Free choice, effort, and wanting more

Philosophical Explorations

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 20-41

  Clarke, Randolph ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 52849131624     PISSN: 13869795     EISSN: 17415918     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13869799908520963     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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