Why the British were on the Somme in 1916

War in History

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 147-173

  Greenhalgh, Elizabeth ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61149494914     PISSN: 09683445     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/096834459900600202     Document Type: Article

References (78)

1. Sir J.E. Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1916 (London, 1932), p. 32
2. B. Bond, 'Worse than the Somme?', Times Literary Supplement, 12 July 1996, p. 4(d)
3. J. Gooch, 'The Weary Titan: Strategy and Policy in Great Britain, 1890-1918', in W. Murray, A. Bernstein and M. Knox, eds, The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War (Cambridge, 1994), p. 302
4. The minutes of the conference and the conclusions reached are in AFGG 4/1, annexes 46, 47, 49. There is a copy in French of the conference conclusions (I.C. 5) in CAB 28/1, Public Record Office, Kew [hereafter PRO]. The British official history merely gives the translated text of Joffre's memorandum for the conference, not the conference conclusions: Edmonds, Military Operations, 1916, appendix 1
5. Reprinted in J.H. Boraston, ed., Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches (London, 1920), p. 20
6. D. French, The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition 1916-1918 (Oxford, 1995), p. 4
7. This summarizes the argument of French's earlier study of British war aims during the Asquith years: British Strategy and War Aims 1914-1916 (London, 1986)
8. Minutes of the Dardanelles Committee, 20 Aug. 1915, CAB42/3/16, PRO. Kitchener was referring to the need to take the offensive with France in order to ease the pressure on Russia
9. One biographer writes of 'military chaos' and 'defective... mobilization': E.S. Grew et al., eds, Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener: His Life and Work for the Empire (3 vols, London, 1916) I, p. 58
10. French, British Strategy and War Aims 1914-1916, p. 158
11. W.J. Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914-18 (London, 1996), ch. 7
12. The title of the doctoral dissertation from which this work is derived reveals the author's thesis more clearly: 'British Military Strategy on the Western Front: Independence or Alliance, 1904-1918' (DPhil., University of Oxford, 1991)
13. W. Philpott, 'Britain and France Go to War: Anglo-French Relations on the Western Front 1914-1918', War in History II (1995), p. 46
14. Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy, p. 14. The phrase 'strategic paradox' recurs frequently throughout the work
15. Esher diary, 10 Dec. 1915, Esher papers, ESHR 2/15, Churchill College, Cambridge
16. For Germany's war aims, see the discussion, esp. that on the 'September Programme', in F. Fischer, Germany's War Aims in the First World War (London, 1967), pp. 98-118. The elimination of France as a great power entailed the cession of stretches of the French coast; and control over Belgium (with the cession of Antwerp) remained a war aim right to the end. Economic domination would flow from the Mitteleuropa programme after the annexation of France's Longwy-Briey area with its coal and iron ore. A similar Mittelafrika programme would cut the red line from the Cape to Cairo; and the establishment of a land bridge through southern Russia, Asia Minor and Persia would directly threaten Britain's interests in the Middle East. There was even a suggestion (op. cit., p. 84) that the US might be rewarded with Canada for turning its navy against Britain
17. See K.M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy 1904-1914 (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 128-9
18. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, KG, Twenty-Five Years 1982-1916 (2 vols, London, 1925) I, p. 312
19. Keith Wilson insists on the essentially 'political' nature of the decision to support France: see his Policy of the Entente, pp. 133-4
20. See also Lady A.G. Lennox, ed., The Diary of Lord Bertie of Thame 1914-1918 (2 vols, London, 1924) I, pp. 25-6. The text of Kitchener's summary of their conversation is in the Bertie papers, FO800/Fr/14/41, PRO (reproduced in facsimile in Bertie's diary, between pp. 24 and 25)
21. Gen. Ferdinand Foch, Journées', fo. 25, Foch papers, 1K129, carton 2, AG. It is worth noting that Foch's account has 1 million each year on 1 July - but he has overwritten 'chaque an' with '1915'. Perhaps his recollection was not clear. Certainly his published memoirs give 1 July 1915, as do Poincaré's and Weygand's (the latter was Foch's chief of staff). The ungracious reaction - note that the conference took place at a time of great urgency during First Ypres - was that fewer, sooner, would be preferred
22. P. Simkins, Kitchener's Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-16 (Manchester, 1988), p. 146
23. Sir George Arthur claims that Kitchener had 70 divisions in mind right from Aug. 1914: see his Life of Lord Kitchener (3 vols, London, 1920) III, p. 9
24. M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill III: 1914-1916 (London, 1971), pp. 21-4
25. Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 5 Oct. 1914, in Brock and Brock, Asquith Letters, p. 263
26. Haig diary, 7 Feb. 1916, WO 256/8, PRO
27. King Albert, carnet de guerre, entry for 7 Feb. 1916, in M.-R. Thielmans, ed., Albert I: Carnets et correspondence de guerre 1914-1918 (Paris, 1991), pp. 248-9
28. 'Note préparée... pour servir de base à une conférence...', 7 Feb. 1916, in M.-R. Thielemns and E. Vanderwoude, Le Roi Albert au travers de ses lettres inédites (Brussels, 1982), doc. 451. This document, prepared for the 7 Feb. conference with Haig and Lord Curzon, even speaks of persuading Britain to a compromise peace
29. Diary entry, 11 Aug. 1914, cited in R. Blake, ed., The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1919 (London, 1952), p. 70
30. Kitchener's instructions for Haig are given in Edmonds, Military Operations, 1916, appendix 5, pp. 40-41
31. Haig diary, 3 Dec. 1915
32. cited in Blake, Haig Papers, p. 115
33. J. Charteris, Field-Marshal Haig (London, 1929), p. 152. Charteris's own French was fluent. Curiously, Haig expressed himself 'far more coherently and articulately in French than in English' (op. cit.)
34. 'Notes on the Operations on Western Front after Sir D. Haig became Commander in Chief December 1916', p. 6, Haig papers, Acc. 3155, no. 213a. The notes were complied by Haig's CGS, Sir L.E. Kiggell, during the war and endorsed by Haig on 30 June 1920 as being 'correct in every particular'
35. Rawlinson to Col. Clive Wigram [ADC to George V], 27 Feb. 1916, Rawlinson papers, 5201/33/18, National Army Museum, London [hereafter NAM]. In his discussion of Winston Churchill's criticism of the planning for the Somme, Robin Prior concludes that Haig was not averse to the Somme as the location for the forthcoming battle: Churchill's 'World Crisis' as History (London, 1983), pp. 214-15
36. 'Note pour les généraux commandants de groupes d'armées', 23 Oct. 1916, AFGG 3, annexe 3005. For an analysis of the process, see R.A. Doughty, 'France's After-Action Reports', 1915, paper delivered at the Society for Military History Conference, Gettysburg, PA, 12 May 1995. I am grateful to Professsor Doughty for supplying me with a copy of his paper
37. Joffre, 'Note pour les armées', 3 June 1916, AFGG 4/2, annexe 868
38. For length of front to be attacked, see R. Prior and T. Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914-18 (Oxford, 1992), p. 143
39. For infantry tactics, see op. cit., pp. 155-60. Note 16 of the Fourth Army's 'Tactical Notes' (May 1916) reads: 'Each line of assaulting troops must leave its trenches simultaneously and make the assault as one man
40. This is of the highest importance': Edmonds, Military Operations, 1916, appendix 18
41. 'Note a communiquer jusqu'aux bataillons', 20 June 1916, AFGG 4/2, annexe 1369
42. There seems to have been little formal transmission of French tactical documents to the corps (the unit responsible for training). In his enthusiastic defence of British tactical methods, Paddy Griffith cites the translation of a few French pamphlets, but the corps war diaries show little sign that the lessons were passed on: P. Griffith, The British Army's Art of Attack, 1916-18 (New Haven, CT, 1994), pp. 52-3 and n. 21
43. Maj.-Gen. Sir E. Spears, Prelude to Victory (London, 1939), p. 95
44. Op. cit., p. 91. This description cannot be dismissed as mere proof of the advantages of hindsight. Spears's papers for 1916 contain frequent reports on French tactics, especially in artillery matters. The reasons why the British failed to heed the French lessons can only be conjectured and are beyond the scope of this paper. For a more recent comparison between French and British tactics, see T. Travers, 'July 1, 1916: The Reason Why', MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History VII (summer 1995), pp. 62-73
45. Rawlinson diary, 6 April 1916, RWLN 1/5, Churchill College, Cambridge. Haig's diary notes (4 Apr.) that he 'studied Gen Foch's plan of attack and discussed it with Gens Kiggell and Butler after lunch': WO 256/10, PRO
46. Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, pp. 166-9, 174
47. Rawlinson diary, 22 June 1916, RWLN 1/5, Churchill College, Cambridge
48. A. Home, Price of Glory: Verdun 1916 (London, 1962), p. 282
49. All in GQG: Ordres et instructions relatifs aux operations, [d] 5-22 juin 1916, 16N1681, AG
50. 'Note', 21 Dec. 1917, in Journal de marche de Joffre (1916-1919) (Vincennes, 1990), p. 247
51. 'Instruction personelle et secrète pour M. le géné ral Sir Douglas Haig et le général Foch', 21 June 1916, AFGG 4/2, annexe 1385; Journal de marche de Joffre, p. 29 (entry for 28 June 1916). Rawlinson had decided at 2 p.m. on the 28th to postpone the operation for 48 hours
52. Journal de marche de Joffre, entry for 2 July 1916, 14N2, AG (this is missing from the published version)
53. J. de Pierrefeu, French Headquarters, 1915-1918 (London, 1924), p. 76. Pierrefeu's testimony could be suspect, as he says he had the news from 'an orderly' of Castelnau's, who could well not have been privy to all the discussions; R. Poincaré, Au Service de la France: neuf années de souvenirs (11 vols, Paris, 1926-74) viii: Verdun 1916 (1931), p. 284 (entry for 5 July 1916)
54. Poincaré probably got the information from his GQG liaison officer, Col. Emile Herbillon: Souvenirs d'un officier de liaison (2 vols, Paris, 1930) I, pp. 302, 303 (2, 3 July 1916)
55. For Foch, see Journal de marche de Joffre, 34 (entry for 2 July 1916)
56. for Fayolle, see AFGG 4/2, p. 238
57. Blake, Haig Papers, p. 154 (entry for 3 July 1916)
58. M. Weygand, Mémoires (3 vols, Paris, 1950) I: Idéal vécu, p. 332
59. The row made so many ripples that the British ambassador in Paris noted it in his diary as early as 4 July: Diary of Lord Bertie II, p. 1
60. Sir Henry Wilson had the story from Foch himself: Maj.-Gen. Sir C.E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson Bart., G.C.B., D.S.O (2 vols, London, 1927) I, p. 287
61. Wilson's account (via Foch) has 'Haig said that he was not speaking as one gentleman to another': Callwell, Sir Henry Wilson I, p. 287
62. Journal de marcke de Joffre, p. 38 (entry for 4 July 1916)
63. The tale is recounted in Capt. W. Miles, Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1916 (London, 1938), p. 82
64. and in A.H. Farrar-Hockley, The Somme (London, 1964), p. 151
65. Joffre to Haig, 11 Aug. 1916, AFGG4/2, annexe 2864; Miles, Military Operations 1916, p. 182 (text of letter not cited). Haig to Joffre, 16 Aug. 1916 (OAD 113), WO 158/15, PRO. In his comments on Haig's response to Joffre's letter, Denis Winter remarks inexplicably that Joffre's letter (which he misleadingly called 'Directive 8162 of 11 August') is 'inevitably missing from Britain's public records'. On the contrary, as well as coming into the public domain in 1934, when the French Official History was published, as annexe 2864 (cited above), it is to be found in its correct place in WO 158/15, together with Haig's reply: Denis Winter, Haig's Command: A Reassessment (London, 1991), p. 65
66. N. Stone, The Eastern Front 1914-1917 (London, 1975), p. 273
67. See Prior and Wilson, Conmmand on the Western Front, p. 250
68. Miles, Military Operations 1916, p. 427
69. See also Miles, Military Operations, 1916, p. 459
70. Des Vallieres, diary entry, no date, cited verbatim in J. des Vallieres, Au sokil de la cavalerie avec k général des Vallières (Paris, 1965), p. 167. Des Vallières continued: 'Joffre... s'est excusé et a prié son interlocuteur de ne plus s'inquiéter à l'avenir des lettres qu'il recevra de Chantilly!' This close concordance between Haig's account of an incident and any French account is rare
71. e Bureau service special: moral, 16N1485, AG. Morale reports were compiled monthly, later fortnightly, from the postal control records received from each army
72. Postal Control Report on correspondence of 20-27 Sept. 1916, Controle postal VI Armée 1916, 16N1417, AG. The writer of one extract cited in the report claimed that, although he had been in the Champagne battles in 1915 and at Verdun, 'ce n'était rien à côté de ce que je vois dans la Somme'
73. Report of the sous-préfet of Mauléon, Pyréné es-Atlantiques, 19 Dec. 1916
74. cited in Y. Pourcher, Les Jours de guerre: la vie des français au jour le jour entre 1914 et 1918 (Paris, 1994), p. 432
75. Peter fiddle points out Haig's dissembling: see his The 1916 Battle of the Somme: A Reappraisal (London, 1992), pp. 27-8
76. Liddell Hart also describes the denial that a breakthrough was intended as 'one of the most elaborate perversions of historical truth that has come to light': B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the First World War (London, 1992 edn), p. 236
77. British figures are not universally agreed but vary around the half-million mark, which is certainly more than double the French figures. For the controversy surrounding the Somme casualty figures, see Prior, Churchill's "World Crisis', pp. 221-30, esp. table 12.2, p. 227. The French figures are derived from the Northern Army Group's five-day casualty reports for 1 July to 20 Nov. 1916, tabulated in AFGG 4/3, pp. 552-3. A similar table for Verdun is given at pp. 551-2
78. The Marquess of Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry 1916 to 1919 (8 vols, London, 1973-97) VIII (1997), p. 64