When less liability leads to more care: Adverse effects of liability regimes in multitask principal agent settings

Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 4, Issue 2, 2008, Pages

  Samwer, Martina C ^a  

^a Bain and Company   (Germany)

Author keywords

Health care; Liability law; Multitasking; Principal agent theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 58149335357     PISSN: 15555879     EISSN: 15555879     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1180     Document Type: Article

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