Optimal corporate leniency programs

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 56, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 215-246

  Harrington Jr , Joseph E ^a  

^a JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 57049141710     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: 14676451     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00339.x     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Aubert, C.; Patrick, R. and Kovacic, W, 2006, 'The Impact of Leniency and Whistle-Blowing Programs on Cartels,' International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24, pp. 1241-1266.
2. Chen, J. and Harrington, J. E., Jr., 2007, 'The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path,' in Political Economy of Antitrust, Vivek Ghosal and Johan Stennek, eds., (Elsevier, Amsterdam, Netherlands).
3. Feess, E. and Walzl, M., 2004, 'An Analysis of Corporate Leniency Programs and Lessons to Learn for U.S. and E.U. Policies,' University of Maastricht.
4. Harrington, J. E., Jr., 2004, 'Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority,' RAND Journal of Economics, 35, pp. 652-674.
5. Harrington, J. E., Jr., 2005, 'Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority,' International Economic Review, 46, pp. 145-169.
6. Harrington, J. E., Jr. and Chen, J., 2006, 'Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection,' International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24, pp. 1185-1212.
7. Harrington, J. E. Jr., 2006, 'Modelling the Birth and Death of Cartels with an Application to Evaluating Antitrust Policy,' Johns Hopkins University.
8. Kobayashi, B. H., 2001, 'Antitrust, Agency and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations,' George Washington Law Review, 69, pp. 715-744.
9. Motchenkova, E., 2004, 'The Effects of Leniency Programs on the Behavior of the Firms Participating in Cartel Agreements, Tilburg University.
10. Motta, M. and Polo, M., 2003, 'Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution,' International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21, pp. 347-379.
11. OECD, 2003, 'Hard Core Cartels,' OECD report (OECD, Paris).
12. Spagnolo, G., 2003, 'Divide et Impera: Optimal Deterrence Mechanisms Against Cartels and Organized Crime,' University of Mannheim.
13. Spagnolo, G., 2008, 'Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust,' in Paolo Buccirossi (ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A.).