A note on optimal procurement contracts with limited direct cost inflation

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 137, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 745-753

  Chu, Leon Yang ^a   Sappington, David E M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Cost inflation; Procurement contracts

Indexed keywords

EID: 36049009451     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.005     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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