The formation of an international environmental agreement as a two-stage exclusive cartel formation game with transferable utilities

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 317-341

  Chou, Porchiung Benjamin ^a   Sylla, Cheickna ^a  

^a NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperative game theory; Core; Dominant cartel formation game; Endogenous coalition formation with transferable utility; Exclusive membership game delta; International environmental agreement

Indexed keywords

EXCHANGE RATE; GAME THEORY; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; KYOTO PROTOCOL; MONTREAL PROTOCOL;

EID: 55849089581     PISSN: 15679764     EISSN: 15731553     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10784-008-9082-6     Document Type: Article

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