Optimal mechanism for selling a set of commonly ranked objects

Marketing Science

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 501-512

  Feng, Juan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction; Common ranking; Optimal mechanism; Slot allocation

Indexed keywords

EID: 60249103161     PISSN: 07322399     EISSN: 1526548X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mksc.1070.0290     Document Type: Article

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