On free will, responsibility and indeterminism: Responses to clarke, haji, and mele

Philosophical Explorations

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 105-121

  Kane, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84982941540     PISSN: 13869795     EISSN: 17415918     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13869799908520971     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Bernstein, M. (1995), “Kanean Libertarianism”, Southwest Philosophy Review 11, 151-157.
2. Double, R. (1991), The Non-reality of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Kane, R. (1985), Free Will and Values. New York: State University of New York Press.
4. Kane, R. (1996), The Significance of Free Will Oxford: Oxford University Press. Paperback edition 1998.
5. Mele, A. (1995), Autonomous Agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. Mele, A. (1999), “Ultimate Responsibility”, Social Philosophy and Policy, forthcoming.
7. Mele, A. (1998), “Review of Robert Kane’s The Significance of Free Will”, The Journal of Philosophy 95:581-84.
8. Strawson, G. (1994), “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”, Philosophical Studies 75, 5-24.
9. Waller, B. (1988), “Free Will Gone Out of Control: A Critical Study of R. Kane’s Free Will and Values”, Behaviorism 16, 149-167.
10. Widerker, D. (1995), “Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities”, The Philosophical Review 104, 247-261.