The intellectual roots of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia

Muslim World

Volumn 95, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 81-120

  Sirozi, Muhammad ^a  

^a State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN)   (Indonesia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949177071     PISSN: 00274909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1478-1913.2005.00080.x     Document Type: Review

References (67)

1. William Ayres 2003. In Encounter Education for Meaning and Social Justice. Volume 16, Number 1. Spring
2. The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World. Mew York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, Volume 2, 369-70
3. Berry, J. M. 1997. The Interest Group Society (3rd ed.). New York: Longman, 99
4. See also H. Tarmizi Taher 1997, Aspiring for the Middle-Path: Religious Harmony in Indonesia. Jakarta: Center for the Study of Islam and Society; Tarmizi Taher 1996. "Changing the Image of Islam and Muslim World: Indonesian Exercises." In Studia Islamika, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1-21
5. Nurcholis Madjid 1994. "Islamic Roots of Modern Pluralism, Indonesian Experience." In Studi Islamika, (1), April-June 1994, 55-77
6. Ali Munhanif 1996. "Islam and the Struggle for Religious Pluralism in Indonesia; A Political Reading of the Religious Thought of Mukti Ali." In Studia Islamika, Vol. 3, No. 1, 79-126
7. and "Pancasila as an Islamic Ideology for Indonesian Muslim: An Interview with Munawir Sjadzali." In Studia Islamika 1 (1), April-June, 185-205
8. For critical accounts of Suharto government, see Micheal R. J. Vatikiotis 1993. Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change. London and New York: Routledge and Adam Schwarz 1996. A Nation in Waiting: Indonesian in the 1990s. Third printing. Boulder: Westview Press
9. Quoted in Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter 1982. Roots of Radicalism: Jews, Christinas, and the New Left. New York: Oxford University Press, 380
10. For more information and further discussion of the survey results, see Tempo (English Edition), December 24-30, 2002, Special Report Religion, 32-42
11. See Jamhari 2002. "Indonesian Fundamentalism?" In Studia Islamika, Vol. 9, No. 3, 183
12. The involvement began on January 7, 2000, when some radical Muslim leaders organized a gathering of more than 100,000 people at the National Monument (Monas) Park in Central Jakarta, calling for Muslims to wage a holy war in Maluku. The attendees represented 22 militant Muslim organizations, including FPI and the Indonesian Committee in Solidarity with the Muslim World (KISDI). The gathering was addressed by People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) speaker Amien Rais, Vice President Hamzah Haz, and Fuad Bawazier, a former finance minister in Suharto's short-lived final cabinet. There have been allegations that FPI is close to Hamzah Haz, while the main figures behind the formation of KISDI were believed to be former president Suharto's half-brother Probosutedjo and Suharto's son-in-law retired Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto. See "Usama bin Laden and Indonesia," September 12, 2001. Editor, Laksamana.Net in http://www.laksamana.net/vnews.cfm?ncat=19&news-id= 117562). According to Ja'far, the deployment was decided due to the failure of the government to control the situation. See "Declaration of War," ibid
13. Andrew Marshall is a reporter for The New York Times. He interviewed Ja'far in late December 2001 in Laskar Jihad's Headquarter, Central Java. See his report: "The Threat of Jaffar," The New York Times, Headine, March 10, 2002
14. See Ja'far's biography in Tempo Interaktif 2002. "Ja'far Umar Thalib: Sang Ustad yang Penuh Warna." Available at http://www. tempomteractive.com/harian/profil/prof-jafar.html
15. Suara Merdeka, October 20, 2002, 1
16. Kompas Online (Tuesday, 7-5-2002), in http://www.kompas.com/kompascetak/ 0205/07/english/jafa.htm
17. See Dan Murphy 2000. Indonesia's far-flung 'holy war' Ambon, a Maluku official met with the Laskar Jihad for the first time Aug. 16. in http://csmweb2.emcweb.com/durable/2000/08/23/p6s1.htm
18. See Time Asia Online, December 17, 2001. Vol. 158. No. 24. "Indonesia's Dirty Little Holy War," in http://www.time.com/time/asia/ news/magazine/0,9754,187655-2,00.html
19. Andrew Marshall 2002. "The Threat of Jaffar," in The New York Times, March 10
20. Azyumardi Azra 2002. "Radikalisasi Salafi Radikal," in Majalah Tempo, No. 41/XXXI/08-15 December 2002. Available at http://www.tempo.co.id/ majalah/arsip/thn05/edisi41/kol-l.html, accessed on December 16, 2002
21. Robert W. Hefner 2002. "Civil Pluralism Denied? The New Media and Jihadi Violence in Indonesia," Paper, p. 6
22. Quoted in Sukidi, Mulyadi 2003. "Violence under the Banner of Religion: The Case of the Laskar Jihad and the Laskar Kristus. Paper presented at Conference on Children and Islam: Faith and Social Change in Africa and Southeast Asia. Institute for the African Child - Ohio University Athens, Ohio, April 10-14, 2003
23. For a complete text of the speech, see Ja'far Umar Thalib's Declaration of War, in http://www.angelfire.corn/rock/hotburrito/laskar/spmm010502.html
24. Forum Komunikasi Ahl al-Sunnah Wa al-Jama'ah or the Sunni Communication Forum (FKAWJ) ) was established in 1998, two years before the establishment of Laskar Jihad, by a group of hardline Muslim leaders. It is controlled by a 60-member board of patrons (Dewan Pembina), of which Ja'far is chairman. The main objective of FKAWJ is to promote 'true Islamic values'. The truth for FKAWJ is the truth as justified by its board members whose concept of truth is notably based on narrow Islamism and exclusivism. For them, FKAWJ is the only authentic ahlus sunnah wal jamaah in Indonesia. They believe that other major organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Mubammadiyah are deviating from the Qur'ān and example of the Prophet Muhammad. The doctrines of these organizations, they criticize, are corrupted by non-Islamic sources. Their views on "hot" topics, such as democracy and the implementation of Islamic law as well as the position of woman in social and political life are very different from the views of the mainstream organizations. See discussion in Greg Fealy January-March 2001. "Inside the Laskar Jihad. An interview with the leader of a new, radical and militant sect," 21. Available on http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit65/fealy.htm
25. Since 1999, when sectarian violence began in the Moluccas, fighting has claimed over 5000 lives in that province
26. See "Usama bin Laden and Indonesia," September 12, 2001, Editor, Laksamana.Net, in http://www.laksamana.net/vnews.cfm?ncat=19&news- id=1175
27. See Tempo Interaktif 2002. "TIM 'Jibril' Mengancam America?". Opini Tempo edition number 51/XXX/18-24 February
28. See Raymond Bonner and Jane Perlez 2002. "A Nation Challenged: Asian Terror; Qaeda Moving Into Indonesia, Officials Fear," in The New York Times, January 23
29. See Tempo Interactive in http://www.geocities.com./chosye/special- Terrorist.htm
30. See discussion in Tempo Interaktif, Ibid
31. See Seth Mydans 2001. "Americans Are Target of Radicals in Indonesia," in The New York Times, October 4, 1
32. Quoted in Andrew Marshall 2002. Ibid, 2
33. This view has been strongly opposed by mainstream Muslim organizations in Indonesia, such as Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Hasyim Muzadi of NU, for example, states the position of his organization: "Through the khittah NU will become the nation's most important asset. In the hands of NU religion is peaceful and tolerant. NU sees that the country must not become an Islamic state. The inclusion of Islamic values in the Constitution and way of living is enough. We have never formalized religion in the state. No religion condones and supports gambling, corruption and prostitution. The government can just formulate antigambling, anticorruption and antiprostitution laws and regulations with Islamic values in them, so as not to disturb the sensitivities of other religions and ideologies. In this way religion can develop properly in the nation state." See The Jakarta Post, October 23, 2002. "Religion will not prosper through violence." In http://www.infid.be/interviewmuzadi.html, 4
34. See Martin van Bruinessen 2002. "The violent fringes of Indonesia's radical Islam," in http://www.let.uu.nl/∼martin.vanbruinessen/personal/ publications/violent- fringe.htm Also in ISIM Newsletter 11 (December)
35. Muhammad ibn 'Abdul Wahhāb was born into a Najdi (in Ottoman central Arabia) family of renowned Hanbali scholars. Part of his scholarly training involved traveling (in his late teens) and seeking knowledge in various Islamic centers in Arabia, Persia and Iraq. He studied Islamic fiqh, theology, and philosophy and also Sufism. But during his travels, he became exposed to many "deviationist" practices centered on the cult of saints, which in turn made him turn his back against Sufi superstition accretions and practices. He returned home at the age of forty and started to his summon (da'wah) for tawhid in 1740, following the death of his father. Resistance to his da'wah by his kinsmen led him to emigrate to Dar'iyah, whe he forged an alliance with the local tribal chieftain, Muhammad ibn Sa'ud, who accepted his religious views. It was from there the the Wahabiyyah [Unitarian] movement expanded from Najd to Hijaz to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. This alliance led to the establishment of the first Saudi Dynasty, one that extended its control over most of the Arabian Peninsula and beyond. After the takeover of Riyadh, ibn 'Abdul Wahhāb retired from campaining and devoted the last two decades of his life to worship and meditation. The first Wahhabi/Saudi dynasty was crushed I 1818 at the hands of Egyptian and Ottoman forces. See A. Vasil'ev 1998. The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Saqi Books. See also discussion in Samira Haj 2002, 338
36. See discussion in Samira Haj 2002. "Reordering Islamic Orthodoxy: Muhammad ibn 'Abdul Wahhāb," in The Muslim World, Volume 92, Numbers 3 & 4. Fall, 333-370
37. For further discussion of the development of Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia, see Alexel Vassilief 2000. The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Saqi Books
38. Bertil Litner 2002. Terrorism: Think Local, Book Review. Available on http://www.siapacificms.com./article/inside al qaeda/
39. Tempo Interaktif, "Sang Ustad yang Penuh Warna," Ibid
40. Pesantren is a type of school in Southeast Asia offering second-level training in Islamic subjects is termed pesantren on Java, surau on Sumatera, pondok on the Malay Peninsula, and pandita ("school") in the Philippines. Pesantren derives from the sixteenth century, when learning centers known as the "place of learning for the Islamic faithful (santris)," were established. See John L. Esposito (Ed. In Chief) 1995 The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, Volume 3, 324
41. Originally, madrasah was School Mosque, an educational institution which made its appearance about the middle of the XIth century and combined the functions of theological seminary, a law school and a mosque. Its purpose was to teach and consolidate the body of officially approved religious and juridican doctrines founded on orthodox Sunnite Islam, and to train for the office of qadi (judge), mufti (juridical expert), and khatib (preacher), but in general also for career in the public service. See Stephan and Nandy Ronart 1960. Concise Encyclopaedia of Arabic Civilization. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 331
42. 97 There are thirteen IAINs and one Islamic University throughout Indonesia operated by Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA). These Islamic higher education institutions have been widely known as a strong base for the development of broad minded and moderate Islamic thoughts in Indonesia. They have been a dominant force in the nationalization and internationalization of Islamic studies in the country. See Fuad Jabali 2001. "The Future of Islamic Studies in Indonesia: In Appreciation of IAIN-McGill Cooperation. In Studia Islamika, Vol. 8, No. 2, 187
43. See also "Pusat Jaringan Penelitian IAIN/STAIN (PUSJARLIT): The Research Networking Potential of Islamic Public Higher Education in Indonesia. In Studia Islamika, Vol. 5, No. 3, 125 and "Empowering Islamic West Java and West Sumatera. Its leaders included Muhammad Natsir
44. See Robert Cribb 1992. Historcan Dictinonary of Indonesia. Metuchen, N. J., & London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 369-370
45. For a discussion of Hasan's views and critics, see Akh. Minhaji 2000. "Islamic Reform in Contest: Ahmad Hasan and his Traditionalist Opponents." In Studia Islamika. Vol. 7, No. 2, 87-116
46. See discussion in Faisal Ismail 1996. "Pancasila as the Sole Basis for all Political Parties and for all Mass Organizations; an Account of Muslims' Responses." In Studia Islamika, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1-92
47. Pancasila, the five principles of state ideology, as follows: (1) Ketuhanan yang maha esa (belief in one supreme God), (2) Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab (just and civilized humanitarianism), (3) Perstuan Indonesia (Indonesian unity), (4) Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan (popular sovereignty governed by wise policies arrived at through deliberation and representation), and (5) Keadilan social bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia, social justice for the entire Indonesian people. See Robert Cribb, 340
48. Tempo Interaktif, "Sang Ustad yang Penuh warna." Ibid
49. For discussion of the important of the concept of holy war in many Muslim countries, including Pakistan, see Dilip Hiro 1989 Holy Wars: The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism. New York: Routledge and Marc Gopin 2002. Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East. Auckland; New York: Oxford University Press
50. For discussion of the concept of holy war in the Western worl, see Karen Amstrong 1992. Holy War: The Crusades and Their Impact on Today's World. New York: Anchor Book. For discussion of the concept of holy war in the activities of Laskar Jihad in Indonesia, see "Usama bin Laden and Indonesia," September 12, 2001, Editor, Laksamana.Net, in http://www.laksamana.net/vnews. cfm?ncat=19&news-id=1175
51. Thomson notes that there are as many as 30,000 young Indonesians went to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight the Soviets. More than 1,000 went to Egyptian universities in the same period and at least that number to the same Pakistani schools - the madrasas - from which most of Bin Laden's associates emerged. See W. Scott Thompson October 2001. Champagne in Jakarta; Challenges in the U.S., Reprinted from the LA Times. In http://fletcher.tufts.edu/news/2001/october/ thompson9.htm
52. Muqbil was born in the late 1920s into the tribe of Wadi'a of the Bakil tribal confederation and that is centered on the Wadi Dammaj region of Sa'da, the most important Zaydi city and center in Nothern Yaman. As a child, Muqbil attended a traditional elementary school (maktab) where he learned the Qur'ān and the basics of reading and writing. After completing the maktab curriculum, Muqbil wanted to continue his studies and tried to study in great mosque of al-Hadi Yahya bin al-Husayn in Sa'da. Being unhappy with the way al-Hadi Yahya taught him, Muqbil left Yaman for Mecca. While in Saudi Arabiah, he became exposed to Salafi ideas and writings. Among the works he read was a Wahhabi work entitled Fath al-majid sharh Kitab al-tawhid by 'Abd al-Rahman bin Hasan Al al-Syakh. Muqbil passed away on July 21, 2001 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, having suffered for some years from cirrhosis of the liver. He left a large corpus of published works and a number of interviews to the press picturing his life, ideas, and teachings. See Bernard Haykel 2002. "The Salafis in Yemen at a Crossroads: An obituary of Syakh Muqbil al-Wadi'I of Dammaj (d. 1422/2001). In Jemen-Report Jg 33/2002, Heft 1, 28-31
53. Islāh party is a conglomeration of various Islamist groups in Yemen, including moderate Salafiyah (non-sectarian Sunnism), as well as conservative and extremely conservative groups influenced by Wahhabism. See discussion in Paul Dresch and Bernard Haykel 1995 "Stereotypes and Political Styles: Islamists and Tribesfolk in Yemen." In International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, 405-31
54. See, Bernard Haykel 2002. Ibid. and Noorhaidi Hasan, "Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia," Indonesia 73, April 2002, 153
55. Although predominant moderate in character, radicalism has been a continuous part of development of Islam in Indonesia. See Ismatu Rofi 1999 "Depicting the Other Faith: A Bibliographical Survey of Indonesian Muslim Polemics on Christianity." In Studia Islamika, Vol. 6, No. 1, 77-120
56. Amiq 1998. "Two Fatwas on Jihad Against the Dutch Colonization in Indonesia: A Prosopographical Approach to the Study of Fatwa." In Studia Islamika, Vol. 5, No. 3, 77-124
57. M. C. Ricklefs 1993. A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1300. Second edition. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press; George McTurnan Kahin 1952. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; and Martin van Bruinessen 2003. Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia. Available on http://www.let.uu.nl/∼martin. vanbnainessen/personal/pu.../genealogies- islamic-radicalism.ht
58. See Martin van Bruinessen 2002. "The violent fringes of Indonesia's radical Islam," Ibid
59. Greg Fealy January-March 2001. Ibid
60. Foucault, M. 1977. Discipline and Punish. London: Penguin, 27
61. Pakistan under Islamically oriented Zia ul-Haq was a close ally of the United States, had relations with the West and the international community, and was generally regarded as moderate. It was in contrast with Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini who was highly critical, even condemnatory of the West, of ten at odds with the international community, and regarded as a radical terrorist state. See John L. Esposito (Editor in Chief) 1995. The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World. New York Oxford: Oxford University Press. Book 2, 250
62. See Jamal Malik 1997. "Dynamics aong Traditional Religious Scholars and Their Institutions in Contemporary South Asia," in The Muslim World, Special Issue Islam in South Asia. Vol. LXXXVII, Numbers 3-4, July-October, 208
63. For the development of policies on Madrasah in Indonesia, see Jajat Burhanuddin 2000. "Accellerating the Empowerment of Madrasah: The Policy of Islamic-Education in Indonesia." In Studia Islamika, Vol. 7, No. 2, 191
64. Fazal Rizvi 2003. "Democracy and Education after September 11," in Globalisation, Societies and Education, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2003, 28
65. Ibrahim Abu Rabi 2002. "A post-September 11 critical assessment of modern Islamic history," in Ian Markham and Ibrahim Abu Rabi', September 11 Religious Perspectives on the Causes and Consequences. Oxford: Oneworld. Ibid., 29
66. See Wilson, G. K. 1990. Interest Groups. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 34
67. See The Jakarta Post, Indonesia, October 23, 2002. An interview with Hasyim Muzani by Soeryo Winoto on Terrorism and Islam in Indonesia: Indonesia: 'Religion Will Not Prosper Through Violence', in http://www.worldpress.org/ article-model.cfm?article-id=891