The green paper on damages actions for breach of the ec antitrust rules and beyond: reflections on the utility and feasibility of stimulating private enforcement through legislative action

Common Market Law Review

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 431-478

  Eilmansberger, Thomas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SALZBURG   (Austria)

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EID: 46649083075     PISSN: 01650750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (270)

1. European Commission, "Green Paper - Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", COM(2005)672 final; see also European Commission, "Annex to the GREEN PAPER: Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules" (Commission Staff Working Paper), SEC(2005)1732.
2. According to an OECD report for 2005, the total staff enforcing Arts. 81 and 82 EC in the EEA is nearly 3300, see Competition Law and Policy in the European Union, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/41/35908641.pdf, p. 48.
3. Cf. Böge and Ost, "Up and running, or is it? Private enforcement - The Situation in Germany and Policy Perspectives", (2006) ECLR, 197, 198.
4. Furthermore, in case of hard-core offences, the party would expose itself to fines.
5. Case C-453/99, Courage v. Crehan, [2001] ECR I-6297, para 26. After more than 10 years, the national proceedings in that case have recently been concluded with the House of Lords' judgment in Inntrepreneur Pub Company (CPC) and others v. Crehan of 19 July 2006, [2006] UKHL 38, available at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd060719/crehan-1.htm. This judgment does not deal with damages issues but with the finding of an infringement, turning ultimately on the question whether and to what extent the High Court was bound by earlier conclusions of the Commission regarding beer tie arrangements in the UK.
6. For an in-depth assessment of the effects of the Regulation on private enforcement see Bornkamm and Becker, "Die privatrechtliche Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots nach der Modernisierung des EG-Kartellrechts", (2005) Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht (ZWeR), 213;
7. Reich, "The 'Courage' doctrine: Encouraging or discouraging compensation for antitrust injuries?", (2005) CML Rev., 35.
8. Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA (Oxford, 1999), at p. 112;
9. Brkan, "Procedural Aspects of Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law: Heading toward new reforms?", (2005) World Comp., 479, 481.
10. Case C-234/89, Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG, [1991] ECR I-935, para 52.
11. See also Mäsch, "Private Ansprüche bei Verletzung des europäischen Kartellverbots - 'Courage' und die Folgen", (2003) EuR, 825.
12. Ashurst, "Study on the conditions of claim for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules", Comparative Report, August 2004; prepared by Waelbroeck, Slater and Even-Shoshan for the European Commission, available at: ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions-for-da mages/stu dy.html.
13. Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases ("2006 leniency notice"), O.J. 2006, C 298/17, para 39.
14. Commission, staff working paper, cited supra note 1, para 231.
15. According to certain commentators, leniency is altogether irreconcilable with a private litigation model, see e.g. Hodges, "Competition enforcement, regulation and civil justice: What is the case?" 43 CML Rev. (2006), 1381, 1390.
16. See e.g. the jurisprudence of the German courts in LG Mannheim 11.7.2003, (2004) Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht (GRUR), 182;
17. OLG Karlsruhe 28.1.2004, (2004) NJW, 2243;
18. LG Dortmund 1.4.2004, (2004) Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (EWS), 434;
19. LG Mannheim 29.4.2005, Az. 22 O 74/04 Kart (not published);
20. for a discussion see Bulst, Schadenersatzansprüche der Marktgegenseite im Kartellrecht (Baden-Baden, 2006), at pp. 121 et seq.;
21. Reich, op. cit. supra note 6, 42 seq.
22. 2006 leniency notice, cit. supra note 11, para 7;
23. see also Wils, "Leniency in Antitrust Enforcement: Theory and Practice", (forthcoming 2007) World Comp., available at: papers. ssrn.com/sol3/cf-dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per-id=456087, 40 (page numbers are of the online-version).
24. See also Böge and Ost, op. cit. supra note 3, 198;
25. Baker, "Revisiting History - what have we learned about private antitrust enforcement that we would recommend to others?", (2004) Loyola Consumer Law Review, 379, 400.
26. UK Government comment, para 122, available at www.dti.gov.uk/files/ file28534.pdf.
27. That Option reads: "Exclusion of discoverability of the leniency application, thus protecting the confidentiality of submissions made to the competition authority as part of leniency applications."
28. As to the possibility of an oral (paperless) leniency procedure, see 2006 leniency notice, cited supra note 11, para 32;
29. also Wils, op. cit. supra note 15, at 40 footnote 185;
30. th EUI Competition Law and Policy Workshop (Florence, 2-3 June 2006), available at www.iue.it/RSCAS/ Research/Competition/Index.shtml, at pp. 4, 17-21;
31. forthcoming in Ehlermann and Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2006: Enforcement of Prohibition of Cartels, (Oxford, forthcoming 2007) Reynolds and Anderson, "Immunity and Leniency in EU Cartel Cases: Current Issues", (2006) ECLR, 82, at 82-84;
32. Nordlander, "Discovering Discovery - US Discovery of EC Leniency Statements", (2004) ECLR, 646.
33. That Option reads: "Conditional rebate on any damages claim against the leniency applicant; the claims against other infringers - who are jointly and severally liable for the entire damage - remain unchanged".
34. See Wils, op. cit. supra note 15, 41.
35. That Option reads: "Removal of joint liability from the leniency applicant, thus limiting the applicant's exposure to damages. One possible solution would be to limit the liability of the leniency applicant to the share of the damages corresponding to the applicant's share in the cartelized market."
36. See figures in Bundeskartellamt, Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung - Stand, Probleme, Perspektiven, 4, Discussion paper, available at: www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/Diskussions beitraege/05-Proftag. pdf; see also Lübbig and le Bell, "Die Reform des Zivilprozesses in Kartellsachen", (2006) Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis (WRP), 1209, 1211.
37. See however A.G. Jacobs in Joined Cases C-264, 306, 354 & 355/01, AOK Bundesverband et al v. Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes et al., [2004] ECR I-2493, pointing out in para 105, that he had "no doubt that both damages and injunctive relief would as a matter of Community law be available to anyone suffering loss as a consequence of that conduct".
38. Case C-253/00, Muñoz v. Frumar, [2002] ECR I-7289, para 32.
39. Ashurst Study, cit. supra note 10, 2;
40. Commission Staff Working Paper, cit. supra note 1, para 48.
41. Cf. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - A more coherent European contract law - An action plan, O.J. 2003, C 63/1, 30.
42. E.g. Council Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 of 9 Oct. 1997 on air carrier liability in the event of accidents, O.J. 1997, L 285/1 (legal basis Art. 80(2) EC - transport);
43. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on International Rail Passengers' Rights and Obligations, COM(2004)143 final (legal basis Art. 71 EC - transport);
44. Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, O.J. 2004, L 143/56 (legal basis Art. 175(1) EC - environment);
45. Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, O.J. 1985, L 210/29 (legal basis Art. 94 EC - internal market/consumer protection);
46. Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 Dec. 2001 on general product safety, O.J. 2002, L 11/4 (legal basis Art. 95 EC - internal market/consumer protection);
47. Council Directive 72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972 on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, O.J. 1972, L 103/1, Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC of 30 Dec. 1983 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, O.J. 1984, L 8/17 and Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC of 14 May 1990 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, O.J. 1990, L 129/33 (legal basis Art. 95 EC - internal market/consumer protection).
48. Similarly Van Gerven, "Bringing (private) laws closer to each other at the European level", at pp. 37 et seq., in Cafaggi (Ed.), The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (Oxford, 2006).
49. Cf. e.g. Art. 1 and 8 et seq. Council Directive 85/374/EEC, cit. supra note 28.
50. Cf. e.g. Art. 38(3) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2561/90 of 30 July 1990 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2503/88 on customs warehouses, O.J. 1999, L 246/1;
51. Art. 526(3) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, O.J. 1993, L 253/1.
52. Cf. e.g. Art. 94 et seq. Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights, O.J. 1994, L 227/1.
53. Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, [2005] ECR I-7879. For a detailed analysis of that judgment see Weiß, "EC Competence for Environmental Criminal Law - An Analysis of the Judgment of the ECJ of 13.9.2005 in Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council", (2006) Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien (ZEuS), 381.
54. Para 48.
55. That seems to be the prevailing opinion in the literature: Sturhahn, Art. 83, para 9, in Loewenheim, Meessen, Riesenkampff, Kartellrecht, Band 1: Europäisches Recht (München, 2005);
56. Schröter, Art. 83, para 30, in von der Groeben and Schwarze, Kommentar zum Vertrag über die Europäische Union und zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Baden-Baden, 2003, 6th ed.);
57. Jung, Art. 83 para 11, in Calliess and Ruffert, Kommentar zu EU-Vertrag und EG-Vertrag (Neuwied, 2007, 3rd ed.);
58. Bauer and Weyer, Zivilrechtsfolgen Art. 81 paras. 95 et seq., in Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht (Köln, Loose-leaf, May 2006);
59. Jungbluth, Art. 83 para 20, in Langen and Bunte, Kommentar zum deutschen und europäischen Kartellrecht (Neuwied, 2001, 9th ed.);
60. Stadler, Art. 83 para 22, in Langen and Bunte, Kommentar zum deutschen und europäischen Kartellrecht (Neuwied, 2006, 10th ed.);
61. K. Schmidt, Art. 85 para 23, in Immenga and Mestmäcker, EG-Wettbewerbsrecht (München, 1997);
62. Mestmäcker and Schweitzer, Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht (München, 2004, 2nd ed.), § 3 para 12;
63. contra Pernice, Art. 85 para 16, in Grabitz and Hilf, Das Recht der Europäischen Union - Kommentar (München, Loose-leaf, 1997);
64. Van Gerven, "Substantive Remedies for the Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Rules Before National Courts", in Ehlermann and Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2001 (Oxford, 2003), at pp. 53, 81;
65. Basedow, "Perspektiven des Kartelldeliktsrechts", (2006) ZWeR, 294, 298.
66. Equally Jaeger, "Gemeinschaftskompetenz 'private enforcement'?", (forthcoming 2007) Juristische Blätter, pt. E.III.1.
67. Cf. Jaeger, op. cit. supra note 36, pt. E.III.5.
68. Cf. Jaeger, ibid. pt. E.III.6.
69. See e.g. for the Austrian position, the observations submitted by the Austrian Ministries of Justice and of Foreign Affairs of 21 April 2006, p. 2 et seq.;
70. observations submitted by the Austrian Competition Authority of 20 April 2006, p. 3 et seq.;
71. both available at ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions- for-damages/gp-contributions.html.
72. In that sense, see Basedow, op. cit. supra note 35, 298;
73. Jaeger, however, is less optimistic, cf. op. cit. supra note 36, pt. F.IV.
74. Green Paper, cit. supra note 1, 4.
75. See Commission Staff Working Paper, cit. supra note 1, para 13. In the US, the power to award treble damages in antitrust cases introduced by Congress in 1890 was intended to encourage private enforcement of a new law for which no appropriation for public enforcement had been provided; see e.g. Baker, op. cit. supra note 16, 380.
76. Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss v. Benetton, [1999] ECR I-3055, para 36.
77. Commission Staff Working Paper, cit. supra note 1, para 45.
78. Similarly, see Jaeger, op. cit. supra note 36, pt. F.
79. Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 Dec. 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, O.J. 2001, L 12/1. For Denmark, jurisdiction is governed by the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (O.J. 1990, C 189/2), as amended, which is substantially similar to Regulation 44/2001.
80. It should be noted, however, that such jurisdiction clauses do not cover claims for damages in even the majority of cases. This needs to be established in each individual case by an interpretation of such clauses. In its Provimi judgment, the English High Court concluded that a jurisdiction clause in a contract between a cartel member and its customer which read "the place of jurisdiction for all disputes arising out of the legal relationship between us and the buyers is ⋯" did not cover damages claims by the customer; see Provimi Ltd v. Roche Product Ltd et al (QB [2003], judgment of May 6, 2003). For a critical comment see Mäsch, "Vitamine für Kartellopfer - Forum shopping im europäischen Kartelldeliktsrecht", (2005) Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax), 509, 511;
81. Bulst, "The Provimi Decision of the High Court: Beginnings of Private Antitrust Litigation in Europe", (2003) European Business Organisation Law Review, 623 et seq.
82. The "place where the harmful event occurred" referred to in Art. 5(3) can be both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it;
83. Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse D'Alsace, [1976] ECR 1735, paras. 17 et seq. As to what constitutes the place of event giving rise to damage see Ashton and Vollrath, "Choice of court and applicable law in tortuous actions for breach of Community Competition law", (2006) ZWeR, 1, 8;
84. Bulst, "Internationale Zuständigkeit, anwendbares Recht und Schadensberechnung im Kartelldeliktsrecht", (2004) EWS, 403, 405;
85. Mäsch, op. cit. supra note 47, 515.
86. Case C-68/93, Fiona Shevill and others v. Presse Alliance [1995] ECR I-415, para 20.
87. Amended proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on the law applicable to non contractual obligations ("Rome II"), COM(2006)83 final; see Zimmer and Leopold, "Private Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts und der Vorschlag zur 'Rom II-VO', (2005) EWS, 149.
88. The rule was introduced in Common Position of 29 Sept. 2006, O.J. 2006, C 289 E/04. In chapt. 3 of the explanatory memorandum, the Commission had, however, already hinted that the inclusion of a special rule for cartel damages might depend on the replies to the Green Paper.
89. See however Basedow, op. cit. supra note 35, 300.
90. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament pursuant to the second subparagraph of Art. 251(2) of the EC Treaty concerning the common position of the Council on the adoption of a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations ("Rome II"), COM(2006)566 final, 3 et seq.
91. Cf. Basedow, op. cit. supra note 35, 300.
92. Such elaboration would involve rules clarifying at what stage and in what manner this choice would have to be made, whether this choice can be rescinded, whether there would be a default option applying in the absence of a choice being made etc.
93. Riley and Peysner, "Damages in EC antitrust actions: Who pays the piper?", Comments on the Green paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, available at: ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/anti trust/ot hers/ac tions-for-da mages/gp-contributions.html.
94. I.e. by demonstrating or refuting the availability of a relevant defence (Art. 81(3) EC; objective justification or efficiency defence under Art. 82 EC).
95. The accurate calculation of the damage is a potentially serious problem for the claimant. It could, however, be significantly reduced by the introduction of a rule under which proof of fact of injury suffices, as was suggested in the Commission Staff Working Paper, cit. supra note 1, para 137 (see also Section 273 Austrian Code for Civil Procedure, and Section 287 German Code of Civil Procedure). Also under Art. 288 EC only requirement that damage for which compensation is sought be actual and certain (see, to that effect, Case 51/81, De Fran ceschi SpA Monfalcone v Council and Commission, [1982] ECR 117, para 9;
96. and Joined Cases 256, 257, 265, 267/80, 5 and 51/81 and 282/82, Birra Wührer SpA and others v. Council and Commission, [1984] ECR 3693, para 9), which it is for the appellants to prove
97. (see Case 26/74, Roquette frères v. Commission, [1976] ECR 677, paras. 22 et seq., and Case C-362/95 P, Blackspur DIY and Others v Council and Commission, [1997] ECR I-4775, para 31), not that can be determined with certainty: Case C-243/05, Agraz, SA and others v. Commission, judgment of Nov. 9, 2006, nyr.
98. See from an economist's perspective, Fisher, "Economic Analysis and Antitrust Damages", (2006) World Comp., 383, 392 et seq.
99. Commission Staff Working Paper, cit. supra note 1, para 218.
100. Ashurst Study, cit. supra note 10, 93 et seq.
101. The first such action, based on purchased cartel claims, was brought in 2006 against members of the German cement cartel before the regional court of Düsseldorf (34 O (Kart) 147/05) by a Belgian joint stock company. Austrian law provides consumers the power to assign claims to associations which then - with or without the help of an outside investor financing the proceedings - enforces the acquired claims in a single proceeding. See in more detail Stadler and Mom, "Tu felix Austria? - Neue Entwicklungen im kollektiven Rechtsschutz im Zivilprozess in Österreich", (2006) RIW, 199, 202 et seq.
102. Senator Sherman, considering his original proposal for double damages inadequate, urged that multiple damages "be commensurate with the difficulty of maintaining a private suit". For a review of the legislative history of US federal statutes permitting private treble damage suits see "Study of the Antitrust Treble Damage Remedy", Report of the House Judiciary Committee, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-9 (1984).
103. Especially if combined with prejudgment interest. In the absence of prejudgment interests, treble damages may in reality approach single damages; see Lande, "Are antitrust 'treble' damages really single damages?", 54 Ohio State Law Journal (1993), 115;
104. Rodger, "Private enforcement and the enterprise act: An exemplary system of awarding damages?", (2003) ECLR, 103, 104;
105. th amendment). In the context of employment discrimination, the ECJ explicitly called for full compensation and therefore for the award of interest according to the applicable national rules,
106. in Case C-271/91, M. Helen Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority, [1993] ECR I-4367, para 31.
107. Ashurst Study, cit. supra note 10, 129 et seq.;
108. Commission Staff Working Paper, cit. supra note 1, para 121;
109. for Germany see however OLG Koblenz, (2004) WuW, 1147;
110. Monopolkommission, Das allgemeine Wettbewerbsrecht in der Siebten GWB-Novelle (Sondergutachten 41, 2004), available at www.monopolkommission. de/sg-41/text-s41.pdf, paras. 80 et seq.;
111. Piekenbrock, "Zur Zustellung kartellrechtlicher treble damages-Klagen in Deutschland", (2006) IPRax, 4.
112. Altogether critical of the value of litigation as deterrence, Hodges op. cit. supra note 13, at 1394.
113. I.e. if they are not high enough to inversely reflect the likelihood of detection.
114. Cf. also Diemer, "The Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules", (2006) ECLR, 309, 315.
115. See e.g. Monopolkommission, cit. supra note 65, paras. 75 et seq.;
116. against a need in that respect see e.g. Wils, Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement (Oxford, 2005), at p. 122 et seq.;
117. Böge and Ost, op. cit. supra note 3, 202;
118. Roth, "Zivilrechtliche Durchsetzung des europäischen Kartellrechts", in Festschrift Walter Gebhard (Köln, 2004), at p. 832;
119. Möschel, "Erweiterter Privatrechtsschutz im Kartellrecht?", (2006) WuW, 115;
120. Rüggeberg and Schinkel, "Consolidating Antitrust Damages in Europe: A Proposal for Standing in Line with Efficient Private Enforcement", (2006) World Comp., 395, 415.
121. While the term "horizontal cartels" used in Green Paper, cit. supra note 1, could be understood as applying to all forms of horizontal cooperation, the Commission Staff Working Paper, cit. supra note 1, at para 50, makes it clear that the term "horizontal cartels" used in Option 16 must be understood as referring to core cartels ("the most serious infringements").
122. See also Baker, op. cit. supra note 16, 382.
123. In general, no court fees are due for proceedings before the European Courts (Rules of Procedure of the ECJ, Art. 72;
124. Rules of Procedure of the CFI, Art. 90), an exemption being made only for vexatious actions.
125. Cit. supra note 1, para 205.
126. Baker, op. cit. supra note 16, 387.
127. In the US, in order to reduce the threat of litigation against potentially pro-competitive activities, Congress has introduced a "loser pays" rule. For an analysis of that rule and its implications see Baker, op. cit. supra note 16, 386.
128. Questions A through C and Options 1 through 10 are devoted to rules on burden and standard of proof; see for an overview e.g. Diemer, op. cit. supra note 68, 313;
129. Pheasant, "Damages Actions for Breach of EC Antitrust Rules: The European Commission's Green Paper" (2006) ECLR, 365, 372 et seq.
130. Cf. also Basedow, "Das Kartelldeliktsrecht und der 'More Economic Approach'", (2006) EuZW, 97.
131. To the extent apparent from a review of the Ashurst country reports, available at ec.europa. eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions-for- damages/study.html, Option 1 (disclosure after fact pleading) is already part of the laws governing civil procedure in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden; Option 4 (sanctions for destruction of evidence) seems to be recognized in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and Sweden; Option 10 (change of burden of proof in case of unjustified refusal to turn over evidence) appears to be available in Denmark, Estonia, France, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain; and Option 9 (lowering or reversal of burden of proof in cases of information asymmetry) is the rule in at least Denmark and Spain; for procedural rules facilitating proof in Germany see also Lübbig and le Bell, op. cit. supra note 23, 1214.
132. th amendment of the German Cartel Act, such a provision has already been introduced (Section 33 para 4 GWB; for an instructive analysis see Bornkamm, § 33 paras. 119 et seq., in Langen and Bunte, Kommentar zum deutschen und europäischen Kartellrecht (Neuwied, 2006, 10th ed.)).
133. See Riley, "Beyond leniency: Enhancing the enforcement of EC antitrust litigation", (2005) World Comp., 377.
134. See Holmes, "Public Enforcement or Private Enforcement? Enforcement of Competition Law in the EC and UK", (2004) ECLR, 25, 30;
135. Clifford Jones, "Panel Discussion", in Ehlermann and Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2001 (Oxford, 2003), 25.
136. Böge and Ost, op. cit. supra note 3, 198.
137. Whether and under what conditions adequate redress might necessarily entail the initiation of supplies is, however, unclear. This is not an issue discussed in the Green Paper and will most likely not be dealt within legislation following up on this document. Duty to supply under Art. 81 EC will thus most likely remain a matter of national private law and solutions might differ accordingly in the various Member States.
138. Basedow, op. cit. supra note 77, 97.
139. Cf. Wils, op. cit. supra note 69, at p. 121;
140. Snyder and Kauper, "Misuse of Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff", 90 Michigan Law Review (1991), 551;
141. Baumol and Ordover, "Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition", 28 Journal of Law & Economics (1985), 247;
142. Hodges, op. cit. supra note 13, at 1395.
143. See e.g. Case No 1060/5/7/06, Healthcare at Home Limited v. Genzyme limited [2006] CAT 29.
144. There are certainly formidable hurdles for the claimant in a civil law action as well; in particular an information asymmetry regarding cost structures, and the smallness of the claim in relation to the cost of the proceeding.
145. DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Art. 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, available at ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf.
146. This concern has frequently been articulated; see e.g. Basedow, op. cit. supra note 77, 97;
147. Bundeskartellamt, op. cit. supra note 23, 29.
148. Ashurst Study, cit. supra note 10, paras. 101 et seq.
149. See however De Smijter and O'Sullivan, "The Manfredi judgment of the ECJ and how it relates to the Commission's initiative on EC antitrust damage actions", (2006) Competition Policy Newsletter Number 3, 25.
150. Elements specifically mentioned are damage, illegality and causation (Courage v. Crehan, cit. supra note 5, para 26;
151. Joined Cases C-295-298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and others, [2006] ECR I-6619, para 60). On the contrary, in Courage v. Crehan (without using this term), one of the elements the Court explicitly approves of is the principle of contributory negligence according to which courts may take a "significant" responsibility of the claimant into account. This is an indication that the Court itself considers the issue of fault or negligence relevant in this context, see Courage v. Crehan, para 31.
152. Commission Staff Working Paper, cit. supra note 1, para 106 (the Commission refers to a judgment which appears to have been overruled since).
153. Case C-224/01, Gerhard Köbler v. Republik Österreich, [2003] ECR I-10239, paras. 51 et seq.;
154. A.G. Leger in Köbler, paras. 138 seq.
155. It is a characteristic if not constitutive feature of core violations that an intent to restrict competition can and will be assumed. For this reason, anti-competitive effects need not to be proven, see e.g. Case C-49/92 P, Commission v. Anic Partecipazioni spa, [1999] ECR I-4125, para 99;
156. Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten and Grundig v. Commission, [1964] ECR 299, at para 342;
157. Case C-277/87, Sandoz Prodotti Farmaceutici v. Commission, [1990] ECR I-45;
158. Case C-219/95 P, Ferriere Nord v. Commission, [1997] ECR I-4411, paras. 14 and 15.
159. Wils, op. cit. supra note 69, 121.
160. The most efficient standing restriction in this regard is the antitrust injury requirement, see section 5.3 infra.
161. For this view, see Weidenbach and Schultze, "Das Grünbuch der Europäischen Kommission zu Schadenersatzklagen im EG-Kartellrecht: Der zweite Schritt auf einem langen Weg" (2006) Zeitschrift für Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht, 133, 136.
162. Courage v. Crehan, cit. supra note 5, paras. 30 et seq.
163. Manfredi, cit. supra note 92, para 64.
164. For example, firms making products which use the cartelized input, which lose sales if a price increase of the latter makes these products less appealing to the consumer.
165. E.g. a market foreclosing exclusivity arrangement.
166. In US case law, this kind of "collateral damage" was an issue e.g. in Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 9 Cir., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55;
167. see Jones, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 162.
168. Ashurst Study, cit. supra note 10, 38.
169. See the reports on Greece, 13, The Netherlands, 9, Norway, 14 et seq., Italy, 14 et seq., Sweden, 82 et seq., of the series edited by von Bar, Deliktsrecht in Europa (Köln, 1993).
170. Rodger, op. cit. supra note 64, 109;
171. Jones, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 131;
172. Royal Courts of Justice (London), Case No: A3/2003/1725, Crehan v. Inntrepreneur Pub Company CPC, [2004] EWCA 637: "We therefore hold that [for] the plaintiffs to recover treble damages ⋯ they must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful."
173. According to the Supreme Court in its landmark 1977 Brunswick decision (Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477), plaintiffs trying to recover treble damages on account of § 7 Clayton Act Violations "must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendant's acts unlawful"; see e.g. Pheasant, op. cit. supra note 76, 369.
174. See e.g. Jones, op. cit. supra note 7, pp. 173 et seq.
175. See for German jurisprudence on this; BGH, 25.1.1983 " Familienzeitschrift" BGHZ 86, 324, 330 = WuW/E BGH 1985, 1988;
176. BGH, 23.10.1979 "BMW-Importe" WuW/E BGH 1643, 1645;
177. 10.11.1987 "Cartier-Uhren" WuW/E BGH 2451, 2457;
178. 12.5.1998 "Depotkosmetik" WuW/E DE-R 206, 207;
179. LG Berlin, 23.5.2003 "Berliner Transportbeton II" WuW/E DE-R 1325 et seq.;
180. LG Mannheim, 11.7.2003 "Vitaminkartell", GRUR 2004, 182, 183;
181. LG Mainz, 15.1.2004 "Vitaminpreise Mainz" WuW/E DE-R 1349, 1351;
182. see Bornkamm, § 33 paras. 6 et seq., in Langen and Bunte, Kommentar zum deutschen und europäischen Kartellrecht (Neuwied, 2001, 9th ed.);
183. Topel, § 50 paras. 55 et seq., in Wiedemann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts (München, 1999);
184. Roth, § 35 paras. 24 et seq., in Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht (Köln, Loose-leaf);
185. Keßler, "Private Enforcement - Zur deliktsrechtlichen Aktualisierung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellrechts im Lichte des Verbraucherschutzes", (2006) WRP, 1061, 1066 et seq.;
186. for the US jurisprudence see Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477;
187. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104;
188. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334;
189. see e.g. Bulst, op. cit. supra note 14, 55 et seq.;
190. ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments (1997, 4th ed.), 765;
191. Baker, op. cit. supra note 16, at 390 et seq.
192. In addition, the protective scope requirement has recently been abolished for antitrust damage claims in Germany, see Section 33 para 1 sentence 1 and 3 GWB, for reasons see Bornkamm, op. cit. supra note 79, § 33 paras. 16 et seq.;
193. see also Zimmer and Logemann, "Unterliegen 'Altfälle' der verschärfen Schadenersatzhaftung nach § 33 GWB?", (2006) WuW, 982, 984 et seq.
194. The leading case is still Case C-234/89, Stergios Delimitis v. Heininger Bräu AG, [1991] ECR I-935.
195. Crehan v. Inntrepreneur, cit. supra note 106: "The statutory duty argument is without doubt a formidable one. If, as we think, it is correct, Mr Crehan's claim cannot succeed in English law alone. It can only succeed by an application of the principle of effectiveness; in other words, on the basis that the rule of English law would render practical impossible the exercise of a right to damages conferred on Mr Crehan by Community law ⋯ we think it must follow that the effect of the ECJ decision was to put its imprimatur on the particular claim of Mr Crehan, holding that a right to the type of damages he claimed was conferred on him by Community law".
196. The economic committee explained its suggestion to extend the entitlement to the damages claim to all persons affected by the infringement (affected persons are competitors or other market participants impaired by the infringement) by pointing out that after the Courage judgment, the protective scope requirement could not be applied any more (see Bericht 2005, 16 and 49, as cited in Bornkamm, op. cit. supra note 79, § 33 paras. 18);
197. for account of legislative history see Wurmnest, "A new era for private antitrust litigation in Germany? A critical appraisal of the modernized law against restraints of competition", 6 German Law Journal (2005), 1173, 1182.
198. Opinion of A.G. Geelhoed of 26 Jan. 2006 in Manfredi, cited supra note 92, para 31.
199. Reich, op. cit. supra note 6, 49;
200. Mäsch, op. cit. supra note 9, 838;
201. Fritzsche, "Der Beseitigungsanspruch im Kartellrecht nach der 7. GWB-Novelle", (2006) WRP, 42, 45;
202. Eilmansberger, "The relationship between rights and remedies in EC law: In search of the missing link", 41 CML Rev. (2004), 1199, 1231 et seq.;
203. contra: Scheffler, "Schadensersatz für Kartellrechtsverletzungen: Wie restriktiv war das GWB?", (2005) EuZW, 673;
204. Koch, "Kartellrechtliche Schadensersatzansprüche mittelbar betroffener Marktteilnehmer nach § 33 GWB n. F.", (2005) WuW, 1210, 1215.
205. Similarly Reich, op. cit. supra note 6, 55.
206. Such as Joined Cases C-178, 179, 188, 189 & 190/94, Erich Dillenkofer et al. v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, [1996] ECR I-4845, para 21;
207. Joined Cases C-94 & 95/95, Danila Bonifaci and others v. Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS), [1997] ECR I-3969, para 42;
208. Case C-373/95, Federica Maso and others v. Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) and Repubblica italiana, [1997] ECR I-4051, para 52;
209. Case C-222/02, Peter Paul et al. v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, [2004] ECR I-9245, para 49.
210. Case 5/71, Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v. Council, [1971] ECR 975, para 11. This condition has been slightly modified in the meantime, and was restated in Case C-352/98 P, Bergaderm and Goupil v. Commission, [2000] ECR I-5291 as requiring a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals.
211. See also the examples given by Reich, op. cit. supra note 6, 49.
212. In this sense also Sullivan and Grimes, The Law of Antitrust (St. Paul, 2000), at p. 969 ("Over time, antitrust injury might best serve as the central and exclusive test for determining antitrust standing. As a theory based test it can be systematically developed having regard to teleological considerations").
213. According to the Ashurst Study, cit. supra note 10, 74, this appears to be the case in Italy where, at least according to some scholars, the direct causation test considers the type of risk that the legal provision breached was intended to prevent. In the US, considerations and arguments reminiscent of the protective scope approach occasionally appear in standing tests, e.g. the target area test, the zone of interests test and the factual matrix test (for a concise representation of these tests and references to relevant cases see Jones, op. cit. supra note 7, at pp. 162 et seq.);
214. Sullivan and Grimes, op. cit. supra note 120, call them "awkward causation requirements" for which "the antitrust injury requirement announced in Brunswick has lessened the pressure to rely on", 967.
215. See Bulst, op. cit. supra note 14, 261.
216. Cf. Monti, "Anti competitive agreements: The innocent party's right to damages", (2002) EL Rev., 282, 296.
217. That would leave open the possibility to exclude plaintiffs claiming injury by efficiency-enhancing aspects of a cartel arrangement (prohibited because of a danger of market power exploitation).
218. Manfredi, cit. supra note 92, para 64.
219. Joined Cases 64 & 113/76, 167 & 239/78, 27, 28 & 45/79, P. Dumortier frères SA and others v. Council of the European Communities, [1979] ECR 3091, para 21.
220. "Collateral damages" (damages incidentally caused by conduct aiming at the infliction of other, anti-competitive, harm) can in my view not be dealt with satisfactorily through this "directness of injury" test. Again, this appears to be primarily a protective scope issue.
221. The exclusionary value of the concept of adequate cause is limited, as many indirect and remote injuries are often typical and foreseeable.
222. E.g. a price increase would have occurred anyway because of an oligopolistic market structure; or a business relationship would have been denied or discontinued even without single branding or exclusivity because of the superiority of the defendant's products.
223. E.g. sunk investments, future profits for a limited time, the investment necessary to reenter a market or penetrate a new market etc.
224. Commission Staff Working Paper, cit. supra note 1, para 111.
225. Ashurst Study, cit. supra note 10, 79 et seq.
226. Courage v. Crehan, cit. supra note 5, para 31.
227. This can be inferred from the statement in para 32 according to which the markedly weaker position might also have compromised or eliminated his capacity to avoid the loss or reduce its extent, e.g. by availing himself of other legal remedies in good time (para 33). Similarly, see also Monti, op. cit. supra note 123, 285.
228. In this case, however, it must be assumed that significant responsibility is excluded not merely by the lack of negotiating power of a party joining a network of agreements, but also because such a party will, as a rule, not dispose of the relevant (market) information for judging the compatibility of the agreement with competition law.
229. See however Odudu and Edelman, "Compensatory Damages for Breach of Article 81", (2002) EL Rev., 327, 331.
230. Cf. Bulst, op cit. supra note 47, 645;
231. see also Justice John Harlan in his concurring opinion in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), para 154: "[i]t seems to me a bizarre way to 'further the overriding public policy in favor of competition,' to pay violators three times their losses in doing what public policy seeks to deter them from doing ⋯".
232. Koch, op. cit. supra note 115, 1219.
233. For a similar distinction see also Bulst, op. cit. supra note 14, 57.
234. Unless, of course, an aggregation of claims (discussed in Options 25 and 26) is possible. The recent filing of 12,521 claims for damages (for amounts between € 45-60) by the French consumer association before the commercial court in Paris will certainly remain an exception. The primary point there was clearly to support the establishment of a possible class action, see Le Figaro 14 Oct. 2006, available at www.le figaro.fr/ecoentreprises/20061014. FIG000000625-ufc-monte-un-show-du-telephone-mobile-pour-defendre-les-ac tions-de-groupe.html.
235. Ashurst Study, cit. supra note 10, 79.
236. th amendment to the German Cartel Act, does not change the law but merely confirms that passing-on does not automatically exclude injury (which would appear to have been undisputed anyway). See Böge and Ost, op. cit. supra note 3, 200;
237. Bundeskartellamt, op. cit. supra note 23, 12;
238. Reich, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 42 et seq. The existence of a claim under the new rule thus depends on general principles (" Vorteilsausgleichung"). For a detailed analysis of this provision see Bornkamm, op. cit. supra note 79, § 33 paras. 97 et seq., especially para 107;
239. see also Zimmer and Logemann, op. cit. supra note 110, 986;
240. Lübbig and le Bell, op. cit. supra note 23, 1212.
241. Courage v. Crehan, cit. supra note 5, para 94.
242. See also Bulst, op. cit. supra note 14, 237.
243. Ibid., 237.
244. Case 238/78, Ireks-Arkady v. Council and Commission, [1979] ECR 2955, para 14;
245. Joined Cases C-441 & 442/98, Michaïlidis, [2000] ECR I-7145, para 31;
246. and Courage v. Crehan, cit. supra note 5, para 30.
247. In the Commission Staff Working Paper, cit. supra note 1, para 164 et seq. the Commission argues probably correctly that the passing-on rule is only accepted and not applied as a matter of Community law. In Case C-147/01, Weber's Wine World Handels-GmbH and Others v. Abgabenberufungskommission Wien, [2003] ECR I-11365, para 98, however, the ECJ shows sympathy for that argument; A.G. Jacobs in para 49 of his Opinion, even considers it part of Community law. Similarly, Rüggeberg and Schinkel, op. cit. supra note 69, 406.
248. See also the critique by A.G. Tesauro in Joined Cases C-192-218/95, Comateb v. Directeur général des douanes et droits indirects, [1997] ECR I-165, para 21.
249. Dumortier frères, cit. supra note 126, para 15: "The council objected to that method of calculating the damage on the ground that the gritz producers eliminated the damage by passing on the loss resulting from the abolition of the refunds in their selling prices. In principle, in the context of an action for damages, such an objection may not be dismissed as unfounded. In fact, it must be admitted that if the loss from the abolition of the refunds has actually been passed on in the prices the damage may not be measured by reference to the refunds not paid. In that case the price increase would take the place of the refunds, thus compensating the producer".
250. See also Bulst, op. cit. supra note 14, 237.
251. Hanover Shoe v United Shoe Machinery, 392 US 481 (1968);
252. Illinois Brick v Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977).
253. For a detailed analysis from a comparative perspective of the law after Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick see Brkan, op. cit. supra note 7, 493;
254. Bulst, op. cit. supra note 14, at pp. 64 et seq.;
255. Jones, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 177.
256. Namely symmetrically (i.e. including exclusion of indirect buyers claims) in Option 22, and asymmetrically in Option 23 (the passing on defence is excluded but indirect purchasers retain claim). Option 24 features a complete exclusion of the defence combined with the distribution among all victims of the overcharge retained by any claimant.
257. See also Pheasant, op. cit. supra note 76, 370.
258. Cf. Reich, op. cit. supra note 6, 45.
259. See also Rüggeberg and Schinkel, op. cit. supra note 69, 407.
260. See also Sullivan and Grimes, op.cit. supra note 120, at pp. 97 et seq.;
261. Brkan, op. cit. supra note 7, 496.
262. Böge and Ost, op. cit. supra note 3, 200;
263. Bulst, op. cit. supra note 14, 286, quoting empirical studies according to which, for the most part, no passing-on was established; see also Commission Staff Working Paper, cit. supra note 12, paras. 159 et seq.
264. Other factors are described in Bulst, op. cit. supra note 14, at 281 et seq.
265. Competition on the output market would prevent the middleman from maintaining a mark-up once the overcharge is eliminated so that there is no impact on profits and therefore no injury. Decisive factors for the applicability of the passing-on defence are thus (1) elasticity of demand (to cover the overcharge), and (2) the market power of the direct purchaser on the output market (his market).
266. If proven, such a fact quashes the end purchaser's claim because it removes the causal link between high prices charged by the middleman and the cartel (i.e. from the end purchaser's perspective, passing on is a causation issue, see also Bulst, op. cit. supra note 14, at pp. 120 et seq.).
267. This would be a separate injury (from an economic point of view as well), i.e. an allocation injury rather than a wealth transfer injury. Thus, if damages were granted alongside end-consumer claims, no duplicate recovery would occur. See Sullivan and Grimes, op. cit. supra note 120, 975.
268. See also ECJ in the context of restitution of charges; see Case 199/82, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. SpA San Giorgio, [1983] ECR 3595, para 18;
269. see also Reich, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 47.
270. Which would probably not be compatible with Courage v. Crehan (cit. supra note 5).