Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 407-423

  Lavi, Ron ^a   Mu'Alem, Ahuva ^b   Nisan, Noam ^b  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58849107521     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-008-0331-y     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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4. R Holzman D Monderer 2004 Characterization of ex-post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions Games Econ Behav 47 87 103
5. Jehiel P, ter Vehn MM, Moldovanu B (2004) Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potenials, 2004. Working paper (in revision for J Econ Theory)
6. E Kalai E Muller M Satterthwaite 1979 Social welfare functions when preferences are convex, strictly monotonic, and continuous Public Choice 34 87 97
7. Lavi R, Mu'alem A, Nisan N (2003) Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions, 2003. Working paper, The Hebrew University. Preliminary version presented in FOCS-03
8. Meyer-ter-Vehn M, Moldovanu B (2002) Ex-post implementation with interdependent valuations, 2002. Discussion paper, University of Bonn
9. R Myerson 1981 Optimal auction design Math Oper Res 6 58 73
10. Roberts K (1979) The characterization of implementable choice rules. In: Laffont J (ed) Aggregation and revelation of preferences. Papers presented at the 1st European Summer Workshop of the Econometric Society, pp 321-349, North-Holland
11. JC Rochet 1987 A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context J Math Econ 16 191 200
12. Rozenshtrom I (1999) Dominant strategy implementation with quasi-linear preferences, 1999. Master's thesis, Dept. of Economics, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
13. Saks M, Yu L (2005) Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains. In: Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC)