Will lessons from small-scale social dilemmas scale up?

New Issues and Paradigms in Research on Social Dilemmas

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 189-211

  McGinnis, Michael ^a   Ostrom, Elinor ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58449129817     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-72596-3_12     Document Type: Chapter

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