Recent developments in philosophy of psychopathology

Current Opinion in Psychiatry

Volumn 21, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 578-584

  Parnas, Josef ^a   Sass, Louis A ^b   Zahavi, Dan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Operationalism; Phenomenology; Philosophy; Psychiatry; Schizophrenia; Self disorder; Selfhood

Indexed keywords

COGNITION; DIAGNOSTIC ACCURACY; DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS; DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS; EPISTEMOLOGY; HUMAN; MEDICAL LITERATURE; MENTAL DISEASE; METAPHYSICS; PHENOMENOLOGY; PHILOSOPHY; REVIEW; SCHIZOPHRENIA;

DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS; HUMANS; PHILOSOPHY; PSYCHIATRY; SCHIZOPHRENIA; SCHIZOPHRENIC PSYCHOLOGY;

EID: 56249105868     PISSN: 09517367     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1097/YCO.0b013e32830e4610     Document Type: Review

References (44)

1. Bennett M, Hacker P. Philosophical foundations of neuroscience. Oxford: Blackwell; 2003.
2. Parnas J, Zahavi D. The link: philosophy-phenomenology-psychopathology. In: Zahavi D, editor. Exploring the self: psychopathological and philosophical perspectives on self-awareness. Philadelphia: J Benjamin's Publishing Company; 2000. pp. 1-16.
3. Gallagher S. Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: a neurophenomenological critique. Psychopathology 2004; 37:8-19.
4. Frith C. Comments on Shaun Gallagher: neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: a neurophenomenological critique. Psychopathology 2004; 37:20-22.
5. Gallagher S, Zahavi D. The phenomenological mind. London: Routledge; 2008.
6. Legrand D. Prereflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives. Conscious Cogn 2007; 16:583-599. This article illustrates very nicely the importance of conceptual analysis of terms (dependent variables) used in empirical psychophysical correlations.
7. Bennett M, Dennett D, Hacker P, Searle, J. Neuroscience and philosophy: brain, mind, and language. New York, USA: Columbia University Press; 2007. This is a follow-up of the first book[1], containing critical comments from Daniel Dennett and John Searle. This is a very careful analysis (from a Wittgensteinian perspective) of common claims, identified in empirical and theoretical neurocognitive literature, on the various aspects of the life of consciousness (e.g. perception, cognition, willing, self-awareness). The authors succeed in showing frequent conceptual incoherence in many attempts to explain experiential life by facile reductions to the neural level. Both books are jointly extremely useful and recommendable as primers for philosophical reasoning for a research-engaged psychiatrist.
8. Dreyfus H. What computers can't do. Revised ed. New York: Harper and Row; 1979.
9. Varela FJ, Thompson E, Rosch E. The embodied mind: cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press; 1991.
10. Thompson E. Mind in life: biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; 2007.
11. Andreasen NC. DSM and the death of phenomenology in America: an example of unintended consequences. Schizophr Bull 2007; 33:108-112.
12. Jansson L, Handest P, Nielsen J, et al. Exploring boundaries of schizophrenia: a comparison of ICD-10 with other diagnostic systems in first-admitted patients. World Psychiatry 2002; 1:109-114.
13. Jansson LB, Parnas J. Competing definitions of schizophrenia: what can be learned from polydiagnostic studies? Schizophr Bull 2007; 33:1178-1200.
14. Mullen PE. A modest proposal for another phenomenological approach to Psychopathology. Schizophr Bull 2007; 33:113-121.
15. Nordgaard J, Arnfred SM, Handest P, Parnas J. The diagnostic status of first-rank symptoms. Schizophr Bull 2008; 34:137-154.
16. Kendler KS, Appelbaum PS, Bell CC, et al. Issues for DSM-V: DSM-V should include a conceptual issues work group. Am J Psychiatry 2008; 165:174-175.
17. Maj M. 'Psychiatric comorbidity': an artefact of current diagnostic systems? Br J Psychiatry 2005; 186:182-184.
18. Parnas J, Licht D, Bovet P. The cluster A personality disorders: a review. In: Akiskal H, Maj M, editors. Personality disorders. World Psychiatric Association's series: evidence and experience in psychiatry. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.; 2004. pp. 1-74.
19. Parnas J, Sass L. Varieties of 'phenomenology': on description, understanding, and explanation in psychiatry. In: Kendler K, Parnas J, editors. Philosophical issues in psychiatry: explanation, nosology and phenomenology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; 2008. p. 20.
20. Kendler J, Parnas J, editors. Philosophical issues in psychiatry: explanation, nosology and phenomenology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; 2008. This volume is written by philosophers and scientists on a broad spectrum of epistemological and ontological issues (e.g. self-organization, reduction). Each chapter is preceded by a short general introduction and followed by a comment, both written by peers.
21. Kendler KS. Towards a philosophical structure for psychiatry. Am J Psychiatry 2005; 162:433-440.
22. Kendler KS. Explanatory models for psychiatric illness. Am J Psychiatry 2008; 165:695-702.
23. Sass L. Contradictions of emotion in schizophrenia. Cogn Emotion 2007; 21:351-390.
24. Sass L, Parnas J. Explaining schizophrenia: the relevance of phenomenology. In: Chung MC, Fulford KWM, Graham G, editors. Reconceiving schizophrenia. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2007. pp. 63-95.
25. Mishara A. Missing links in phenomenological clinical neuroscience: why we still are not there yet. Curr Opin Psychiatry 2007; 20:559-569.
26. Sass L, Parnas J. Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self. Schizophr Bull 2003; 29:427-444.
27. Sass L. Madness and modernism: insanity in the light of modem art, literature, and thought. New York: Basic Books; 1992; 595 pp.
28. Parnas J. Self and schizophrenia: a phenomenological perspective. In: Kircher T, David A, editors. The self in neuroscience and psychiatry. Cambridge University Press; 2003. pp. 217-241.
29. Parnas J, Handest P. Phenomenology of anomalous self-experience in early schizophrenia. Compr Psychiatry 2003; 44:121-134.
30. Zahavi D. Subjectivity and selfhood: investigating the first-person perspective. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press; 2005.
31. Varela F. Neurophenomenology. J Conscious Stud 1996; 3:330-349.
32. Gallagher S. Mutual enlightenment: recent phenomenology in cognitive science. J Conscious Stud 1997; 4:195-214.
33. Vollmer-Larsen A, Handest P, Parnas J. Reliability of measuring anomalous experience: the Bonn scale for the assessment of basic symptoms. Psychopathology 2007; 40:345-348.
34. Spitzer M. On defining delusions. Compr Psychiatry 1990; 31:377-397.
35. Sass L. Introspection, schizophrenia, and the fragmentation of self. Representations 1987; 19:1-34.
36. Sass L, guest editor. Philosophy, psychiatry, psychology, special issue ('The phenomenology of schizophrenia: three classic approaches'), vol. 8, no. 4; 2001.
37. Henry M. Philosophy and phenomenology of the body (translated by G. Etzkom). The Hague: Nijhoff; 1975.
38. Zahavi D. Serf-awareness and alterity. A phenomenological investigation. Evanston: Northwestern University Press; 1999.
39. Parnas J, Jansson L, Sass LA, Handest P. Self-experience in the prodromal phases of schizophrenia: a pilot study of first admissions. Neurol Psychiatry Brain Res 1998; 6:107-116.
40. Møller P, Husby R. The initial prodrome in schizophrenia: searching for naturalistic core dimensions of experience and behavior. Schizophr Bull 2000; 26:217-232.
41. Parnas J, Handest P, Jansson L, Sæbye D. Anomalous subjective experience among first admitted schizophrenia spectrum patients: empirical investigation. Psychopathology 2005; 38:259-267.
42. Handest P, Parnas J. Clinical characteristics of first-admitted patients with ICD-10 schizotypal disorder. Br J Psychiatry Suppl 2005; 48:49-54.
43. Parnas J, Handest P, Sæbye D, Jansson L Anomalies of subjective experience in schizophrenia and psychotic bipolar illness. Acta Psychiatr Scand 2003; 108:126-133.
44. Sass L. 'Person with schizophrenia' or 'schizophrenic person': reflections on illness and the self. Theory Psychol 2007; 17:395-420.