Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War

Middle East Journal

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 190-209

  Cohen, Avner ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0042786375     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (135)

1. Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days Their Changed the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984); Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 109-25; Michael Brecher and Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967-1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices, 1967 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980); Michael Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970); Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Eitan Haber, Hayom Tifrotz Milchama (Today War Will Break Out) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987), the memoirs of Brigadier General Israel Lior, aide-de-camp to Prime Ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir; Moshe Gilboa, Shesh Shanim, Shisha Yamim (Six years, six days) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968); Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979); Indar Jit Rikhye. The Sinai Blunder (London: Frank Cass, 1980).
2. Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days Their Changed the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984); Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 109-25; Michael Brecher and Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967-1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices, 1967 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980); Michael Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970); Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Eitan Haber, Hayom Tifrotz Milchama (Today War Will Break Out) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987), the memoirs of Brigadier General Israel Lior, aide-de-camp to Prime Ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir; Moshe Gilboa, Shesh Shanim, Shisha Yamim (Six years, six days) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968); Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979); Indar Jit Rikhye. The Sinai Blunder (London: Frank Cass, 1980).
3. Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days Their Changed the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984); Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 109-25; Michael Brecher and Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967-1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices, 1967 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980); Michael Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970); Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Eitan Haber, Hayom Tifrotz Milchama (Today War Will Break Out) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987), the memoirs of Brigadier General Israel Lior, aide-de-camp to Prime Ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir; Moshe Gilboa, Shesh Shanim, Shisha Yamim (Six years, six days) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968); Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979); Indar Jit Rikhye. The Sinai Blunder (London: Frank Cass, 1980).
4. Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days Their Changed the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984); Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 109-25; Michael Brecher and Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967-1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices, 1967 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980); Michael Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970); Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Eitan Haber, Hayom Tifrotz Milchama (Today War Will Break Out) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987), the memoirs of Brigadier General Israel Lior, aide-de-camp to Prime Ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir; Moshe Gilboa, Shesh Shanim, Shisha Yamim (Six years, six days) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968); Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979); Indar Jit Rikhye. The Sinai Blunder (London: Frank Cass, 1980).
5. Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days Their Changed the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984); Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 109-25; Michael Brecher and Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967-1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices, 1967 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980); Michael Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970); Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Eitan Haber, Hayom Tifrotz Milchama (Today War Will Break Out) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987), the memoirs of Brigadier General Israel Lior, aide-de-camp to Prime Ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir; Moshe Gilboa, Shesh Shanim, Shisha Yamim (Six years, six days) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968); Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979); Indar Jit Rikhye. The Sinai Blunder (London: Frank Cass, 1980).
6. Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days Their Changed the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984); Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 109-25; Michael Brecher and Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967-1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices, 1967 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980); Michael Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970); Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Eitan Haber, Hayom Tifrotz Milchama (Today War Will Break Out) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987), the memoirs of Brigadier General Israel Lior, aide-de-camp to Prime Ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir; Moshe Gilboa, Shesh Shanim, Shisha Yamim (Six years, six days) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968); Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979); Indar Jit Rikhye. The Sinai Blunder (London: Frank Cass, 1980).
7. Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days Their Changed the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984); Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 109-25; Michael Brecher and Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967-1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices, 1967 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980); Michael Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970); Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Eitan Haber, Hayom Tifrotz Milchama (Today War Will Break Out) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987), the memoirs of Brigadier General Israel Lior, aide-de-camp to Prime Ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir; Moshe Gilboa, Shesh Shanim, Shisha Yamim (Six years, six days) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968); Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979); Indar Jit Rikhye. The Sinai Blunder (London: Frank Cass, 1980).
8. Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days Their Changed the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984); Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 109-25; Michael Brecher and Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967-1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices, 1967 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980); Michael Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970); Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Eitan Haber, Hayom Tifrotz Milchama (Today War Will Break Out) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987), the memoirs of Brigadier General Israel Lior, aide-de-camp to Prime Ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir; Moshe Gilboa, Shesh Shanim, Shisha Yamim (Six years, six days) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968); Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979); Indar Jit Rikhye. The Sinai Blunder (London: Frank Cass, 1980).
9. Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days Their Changed the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984); Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 109-25; Michael Brecher and Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967-1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices, 1967 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980); Michael Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970); Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Eitan Haber, Hayom Tifrotz Milchama (Today War Will Break Out) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987), the memoirs of Brigadier General Israel Lior, aide-de-camp to Prime Ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir; Moshe Gilboa, Shesh Shanim, Shisha Yamim (Six years, six days) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968); Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979); Indar Jit Rikhye. The Sinai Blunder (London: Frank Cass, 1980).
10. Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days Their Changed the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984); Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 109-25; Michael Brecher and Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967-1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices, 1967 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980); Michael Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970); Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Eitan Haber, Hayom Tifrotz Milchama (Today War Will Break Out) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987), the memoirs of Brigadier General Israel Lior, aide-de-camp to Prime Ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir; Moshe Gilboa, Shesh Shanim, Shisha Yamim (Six years, six days) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968); Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979); Indar Jit Rikhye. The Sinai Blunder (London: Frank Cass, 1980).
11. See Aluf Benn, "Hamil Chama Hagarinit Harishonah" (The First Nuclear War), Ha'aretz, 11 June 1993. Oblique confirmation of these flights, without mentioning Dimona specifically, appeared in Yitzhak Rabin's Pinkas Sherut (Service Notes) (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1979), pp. 136-37, 163-66; this is the Hebrew and longer version of the Rabin Memoirs. See also Haber, Today War Will Break Out. pp. 161-63, 187-86, 208.
12. See Aluf Benn, "Hamil Chama Hagarinit Harishonah" (The First Nuclear War), Ha'aretz, 11 June 1993. Oblique confirmation of these flights, without mentioning Dimona specifically, appeared in Yitzhak Rabin's Pinkas Sherut (Service Notes) (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1979), pp. 136-37, 163-66; this is the Hebrew and longer version of the Rabin Memoirs. See also Haber, Today War Will Break Out. pp. 161-63, 187-86, 208.
13. See Aluf Benn, "Hamil Chama Hagarinit Harishonah" (The First Nuclear War), Ha'aretz, 11 June 1993. Oblique confirmation of these flights, without mentioning Dimona specifically, appeared in Yitzhak Rabin's Pinkas Sherut (Service Notes) (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1979), pp. 136-37, 163-66; this is the Hebrew and longer version of the Rabin Memoirs. See also Haber, Today War Will Break Out. pp. 161-63, 187-86, 208.
14. Shlomo Aronson and Oded Brosh, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), esp. pp 109-18.
15. Ariel E. Levite and Emily B. Landau, Be-enay Haaravini: Dimuya Hagarini Shell Yisrael (Israel's Nuclear Image: Arab Perceptions of Israel's Nuclear Posture) (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1994), pp. 41-42.
16. Ibid., p. 73.
17. "Nasser Threatens Israel on A-Bomb," New York Times, 24 December 1960.
18. Levite and Landau, Israel's Nuclear Image, p. 73.
19. The concern was occasionally raised in discussions with Israeli diplomats in the early to mid-1960s. See, for example, a report by Mordechai Gazit, in the Foreign Ministry Record's Group (FMRG), Israel State Archives (ISA) 4317/1, for a conversation between Robert Strong of the Department of State and Israeli deputy minister of defense Shimon Peres during the latter's visit to Washington on 23 May 1962.
20. For example, when Egyptian ambassador Mustafa Kamil discussed US-UAR relations with President Lyndon Johnson on 25 May and 10 August 1964, the nuclear issue was never raised. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Mr. Mustafa Kamel, Ambassador of the UAR. 25 May 1964, National Security Files (NSF), Box 158, Lyndon B. Johnson Library (LBJL), Austin, Texas.
21. That program did not bear fruit because the scientists were unable to overcome problems related to the guidance system and the weight of the warhead. According to Robert Komer of the National Security Council, the German scientists were the "leftovers" of the few World War II veteran German scientists who worked in the 1950s for the French early rocket program. The number of scientists who went to Egypt was very small, perhaps less than half a dozen. Komer, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 11 January 1995.
22. The proposals McCloy brought before Nasir, in late June 1963, called for mutual Egyptian-Israeli curbs on nonconventional weapons and delivery means. In particular, the Kennedy administration had pushed tor an arrangement to avoid a missile and nuclear arms race between the UAR and Israel, that is, to curb Egypt's missile program and Israel's nuclear program. With no satisfactory response from Nasir, and in the wake of Ben Gurion's resignation in late June, McCloy decided not to continue on to Tel Aviv. There was a plan to resume the diplomatic effort later that summer, but both President Kennedy and John McCloy lost interest in the effort. Interview with Hermann Eilts, McCloy's aide on that mission, Boston, 26 January, 1996.
23. Komer cites it in the memorandum of conversation he had with Egyptian ambassador Kamil, on 18 March 1963. The date of the memo was 26 March 1963. NSF, Box 322, John F. Kennedy Library (JFKL), Boston, Massachusetts.
24. Letter from Ambassador John Badeau to President Johnson, 3 January 1964, NSF, Country File: UAR, Box 158, LBJL.
25. Ibid. A more detailed assessment appears in another thirteen-page secret study, dealing with "various aspects of US-UAR relations," which Badeau prepared for the Department of State in April 1964, shortly before he left Cairo. Embtel, A-737 (Cairo), Embassy to Department of State, 11 April 1964, NSF, Country File: UAR, Box 158, LBJL, p. 6.
26. Memo, Robetr Komer to the President, 29 May 1964, NSF, Country File, Israel, Box 143, LBJL.
27. Komer, interviews by author, Washington, D.C., in June 1992 and January 1995.
28. Telegram, from Undersecretary of State George Ball to American Embassy (Embtel 5567), 26 May 1964, NSF, Country File: UAR, Box 158, LBJL.
29. Ibid.
30. Although the text of the letter is unavailable, there is a reference to it in a memo: McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson, 3 August 1964, NSF, Box 159, LBJL.
31. Memorandum, Rusk to President Johnson, 12 August 1964, NSF, Box 159, LBJL.
32. The minutes of the McCloy-Nasir meeting are still unavailable at the LBJ Library. The two-page memorandum of the conversation McCloy had with Rusk, on 6 October 1964, after his return from Egypt, is available at NSF, Box 159, LBJL.
33. This attitude was evident in Nasir's public statements even prior to his talks with McCloy. In an interview he gave the British Observer on 4 July 1964, he said that while the Dimona reactor was capable of producing nuclear weapons, according to the information Egypt had, it was not used for that purpose. As cited in Mordechai Oren. "Yisrael Kerogem Gariini," (Israel as a Nuclear Factor), al-Hamishmar, 18 November 1966.
34. Embtel 3653 (Cairo), Battle to Rusk, 18 April 1965 (section one of four), NSF, Box 159, LBJL. As for the press reports, see John W. Finney. "Israel Permits U.S. to Inspect Atomic Reactor," New York Times, 14 March 1965.
35. Embtel 3653, Battle to Rusk.
36. Ibid.
37. Telegram from Ambassador Battle to Secretary of State Rusk. Telegram 4019, 17 May 1965, NSF, Country File: UAR, Box 159, LBJL.
38. See the remarks on Israel by William Foster, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament," Foreign Affairs 43, no. 4 (1965), pp.587-601. Later reports, in early January 1966, that Israel had purchased from France the first installment of thirty surface-to-surface ballistic missiles added another suspicious aspect to Israel's nuclear program. See, John W. Finney, "Israel Said to Buy French Missiles," New York Times, 7 January 1966.
39. See the remarks on Israel by William Foster, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament," Foreign Affairs 43, no. 4 (1965), pp.587-601. Later reports, in early January 1966, that Israel had purchased from France the first installment of thirty surface-to-surface ballistic missiles added another suspicious aspect to Israel's nuclear program. See, John W. Finney, "Israel Said to Buy French Missiles," New York Times, 7 January 1966.
40. Debate on the significance of Dimona was closely monitored in Israel. See Ze'ev Schiff "Toanot Arriot Lemilchmet mena de Yisrael" (Arab Pretexts for Preventive War against Israel), Ha'aretz, 28 January 1966; Eliezer Ben Moshe "Haatom Ha Yisrael Be-enay Maaravini", (Israeli Atom in the Eyes of the Arab), Lamerhav, 11 February 1966.
41. Debate on the significance of Dimona was closely monitored in Israel. See Ze'ev Schiff "Toanot Arriot Lemilchmet mena de Yisrael" (Arab Pretexts for Preventive War against Israel), Ha'aretz, 28 January 1966; Eliezer Ben Moshe "Haatom Ha Yisrael Be-enay Maaravini", (Israeli Atom in the Eyes of the Arab), Lamerhav, 11 February 1966.
42. "Cairo Editor Says Israel Plans to Test Nuclear Device Soon," New York Times, 21 August 1965. Haykal's article was also translated into Hebrew and published in a shortened form in Ha 'aretz, 25 August 1965.
43. "Cairo Editor Says Israel Plans to Test Nuclear Device Soon," New York Times, 21 August 1965. Haykal's article was also translated into Hebrew and published in a shortened form in Ha 'aretz, 25 August 1965.
44. New York Times, 21 August 1965.
45. Ibid. Two months later, in October 1965, Haykal returned to this issue, repeating his claim that Israel would attain a nuclear capability within three years and urging the Arabs to work collectively to respond to the Israeli threat: "In confronting the atomic menace the people do not wait until they find themselves facing the critical moment but have to mobilize all resources to be in a position to face it in advance." Hedrick Smith, "Soviet Said to Offer Cairo Atom Defense", New York Times, 3 February, 1966. See also Haykal, "Israel Will Reach Nuclear Weapons Production Capability Within Three Years," Ma'ariv, 10 October 1965.
46. Ibid. Two months later, in October 1965, Haykal returned to this issue, repeating his claim that Israel would attain a nuclear capability within three years and urging the Arabs to work collectively to respond to the Israeli threat: "In confronting the atomic menace the people do not wait until they find themselves facing the critical moment but have to mobilize all resources to be in a position to face it in advance." Hedrick Smith, "Soviet Said to Offer Cairo Atom Defense", New York Times, 3 February, 1966. See also Haykal, "Israel Will Reach Nuclear Weapons Production Capability Within Three Years," Ma'ariv, 10 October 1965.
47. Ibid.
48. The issue became, for the first time, part of the Palestinian rhetoric. PLO chairman Ahmad al-Shuqayri stated that the PLO considered preventing Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons an "urgent task" and urged Arab states to wage an 'istibaqiyya' or preemptive battle with Israel to prevent it from acquiring such weapons. Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, Cairo, 15 June, 1966. I owe this information to Dr. Yazid Sayigh of Oxford University.
49. These rumors, thought to be credible by US diplomats, were spread following a visit by Marshal Andrei Grechko, the Soviet first deputy minister of defense. It was reported that Nasir raised with the Soviets the possibility of Moscow letting Egypt buy nuclear weapons, but Grechko rebuffed him, offering instead a nuclear guarantee. Smith, "Soviet Said to Offer Cairo Atom Defense."
50. "Nasser Cites Need for Nuclear Arms," New York Times, 9 May 1966.
51. Hedrick Smith, "Warning on Bomb Given by Nasser," New York Times, 21 February 1966. Similar ideas were also expressed in "Nasser Assails U.S. and Britain," New York Times. 23 February 1966; "Nasser Threatens to War on a Nuclear Armed Israel," New York Times, 18 April 1966; "Nasser Cites Need for Nuclear Arms," New York Times, 9 May 1966.
52. Hedrick Smith, "Warning on Bomb Given by Nasser," New York Times, 21 February 1966. Similar ideas were also expressed in "Nasser Assails U.S. and Britain," New York Times. 23 February 1966; "Nasser Threatens to War on a Nuclear Armed Israel," New York Times, 18 April 1966; "Nasser Cites Need for Nuclear Arms," New York Times, 9 May 1966.
53. Hedrick Smith, "Warning on Bomb Given by Nasser," New York Times, 21 February 1966. Similar ideas were also expressed in "Nasser Assails U.S. and Britain," New York Times. 23 February 1966; "Nasser Threatens to War on a Nuclear Armed Israel," New York Times, 18 April 1966; "Nasser Cites Need for Nuclear Arms," New York Times, 9 May 1966.
54. Hedrick Smith, "Warning on Bomb Given by Nasser," New York Times, 21 February 1966. Similar ideas were also expressed in "Nasser Assails U.S. and Britain," New York Times. 23 February 1966; "Nasser Threatens to War on a Nuclear Armed Israel," New York Times, 18 April 1966; "Nasser Cites Need for Nuclear Arms," New York Times, 9 May 1966.
55. Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, p. 37.
56. A five-page Department of State "secret" memo, prepared in mid-August 1966, states "Nasser may well fulminate against Israel but we believe there is practically no possibility that he will attack or provoke the Israelis within the foreseeable future." Department of State, "Current Status of US-UAR Relations," undated (but prepared for the meeting between President Johnson and Egyptian ambassador Kamil on 12 August 1966), NSF, Box 159, LBJL.
57. Lucius Battle, interview by author, 27 December 1994. Richard Parker, interview by author, 23 December and 26 December 1994 in Washington, D.C.
58. Levite and Landau, Israel's Nuclear Image, p. 41.
59. Memorandum of Conversation, The White House, 23 February 1966, NSF, Country File: UAR, Box 159, LBJL.
60. Ibid.
61. Memorandum of Conversation, The White House, 12 August 1966, NSF, Country File: UAR, Box 159, LBJL.
62. Ibid.
63. In another meeting, in January 1967, between Kamil and National Security Advisor Walt Rostow, the Israeli nuclear issue was not mentioned. Memorandum of Conversation, The White House, 7 January 1966, NSF, Country File: UAR, Box 159, LBJL.
64. Memo, Walt W. Rostow to President Johnson, "Our Latest Brush with Nasser," 10 May 1967, NSF, Country File: UAR, Box 159, LBJL.
65. In January 1969, the Historical Studies Division of the Department of State completed a comprehensive and authoritative study titled "United States Policy and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis." It was based on all the materials related to the 1967 crisis in the files of the department, and was recently declassified almost in its entirety. The study does not include a single reference that would suggest that the 1967 war was the result of Egyptian concerns over Israel's nuclear capabilities. NSF, National Security Council History, Box 20 (Middle East Crisis), LBJL.
66. Battle and Parker recall that in early 1967 the US embassy in Cairo sensed forthcoming political trouble, to the extent of making contingency plans for a sudden break in relations. Battle said that on the eve of his departure in early March 1967, following his farewell call on Nasir and a dinner conversation with 'Amir, Sadat, and Haykal, he sensed that Nasir was in political trouble in the Arab world, and thought that Nasir would have to do something "dramatic" to restore his prestige. A day or two later, Battle expressed his thoughts on this matter in his last cable from Cairo, in which he outlined three courses of action that Nasir might take. Battle makes it clear, however, that he did not think about this dramatic action in terms of the Badeau-Komer scenarios. When asked by this author explicitly whether Nasir's threat, a year earlier, regarding a preventive war against Dimona was an element in his assessment, Battle said that he did not consider it seriously for the same reason that he had not taken it seriously in 1966: as long as a third of the Egyptian army was in Yemen, Egypt was not ready to face Israel militarily. Lucius Battle, interview by author, 27 December 1994 in Washington, D.C.: Richard Parker, interview by author, 23 December and 26 December 1994, in Washington, D.C. See also Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, pp. 92, 104-7.
67. Embtel 1517 (Lisbon), Robert Anderson to President Johnson, 2 June 1967, NSF, NSC History, Box 18, LBJL. The sources are unclear as to the exact date of the meeting.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. According to Haykal, this idea was raised prior to the third Arab summit at Casablanca in 1964 and was raised again by 'Amir in 1966 and early 1967. General Fawzi relates the same story though slightly differently. He states that "since 1957 the [Egyptian] political and military leadership had wanted to remove UNEF in order to control Egyptian territorial waters." He recalls that both Nasir and 'Amir made clear to him before 1967 "that they wanted to seize on any international or regional situation which permited doing away with that force." Cited in Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, p. 91.
71. In addition to Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, pp. 59-98; see also Ehud Ya'ari, "June 1967: How Nasser Was Lured into War," Jerusalem Report, 4 June 1992, pp. 14-18. According to Ya'ari, "material from newly opened archives, as well as the memoirs of Egyptian generals and civilian leaders" indicate "that none of the leaders of Middle East countries wanted all-out war in 1967. It shows that the real culprit of 1967 was Abd al-Hakim Amer, Egypt's vice president and commander in chief, an overconfident blunderer who recklessly pushed his country into the fateful confrontation with Israel" (p. 14).
72. In addition to Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, pp. 59-98; see also Ehud Ya'ari, "June 1967: How Nasser Was Lured into War," Jerusalem Report, 4 June 1992, pp. 14-18. According to Ya'ari, "material from newly opened archives, as well as the memoirs of Egyptian generals and civilian leaders" indicate "that none of the leaders of Middle East countries wanted all-out war in 1967. It shows that the real culprit of 1967 was Abd al-Hakim Amer, Egypt's vice president and commander in chief, an overconfident blunderer who recklessly pushed his country into the fateful confrontation with Israel" (p. 14).
73. Nasir thought first in terms of a partial or temporary withdrawal of the UNEF forces along the international border in a way that would keep the credibility of the Egyptian move intact. To avoid opening the whole question of the UNEF mandate. Nasir decided that the Egyptian request should be made on the military level, between General Fawzi and General Indar Jit Rikhye, the commander of the UNEF. This narrative is consistent with General Rikhye's recollections: "It seemed clear, therefore, that Nasir never wanted or even approved complete withdrawal of UNEF at this stage, and his subsequent statements to this effect would, therefore, appear to be valid" (The Sinai Blunder, p. 160).
74. Parker, pp. 74-75, 87-91.
75. Ibid., pp.79-89.
76. Embtel 3653 (Cairo), Battle to Rusk, 18 April 1965 (section one of four), NSF, Box 159, LBJL.
77. According to General Fawzi, as early as 14 May 'Amir issued orders designed to make the army combat ready, something for which it was yet unprepared. According to 'Abd al-Muhsin Murtagi, the commander of the Sinai forces, 'Amir, in a meeting that day with senior general staff members, was already talking about undertaking limited offensive operations against Israel, something that had not been part of the calculations of the operations planners. Cited in Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, p. 43.
78. Ha'aretz, 22 June 1967; Levite and Landau, Israel's Nuclear Image, pp. 41, 65.
79. Ha'aretz, 22 June 1967; Levite and Landau, Israel's Nuclear Image, pp. 41, 65.
80. William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), p. 512; Ya'ari, "How Nasser Was Lured into War," pp. 17-18.
81. William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), p. 512; Ya'ari, "How Nasser Was Lured into War," pp. 17-18.
82. In Israel this episode is known as the Rotem Operation. On the operation and its relevance to the 1967 situation, see Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb, pp. 84-85, 118, 119; also Rabin, Rabin Memoirs, pp. 56-57.
83. In Israel this episode is known as the Rotem Operation. On the operation and its relevance to the 1967 situation, see Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb, pp. 84-85, 118, 119; also Rabin, Rabin Memoirs, pp. 56-57.
84. Rabin, Rabin Memoirs, pp. 68-69; Haber, Today War Will Break Out, pp. 147-51; Dov Goldstein, Ra'ayon Hashvoh Ezer Weizman (Interview with Ezer Weizman), Ma'ariv, 5 June 1973; Shlomo Nakdimon, Yediot Aharonot, 5 June 1992.
85. Rabin, Rabin Memoirs, pp. 68-69; Haber, Today War Will Break Out, pp. 147-51; Dov Goldstein, Ra'ayon Hashvoh Ezer Weizman (Interview with Ezer Weizman), Ma'ariv, 5 June 1973; Shlomo Nakdimon, Yediot Aharonot, 5 June 1992.
86. Rabin, Rabin Memoirs, pp. 68-69; Haber, Today War Will Break Out, pp. 147-51; Dov Goldstein, Ra'ayon Hashvoh Ezer Weizman (Interview with Ezer Weizman), Ma'ariv, 5 June 1973; Shlomo Nakdimon, Yediot Aharonot, 5 June 1992.
87. Rabin, Rabin Memoirs, pp. 68-69; Haber, Today War Will Break Out, pp. 147-51; Dov Goldstein, Ra'ayon Hashvoh Ezer Weizman (Interview with Ezer Weizman), Ma'ariv, 5 June 1973; Shlomo Nakdimon, Yediot Aharonot, 5 June 1992.
88. Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, pp. 43, 89-90.
89. See Brecher, Decisions in Crisis, pp. 35-50.
90. Letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol, 17 May 1967; NSF, NSC History, Box 17, LBJL; also, Memorandum for the President, Rostow to Johnson, "Urgent Message to Eshkol," 17 May 1967, NSF, NSC History, Box 17, LBJL.
91. Haber, Today War Will Break Out, p. 152.
92. Brecher, Decisions in Crisis, pp. 230-34.
93. Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder, pp. 14-62.
94. Rabin, Pinkas Sherut, p. 137; also Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis, pp. 36-37.
95. Rabin, Pinkas Sherut, p. 137; also Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis, pp. 36-37.
96. This was acknowledged by Mordechai Hod, former commander of the Israeli air force, in Benn, "The First Nuclear War."
97. Shimon Peres, "Gorem Hazmam" (The Time Dimension), Ma'archot, no. 146 (1962), pp. 3-5.
98. Pierre Pea'n, Les Deux Bombes (Paris: Fayard, 2nd revised ed., 1991)
99. "Yisrael Muchanah Lesakel Kol Tzaad Mitzad Mitzrayim" (Israel Is Ready to Thwart Egyptian Action), Haaren, 22 February 1966.
100. James Feron, "Mideast Atom Curb Is Urged by Eshkol," New York Times, 19 May 1966; see also "Eshkol: Lo Nihiyeh Rishonim Behachnasat Neshek Garini la Mizrach Hatichon" (Eshkol: We Will Not Be the First to Introduce Nuclear Weapons to the Middle East), Ha'aretz, 19 May 1966.
101. James Feron, "Mideast Atom Curb Is Urged by Eshkol," New York Times, 19 May 1966; see also "Eshkol: Lo Nihiyeh Rishonim Behachnasat Neshek Garini la Mizrach Hatichon" (Eshkol: We Will Not Be the First to Introduce Nuclear Weapons to the Middle East), Ha'aretz, 19 May 1966.
102. Ha'aretz, 28 July 1966.
103. Interview in August 1994 with General Hod, commander of the Israeli air force in 1967, confirmed that on the eve of the 1967 war the Dimona installation was the most sensitive site in Israel, and that there was concern that it was the highest priority target for the Egyptian air force. Also see Benn, "The First Nuclear War," for comments by Hod on this subject.
104. Yigal Allon, "The Last Stage of the War of Independence," Ot (Tel Aviv), November 1967, pp. 5-13.
105. Rabin, Rabin Memoirs, p. 70.
106. Haber, Today War Will Break Out, p. 153; Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis, pp. 35-41.
107. Haber, Today War Will Break Out, p. 153; Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis, pp. 35-41.
108. Egypt's demand for the withdrawal of the UNEF from the international border was broadcast by Cairo Radio at 6:00 A.M. The Israeli Defense Ministerial Committee, which convened at 11:00 A.M., already knew about this move. In the committee meeting, however, Eshkol still considered Egypt's actions to be primarily political posturing. Rabin's briefing before the Knesset committee took place that morning.
109. Haber, Today War Will Break Out, p. 161.
110. Ibid., pp. 62-63.
111. Rabin, Rabin Memoirs, pp. 85-86.
112. Memo, Walt Rostow to President Johnson, 25 May 1967, 6:00 P.M., NSF, NSC History, Box 17, LBJL.
113. Quandt, Decade of Decisions, pp. 36-37; also Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis, pp. 114-15.
114. Quandt, Decade of Decisions, pp. 36-37; also Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis, pp. 114-15.
115. Haber, Today War Will Break Out, p. 186. Benn also made a reference to this in"The First Nuclear War."
116. Rabin, Rabin Memoirs, pp. 89-90; Cf. Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976), p. 259.
117. Rabin, Rabin Memoirs, pp. 89-90; Cf. Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976), p. 259.
118. Quandt, Decade of Decisions, p. 512 n. 38. According to another version, after the blockade was imposed, there was mounting pressure on Nasir by his military to attack first. At a meeting of the Egyptian general staff, on 25 May, Nasir was told that Egypt should be prepared for some hard blows from the air, and then to retaliate. Despite pleas of his air force chief to attack first, Nasir said "we have a political decision not to start a war." Ya'ari, "How Nasser Was Lured into War," pp. 14-15.
119. Quandt, Decade of Decisions, p. 512 n. 38. According to another version, after the blockade was imposed, there was mounting pressure on Nasir by his military to attack first. At a meeting of the Egyptian general staff, on 25 May, Nasir was told that Egypt should be prepared for some hard blows from the air, and then to retaliate. Despite pleas of his air force chief to attack first, Nasir said "we have a political decision not to start a war." Ya'ari, "How Nasser Was Lured into War," pp. 14-15.
120. Telegram (203943), President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol, 27 May 1967, NSF History, Box 17, LBJL.
121. Rabin, Rabin Memoirs, pp. 91-92; Haber, Today War Will Break Our, pp. 191-93; Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis, pp. 137-43; Brecher, Decisions in Crisis, pp. 144-48.
122. Rabin, Rabin Memoirs, pp. 91-92; Haber, Today War Will Break Our, pp. 191-93; Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis, pp. 137-43; Brecher, Decisions in Crisis, pp. 144-48.
123. Rabin, Rabin Memoirs, pp. 91-92; Haber, Today War Will Break Our, pp. 191-93; Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis, pp. 137-43; Brecher, Decisions in Crisis, pp. 144-48.
124. Rabin, Rabin Memoirs, pp. 91-92; Haber, Today War Will Break Our, pp. 191-93; Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis, pp. 137-43; Brecher, Decisions in Crisis, pp. 144-48.
125. Interview by the author with General Hod and other former senior military officials, in August 1994, in Tel Aviv.
126. Haber, Today War Will Break Out, pp. 205, 207.
127. In Pinkas Sherut, Rabin only hints at the issue (pp. 136-37, 163-66). In Lior's memoirs, written by Haber, Today War Will Break Out the issue appears in various ways, but mostly in code such as "sensitive strategic site."
128. In Pinkas Sherut, Rabin only hints at the issue (pp. 136-37, 163-66). In Lior's memoirs, written by Haber, Today War Will Break Out the issue appears in various ways, but mostly in code such as "sensitive strategic site."
129. General Yariv, who died in 1994, acknowledged the issue in passing in various private forums. General Hod's comments were cited in Benn, "The First Nuclear War."
130. Memorandum for the Record: Record of National Security Council Meeting held on May 24, 1967 at 12 noon-Discussion of Middle East Crisis, NSF, NSC History, Box 17, LBJL.
131. Munya Mardor, Rafael (Tel Aviv: Misrad Habitachon, 1981), p. 499.
132. Myer Feldman, a White House aide, recalls that some elements within the US government knew (or estimated) that the Israelis had two nuclear bombs. Interview by author, 22 June 1992, Washington D.C.
133. In his Battling for Peace: Memoirs (London: Weidenfeld Nicolson, 1995), Peres writes: "My contribution during that dramatic period was something that I still cannot wrile openly, for reasons of state security. After Dayan was appointed Defense Minister, I submitted to him a certain proposal which in my opinion then - and in my opinion today, nearly three decades later - would have deterred the Arabs and prevented the war. My proposal, which, by the way, Yigael Yadin knew about and supported, was considered and rejected" (pp. 166-67). See also pp. 132-42.
134. Personal communication with former Israeli senior officials.
135. Before the war there were claims that the USSR had provided Egypt with nuclear guarantees, see Hedrick Smith, "Soviet Said to Offer Cairo Atom Defense."