Legislative supremacy in the United States?: Rethinking the "enrolled bill" doctrine

Georgetown Law Journal

Volumn 97, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 323-390

  Bar Siman Tov, Ittai ^a  

^a The Earth Institute at Columbia University   (United States)

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EID: 60349105959     PISSN: 00168092     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (454)

1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98 (1921).
2. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892).
3. Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C. (Public Citizen II), 486 F. 3d 1342, 1351 (D.C. Cir.) (noting that "the Courts of Appeals have consistently invoked Marshall Field"), cert, denied, 128 S. Ct. 823 (2007); OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec'y of Educ, 496 F. 3d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 2007) (describing EBD as "a longstanding rule, invoked by many courts, including the Supreme Court and our own Court" (quoting United States v. Pabon-Cruz, 391 F. 3d 86, 99 (2d Cir. 2004))), cert, denied sub nom., OneSimpleLoan v. Spellings, 128 S. Ct. 1220 (2008); Public Citizen v. Clerk, U.S. Dist. Court for D.C. (Public Citizen I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 109, 125 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting that EBD "has, in fact, been uniformly applied over the years"), aff'd sub nom., Public Citizen II, 486 F. 3d 1342, cert, denied, 128 S.Ct. 823.
4. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV.1, 72 (2004) (describing EBD as "little known"). There are, of course, a few exemplary exceptions. These works are cited throughout this Article.
5. See Public Citizen I,451 F. Supp. 2d at 109 n. 1.
6. See Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, http:/balkin.blogspot.com/2006/02/q-when-isbill-signed-by-president-not.html (Feb. 10, 2006, 10:33 EST) (arguing that the DRA case was, "in fact, a 'conspiracy' to violate the Constitution. That is to say, [House Speaker] Dennis Hastert has violated his constitutional oath by attesting to the accuracy of the bill, knowing that the House version was different (and having intentionally avoided fixing the discrepancy when it came to his attention before the House vote). And [President pro tempore of the Senate] Stevens and the President are coconspirators, assuming they, too, knew about the problem before they attested to and signed the bill, respectively.").
7. OneSimpleLoan, 496 F. 3d at 200-01 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 9,2006), aff'd, 496 F. 3d 197 (2d Cir. 2007).
9. Public Citizen I,451 F. Supp. 2d at 115-16; see also OneSimpleLoan, 496 F. 3d at 203, 208.
10. While there are many models of judicial review of the legislative process-and all will apparently be blocked by EBD-this Article focuses on the model that grants courts the power to invalidate a statute that was enacted in violation of the lawmaking requirements of the Constitution. See Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1711-13 (2002) (describing "the model of procedural regularity").
11. Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 600 (1976).
12. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 2; see Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,448 (1998).
13. 1 U.S.C. § 106 (2002); see Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV.1105, 1172 (2003); Charles W. Johnson, How Our Laws Are Made, H.R. REP. No. 108-93, at 37-38, 50-51 (2003), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/howourlawsaremade. pdf. On the enrollment process, see infra section III.B.
14. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892).
15. Id. at 668-69.
16. Id. at 672-80.
17. Id. at 672.
18. Id. at 670.
19. Id. at 672.
20. Id. at 670 ("[W]e cannot be unmindful of the consequences that must result if this court should feel obliged... to declare that an enrolled bill, on which depend public and private interests of vast magnitude ... did not become a law.");
21. see also id. at 675-77.
22. Id. at 673.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 670.
25. Id. at 672-73.
26. Id. at 673;
27. see also id. at 675 ("Better, far better, that a provision should occasionally find its way into the statute through mistake, or even fraud, than that every act, state and national, should, at any and all times, be liable to be put in issue and impeached by the journals, loose papers of the legislature and parol evidence. Such a state of uncertainty in the statute laws of the land would lead to mischiefs absolutely intolerable." (quoting Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253, 275 (1866) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
28. *7-8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007); and discussion infra section IV.D.
29. See 1 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 15:3 (6th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2006).
30. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Locke, 105 P. 3d 9, 22-23 (Wash. 2005); Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204, 219-21 (Ala. 2005); Med. Soc'y of S.C v. Med. Univ. of S. C., 513 S.E.2d 352, 356-57 (S.C. 1999).
31. See, e.g., OneSimpleLoan, 496 F. 3d at 202, 208; Public Citizen II, 486 F. 3d at 1349-50, 1354; Med. Soc'y of S.C, 513 S.E.2d at 356-57; Wash. State Grange, 105 P. 3d at 22-23; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 388-89 (3d ed. 2001); SINGER, supra note 27, § 15:3, at 820-22; Bernard W Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1278 (2000); Kristen L. Fraser, "Original Acts," "Meager Offspring," and Titles in a Bill's Family Tree: A Legislative Drafter's Perspective on City of Fircrest v. Jensen, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 35, 65 (2007); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797, 817 (1987); Elizabeth Hunter Cobb, Comment, Judicial Review of the Legislative Enactment Process: Louisiana's "Journal Entry" Rule, 41 LA. L. REV. 1187, 1190 (1981), see also Public Citizen I,451 F. Supp. 2d 109, 126 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting that the respect due a coequal branch is the primary rationale currently stated by state courts that still adhere to EBD).
32. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 6, 12-14, Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 128 S. Ct. 823 (2007) (No. 07-141); see also OneSimpleLoan, 496 F. 3d at 208 ("[T]he separation-of-powers concerns at the forefront of Marshall Field... are surely undiminished by the passage of time").
33. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962) (discussing the cases regarding validity of enactments and noting that judicial reluctance to review the enacting process is based on the respect due to coequal and independent departments and the need for finality and certainty about the status of a statute); ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 29, at 388; SINGER, supra note 27, § 15:3, at 820-22.
34. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 408-10 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also infra section IV.D.
35. See SINGER, supra note 27, § 15:10, at 838; see also infra section III.A.
36. See William J. Lloyd, Judicial Control of Legislative Procedure, 4 SYRACUSE L. REV. 6, 12-13 (1952); Cobb, supra note 29, at 1190; Comment, Judicial Review of the Legislative Process of Enactment: An Assessment Following Childers v. Couey, 30 ALA. L. REV. 495,497 n. 23 (1978).
37. See Lloyd, supra note 34, at 12-13.
38. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 27, § 15:3, at 822; Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601,636 (2006).
39. Cf. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 243-44 (1976) (supporting judicial review of the legislative process, but stressing that "[o]ther participants than courts have the opportunity, and the obligation, to insist on legality in lawmaking").
40. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672-73 (1892); see Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 13, Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist Court for Dist. of Columbia, 128 S. Ct 823 (2007) (No. 07-141) ("[T]t is not clear how often this issue arises. With Marshall Field in place, the issue appears to have recurred only rarely, which provides another reason for not overruling such a well-settled precedent").
41. See 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1350, at 832-34 (J. Chadboum ed., 1972); Cobb, supra note 29, at 1190.
42. Specifically, it was alleged that when preparing the Senate's version of the bill for transmittal to the House, a Senate clerk changed the text of Section 5101 of the bill, altering the duration of Medicare payments for certain durable medical equipment, stated as thirteen months in the version passed by the Senate, to thirty-six months. It was further alleged that the House voted on the version of the bill that contained the clerk's error and, therefore, was not identical to the version of the bill passed by the Senate.
43. Public Citizen I,451 F. Supp. 2d 109, 111 n. 7 (D.D.C. 2006).
44. See 110th Congress House Rules Manual, H.R. Doc. No. 109-157, at 202, 277, 302 (2007), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/hrm/index.html [hereinafter House Rules Manual]; ROBERT B. DOVE, ENACTMENT OF A LAW23-24 (1997), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/enactment/enactlaw.pdf.
45. OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec'y of Educ, 496 F. 3d 197, 200-01 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 6, 2006), Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 110-13, and OneSimpleLoan, 496 F. 3d at 200-01.
47. Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 115 ("Certain fundamental principles are not in dispute. The bicameral requirement embodied in Article I, Sections 1 and 7, requires that the same bill-that is, the same text-be passed by both chambers of Congress.... Absent bicameral passage, a bill does not become a lawquot;); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,448 (1998); Public Citizen II, 486 F. 3d 1342, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
48. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669 (1892).
49. Public Citizen II, 486 F. 3d at 1344.
50. *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2006).
51. See, e.g., OneSimpleLoan, 496 F. 3d at 203, 208; Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 115-16, 124.
52. See OneSimpleLoan, 128 S. Ct. 1220 (2008); Public Citizen, 128 S. Ct. 823. (2007).
53. OneSimpleLoan, 496 F. 3d at 208.
54. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (quoting. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
55. Id. at 854-55, 861-64; see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006).
56. See Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,673-74,676-77 (1892).
57. Vikram David Amar, Why the "Political Question Doctrine" Shouldn't Necessarily Prevent Courts from Asking Whether a Spending Bill Actually Passed Congress, FINDLAW, Apr. 13, 2006, http://writ.news.flndlaw.com/amar/20060413.html.
58. Field, 143 U.S. at 677 (quoting Weeks v. Smith, 81 Me. 538, 547 (1889)).
59. Id. at 674 (citing Pangborn v. Young, 32 N.J.L. 29, 37 (N.J. 1886)).
60. Id.
61. SINGER, supra note 27, § 15:10, at 837-38 & nn.1-2.
62. D & W Auto Supply v. Dep't of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420,423 (Ky. 1980).
63. SINGER, supra note 27, § 15:10, at 837-38.
64. Field, 143 U.S. at 674 (quoting Pangborn, 32 N.J.L. at 37).
65. SINGER, supra note 27, § 15:10, at 838 ("Modern cases have not stressed the poor quality of legislative records. Apparendy the records are constantly being improved, and their authenticity is receiving a higher repute.").
66. See, e.g., D & W Auto, 602 S.W.2d at 424.
67. Cf. OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec'y of Educ, 496 F. 3d 197, 207-08 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[A]lthough technological advances in printing and copying since the late nineteenth century may have removed some of me sources of unreliability in congressional documents,... even engrossed bills printed today are subject to error or mishandling."); Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d 109, 126 ("Marshall Field rested [in part] on concerns about me reliability of outside evidence. However, such reliability concerns are alleviated, at least in part, by the ability of modern technology (for example, recording devices and computers) accurately to transcribe proceedings and make them readily accessible. Of course, even modem technology does not eliminate the problem of typographical and clerical errors, or mistakes arising from misunderstandings and hastily conducted business." (internal citation omitted)).
68. THOMAS, the Library of Congress website, which makes legislative records and much more information on legislative activity easily and freely available, is a good example. See About Thomas, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/abt-thom. html (last visited Aug. 20, 2008).
69. See Ron Garay, Museum of Broad. Commc'ns, U.S. Congress and Television, http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/U/htmlU/uscongress/uscongress.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2008); Johnson, supra note 13, at 35.
70. See Fednet, http://www.fednet.net (last visited Sept. 12, 2008); see also Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Electronic Technology in the House of Representatives, http://clerk.house.gov/art-history/house-history/technology/internet.htrnl (last visited Feb. 27, 2008) (detailing the history of the House's adoption of computer technology).
71. The Hamdan case provides a remarkable example. In that case, it was alleged mat statements had been inserted into the Congressional Record after the Senate debate on the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, presumably in order to influence the courts' interpretation of the Act based on its "legislative history." The Petitioner was able to show, based on a C-SPAN recording, that the statements were inserted in the Record after the fact. As a result, the Court gave no weight to these statements. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2766 n. 10 (2006); Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 5 n. 6, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184); see also Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/ analysis-hamdan-and-a-few-minutes-in-the-senate (Mar. 23, 2006,17:17 EST).
72. J.A.C. Grant, Judicial Control of the Legislative Process: The Federal Rule, 3 W. Pol. Q. 364, 366 (1950) (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 57 (1834)).
73. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892). The joint rules were abandoned in 1875, but the same practice (with very slight changes, if any) continued to exist at the time Field was decided in 1892. See Grant, supra note 70, at 366, 381 n. 99 (noting that the Field Court was summarizing the then-current practice).
74. Field, 143 U.S. at 672.
75. Id. at 672-73.
76. Id. at 673.
77. Grant, supra note 70, at 366.
78. Id.
79. House Rules Manual, supra note 42, at 362-63; DOVE, supra note 42, at 23; Johnson, supra note 13, at 50-51.
80. Johnson, supra note 13, at 50-51.
81. Id. at 51; see also DOVE, supra note 42, at 23-24.
82. Grant, supra note 70, at 366.
83. The current House rule, granting the Speaker standing authority to sign enrolled bills, even if the House is not in session, was added in 1981. Hence, today, the Speaker of the House may sign enrolled bills whether or not the House is in session. The President of the Senate, on the other hand, may sign bills only while the Senate is actually sitting, but advance permission is normally granted to sign during a recess or after adjournment. See House Rules Manual, supra note 42, at 341; Johnson, supra note 13, at 51.
84. Grant, supra note 70, at 366.
85. Id. at 368.
86. Id. ("[A]ll the evidence indicates that on more than one instance a measure as enrolled and approved failed to contain a clause that had been in the bill as passed by Congress. State experiences demonstrate that even a defeated bill may on occasion be enrolled, approved, and published as law; and there is at least one such instance in the history of national legislation.").
87. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672-73 (1892).
88. See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOWCONGRESS Is FAILING AMERICA AND HOWTO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 170-75 (2006); BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (2d ed. 2000); see also Chad W. Dunn, Playing by the Rules: The Need for Constitutions To Define the Boundaries of the Legislative Game with a One-Subject Rule, 35 UWLA L. REV. 129, 135 (2003) ("Despite the many rules in place to handle legislation, the major initiatives, which are likely to cause high amending activity on the floor, are rarely heard under the standard rules.").
89. GLEN S. KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE: OMNIBUS LEGISLATING IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 1 (2001).
90. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 173.
91. PETER L. STRAUSS, LEGISLATION: UNDERSTANDING AND USING STATUTES 264 (2006).
92. Dunn,SUPRA note 86, at 137 ("[W]hen all the provisions are rolled into one bill, it is impossible for any member to know the contents of the bills voted on .... Indeed, many votes are for legislation in which the individual member has no idea what is contained therein. This process of legislating has become the rule of the United States Congress.").
93. Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a "Legislative History" of Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 271 n. 58 (2000). I thank Peter Strauss for drawing my attention to this citation.
94. Dunn, supra note 86, at 138; see also MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 174.
95. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 7-13, 170-73; Seth Grossman, Tricameral Legislating: Statutory Interpretation in an Era of Conference Committee Ascendancy, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 251, 262-73 (2006).
96. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 170; Dunn, supra note 86, at 138,150.
97. In December 2004, for example, it was discovered that a giant appropriation bill had a provision that would allow appropriations staff access to individual tax returns and would exempt them from criminal penalties for revealing the contents of those returns. The provision had surfaced between 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. during an all-night staff negotiation just before the final 3,000-page document was sent to the floor. When the mistake was discovered, after the bill had passed, Subcommittee Chair Ernest Istook said that even he had no idea that language was in the bill. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 173-74. The Omnibus Budget Reform Act of 1981 is apparently another example. See Sorenson v. Sec'y of Treasury of U.S., 475 U.S. 851, 867 n. 2 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Francis X. Clines, O'NeillReady To Rejoin Battle over the Budget, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1981, at A16).
98. Cf. E. Bolstad, Young Accused of Changing Bill After Vote, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 10, 2007, at B1, available at http://www.adn.com/news/politics/story/9208370p-9124529c.html (allegations that after bill's passage, as the bill was being prepared to be sent to the President, lawmaker or his staff changed earmark for general road-widening project to one that benefited a specific interchange opposed by many local officials but desired by developer with ties to frequent contributor to lawmaker). For other examples (not necessarily at the enrollment stage),see Grossman, supra note 93, at 272-88; Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 Geo. L.J. 619 (2006); Andrew J. Schwartzman et al., Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Beware of Intended Consequences, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 581 (2006); Charles Tiefer, How To Steal a Trillion: The Uses of Laws About Lawmaking in 2001, 17 J.L. & Pol. 409, 442-47 (2001); Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457 (1997); Victor Goldfeld, Note, Legislative Due Process and Simple Interest Group Politics: Ensuring Minimal Deliberation Through Judicial Review of Congressional Processes, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 367, 368 (2004).
99. But cf. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 17 ("Congress has had its ups and downs in realizing the intentions of the framers. Sadly, today it is down-very much the broken branch of government.").
100. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 116-31 (1991); John Martinez, Rational Legislating, 34 STETSON L. REV. 547 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Goldfeld, supra note 96.
101. See Ass'n of Tex. Prof'l Educators v. Kirby, 788 S.W.2d 827, 829-30 (Tex. 1990) ("[T]he present tendency [in the states] favors giving the enrolled version only prima facie presumptive validity, and a majority of states recognize exceptions to the enrolled bill rule."); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 559 n. 79 (1988) ("[T]he enrolled bill rule ... is adopted by only a minority of state courts."); see also SINGER, supra note 27, § 15:2, at 816-18.
102. SINGER, supra note 27, § 15:2, at 816-18; see also Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d 109, 126 (D.D.C. 2006). For a good example of the "extrinsic evidence rule," see D & W Auto Supply v. Dep't of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420,423-25 (Ky. 1980).
103. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,673 (1892).
104. See id. (concluding that the "evils that may result" from EBD "would be far less than those that would certainly result" from allowing courts to look behind the enrolled bill).
105. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 1:7-1-1:7-7 (West 1992 & Supp. 2008); In re Low, 95 A. 616, 617 (1915) (discussing the enactment of this statute in 1873); see also J.A.C. Grant, New Jersey's "Popular Action" In Rem To Control Legislative Procedure, 4 RUTGERS L. REV.391, 397-98 (1950).
106. Martinez, supra note 98, at 570 n. 75.
107. A Westlaw search of all Kentucky cases, conducted on February 13, 2008, found only Munn v. Commonwealth, 889 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that defendant failed to offer competent proof that governor's attempted veto of the Kentucky General Assembly's Senate Bill 263 was untimely and therefore invalid).
108. Field, 143 U.S. at 673.
109. Id. at 672-73.
110. Grant, supra note 70, at 368.
111. See, e.g., D & W Auto Supply v. Dep't of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 423-24 (Ky. 1980); see also Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. Lazy Nine Mun. Util. Dist. ex rel. Bd. of Dirs., 198 S.W.3d 300, 315 (Tex. App. 2006) ("[T]his case illustrates the dangers of the enrolled bill rule which may produce results inconsistent with the actual facts.").
112. See, e.g., Bull v. King, 286 N.W. 311, 313 (Minn. 1939); see also D & W Auto, 602 S.W.2d at 423-24; SINGER, supra note 27, § 15:3, at 822 and authorities cited there.
113. Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 235 P. 2d 173, 180-81 (Wash. 1951).
114. Id. at 180 (citing WASH. CONST, art. II, § 38).
115. Id. at 180.
116. Id.; see also Geja's Cafe v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 606 N.E.2d 1212, 1220-21 (III. 1992) ("Plaintiffs ... argue that... the General Assembly did not comply with constitutionally required procedures when it passed the Act. The Authority does not dispute that the three-readings requirement was violated. Rather, it urges us to reaffirm our adherence to the longstanding enrolled bill doctrine."); D & W Auto, 602 S.W.2d at 422-23 ("It is conceded by all parties ... that the [statute's] passage did not comply with a clear constitutional mandate.... However, we are immediately confronted with the huge stumbling block of... the 'enrolled bill' doctrine.").
117. Huntley, 235 P. 2d at 180-81.
118. ILL.. CONST, art. 4, § 8(d).
119. Geja's Cafe, 606 N.E.2d at 1221.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161, 171 (III. 2003) ("We noted in [a couple of decisions] that the legislature had shown remarkably poor self-discipline in policing itself in regard to the three-readings requirement."); Cutinello v. Whitley, 641 N.E.2d 360, 367 (III. 1994) (same); McGinley v. Madigan, 851 N.E.2d 709, 724 (III. App. Ct. 2006) (noting the supreme court's frustration with the legislature's continuing failure to abide by the three-readings requirement).
122. Williams, supra note 29, at 800.
123. Id. at 826-27.
124. Linde, supra note 37, at 242.
125. OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec'y of Educ, 496 F. 3d 197, 208 (2d Cir. 2007).
126. See Lloyd, supra note 34, at 12-13.
127. Id. at 7, 13 ("With all due respect to the arguments from the separation of powers [and] certainty in the law, it is submitted that the position a court will take with respect to them will depend upon its judgment on the comparative reliability as evidence of enrolled bill and legislative journals."); see also Denis V. Cowen, Legislature and Judiciary Reflections on the Constitutional Issues in South Africa: Part 2, 16 MOD. L. REV. 273, 280 (1953) ("[T]he conclusiveness... of what is stated in the enrolled copy of an Act... is simply a rule of evidence determining how far courts may pursue an inquiry into the observance of legal rules. The point at which the line is to be drawn depends [only] on considerations of practical convenience ...." (emphasis omitted)).
128. Williams, supra note 29, at 824.
129. John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773, 1790 n. 63 (2003).
130. See Lloyd, supra note 34, at 12-13; cf. Cobb, supra note 29, at 1190 ("[L]egislative journals are subject to error and fraud.").
131. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 673 (1892).
132. Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1177-78.
133. Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U.S. 547 (1896); see also Grant, supra note 70, at 364, 382.
134. See, e.g., D & W Auto Supply v. Dep't of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 422-23 (Ky. 1980) ("It is conceded by all parties and clearly established by the record that... the passage [of the Act] did not comply with a clear constitutional mandate.... At this point, logic suggests that the decision of this Court is obvious. However, we are immediately confronted with the huge stumbling block of what is described as the 'enrolled bill' doctrine."); see also Geja's Cafe v. Metro Pier & Exposition Auth., 606 N.E.2d 1212,1220-21 (III. 1992); Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 235 P. 2d 173,180-81 (Wash. 1951).
135. Bull v. King, 286 N.W. 311, 313 (Minn. 1939).
136. D & W Auto, 602 S.W.2d at 423-24.
137. Ass'n of Tex. Prof'l Educators v. Kirby, 788 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex. 1990); see also D & W Auto, 602 S.W.2d at 423-24; SINGER, supra note 27, § 15:3, at 822.
138. 602 S.W.2d at 423-24.
139. Gardner v. Collector of Customs, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499, 511 (1867).
140. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2721 (2007) ("[W]e have overruled our precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings," or "when the views underlying [them] had been eroded by this Court's precedent" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74, 576-77 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992).
141. William H. Lloyd, Pylkinton's Case audits Successors, 69 U. PA. L. REV. 20,23-29 (1920).
142. Walnut v. Wade, 103 U.S. 683, 689 (1880); see also Post v. Kendall County Supervisors, 105 U.S. 667, 670 (1881); S. Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U.S. 260 (1876) (all decided on state law).
143. Gardner, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 510-11; see also Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1180; Grant, supra note 70, at 379-80; Lloyd, supra note 34, at 20.
144. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1,4-5 (1892); see also ESKRJDGE ET AL., supra note 29, at 386; Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1181. But see OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec'y of Educ, 496 F. 3d 197, 205-06 (2d Cir. 2007); Grant, supra note 70, at 381-82.
145. Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U.S. 547, 558-62 (1896).
146. See Lloyd, supra note 34, at 22; see, e.g., Public Citizen II, 486 F. 3d 1342, 1351-52 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d 109, 120-.21 (D.D.C. 2006).
147. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
148. Id. at 550; cf. Frickey & Smith, supra note 10, at 1712-13 (citing Powell v. McCormack as "the best federal example of the model of procedural regularity").
149. Powell, 395 U.S. at 506 (quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,199 (1881)).
150. Id. (quoting Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 199).
151. Id. at 516-49.
152. Id. at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
154. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
155. Frickey & Smith, supra note 10, at 1712-13.
156. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945-46, 951, 954; Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438-40, 446, 448-49; see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 29, at 383.
157. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448-49.
158. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940-43.
159. Id. at 941-42.
160. Id. at 943. The Court also held, inter alia, that Article I provides "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" for resolving the case, that there is no "showing of disrespect for a coordinate branch" in resolving the case, and that "since the constitutionality of [the] statute is for this Court to resolve, there is no possibility of multifarious pronouncements on this question." Id. at 942 (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951; Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439-40; Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1381, 1387 (2001) (noting that Chadha and Clinton made clear that Article I, Section 7 establishes the exclusive procedure by which Congress may legislate).
162. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 268-69 (2002).
163. Id. at 246-53.
164. Id. at 253.
165. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see also Barkow, supra note 160, at 265. Interestingly, the Baker Court adopted "the respect due coordinate branches" consideration directly from Field and seemed to view EBD as a type of political question doctrine. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 214. In fact, several lower courts seemed to perceive EBD as "closely related to-if not inherent in-the political question doctrine" or as "an application of the political question doctrine." See Public Citizen II, 486 F. 3d 1342,1348 (D.C. Cir. 2007) and decisions cited therein.
166. See, e.g., HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 218-24 (1990); Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1181-88; Barkow, supra note 160, at 330-35; Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); Henkin, supra note 11, at 622-25; Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1033, 1059-60 (1985); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
167. Barkow, SUPRA note 160, at 267-72; see also Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1182-85; Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203,1206-14 (2002); cf. Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 112-13 (2007). But see Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question, Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 441 (2004) (arguing that certain decisions, while not expressly invoking the prudential political question doctrine, in effect still apply it; that this doctrine is hidden, but nonetheless ubiquitous).
168. See, e.g., JOHN H. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 177 n. 54 (1993) (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 (1983)).
169. Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 369 (2006).
170. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
171. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
172. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 387-88.
173. Id. at 390.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 390-91 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,549 (1969)).
179. Id. at 408 (Scalia, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 409.
181. Id. at 409-10.
182. Id. at 391 (majority opinion).
183. Id. at 391 n. 4.
184. Id. (emphasis omitted).
185. See, e.g., Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1181; Amar, supra note 55; Goldfeld, supra note 96, at 417 n. 173.
186. See Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204, 221 (Ala. 2005) ("The Supreme Court of the United States has explained that... Field... does not apply in the presence of a clear constitutional requirement that binds Congress." (citing Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 391 n. 4)); Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 426 n. 209 (2004) ("The Court clearly limited the enrolled-bill rule in Munoz-Flores, saying that the rule does not apply when 'a constitutional provision is implicated.'" (quoting Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 391 n. 4)); Goldfeld, supra note 96, at 417 n. 173 ("The Court [in Munoz-Flores] has stated that the enrolled bill rule of Field v. Clark is inapplicable when 'a constitutional provision is implicated.'" (quoting Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 391 n. 4)).
187. See, e.g., Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1181.
188. This was the Appellant's argument in Public Citizen II, 486 F. 3d 1342, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 55.
191. *5 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 6, 2006); Public Citizen 1,451 F. Supp. 2d 109, 123 (D.D.C. 2006).
192. z.ast;4; Cal. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Leavitt, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1096-97 (E.D. Cal. July 18, 2006).
193. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237-38 (1997); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
194. Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 124; see also OneSimpleLoan, 496 E3d at 208; Public Citizen II, 486 F. 3d at 1355 ("The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that we 'should [not] conclude [that its] more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent' Therefore, even if we were inclined to think that the Munoz-Flores footnote offers some implicit support for Public Citizen's position-and we are not-this would not change the outcome that we reach today." (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 237)).
195. Amar, supra note 55; see also OneSimpleLoan, 496 F. 3d at 207 n. 7 ("[W]e do agree with plaintiffs that the Supreme Court has been less than clear in explaining why courts may probe congressional documents when adjudicating some types of constitutional claims [Origination Clause claims] but not others.").
196. Public Citizen 1, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 124.
197. See supra section I.C.
198. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 392 (1990).
199. Id. at 392-96.
200. Id. at 396-97 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,176-80 (1803)).
201. Id. at 397.
202. Id. at 397-401.
203. U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 n. 7 (1993).
204. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 408-10 (Scalia, J., concurring).
205. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 29, at 407 (describing Justice Scalia as "the leading proponent of textualism in statutory interpretation").
206. See Bell, supra note 29, at 1266-70; see also, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("As anyone familiar with modern-day drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware, the references to the cases were inserted, at best by a committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those references was not primarily to inform the Members of Congress... but rather to influence judicial construction."); Scalia, supra note 203, at 32-34.
207. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 87, 148-53 (2001); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 80, 136-41 (2001); Frickey & Smith, supra note 10, at 1750-51; see also Eric F. Citron, Note, Sudden Death: The Legislative History of Future Dangerousness and the Texas Death Penalty, 25 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 143, 147-48 & nn.21-22 (2006) (linking textualism and its rejections of legislative history to EBD); cf. Goldfeld, supra note 96, at 419 (noting that "some have argued that legislative record review seems inconsistent with a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, which discounts the use of legislative history," but rejecting the argument).
208. Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political History?, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 242, 255-256 & n. 50 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
209. Bell, supra note 29, at 1279.
210. John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 494 (2001).
211. See Paul E. McGreal, A Constitutional Defense of Legislative History, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1267, 1268 (2005) (summarizing Justice Scalia's constitutional argument for textualism); Roberts, supra note 208, at 497-501 (discussing Justice Scalia's and other textualists' Article I critique of references to legislative history).
212. United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 535-36 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7).
213. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845)) (emphasis omitted); see also W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991) (Scalia J., writing the opinion of the Court).
214. On the enrollment process, see supra section III.B.
215. WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 1350, at 816 (emphasis omitted).
216. Id. (stressing that both the enrolled bill and legislative journals are official reports and copies and that the only difference between them is in the "degree of solemnity and trustworthiness").
217. See, e.g., McGreal, supra note 209, at 1287 ("[T]he real choice is not between text and legislative history, but rather between text understood within its legislative history and text understood within some other context.") (emphasis omitted).
218. WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 1350, at 818 (emphasis omitted).
219. SCALIA, supra note 203, at 35; see Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 695-99 (1997); Roberts, supra note 208, at 498-501.
220. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1.
221. Bank One Chi., 516 U.S. at 280 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 87 (R. COX ed., 1982) (I960)); SCAUA, supra note 203, at 35.
222. 516 U.S. at 280.
223. SCAUA, supra note 203, at 35.
224. See infra section V.B.
225. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
226. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 29, at 407.
227. Id; see also Bell, supra note 29, at 1255 ("[N]ew textualist judges, like Justice Antonin Scalia, have assumed the task of disciplining Congress to correct its inadequacies."); Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the Age of Legislation, 34 TULSA L.J. 679, 685 (1999) ("[I]nterpretative methods like textualism... are best understood as efforts to improve the quality of the decisionmaking in the politically accountable branches."); Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 564 (2005) ("Textualists often argue for the primacy of statutory text over legislative history on democracy-forcing grounds. A central argument for textualism is that it improves legislative performance: judicial refusal to remake enacted text forces Congress to legislate more responsibly ex ante.").
228. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345-46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
229. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 98, at 116-31; Goldfeld, supra note 96; Martinez, supra note 98; Sunstein, supra note 98; cf. Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth of Self-Rule with an Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 477, 502-19 (1994).
230. Berman, supra note 4, at 72.
231. Id. at 9.
232. Id.
233. Id.; cf. Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 57 (1997) (making a similar distinction between two judicial functions-determining the meaning of the Constitution and implementing the Constitution-and discussing judicially crafted doctrines that concern implementing the Constitution, rather than identifying its meaning).
234. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7).
235. Berman, supra note 4, at 72-74.
236. D & W Auto Supply v. Dep't of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Ky. 1980).
237. Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1177-78; see also supra section III.E.
238. Walnut v. Wade, 103 U.S. 683, 689 (1880); see also Post v. Kendall County Supervisors, 105 U.S. 667 (1881); S. Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U.S. 260 (1876). These cases were all decided based on state law.
239. See Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1178 ("[W]hat Article I, Section 7 means for members of Congress might be different from what it means for courts."); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 908-09 (2003) ("In determining whether a law actually met the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, a court would have to interpret the Constitution... to determine what exactly constituted bicameralism, what constituted presentment to the President, and ultimately what constituted a federal law."); Roberts, supra note 208, at 522-28 (arguing that the requirements of bicameral passage and presentment are in fact much more open to interpretation than is often assumed). Professor Berman also concedes that the "constitutional operative proposition" regarding the requirements of lawmaking in Article I, Section 7 and compliance with it (such as the debate over just what "passage" entails) are open to interpretation. See Berman, supra note 4, at 74 n. 233.
240. Williams, supra note 29, at 827 ("The courts should not abdicate their inherent function of interpreting and enforcing the written constitution" in procedural challenges to the validity of legislation.).
241. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 529 (1997); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 (1990); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
242. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6-8 (2001) ("[T]he notion that judges have the last word when it comes to constitutional interpretation and that their decisions determine the meaning of the Constitution for everyone... has... found widespread approbation.... It seems fair to say that, as a descriptive matter, judges, lawyers, politicians, and the general public today accept [this] principle.... I am certain that the vast majority of law professors also shares this view....").
243. For a defense of the proposition that all branches should enforce the Constitution according to the judicial understanding of what the Constitution means, see, for example, Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455 (2000); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).
244. For recent reviews of the different academic views on the question, see, for example, Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 342-52 (2007); Lee Epstein, "Who Shall Interpret the Constitution?," 84 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (2006); and Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533, 1579-82 & n. 227 (2007).
245. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
246. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97 (2d ed. 1994).
247. Id. at 103, 148, 152.
248. Id. at 67-71, 95-96; see also Jeremy Waldron, Legislating with Integrity, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 375 (2003) (noting that legal positivists argue that "law-making cannot be understood except as a rule-governed process").
249. HART, supra note 244, at 69.
250. See, e.g., PETER C. OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND NEW ZEALAND 86 (2005); Katherine Swinton, Challenging the Validity of an Act of Parliament: The Effect of Enrolment and Parliamentary Privilege, 14 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 345, 360-61 (1976); Luc B. Tremblay, Legitimacy of Judicial Review: Special or General?, 21 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 505, 511-15 (2002); see also infra section VI.A.
251. Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1123-24.
252. Id. at 1107-08,1123-25.
253. Id. at 1172.
254. Id. at 1131.
255. Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165, 170-71 (1852), overruled by Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253, 279-80 (1866).
256. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669 (1892).
257. See supra Part II.
258. See House Rules Manual, supra note 42, at 202, 277, 302; DOVE, supra note 42, at 23-24.
259. 1 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
260. Cf. Adler" & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1175-76.
261. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 275 (1991).
262. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 737 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring); SCALIA, supra note 203, at 35.
263. Clark, supra note 159, at 1379-80; Manning, supra note 217, at 715-18.
264. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 755 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)).
265. Lederman, supra note 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
266. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 737; see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438, 439-40, 446, 448-19 (1998); United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 535-36 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945-46, 951, 954.
267. See Lloyd, supra note 139, at 20-23; Seth Barrett Tillman, Defending the (Not So) Indefensible, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 363, 375-76 (2007).
268. Lloyd, supra note'139 (discussing the English antecedents of the American EBD starting with Pylkinton in 1454).
269. Edinburgh & Dalkeith Ry. v. Wauchope, (1842) 8 Eng. Rep. 279, 285 (H.L.).
270. On the principle of parliamentary supremacy as the basis for the English EBD, see, for example, R. Elliot, Rethinking Manner and Form: From Parliamentary Sovereignty to Constitutional Values, 29 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 215, 220-22 (1991); Jonathan E. Levitsky, The Eurvpeanization of the British Legal Style, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 347, 349 (1994); Lloyd, supra note 139, at 21-22; and Swinton, supra note 248, at 359-62. Admittedly, there are additional (and apparently earlier) historical explanations for this doctrine. See Swinton, supra note 248, at 362-64. However, even if the principle of parliamentary supremacy is a later historical ground for EBD, it has surely become the most dominant foundation for the English doctrine.
271. On this orthodox view of parliamentary sovereignty, see, for example, Elliot, supra note 268, at 221-22; and Waldron, supra note 246, at 375.
272. Waldron, supra note 246, at 375.
273. Elliot, supra note 268, at 221-22.
274. See Lord Irvine of Lairg, Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective: Constitutionalism in Britain and America, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001).
275. Lee v. Bude & Tonington Junction Ry. Co., (1871) 6 L.R. 576, 582 (P.C.).
276. British Rys. Bd. v. Pickin, [1974] A.C. 765,782 (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.) (U.K.).
277. See, e.g., Manuel v. Att'y Gen., [1983] Ch. 77, 89 (C.A.) (U.K.) (rejecting a procedural challenge to the validity of the Canada Act of 1982 on the ground that "the duty of the court is to obey and apply every Act of Parliament, and... the court cannot hold any such Act to be ultra vires. [I]t is a fundamental of the English constitution that Parliament is supreme. As a matter of law the courts of England recognize Parliament as being omnipotent in all save the power to destroy its own omnipotence."); Elliot, supra note 268, at 221-22.
278. See, e.g., R (Jackson) v. Att'y Gen., [2006] 1 A.C. 262 at para. 168 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)(U.K.).
279. Douglas W. Vick, The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37 TEX.. INT'L L.J. 329, 338 & n. 60 (2002); see also B.M. Selway, The Constitution of the UK: A Long Distance Perspective, 30 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 3 n. 5 (2001); Swinton, supra note 248, at 359-60.
280. Swinton, supra note 248, at 363 (arguing that the enrollment rule preceded parliamentary supremacy as a historical matter but recognizing that the rule assisted in the development of parliamentary supremacy).
281. Id. at 403.
282. Victoria v. Commonwealth (1975) 134 C.L.R 81, 163 (Austl.) (Gibbs, J.).
283. Id. and authorities cited therein; see also Harris v Minister of the Interior 1952 (2) SA 428 (A) (S. Afr.); Att'y Gen. for New S. Wales v. Trethowan, [1932] A.C. 526 (P.C. 1931) (appeal taken from Austl.); Bribery Comm'r v. Ranasinghe, [1965] A.C. 172 (P.C. 1964) (appeal taken from Ceylon).
284. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council hears cases from certain former colonies assenting to its jurisdiction.
285. Ranasinghe, [1965] A.C. at 195.
286. Id. at 197.
287. Id. at 194.
288. Anupam Chander, Note, Sovereignty, Referenda, and the Entrenchment of a United Kingdom Bill of Rights, 101 YALE LJ. 457, 464-65 (1991); see also Swinton, supra note 248, at 353-59.
289. Victoria v. Commonwealth (1975) 134 C.L.R 81, 164 (Austl.) (Gibbs, J.).
290. On these changes and their effect on the principle of parliamentary supremacy in England, see, for example, Mark Elliott, United Kingdom: Parliamentary Sovereignty Under Pressure, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 545 (2004); David Judge, Whatever Happened to Parliamentary Democracy in the United Kingdom?, 57 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 682, 690-96 (2004); cf. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Is Parliament Sovereign? Recent Challenges to the Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, 3 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT'L L. 7, 29-36 (2005).
291. See, e.g., Patricia M. Leopold, Parliamentary Free Speech, Court Orders and European Law, 4 J. LEGIS. STUD. 53, 62-66 (1998) (considering the question whether English courts can intervene in the legislative process, and, specifically, grant an injunction to stop Parliament from passing a bill, which would be in breach of European law, or to restrain a minister from presenting such a bill for the Royal Assent; and concluding that "the time may come when 'proceedings in parliament' might have to be 'questioned' in an English court to enable that court to give effect to a directly effective EC right"); Dennis Morris, "A Tax By Any Other Name"; Some Thoughts on Money Bills and Other Taxing Measures: Part II, 23 STATUTE L. REV. 147, 151 (2002) ("[B]ecause of the obligation arising from British membership of the EU, the dicta in Wauchope and Pickin as regards challenges to Parliament's power to legislate must now be significantly qualified, which is of great constitutional significance. Accordingly, why must the position of UK courts in respect of compliance with internal Parliamentary procedure be assumed to have remained unchanged?").
292. The Hunting Act 2004-which outlawed hunting a wild mammal with a dog-was passed through a special legislative procedure that bypassed the House of Lords. The claimants challenged both the validity of this Act and the validity of the Parliament Act 1949, which authorized this legislative procedure. For an overview of the decision and its background, see Mark Elliott, Bicameralism, Sovereignty, and the Unwritten Constitution, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 370 (2007).
293. R (Jackson) v. Att'y Gen., [2006] 1 A.C. 262, 102 (Lord Steyn) (emphasis omitted);
294. see also id. at 104 (Lord Hope) ("Our constitution is dominated by the sovereignty of Parliament. But parliamentary sovereignty is no longer... absolute.... Step by step, gradually but surely, the English principle of the absolute legislative sovereignty of Parliament which Dicey derived from Coke and Blackstone is being qualified."); Mark Elliott, Comment, The Sovereignty of Parliament, the Hunting Ban, and the Parliament Acts, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 1, 2-4 (2006); Michael C. Plaxton, The Concept of Legislation: Jackson v. Her Majesty's Att'y General, 69 MOD. L. REV. 249, 257-61 (2006).
295. R (Jackson), [2006] 1 A.C. at 27, 49, 112, 116, 168.
296. Id. at 85 (citing with approval the holding in Ranasinghe);
297. see also id. at 163 ("What the Commonwealth cases... suggest... is... that if Parliament is required to pass legislation on particular matters in a particular way, then Parliament is not permitted to ignore those requirements when passing legislation on those matters, nor is it permitted to remove or relax those requirements by passing legislation in the ordinary way."); id. at 174 ("[T]he decisions in cases related to colonial legislatures... establish... that... where... the founding legislation contains limitations, the enactments of the body founded will not be valid if they contravene those limitations.").
298. Jeffrey D. Goldsworthy, Manner and Form in the Australian States, 16 MELB. U. L. REV. 403, 403 & n. 4 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).
299. Chander, supra note 286, at 463-64; see also Swinton, supra note 248, at 359-64,403.
300. For a good overview, see OLIVER, supra note 248, at 76-107. See also HART, supra note 244, at 66-78, 94-99, 147-52; Elliot, supra note 268, at 221-30; Waldron, supra note 246, at 375.
301. W.I. JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION, 147-49 (4th ed. 1952).
302. See Hart, supra note 244, at 68-70; OLIVER, supra note 248, at 77; Warren J. Newman, The Principles of the Rule of Law and Parliamentary Sovereignty in Constitutional Theory and Litigation, 16 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 175, 198-99 (2005).
303. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 246, at 375.
304. For a more detailed discussion of the "new view" and "revised view" of parliamentary sovereignty, see OLIVER, supra note 248,. at 80-92; Elliot, supra note 268, at 221-30.
305. Swinton, supra note 248, at 359-64,403; see also Chander, supra note 286, at 463-67; Cowen, supra note 125, at 280; Elliot, supra note 268, at 221-30.
306. Swinton, supra note 248, at 360.
307. Id. at 361; see also Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1107-08,1123-25.
308. Swinton, supra note 248, at 361; see also Tremblay, supra note 248, at 514-15.
309. Cowen, supra note 125, at 280.
310. Swinton, supra note 248, at 361.
311. R.F.V. HEUSTON, ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6-7 (1961).
312. Elliot, supra note 268, at 221-22.
313. Elliott, supra note 291, at 2 (arguing that Lord Steyn and Baroness Hale in R (Jackson) demonstrated receptiveness to the "new view").
314. Elliot, supra note 268, at 229-30 (R. v. Mercure, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234 (Can.), "can, with some justification, be said to reflect a choice on the part of the current Supreme Court of Canada to prefer the new view of parliamentary sovereignty to mat of Dicey."); see also PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 309-14 (3d ed. 1992).
315. David Kretzmer, The Supreme Court and Parliamentary Supremacy, in PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 303, 303, 305-06 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds., 1996); see also Michael J. Beloff, Old Land- New Land: A Comparative Analysis of the Public Law of the United Kingdom & Israel, in ISRAEL AMONG THE NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVES 35, 39-40 (Alfred E. Kellermann et al. eds., 1998).
316. Kretzmer, supra note 311, at 303.
317. The Israeli Court recognized its authority to review the legislative process in Miary v. Knesset Speaker, HCJ 761/86 Miary v. Knesset Speaker [1989] IsrSC 42(4) 868. See Suzie Navot, Judicial Review of the Legislative Process, 39 ISR. L. REV. 182,192-94 (2006). Judicial review of parliamentary proceedings other than legislation began a few years earlier. See Kretzmer, supra note 311, at 305-06.
318. Substantive judicial review was established by the Court six years later, in the "Israeli Marbury" decision of Bank Hamizrahi v. Migdal Association Village, CA 6821/94 Bank Hamizrahi v. Migdal Assoc. Vill. [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 22, following enactment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation in 1992. See Nayot, supra note 313, at 192-94 (noting that judicial review of the legislative process in Israel preceded substantive judicial review).
319. HCJ 975/89 Nimrodi Land Dev. v. Knesset Speaker [1991] IsrSC 45(3) 154, 157 ("The legislative process, like any other governmental proceeding, is a 'normative' proceeding, i.e., a proceeding whose stages are regulated by law.... [I]f there was a defect in one of the proceedings that goes to the heart of the process, the bill does not become legislation, and the court is authorized... to declare the 'statute' void."); HCJ 761/86 Miary, at 873 ("Legislative processes are carried out by law, and the organs of [Parliament] that are involved in legislation hold a public office by law. It follows that even legislative activity is subject to the power of judicial review....").
320. CA 6821/94 Bank Hamizrahi, at 564-71 (Cheshin, J., concurring).
321. Navot, supra note 313, at 194.
322. Suzie Navot, The "Sarid" Test After Twenty Years: Revisiting Judicial Review of Parliamentary Proceedings, 19 MEHKAREI MISHPAT (BAR ILAN STUD. L.) 721, 733-36 (2002) [Isr.].
323. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 635-40 (2000) (arguing that after World War II, Germany, Italy, and other countries adopted "constrained parliamentarianism," which is an alternative to the British model of parliamentary supremacy and also to the American model); see Kenneth M. Holland, Judicial Activism in Western Europe, in HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL LEGAL POLICY 179, 192 (Stuart S. Nagel ed., 2000) (discussing the post-World-War-II constitutions in Germany, Italy, and France as "a conscious effort... to abandon, or at least modify, the principle of parliamentary supremacy"); Markus Ogorek, The Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective, 6 GERMAN L.J. 967, 969-70 (2005) (noting that in contrast to the English Parliament, the German Parliament is not granted any power which could be compared to sovereignty of the people, and that Parliament in Germany is viewed as a creature of the constitution and therefore under an obligation to abide by its regulations).
324. For a detailed discussion, see Navot, supra note 318, at 737-43, 747-65, as well as Paloma Bignilo Campos, Los vicios en el procedimiento legislativo: La postura del Tribunal Constitucional en la Sentenciala Sentencia 99/87 [Defects in the Legislative Process: The Position of the Constitutional Court in Decision 99/87], 24 REVISTA BSPANOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 211, 216-20, 226-28 (1998) and Ana Maria D'Ávila Lopes & José Antonio Tirado, Controle Jurisdicional Dos Interna Corporis Acta no Direito Espanhol [Judicial Review of Interna Corporis Acta in Spanish Law], 44 REVISTA DA FACULDADE DE DIREITO DA UFPR 29 (2006). I thank Javier El-Hage and Ana Lorenzo Sobrado for assistance with Spanish and Portuguese materials.
325. Navot, supra note 318, at 737-43, 747-65.
326. Id; see also Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 129-30 (2002) (describing the position of the constitutional courts in Germany and Spain); Navot, supra note 313, at 193-94, 202-03 (describing judicial review of the legislative process in Spain, Germany, Italy, and France).
327. Navot, supra note 313, at 195.
328. Roberts, supra note 208, at 527, 531; Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 127, at 1789-90.
329. Roberts, supra note 208, at 531.
330. Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 127, at 1790 & n. 63.
331. Bull v. King, 286 N.W. 311, 313 (Minn. 1939).
332. See D & W Auto Supply v. Dep't of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 422-24 (Ky. 1980); Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 235 P. 2d 173,180-81 (Wash. 1951).
333. SINGER, supra note 27, § 15:2, at 815 ("The failure to comply with procedures prescribed in the constitution for enactment of statutes is rarely discoverable from the face of an act itself."). In the states, in contrast, there are some restrictions on the legislative process (such as title and single subject), the violation of which is discoverable from the face of the act. See Williams, supra note 29, at 798-99.
334. Huntley, 235 P. 2d at 180-81.
335. See Geja's Café v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 606 N.E.2d 1212, 1221 (III. 1992); see also supra section III.D.
336. See Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165, 168-69 (1852).
337. Vermeule, supra note 184, at 436; see also J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 153-62 (1988) (seeking to disprove argument that branches have no constitutional obligations other than those courts enforce and asserting that branches are involved in constitutional discourse).
338. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212,1220-27 (1978); Williams, supra note 29, at 825-27.
339. Linde, supra note 37, at 243-44 (supporting judicial review of the legislative process, but stressing that "[o]ther participants than courts have the opportunity, and the obligation, to insist on legality in lawmaking"); Williams, supra note 29, at 825-27 (same).
340. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543, 577-82 (2007) (comparing the institutional competence of Congress, the President, and the courts to enforce a specific type of procedural rule of the legislative process (timing rules) and concluding that although none of these institutional actors would be perfect enforcers, courts are the most competent and promising of the three; arguing, moreover, that "judicial competence is better tailored to the enforcement of procedural restraints... than to substantive review of legislation" and that "courts could do so cheaply and effectively"); Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 609-10 (1983) (doubting Congress's competence to support and defend the Constitution); Barbara Sinclair, Can Congress Be Trusted with the Constitution? The Effects of Incentives and Procedures, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 293, 294, 296 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005) (arguing that Congress has the incentives and procedures to interpret and uphold the Constitution, but conceding, in effect, that the possibility of judicial review is itself one of the incentives; members of Congress who are truly motivated by their desire to promote public policy have "instrumental reasons" to take into account the constitutionality of their legislation if they want it to survive judicial review).
341. See J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, C ONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 3-6 (2004) (providing empirical support to the argument that constitutional considerations are generally given little weight in drafting, considering, and passing legislation in Congress, and that judicial review is required to encourage Congress to consider constitutional considerations in the legislative process); cf. Keith E. Whittington, James Madison Has Left the Building, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1152 (2005) (conceding that Professor Pickerill's empirical study "generally support[s] his claim that the threat of judicial review is a necessary condition for serious constitutional deliberation in Congress").
342. See Lord Irvine, supra note 272, at 5.
343. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 216-17 (1991); see also Prakash & Yoo, supra note 237, at 914 ("According to the theory of popular sovereignty prevalent at the time of ratification, the Constitution is a creation of the people.... This understanding of government power represented a rejection of the notion that sovereignty itself lodged in the government or monarch."); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 357 ("If the Framers thought of anyone as 'sovereign' in
344. SINGER, supra note 27, § 2:1, at 17 ("It is axiomatic in the American system of limited government that, the existence and authoritative capacity of governmental instrumentalities for making law, their powers, and the methods by which their powers may legally be exercised, are subject to the higher law of the constitution."); see also Lord Irvine, supra note 272, at 5; Prakash & Yoo, supra note 237, at 914-15; Rapaczynski, supra note 339, at 357.
345. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
346. See Lord Irvine, supra note 272, at 5; see also Henkin, supra note 11, at 600 ("Judicial review is now firmly established as a keystone of our constitutional jurisprudence.").
347. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
348. Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy and Foreign Affairs, 67 IND. L.J. 879, 885-86 (1992); Henkin, supra note 11, at 600; cf. Redish, supra note 164, at 1033, 1059-60 (arguing abandonment of political question doctrine and judicial review in each case).
349. Wechsler, supra note 164, at 9-10; cf. KOH, supra note 164, at 218-24 (arguing that Wechsler's view applies both to domestic and foreign affairs, and that courts cannot use political question doctrine simply because case deals with foreign policy); Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1182-88 (arguing that courts cannot use political question doctrine unless Constitution requires); Barkow, supra note 160, at 331-35 (same).
350. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,945 (1983) (referring to U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7).
351. Id.
352. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
353. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998).
354. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945-46, 951, 954; see also Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438, 439-40, 446, 448-49; United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 397 (1990); United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 535-36 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 737 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
355. Chandha, 462 U.S.at 951.
356. Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1181.
357. See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1097 (2008) ("[N]othing in the Constitution requires the courts to refrain from examining closely whether the political branches have, in fact, met the constitutional requirements for lawmaking in a given case.").
358. See Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 127, at 1789-90; see also Roberts, supra note 208, at 527-28, 530.
359. Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 127, at 1790.
360. Roberts, supra note 208, at 529 ("There is no record of discussion in the Convention on the inherent powers of the House and Senate to control the details of the enactment process or on the need for an explicit Rulemaking Clause... Likewise, no references to the Rulemaking Clause appear in the Federalist Papers.... Early scholarly explanations and analyses of the Constitution likewise devote little attention to the Rulemaking Clause...."); see also James E. Castello, Comment, The Limits of Popular Sovereignty: Using the Initiative Power To Control Legislative Procedure, 74 CAL. L. REV. 491, 529-30 (1986).
361. Vermeule, supra note 184, at 384, 430; Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1683 (2002); see also Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1179 (rejecting the possibility that the Rulemaking Clause makes the legislative officers authoritative as to compliance with Article I, Section 7); Goldfeld, supra note 96, at 417-18 (arguing that the Rulemaking Clause simply spells out the powers of Congress to establish internal rules); Michael B. Miller, Comment, The Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the "Political" Political Question Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1357-63 (1990) (arguing that the text, history, and possible rationales behind the Rulemaking Clause evince, at best, an intent to empower each house of Congress to adopt its own rules of procedure).
362. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1993) (discussing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519-22 (1969)).
363. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671 (1892).
364. Id.
365. Id. at 671-72.
366. R (Jackson) v. Att'y Gen., [2006] 1 A.C. 262, 168.
367. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 410 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
368. Field, 143 U.S. at 672.
369. Lee v. Bude & Torrington Junction Ry. Co. (1871) 6 L.R. 576, 582 (P.C.).
370. Bribery Comm'r v. Ranasinghe, [1965] A.C. 172, 195 (P.C. 1964).
371. Consumer Party of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 507 A. 2d 323, 332-33 (Pa. 1986) (internal citations omitted), abrogated by Pa. Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877 A. 2d 383 (Pa. 2005) (holding constitutional challenge to legislation that has been amended requires two-part inquiry when changing original purpose).
372. D & W Auto Supply v. Dep't of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Ky. 1980).
373. See supra section VI.A.
374. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 199 (1880); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 506 (1969) (citing above passage from Kilbourn and adding that this is "language which time has not dimmed"); cf. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391, 396-97 (1990).
375. Ranasinghe, [1965] A.C. at 197.
376. Id. at 194.
377. Cf. Barak, supra note 322, at 120-23.
378. Grant, supra note 70, at 368.
379. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892).
380. Id.
381. Id. at 673.
382. Id.
383. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 409 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
384. Strauss, supra note 206, at 255.
385. Grant, supra note 70, at 368; see also supra sections III.B-C.
386. Ass'n of Tex. Prof'l Educators v. Kirby, 788 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Tex. 1990) (citing cases from Pennsylvania, Illinois, Kansas, and Missouri).
387. Id. at 830.
388. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 391 (majority opinion) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969)).
389. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892).
390. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 391.
391. Id. at 390 (emphasis omitted).
392. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
393. Barkow, supra note 160, at 333 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
394. Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 647 (1989).
395. ELY, supra note 166, at 177 n. 54.
396. See A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 373 (2001).
397. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 410 (Scalia, J., concurring).
398. Id.
399. See, e.g., Navot, supra note 318, at 749-53; Swinton, supra note 248, at 390-400, 405.
400. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
401. See Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 114, 143 (1963); Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 87-90 (1949); United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1892).
402. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
403. Williams, supra note 29, at 826.
404. Swinton, supra note 248, at 400-02, 405 ("While an injunction to prevent further action with a bill is an interference with Parliament... relief in the form of a declaration after enactment is not.").
405. Bryant & Simeone, supra note 392, at 373-75 (arguing that courts may not impose procedural requirements on Congress beyond those set forth in Article I, Section 7).
406. Linde, supra note 37, at 243; see also Gottfried Dietze, Judicial Review in Europe, 55 MICH. L. REV. 539, 541 (1957); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 20-21.
407. Cowen, supra note 125, at 280; Swinton, supra note 248, at 361.
408. Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights-and-Democracy- Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813, 817-18 (2003) (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 529 (1997)).
409. Williams, supra note 29, at 825 (emphasis omitted); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 551 & n. 28 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Linde, supra note 37, at 243.
410. See supra Part V.
411. Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165, 171 (1852).
412. See supra section IV.E.
413. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 676 (1892) (quoting Ex parte Wren, 63 Miss. 512, 527, 532 (1886)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
414. Id. at 673.
415. Id. at 670.
416. Cf. Henkin, supra note 11, at 617-22 (arguing that federal courts traditionally used broad discretion to deny remedies on equitable grounds and such denials were conceptually different from exceptions to judicial review).
417. E.g., SINGER, supra note 27, §§ 15:2, 15:4-15:7; Williams, supra note 29, at 816-24.
418. For a detailed discussion of these alternatives, see SINGER, supra note 27, §§ 15:2, 15:4-15:7; Williams, supra note 29, at 816-24.
419. See supra section III.E.
420. D & W Auto Supply v. Dep't of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Ky. 1980); see also Williams, supra note 29, at 822.
421. In re An Act Concerning Alcoholic Beverages, 31 A. 2d 837, 838 (N.J. 1943) (requiring "clear and convincing evidence") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Grant, supra note 103, at 410-11.
422. Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: The Other Nixon v. United States, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 127, 143-44; see also Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing Alone: Do We Still Need the Political Question Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REV. 303, 306 (1996). But see Tushnet, supra note 165, at 1214-22.
423. Linde, supra note 37, at 245; Williams, supra note 29, at 824.
424. *2-3 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 6, 2006).
425. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 1:7-1 to 1:7-7 (West 1992); see also In re LOW, 95 A. 616 (N.J. 1915); Grant, supra note 103, at 411-15; Martinez, supra note 98, at 570 & n. 75.
426. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 1:7-1 to 1:7-7.
427. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670, 675-77 (1892); see also Grant, supra note 103, at 416.
428. Swinton, supra note 248, at 400-02, 405.
429. Henkin, supra note 11, at 617-22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
430. Field, 143 U.S. at 670.
431. See Navot, supra note 313, at 226-29.
432. HCJ 4885/03 Isr. Poultry Farmers Ass'n v. Gov't of Isr. [2004] IsrSC 59(2) 14, 41 (English translation available at [2004] IsrLR 388); Navot, supra note 318, at 226-29.
433. Ernest E. Means, Spurious Legislation and Spurious Mandamus in Florida, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1982). See generally Dorf, supra note 242 (discussing constitutional and other limits on severability and other "fallback" provisions).
434. See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So. 2d 43, 51-53 (Ala. 1990); Williams, supra note 29, at 827.
435. See, e.g., Peter W. Hogg et al., Charter Dialogue Revisited-or "Much Ado About Metaphors," 45 OSOOODE HALL L.J. 1, 14-18 (2007); Kent Roach, Constitutional, Remedial, and International Dialogues About Rights: The Canadian Experience, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 537, 546-53 (2005); cf. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982).
436. Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (Can.) (per curiam).
437. Id. at 5-10.
438. See id. at 71-122; Newman, supra note 298, at 240-46; Roach, supra note 431, at 546.
439. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 165, at 1233-34 (discussing, in a different context, the position that incorporates prudence as a component of judgments on the merits, rather than in the justiciability stage).
440. In re Fisher, 194 A. 2d 353, 357 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963) (quoting In re McGlynn, 155 A. 2d 289, 303-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959)), aff'd per curiam, 204 A. 2d 841 (N.J. 1964).
441. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 18, 2002, 2 BvF 1/02 (para. 176) (F.R.G.) (JJ. Osterloh & Lübbe-Wolff, dissenting), English translation available at http://www.bverfg.de/ entscheidungen/fs20021218-2bvf000102en.html; Nina Arndt & Rainer Nickel, Federalism Revisited: Constitutional Court Strikes Down New Immigration Act for Formal Reasons, 4 GERMAN L.J. 72, 82 & n. 46 (2003).
442. Navot, supra note 313, at 212 (quoting S.T.C. 99/1987).
443. HCJ 4885/03 Isr. Poultry Farmers Ass'n v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 59(2) 14, 42. The High Court of Justice noted that: not every... defect in the legislative process... will lead to the intervention of this court.... [T]he court should examine each case on the merits as to whether a 'defect that goes to the heart of the process' occurred in the legislative process... and only a defect that involves a severe and substantial violation of the basic principles of the legislative process in our parliamentary and constitutional system will justify judicial intervention.... Id.
444. See Navot, supra note 313, at 201-10.
445. See Swinton, supra note 248, at 373-87, 404-05; see also Consumer Party of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 507 A. 2d 323, 332-33 (Pa. 1986) (discussing the distinction between directory and mandatory constitutional provisions as a form of self-restraint in judicial review of the legislative process).
446. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1:7 (West 1992); Martinez, supra note 98, at 570 n. 75.
447. Martinez, supra note 98, at 570 n. 75.
448. Grant, supra note 103, at 411, 415.
449. Even challenges based on state constitutional lawmaking provisions that are not blocked by EBD, such as cases involving single subject, clear title, or original purpose (which can be determined from the face of the act), are rarely successful in state courts, as most state courts (apart, perhaps, from Missouri and Illinois in recent years) exercise significant self-restraint. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 29, at 332-34; Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103, 105-09 (2001).
450. Navot, supra note 313, at 196. As of February, 13, 2008, this was still true.
451. HCJ 4885/03 Isr. Poultry Farmers Ass'n v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 59(2) 14, 40.
452. And some alternatives, such as the use of advisory opinions (which are commonly used in the states to evaluate the propriety of various lawmaking procedures), are not applicable at all. See Hershkoff, supra note 420, at 1844-50.
453. CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 98.
454. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).