Why the British were really on the Somme: A reply to Elizabeth Greenhalgh

War in History

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 446-471

  Philpott, William ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 61149556049     PISSN: 09683445     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/096834450200900404     Document Type: Review

References (76)

1. D. Dutton, The Politics of Diplomacy: Britain and France in the Balkans in the First World War (London, 1998)
2. D. French, British War Aims and Strategy, 1914-1916
3. (London, 1986) and The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916-1918 (Oxford, 1995)
4. K. Neilson, Strategy and Supply: The Anglo-Russian Alliance, 1914-1917 (London, 1984)
5. W.J. Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (Basingstoke, 1996)
6. 'Kitchener and the 29th Division; A Study in Anglo-French Strategic Relations, 1914-1915'
7. Journal of Strategic Studies, xvi (1993), pp. 375-407
8. and 'Squaring the Circle: The Higher Co-ordination of the Entente in the Winter of 1915-1916'
9. English Historical Review, cxiv (1999), pp. 875-98
10. While of course British policy in the First World War could never entirely ignore the alliance factor, earlier works such as P. Guinn, British Strategy and Politics, 1914-1918 (London, 1965) take a decidedly Anglocentric view of the decision-making process
11. This narrow focus persists in the otherwise valuable B. Millman, Pessimism and British War Policy, 1916-1918 (London, 2001)
12. Neilson, Strategy and Supply, p. viii
13. E. Greenhalgh, 'Why the British Were on the Somme in 1916', War in History, vi (1999), pp. 147-73 (hereafter cited Greenhalgh)
14. See, for example, T. Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modem Warfare, 1900-1918 (London, 1990)
15. R. Prior and T. Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson, 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1992)
16. G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory (London, 2001)
17. Existing historiography of the alliance has never suggested that Haig did not retain operational independence in the conduct of individual battles. For discussion of this see Philpott, Anglo-French Relations, pp. 103-106
18. W.J. Philpott, 'Haig and Britain's European allies', in B.J. Bond and N. Cave, eds, Haig: A Reappraisal 70 Years On (Barnsley, 1999), pp. 133-40
19. W.J. Philpott, 'Britain and France go to War: Anglo-French Relations on the Western Front', War in History, II (1995), pp. 43-64
20. This author's work is the most direcdy challenged. It has certainly been misinterpreted, and in part misrepresented. Greenhalgh is not afraid to take on respected experts in the field. Both Brian Bond and John Gooch, identified as failing to understand the Anglo-French relationship (p. 147), base their conclusions on this author's work. John Gooch was external examiner for, and Brian Bond read the final draft of, W.J. Philpott, 'British Strategy on the Western Front; Independence or Alliance, 1904-1918', DPhil. thesis (Oxford University, 1991)
21. Greenhalgh, pp. 156-57. The same unfavourable comparison was made at the time. Maurice Hankey diary, 18 October 1916, Hankey papers, Churchill College Archives Centre, Cambridge, HNKY 1/1
22. Such an interchange of tactical ideas was never formalized. Both armies may have learned as much from their own mistakes and from the successes of their enemy as from each other's experience. P. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack, 1916-1918 (London, 1994), pp. 52-53
23. The broader issues and complexities of strategic decision-making are evaluated in D. French, 'The Meaning of Attrition, 1914-16', English Historical Review, ciii (1988), pp. 385-405
24. H. Strachan, 'The Battle of the Somme and British Strategy', Journal of Strategic Studies, xxi (1998), pp. 79-95
25. W.J. Philpott, 'The Strategic Ideas of Sir John French', Journal of Strategic Studies, xn (1989), pp. 458-78
26. W.J. Philpott, 'The General Staff and the Paradoxes of Continental War', in D. French and B. Holden Reid, eds, The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation (London, 2002, forthcoming)
27. K.M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904-14 (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 125-33
28. The phrase is borrowed from H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London, 1997), p. 36
29. R. Williams, 'Lord Kitchener and the Battle of Loos: French Politics and British Strategy in the Summer of 1915', in L. Freedman, P. Hayes and R. O'Neill, eds, War, Strategy and International Politics: Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard (Oxford, 1992), pp. 117-32
30. Philpott, 'Haig and Britain's European Allies', pp. 128-44
31. K. Neilson, 'Kitchener: A Reputation Refurbished?', Canadian Journal of History, XV (1980), pp. 207-27
32. Note, 14 August 1914, Murray papers, PRO, WO 79/62, quoted in G. Cassar, Kitchener: Architect of Victory (London, 1977), p. 231
33. Neilson, 'Kitchener'
34. Philpott, 'Kitchener and the 29th Division'. The former evaluates Kitchener's grand strategic perspective, the latter his dealings with Joffre and the Western Front in 1915
35. David French's own analysis acknowledges that Kitchener's initial perception was evidently unrealistic by the end of 1915. French, Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, p. 4
36. Haig shared this view. Haig diary, 5 August 1914, The Private Papers of Douglas Haig, 1914-1919, ed. R. Blake (London, 1952), p. 69
37. Panouse to ministre de la guerre, 19 August 1914; C. à C. Repington, The First World War, 2 vols (London, 1920), i, p. 21-22. It is to Kitchener's credit that even before France's early reverses he rejected the so-called 'British way in warfare', limited military effort and 'mercenary' subsidies to her allies
38. Cassar, Kitchener, p. 160
39. Wilson diary, 12 August 1914
40. Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson papers, Imperial War Museum, London; Panouse to ministre de la guerre, 19 August 1914
41. Philpott, 'Kitchener and the 29th Division', pp. 379-387, passim
42. F. Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, trans. T. Bentley Mott (London, 1931), p. 184
43. A very percipient judgement, as it turned out. Notes of a conversation between de Broqueville and Kitchener, 16 February 1915, De Broqueville papers, Archives Gánárales du Royaume, Brussels, file 391. For an analysis of Kitchener's broader strategic analysis, see French, 'The Meaning of Attrition', pp. 390-92
44. Hamilton diary, 15 March 1915
45. in General Sir Ian Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary, 2 vols (London, 1920), i, p. 9
46. R.A. Prete, 'La conflit stratágique Franco-Britannique sur le front occidental et la conference de Calais du 6 juillet 1915', Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains, clxxxvi (1997), pp. 17-49, p. 46
47. Asquith to King George V, 20 August 1915, Asquith papers, box 8, Bodleian Library, Oxford. For Kitchener's reasoning see Williams, 'Kitchener and the Battle of Loos'
48. Kitchener to Asquith, 11 January 1916, Asquith papers, box 16
49. French diary, 19 February 1915, Field Marshal Viscount French of Ypres papers, Imperial War Museum, London. Although Kitchener opposed the idea of breaking up new divisional formations raised in England and redistributing their subunits among experienced formations, once New Army formations started to arrive Sir John French promptly redistributed his experienced regular army brigades to induct and strengthen the new divisions. Kitchener to French, 20 January 1915, and French to Kitchener, 23 January 1915, Kitchener Papers, PRO, 30/57/50/69 and 70
50. Clive diary, 6 July 1915, 'Cabinet Office: Correspondence Used in the Compilation of the Official History', PRO, CAB 45/201
51. 'I have not got an army in France really, but a collection of divisions untrained for the field. The actual fighting Army will be evolved from them.' Haig diary, 29 March 1916, Private Papers, ed. Blake, p. 137
52. Haig diary, 23 December 1915, Haig papers
53. Technological and terrain limitations were unlikely to have produced any greater success in Flanders than on the Somme. See J. Terraine, The Road to Passchendaele (London, 1977)
54. One perceived advantage of a northern flank offensive was that the British army would not have had to work in close tactical cooperation with the French army. In early 1916 the possibility was, however, negated by another awkward ally, the Belgians. W.J. Philpott, 'Britain, France and the Belgian Army'
55. B. Bond et al., Look to Your Front: Studies in the First World War by the British Commission for Military History (Staplehurst, 1999), pp. 121-35
56. Clive diary, 6January 1916, PRO, CAB 45/201
57. French, 'The Meaning of Attrition', argues that from the start of the war Kitchener had conceived the Western Front campaign in terms of a long attritional struggle, although in February 1916 he still showed a certain reluctance to rush ill-equipped British divisions across the Channel when the French were attacked at Verdun. J. des Vallières, Au Soleil de la Cavalerie avec le Gánáral Des Vallières (Paris, 1962), pp. 143 and 147
58. Philpott, 'Squaring the Circle', passim
59. R.A. Prete, 'Joffre and the Question of Allied Supreme Command, 1914-16', Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History, xvi (1989), pp. 329-38, 333-34
60. 'The Opening of the Wearing Out Battle', GHQ, 23 December 1916
61. Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches, ed. J.H. Boraston (London, 1920), p. 20
62. Conclusions of Chantilly conference, quoted by Greenhalgh, p. 148. While, as Greenhalgh states (p. 149), strictly speaking this objective did not 'necessarily require action on the date or in the place agreed', with a Russian offensive already under way, a new Italian offensive being prepared and indeed a French offensive ready to launch on the immediate right of the British army, it would have been a foolish and selfish commander who went back on this long-standing and politically sensitive agreement
63. Robertson to Haig, 28 January 1916, The Military Correspondence of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, December 1915-February 1918, ed. D.R. Woodward (London, 1989), pp. 32-33
64. Des Vallières, Au Soleil de la Cavalerie, pp. 149-50
65. Kitchener's early pronouncements, if abandoned, had clearly not been forgotten. The view that it was now or never if Britain wanted to 'win the peace' was certainly prevalent in early 1916. See, for example, Robertson to Wigram, 12 January 1916, Military Correspondence, ed. Woodward, p. 27
66. 'Plans for Future Operations', by Haig, 10 February 1916, Haig papers, 104
67. J. Joffre, The Memoirs of Marshal Joffre, trans. T. Bentley Mott, 2 vols (London, 1932), ii, 461-62
68. This aspect of Haig's strategic thinking is thoroughly analysed by Blake, Private Papers, pp. 51-58
69. 'The Opening of the Wearing Out Battle', 23 December 1916, Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches, ed. Boraston, p. 20
70. Robertson's words, quoted in Haig diary, 8 March 1916, Private Papers, ed. Blake, p. 135
71. In fact the day of attack had been delayed from 29 June because of bad weather. There was much toing and froing about the actual day between GHQ and GQG in June. Joffre Journal, 9-28 June 1916 passim, Journal de Marche de Joffre, 1916-1919, ed. G. Pedroncini (Vincennes, 1990), pp. 12-29
72. Charteris diary, 1 May 1916
73. J. Charteris, At GHQ (London, 1931), p. 143
74. If there was a post-battle excuse for failure on the Somme it was provided by Lt-Col. J. H. Boraston, Haig's private secretary at the time and a post-war defender of Haig's reputation, who edited Haig's dispatches. He noted on Haig's dispatch of 23 December 1916: 'The choice of front for the allied offensive was governed by the consideration that neither the French nor ourselves were at the moment deemed strong enough to undertake unaided an offensive on a really large scale. It was therefore necessary to deliver a combined attack.' Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches, ed. Boraston, p. 19, n. 2
75. For a survey of the extensive literature on the war see B.J. Bond, ed., The First World War and British Military History (Oxford, 1991)
76. For a more balanced assessment of the strategic significance of the battle see Strachan, 'The Battle of the Somme and British Strategy'