Network creation games with disconnected equilibria

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5385 LNCS, Issue , 2008, Pages 394-401

  Brandes, Ulrik ^a   Hoefer, Martin ^b   Nick, Bobo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

^b RWTH AACHEN UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

NASH EQUILIBRIUM; NETWORK CREATIONS; NON-COOPERATIVE NETWORKS; ORDERS OF MAGNITUDES; PARAMETER VALUES; POTENTIAL GAMES; PRICE OF ANARCHIES; SHORTEST PATHS;

COSTS; GAME THEORY; INTERNET; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS; WINE;

GRAPH THEORY;

EID: 58849146168     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_45     Document Type: Conference Paper

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