Commons and anticommons in a simple renewable resource harvest model

Ecological Complexity

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 56-63

  Brede, M ^a,b   Boschetti, Fabio ^a  

^a CSIRO   (Australia)

^b UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Agent based; Anticommons; Commons; Evolutionary game theory; Renewable resources

Indexed keywords

EID: 58349096089     PISSN: 1476945X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecocom.2008.10.009     Document Type: Article

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