Discussion nelkin on the lottery paradox

Philosophical Review

Volumn 112, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 395-404

  Douven, Igor ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949526942     PISSN: 00318108     EISSN: 15581470     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1215/00318108-112-3-395     Document Type: Article

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