches of EC rights

Common Market Law Review

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 705-742

  Reich, Norbert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BREMEN   (Germany)

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EID: 61349189577     PISSN: 01650750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (211)

1. For an overview with a comparative analysis of German, French, UK and US-American law see Brüggemeier, Haftungsrecht (Springer, 2006) pp. 164-175. The concept of "State" is a broad one, see Case C-424/97, Haim, [2000] ECR I-5123.
2. Case C-453/99, Courage v. Crehan, [2001] ECR I-6297.
3. Case C-295/04 etc., Vincenzo Manfredi et al. v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA et al., [2006] ECR I-6619.
4. For recent developments in German law see Wurmnest, "A New Era for Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany? A Critical Appraisal of the Modernized Law against Restraints of Competition", (2005) German Law Journal, 1173;
5. Keßler, "Cui bono? Schadenersatzansprüche der Verbraucher im Kartellrecht", (2007) Verbraucher und Recht, 41. For UK law see Mazzini and Andenas, "Awarding Damages for Breach of Competition Law in English Courts - Crehan in the Court of Appeal", (2006) EBLR, 1191, and now Inntrepeneur Pub Co (CPC) v. Crehan [2006] UKHL 38 (per Lord Hofmann), which was concerned with the procedural question of how far a court may (or must) use evidence from Community competition proceedings in similar cases which the Court of Appeal held to be possible, but was rejected by the House of Lords, see infra section 7.1 For an overview see the Ashurst Study on the Conditions of Claims for Damages in case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules (prepared by D. Waelbroeck, D. Slater and G. Even-Shoshan), 25 Aug. 2004.
6. COM(2005)672 of 19 Dec. 2005 with an Annex containing the Commission Staff Working Paper. For an overall appraisal see Basedow (Ed.), Private Enforcement of EC-Competition Law (2007 to be published);
7. Eilmansberger, "The Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules and Beyond: Reflections on the Utility and Feasibility of Stimulating Private Enforcement Through Legislative Action", 2007 CML Rev. forthcoming. A critical assessment of the approach taken by the Commission has been put forward by Hodges, "Competition enforcement, regulation and civil justice: What is the Case?" 43 CML Rev. (2006), 1382 at 1398, fearing support for a "litigation culture" instead of, as suggested by the Commission, a "competition culture";.
8. Case C-415/93, ASBL v. Bosman, [1995] ECR I-4921, paras. 83-84;
9. for follow-up cases see C-51/96 & C-191/97, Chr. Deliège v. Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL, [2000] ECR I-2549;
10. C-176/96, Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v. FRBSB, [2000] ECR I-2681.
11. Case 36/74, Walrave v. Union Cycliste internationale, [1974] ECR 1405.
12. Case C-281/98, Angonese v. Casa di Risparmio de Bolzano, [2000] ECR I-4139, para 32;
13. a detailed critical analysis is given in Körber, Grundfreiheiten und Privatrecht (Mohr Siebeck, 2004) at pp. 675-682. According to van Gerven, "Courage v. Crehan and the Way Ahead", in Lowe and Reynolds (Eds.) Antitrust in Europe - one Year in Practice (IBA, 2005) p. 307 at para 2 the question of civil liability (for loss of chance, see infra note 93) of the Italian savings bank was raised before the Italian court, but not referred to the ECJ; in his opinion, this would have given the ECJ the possibility to clarify the question of civil liability arising out of a breach of Art. 39 EC.
14. C-309/99, J.C.J. Wouters et al. v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, [2002] ECR I-1577, para 120;
15. nd ed. (Intersentia 2005), pp. 18-19. Körber (op. cit. supra note 8) at pp. 682-683 prefers an application of the competition rules over the direct effect of Arts. 43 and 49 EC.
16. For a recent restatement, see the Manfredi case, supra note 3 at para 92;
17. concerning questions of standing and injunctive relief see now Case C-432/05, Unibet v. Justiekanslern, [2007] ECR I-(13.3.2007);
18. for a comprehensive treatment see Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2006), pp. 423-427.
19. See his seminal paper, "Of rights, remedies and procedures", 37 CML Rev. (2000), 501 at 529;
20. Micklitz and Reich, Basics of European Consumer Law (Centro de Formação Jurídica, Macau, 2007) paras. 7.12-7.14.
21. A somewhat different approach has been developed by Eilmansberger, "The relationship between rights and remedies in EC law: in search of the missing link", 41 CML Rev. (2004), 1199 focusing particularly on remedies.
22. See Case C-97/91, Oleficio Borelli SpA v. Commission, [1992] I-6313, para 13.
23. For a theory of subjective rights under EC law see my paper "System der subjectiven öffentlichen Rechte" in The Union: A European Constitution for Citizens of Bits and Pieces, Academy of European Law (Ed), Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law VI/1 1995, 157-236, (1998).
24. Kakouris, "Do the Member States possess judicial procedural 'autonomy'?", 34 CML Rev. (1997), 1389;
25. van Gerven, op. cit. supra note 11 at 501;
26. Reich, op. cit. supra note 9 at 241-243.
27. BGH WuW/E BGH 1643, 1645 - BMW-Importe, 2451, 2457 - Cartier-Uhren
28. BGHZ 86, 324, 330 - Familienzeitschrift; LG Mannheim GRUR 2004, 182 - Vitaminkartell; for a discussion see Wurmnest, op. cit. supra note 4 at 1179-1180.
29. For a critique see Reich, "The Courage doctrine: Encouraging or discouraging compensation for antitrust injuries?" 42 CML Rev. (2005), 35 at 44-48.
30. Keßler op. cit. supra note 4.
31. See Wurmnest, op. cit. supra note 4 at 1181-1182;
32. Keßler at 44-46 arguing that the German legislature expressly rejected the "Schutzgesetz" approach; a more restrictive position has been taken by Rehbinder in Loewenheim, Meessen and Riesenkampf, Kartellrecht-Kommentar, Bd. 2 GWB, (2006) § 33 Rdnr. 13.
33. Brüggemeier, op. cit. supra note 1 at 542.
34. Beever, Tort Law, (Brookers, 2003), 639-648;
35. Markesinis and Deakin, Tort Law, 4th ed. (OUP, 1999), at pp. 336-354;
36. th ed. (Sweet and Maxwell, 2006), para 9-01;
37. Brüggemeier, op. cit. supra note 1, 543-544;
38. Wicke, "Haftung des Arbeitgebers für Stalking, Mobbing und andere ausdauernde schikanöse Belästigungen durch seine Angestellten", (2007) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht, 343 at 346.
39. (1874) LR 9 Exch 125.
40. (1877] 2 Ex D 441 (CA);
41. liability of the employer for illegal acts by its staff (harassment of his employees) see Majrowski v. Guy's and St. Thomas NHS Trust (2005) W.L.R. 1503, 1514 (CA).
42. (1983) 2All ER 770 (HL per Lord Diplock);
43. Markesinis and Deakin, op. cit. supra note 21 at 353;
44. Bulst, Schadenersatzansprüche der Marktgegenseite im Kartellrecht (Nomos, 2006), at p. 149. In its case ITW+ FSU v. Viking Line ABP & OU Viking Line Eesti (2005) EWCA 1299 para 9 the Court of Appeal, per Waller LJ, took the view that this reasoning also applied to (non-justified) breaches of the free movement rules by collective action.
45. London Passenger Transport Board v. Upson, (1949) 1 All ER 69 (HL)
46. Cass. Com., Bull. Civil. 1982 IV, No. 76.
47. Viney and Jourdan, Les conditions de la responsabilité, 2è ed. (L.G.D.J., 1998), No. 448.
48. Ibid. No. 449 without reference to EC law.
49. Case 128/92, [1994] ECR I-1209, paras. 45 and 49;
50. see also van Gerven, Tort Law - Scope of Protection, (Hart, 1998), at pp. 481-482;
51. Reich, op. cit. supra note 9 at 334-335. The Commission Staff Working Paper annexed to COM(2006)672 at paras. 31-44 points to a number of still existing differences and difficulties for actions in compensation of antitrust injuries in Member State law, in particular with regard to procedural questions, without making any specific proposals for reform.
52. Cases C-46 & 48/93, Brasserie de Pêcheur and Factortame, [1996] ECR I-1029;
53. its transfer to breaches by an individual is advocated by Van Dam, European Tort Law (OUP, 2006) at para 1805-1;
54. for a different opinion see Tridimas, op. cit. supra note 10 at 544 arguing that the requirement of "sufficiently serious breach" originates from the "sovereign nature of the State and serves public interest purposes"; van Gerven, op. cit. supra at note 8, insists that any unlawful conduct should suffice: it is not necessary that it be "sufficiently serious". In my understanding of the case law of the Court, this criterion is meant to exclude any notion of "fault" or "negligence" in a subjective way, but not to limit liability only to "serious violations" of EC law; see the German translation: "hinreichend qualifiziert", the French "une violation suffisamment caracterisée du droit communautaire".
55. For such a broad "positive" understanding of the non-discrimination principle see Micklitz and Reich op. cit. supra note 11 at 7.14
56. Brasserie, supra note 30, at para 79.
57. See Case C-392/93, R v. HM Treasury ex parte British Telecom, [1996] ECR I-1631;
58. Joined cases C-283/94 et al., Denkavit, [1996] ECR I-5063.
59. Case C-224/01, [2001] ECR I-10239, para 56, confirmed by Case C-173/03, Traghetti, [2006] ECR I-5177.
60. Joined cases C-178/94 et al., Dillenkofer et al v. Germany, [1996] ECR I-4845.
61. Supra note 29 at para 53.
62. See Reich, op. cit. supra note 17 at 50-56.
63. Supra note 3.
64. Opinion of A.G. Lenz, in Bosman, cited supra note 6, at para 277.
65. For an analysis of the legal exemption see Hildebrand, Economic analysis of vertical agreements (Kluwer, 2005).
66. th session of the Asser Institute, The Hague, 2007, to be published.
67. See the critical discussion of the Swedish "lex Britannia" which exempts Swedish labour unions if they take action against foreign companies not having subscribed to Swedish collective agreements, in Reich op. cit. supra note 41.
68. Case 45/85, Verband der Sachversicherer v. Commission, [1987] ECR 405 para 22;
69. see also Case C-198/01, Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF), [2003] ECR I-8055, para 46;
70. with regard to sanctions this depends on the freedom which undertakings enjoy, paras. 56-57: there is no justification for practices which are likely further to exacerbate the adverse effects on competition, but this may be a mitigating factor concerning penalties; comment by de la Torre, "State Action Defence in EC Competition Law", (2005) World Comp., 407; there is no case law yet with regard to civil liability.
71. Case C-24/95, Land Rheinland-Pfalzv. Alcan, [1997] ECR I-1591, para 25.
72. Goyder, EC Competition Law, 4th ed. (OUP, 2003), at p. 478;
73. similar to Case C-67/96, Albany, [1999] ECR I-5751, para 65.
74. See Case C-265/95, Commission v. France, [1997] ECR I-6959, to be distinguished from C-112/00, Schmidberger, [2003] ECR I-5659.
75. Case C-222/02, Peter Paul et al v. Federal Republic of Germany, [2004] ECR I-9425.
76. Van Gerven et al., Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Tort Law, 2nd ed. (Hart Publishing, 2000), at p. 306.
77. Brüggemeier, op. cit. supra note 1 at 536-540.
78. Eilmansberger, op. cit. supra note 11 at 1236-1240 suggests the formula "ubi remedium ibi ius" and correctly insists on the prior existence of an obligation under EC law.
79. Case C-253/00, Antonio Munoz y Cia, Superior Fruticola SA v. Frumar Ld., Redbridge Produce Marketing Ltd., [2002] ECR I-7289, para 30 concerning a restraining order sought by a trader against a competitor for not complying with EC quality regulations for fruits; the Court bases its argument on the well-known principle of "full effectiveness" of EC law.
80. Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Sabena, [1976] ECR 455.
81. Supra note 3.
82. C-234/89, [1991] ECR I-935, para 27; this must of course be established on the facts, which were doubtful in Courage.
83. Reich, op. cit. supra note * at 54;
84. in a similar sense now Eilmansberger, op. cit. supra note 5 section 5.3.: "protective scope requirement".
85. O.J. 2004, L 203/30;
86. Reich, op. cit. at 50;
87. critique Rehbinder, op. cit. supra note 19, at para 11, referring to the limited legal effect of exemption regulations which do not create "binding obligations" on contract partners;
88. Case 10/86, VAG Mange, [1986] ECR 4071, paras. 12 and 16;
89. Case C-125/05, VW-Audi Forhandlersforeningen v. Skanvinanvsk Motor Co A/S, judgment of 7 Sept. 2006, nyr, para 56, but which still indicate the protective scope of a particular anticompetitive behaviour.
90. Case C-125/05, at para 55, insisting that this prohibits a combination of exclusive and selective distribution systems.
91. For a definition cf. Case T-9/92, Peugeot v. Commission, [1993] ECR II-493, upheld on appeal in Case C-322/93 P, [1994] ECR I-2727;
92. for a discussion on the consumer protective ambit of competition law see Stuyck, "EC Competition Law after Modernisation: More Than Ever in the Interest of Consumers", 28 Journal of Consumer Policy (2005), at 6-15.
93. See Case C-70/93, BMW v. ALD Auto Leasing, [1995] ECR I-3439, para 19.
94. Bulst, "Private Antitrust Enforcement at a Roundabout", (2006) European Business Organization Law Review, 725 at 734.; in Joined cases C-438/03, Cannito et al., [2004] ECR I-1605 the ECJ was expressly asked whether a breach of Art. 81(1) EC requires compensation of end users as third parties, but rejected the reference as inadmissible for lack of the factual and legal context of the questions. The Manfredi case (supra note 3) did not clarify the issue.
95. Supra note 29; the ECJ denied the direct effect of the competition rules of the ECSC and therefore dismissed the claim.
96. Case T-62/98, VW v. Commission, [1998] ECR II-2707, confirmed on appeal by Case C-338/00P, [2003] ECR I-9189 para 66.
97. See Komninos, "New prospects for private enforcement of EC Competition law: Courage v. Crehan and the Community right to damages", CML Rev. (2002), 447 at 467;
98. Reich, op. cit. supra note * at 65; "relatively autonomous Community law on remedies."
99. Weyer, "Schadensersatzansprüche gegen Private kraft Gemeinschaftsrecht", (2003) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht, 318 at 341;
100. Bulst, op. cit supra note 24 at pp. 210-226 pleading for a narrow reading of Courage.
101. See the English case Bourgoin SA v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1986] QB 716,
102. cited by Markesinis and Deakin, op. cit. supra note 21 at p. 353.
103. Case C-208/05, ITC Innovative Technology Center v. Bundesagentur für Arbeit, judgment of 11 Jan. 2007, nyr, referring to Case C-350/96, Clean-Car v. Landeshauptmann von Wien, [1998] ECR I-2121
104. Case C-158/96, Raymond Kohll v. Union des Caisses de Maladie, [1998] ECR I-1931 para 35.
105. Case C-413/99, [2002] ECR I-7091, para 84.
106. The very detailed study of Wollenschläger, Grundfreiheit ohne Markt, (Mohr Siebeck, 2007), at pp. 378-384 does not discuss this aspect of a non-discrimination rule based on the citizenship concept without demanding any relation to an economic activity as in Bosman.
107. Wollenschläger, op. cit. supra note 69, at 212-214 with details from the case law, see Case 186/86, Cowan v. Trésor public, [1989] ECR I-195, para 10.
108. Deliège, supra note 6 at paras. 41-58.
109. Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969, para 44.
110. Angonese, supra note 8, para 35;
111. contrary: Franzen, in Streinz, EUV/EGV Kommentar (2003), Art. 39 para 97;
112. Körber, op. cit. supra note 8 at 733-741, 777-797. The question needs to be considered more thoroughly - which is not possible in this context.
113. For a recent overview see Bitterich, "Elements of an autonomous concept of causation in European Community law concerning liability", 106 Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft (2007) 12-39;
114. for an earlier appraisal see further Toth, "The concepts of damage and causality as elements of non-contractual liability" in Heukels and McDonnell (Eds.), The Action for damages in Community law (Kluwer, 1997), p. 179, at 186, where it is specified that the cause should not be too remote and not too broad and unspecific, and that an intervening cause may be positive or negative: at 193 et seq.
115. Case 26/74, [1976] ECR 677, para 23.
116. Joined cases 64/76 etc., [1979] ECR 3091, para 21.
117. Case C-472/00P, [2003] ECR I-7541, para 56.
118. Para 37
119. Supra note 39 at paras. 51-65.
120. Supra note 3.
121. Case C-319/96, Brinkmann Tabakfabriken v. Skatteministerie, [1998] ECJ I-5255, para 29;
122. comments Bitterich op. cit. supra note 74 at 34.
123. Case C-140/97, [1999] ECR I-3499;
124. Bitterich op. cit. supra note 74 at 35.
125. Magnus and Wurmnest, Casebook Europäisches Haftungs-und Schadensrecht, 2002 at 225;
126. similarly, Bitterich, op. cit. supra note 74, at 18 discussing the term "sufficiently direct causal link" which goes beyond the mere "conditio sine qua non" formula and contains an element of evaluation and policy decision.
127. Schweitzer and Hummer, Europarecht, cited by Magnus and Wurmnest at p. 226;
128. Bitterich, op. cit. supra note 74, at 19;
129. Dalloz, Code civil, édition 2004, Art. 1382, para 88.
130. Markesinis and Deakon, op. cit. supra note 21 at pp. 191-201;
131. Smith and Woods, "Causation in Francovich - The neglected problem", (1997) ICLQ, 925.
132. Case T-333/01, Meyer, [2003] ECR II-119.
133. T-193/04, Hans-Martin Tillack v. Commission of the EC, judgment of 4 Oct. 2006, nyr, paras. 118, 124.
134. For details see Bitterich op. cit. supra note 74 at 23-27 (concerning Art. 288(2) EC).
135. The later Kolpak case, Case C-438/00, Deutscher Handballbund v. Maros Kolpak, [2003] ECR I-4135 extended this principle also to nationals of member countries of the Europe Agreements, in the case at hand Slowakia, and Case C-265/03, Igor Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol, ECR [2005] I-2579 to Russia as member of the Partnership agreement.
136. Supra note at 30 para 87.
137. Ibid. at para 84;
138. Tridimas op. cit. supra note 10 at 458;
139. Bitterich op. cit. supra note 74 at 30-31.
140. Supra note 3.
141. Van Gerven et al, Casebook on Tort Law (Hart, 2000), at pp. 111 et seq., 200 et seq., 224 et seq.;
142. van Gerven op. cit. supra note 8.
143. Case C-184/89, Nimz v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, [1991] ECR I-297, para 18;
144. similarly with regard to equal treatment Case C-442/00, Cabellero v. FOGASA, [2002] ECR I-11915, para 42: "Once discrimination contrary to Community law has been established and for as long as measures reinstating equal treatment have not been adopted, observance of the principle of equality can be ensured only by granting to persons within the disadvantaged category the same advantages as those enjoyed by persons within the favoured category". However, there is no obligation to upgrade work of higher value; the threshold is set by the level of non-discrimination, Case 157/86, Murphy v. An Bord Telecom Eiream, [1988] ECR 673. For an overview with regard to sex-discrimination issues see Costello and Davies, "The Case Law of the ECJ in the Field of Sex Equality since 2000", 43 CML Rev. (2006), 1567 at 1610.
145. Joined cases C-104/89 & C-37/90, [2000] ECR I-203, paras. 216-220.
146. Supra note 2.
147. Supra note 3: "However, it is settled case law that Community law does not prevent national courts from taking steps to ensure that the protection of the rights guaranteed by Community law does not entail the unjust enrichment of those who enjoy them ⋯." (para 94).
148. Case 238/78, Ireks-Arkady v. Council and Commission, [1979] ECR 2955, para 14.
149. See also Joined Cases C-441 & 442/98, Michaïlidis, [2000] ECR I-7145, para 31;
150. for a critique see Toth op. cit. supra note 74 at 189.
151. Case 199/82, Amministratione dell Finanze dello State v. S.p.A. San Georgio, [1983] ECR 3595.
152. Case C-147/01, [2003] ECR I-11365, paras. 98-99.
153. Reich, 42 CML Rev. 2005 at 45-47;
154. more details are given by Bulst, op. cit. supra note 60 at 733-737.
155. Sullivan and Grimes, The Law of Antitrust (West publishing, 2000) at p. 926.
156. Hannover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 US 481 (1968).
157. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977).
158. See also the remarks of the Monopolkommission, Gutachten zur 7. Kartellnovelle, 2005 at pp. 37-39.
159. Sullivan and Grimes op. cit supra note 102 at p. 930.
160. See California v. ARC America Corp. 490 U.S. 93 (1989) where the Supreme Court found that Congress had not pre-empted the field of antitrust law because States had traditionally regulated that conduct; critique by Bauer, "Reflections on the Manifold Means of Enforcing Antitrust Laws: Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right?" 16 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. (2004), 303.
161. The recent amendment of § 33 (3) sentence 2 GWB seems to reject the passing-on defence, see Wurmnest, op. cit. supra note 4 at 1183.
162. Bulst, op. cit. supra note 60 at 737, 741.
163. For an economic analysis of the passing-on defence see Dubow, "The Passing On Defence: An Economist's Perspective", (2003) ECLR 238.
164. Supra note 5 at p. 8.
165. For a discussion see Eilmansberger, op. cit. supra note 5 at section 5.6 leaving it to national law to apply the passing-on defence.
166. The Monopolkommission, op. cit. supra note 105 at p. 39 insists that a complete ban of indirect purchaser claims would go against the Courage doctrine.
167. Op. cit. supra note 24 at pp. 254-263;
168. Bulst, op. cit. supra note 60 at 731.
169. Op. cit. supra note 24 at p. 245.
170. Op. cit. supra note 24 at pp. 273-344;
171. see also the discussion in the Commission Staff Working paper, supra note 29 at paras. 130-136.
172. Bulst, op. cit. supra note 60 at pp. 740-745.
173. Ibid. at p. 741.
174. Ibid. at p. 739.
175. See Keßler, op. cit. supra note 4 - without going into details.
176. The case law of the US Supreme Court makes an exception to the indirect purchaser rule in the case of "ownership and control", see Bulst, op. cit. supra note 24 at p. 74.
177. Bulst op. cit. supra note 24 at pp. 326-331 suggests some interesting practical solutions which cannot be discussed in detail here; see also Commission Staff paper op. cit. supra note 29 at paras. 188-201 discussing collective actions for groups of purchasers.
178. Supra note 3
179. Kakouris, "Do the Member Stares possess judicial procedural' autonomy", 34 CML Rev (1997), 1389;
180. van Gerven, op. cit. supra note 11 at 501;
181. Reich, op. cit. supra note 9, at 241-243.
182. C-430 & 431/93, [1995] ECR I-4705.
183. C-312/93, [1995] ECR I-4599.
184. Op. cit. supra note 11 at 533.
185. Micklitz and Reich, Basics of European Consumer Law, 2007, at 7.8
186. Van Gerven, op. cit. supra note 8.
187. Bulst, op. cit. supra note 24 at pp. 269-271.
188. For an overview see Eilmansberger, op. cit. supra note 5 at sections 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2, 5.4.
189. [2004] Eur. LR 693;
190. for detailed comments see Nazzini and Andenas, op. cit. supra note 4 at 1197-1201.
191. [2006] UK HL 38 per Lord Hofman also referring to Case C-34/98, Masterfoods, [2000] ECR I-11369, paras. 47-48. See annotation in this Review by Hanley, 817-836.
192. Bulst, op. cit. supra note 60 at 730 Botana, "Antitrust enforcement and deterrence", (2006) Col. J.E.L., 47 at 74.
193. Supra note 5 at p. 9.
194. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 22 Feb. 2007 at p. 10 referring to an unpublished decision of the Landgericht Düsseldorf.
195. Micklitz and Reich, Basics, op. cit. supra note 118 at 6.22;
196. for its limitations see Case C-168/02, Kronhofe, [2004] ECR I-6009.
197. COM(2006) 83 final of 21 Feb. 2006, amending COM(2003)427 final.
198. Supra note 5 at p. 10.
199. O.J. 2006, C 289 E/89.
200. COM(2006)566 final at 3-4;
201. for an overview see Eilmansberger, op. cit. supra note 5 at section 3.
202. C-261/95 [1997] ECR I-2791.
203. Case C-473/00, Cofidis v. Jean Louis Fredout, [2002] ECR I-10875, para 35.
204. For an excellent overview, see Micklitz, "Vereinbarkeit der Verjährungsregelung des § 37a WpHG mit dem Gemeinschaftsrecht", (2005) Wertpapiermitteilungen (WM), 536.
205. See also Eilmansberger, op. cit. supra note 11 at 1220 criticizing the "basically friendly treatment of time-limits by the Court."
206. Ibid. at 541.
207. Op. cit. supra note 5 at section 6.
208. Op. cit. supra note 5 at 1406.
209. Supra note 24.
210. Supra note 4.
211. The questions of competence will not be subject to discussion here; for a more optimistic view see Eilmansberger, op. cit. supra note 5 at section 2.4.