Ceteris paribus laws, component forces, and the nature of special-science properties

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Volumn 42, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 349-380

  Rupert, Robert D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949309107     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00685.x     Document Type: Article

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