The price of anarchy in network creation games

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 292-298

  Demaine, Erik D ^a   Hajiaghayi, MohammadTaghi ^a   Mahini, Hamid ^b   Zadimoghaddam, Morteza ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b SHARIF UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Iran)

Author keywords

Nash equilibrium; Network design; Price of anarchy; Routing

Indexed keywords

NASH EQUILIBRIUM; NETWORK DESIGN; PRICE OF ANARCHY;

COMPUTER NETWORKS; COST EFFECTIVENESS; NETWORK ROUTING;

INTERACTIVE COMPUTER GRAPHICS;

EID: 36849034429     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1281100.1281142     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (16)

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