Control conundrums: Modest libertarianism, responsibility, and explanation

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 82, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 178-200

  Haji, Ishtiyaque ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949141527     PISSN: 02790750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0114.00124     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. Alfred in Autonomous Agents (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), ch. 12.
2. Randy Clarke, "Modest Libertarianism," forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives, and "Indeterminism and Control," American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1995), 125-38;
3. Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
4. Alfred Mele, "Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck," Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (1999), 274-93, sec. IV and Autonomous Agents, ch. 12.
5. John Martin Fischer, "Review of Alfred R. Mele's Autonomous Agents," Nous 33 (1999), 133-43.
6. Kane The Significance of Free Will; "Freedom, Responsibility, and Will-Setting," Philosophical Topics 24 (1996), 67-90;
7. "On Free Will, Responsibility and Indeterminism: Responses to Clarke, Haji, and Mele," Philosophical Explorations 2 (1999), 105-21;
8. Clarke's "Modest Libertarianism."
9. Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 3.
10. van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, p. 136.
11. The Significance of Free Will, pp. 39-43, 77-8.
12. Mele Autonomous Agents, p. 216,
13. "Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Scenarios," Philosophical Topics 24 (1996), 123-41, pp. 132-3.
14. Daniel Dennett in "On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want," in his Brainstorms (Montgomery, Vermont: Bradford Books, 1978), pp. 201-2;
15. Nozick in Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1981);
16. Kane in Free Will and Values (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985).
17. John Martin Fischer "Libertarianism and Avoidability: A Reply to Widerker," Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995), 119-25.
18. Mele's "Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck," sec. 4;
19. Autonomous Agents pp. 215-6;
20. "Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Scenarios," p. 132.
21. Fischer, "Review of Alfred R. Mele's Autonomous Agents," p. 140.
22. My Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 28.
23. Galen Strawson, Freedom and Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 26.
24. "Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck," pp. 291-2
25. Galen Strawson, "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility," Philosophical Studies 55 (1994), 5-24;
26. Alfred Mele, "Llltimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck," Review of Kane's The Significance of Free Will, Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998), 581-4,
27. Bruce Waller, "Free Will Gone Out of Control," Behaviorism 26 (1988), 149-67;
28. Richard Double, The Non-reality of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 140;
29. Ishtiyaque Haji, "Indeterminism and Frankfurt-Type Examples," Philosophical Explorations 2 (1999), 42-58.
30. Mele, "Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck," p. 280.
31. An Essay on Free Will, p. 141.
32. Barry Loewer, "Freedom From Physics: Quantum Mechanics and Free Will," Philosophical Topics 24 (1996), 92-113;
33. Timothy O'Connor, "Why Agent-Causation?", Philosophical Topics 24 (1996), 143-58;
34. Randolph Clarke, "Free Choice, Effort, and Wanting More," Philosophical Explorations 2 (1999), 20-41.
35. "Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism," Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999), 217-40, p. 239.
36. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chs. 7,8;
37. Apprdisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities, chs. 6,7.
38. "On Free Will, Responsibility, and Indeterminism: Responses to Clarke, Haji, and Mele," p. 106.
39. Robert Kane "Two Kinds of Incompatibilism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1989), 219-54, p. 244-5;
40. Thomas Nagel The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 115-6.
41. Randolph Clarke, "Contrastive Rational Explanation of Free Choice," The Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1996), 185-201.
42. Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 43.
43. "Contrastive Rational Explanation of Free Choice," pp. 188-9.
44. "Contrastive Rational Explanation of Free Choice," pp. 192-3.
45. Clarke "Free Choice, Effort, and Wanting More," pp. 35-6.
46. John Dewey, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics (1891; reprint, New York: Hillary House, 1957), pp. 160-1.
47. Dewey "Two Faces of Responsibility," Philosophical Topics 24 (1996), 227-48.