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Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 51-59

Procurement contracts: Theory vs. practice

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Procurement

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS;

EID: 58149176095     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.04.001     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (19)

References (14)
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  • 4
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    • A note on optimal procurement contracts with limited direct cost inflation
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    • (2007) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.137 , pp. 745-753
    • Chu, L.Y.1    Sappington, D.2
  • 5
    • 0040819373 scopus 로고
    • A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm
    • Guesnerie R., and Laffont J.-J. A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm. Journal of Public Economics 25 (1984) 329-369
    • (1984) Journal of Public Economics , vol.25 , pp. 329-369
    • Guesnerie, R.1    Laffont, J.-J.2
  • 6
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    • Participation constraints in adverse selection models
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    • Jullien, B.1
  • 7
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    • Countervailing incentives in agency problems
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    • Myerson, R.1
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    • Simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement and regulation
    • Rogerson W. Simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement and regulation. American Economic Review 93 (2003) 919-926
    • (2003) American Economic Review , vol.93 , pp. 919-926
    • Rogerson, W.1
  • 14
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    • Price regulation
    • Handbook of Telecommunications Economics. Cave M., Majumdar S., and Vogelsang I. (Eds), Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam
    • Sappington D. Price regulation. In: Cave M., Majumdar S., and Vogelsang I. (Eds). Handbook of Telecommunications Economics. Structure, Regulation, and Competition vol. I (2002), Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam 225-293
    • (2002) Structure, Regulation, and Competition , vol.I , pp. 225-293
    • Sappington, D.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.