Ambivalence, autonomy, and organ sales

Southern Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 237-251

  Hughes, Paul M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN DEARBORN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60950728602     PISSN: 00384283     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2006.tb00100.x     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. And autonomy has been the focus of intense interest in the literature on free will and determinism. Representative examples include Gary Watson, "Free Agency," Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): 205-20
2. Michael Slote, "Understanding Free Will," Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 136-51
3. and Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5-20
4. See for example James Stacey Taylor, "Plea-Bargaining, Constraining Options, and Respect for Autonomy," Public Affairs Quarterly 18, no. 3 (July 2004): 249-64
5. Paul M. Hughes, "Proactive Law Enforcement, Ambivalence, and Autonomy," Public Affairs Quarterly 19, no. 2 (2005): 127-41
6. Paul M. Hughes, "What is wrong with entrapment?" The Southern Journal of Philosophy 42, no. 1 (2004): 45-60
7. and Linda G. Mills, Insult to Injury: Rethinking Our Responses to Intimate Abuse (Princeton, 2003)
8. See Gerald Dworkin, "Markets and Morals: The Case for Organ Sales," in Morality, Harm, and the Law, ed. Gerald Dworkin (Westview, 1994), 155-61
9. Paul M. Hughes, "Exploitation, Autonomy and the Case for Organ Sales," International Journal of Applied Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1998): 89-97
10. James Stacey Taylor, "Autonomy, Constraining Options, and Organ Sales," Journal of Applied Philosophy 19, no. 3 (2002): 273-85
11. Stephen Wilkinson, Bodies for Sale: Ethics and Exploitation in the Human Body Trade (Routledge, 2003)
12. and Mark Cherry, Kidney for Sale by Owner: Human Organs, Transplantation, and the Market (Georgetown University Press, 2005)
13. Watson, "Free Agency."
14. Slote, "Understanding Free Will," 140
15. Frankfurt, "The Faintest Passion," in Necessity, Volition, and Love (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 99
16. For a good sample of his contribution to the literature on hierarchical views of autonomy see Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person"; "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 828-39
17. "Identification and Wholeheartedness," in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, ed. Ferdinand Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 27-45
18. David Zimmerman, "Making Do: Troubling Stoic Tendencies in an Otherwise Compelling Theory of Autonomy," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (March 2000): 26
19. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen agrees with Zimmerman when he writes, "generally speaking, real-self accounts (of autonomy) are promising because they match well our intuitions concerning the nature and appropriate ascription of moral responsibility" (Lippert-Rasmussen, "Identification and Responsibility," Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6, no. 4 (2003): 349-76). But note that Watson in "Free Agency" argues that Frankfurt's talk of "whole-hearted" identification with second-order desires as a condition of autonomy is weak. Lippert-Rasmussen argues that Watson's view suffers from a comparable weakness of its own
20. For another example of a coercive offer that compromises a person's autonomy see Paul M. Hughes, "What is wrong with entrapment?"
21. Oxford English Dictionary, second edition, 17 (1989): 759
22. Temptations may be nonmoral, as when one is tempted to have another cup of coffee, or stay up late and watch a movie. Even in these cases, however, people typically regard what they are tempted to do as in some way inappropriate, even if not morally inappropriate. Of course, there are uses of the term temptation in which nothing inappropriate is connoted, and instances of temptation in which the act or object of temptation is regarded as right or good. My description of the psychology of being tempted as typically desiring what one regards as in some sense evil or wrong is offered as a partial account of temptation in its main moral sense. For more on this view of temptation see Paul M. Hughes, "The Logic of Temptation," Philosophia 29 (2002): 89-110
23. and Paul M. Hughes, "Temptation and the Manipulation of Desire," The Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (1999): 371-79
24. Oxford English Dictionary, 759
25. and James Stacey Taylor, Stakes and Kidneys, chapters 3 and 4
26. See Wilkinson, Bodies for Sale, chapter 5, for a detailed analysis and discussion of some of the invalid consent arguments that invoke one or more of these claims
27. This point is made in various ways in recent literature on temptation. See J. P. Day, "Temptation," American Philosophical Quarterly 30, no. 2 (1993): 175-83
28. Joseph Fulda, "The Mathematical Pull of Temptation," Mind 101, no. 402 (1992): 305-07
29. See also Hughes, "The Logic of Temptation,"
30. and Taylor, Stakes and Kidneys, 73-93
31. Journal of the American Medical Association (October 2, 2002): 1589-93