Juvenile crime and criminal justice: Resolving border disputes

Future of Children

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 81-118

  Fagan, Jeffrey ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT; CRIMINAL JUSTICE; CRIMINAL LAW; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HUMAN; JUVENILE DELINQUENCY; LEGAL PROCEDURE; RACE DIFFERENCE; REVIEW;

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; CRIMINAL LAW; HUMANS; INTERINSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS; JUVENILE DELINQUENCY; LAW ENFORCEMENT; STATE GOVERNMENT; UNITED STATES;

EID: 55649098824     PISSN: 10548289     EISSN: 15501558     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/foc.0.0014     Document Type: Review

References (154)

1. David Tanenhaus, Juvenile Justice in the Making (Oxford University Press, 2004);
2. see Judith Sealander, The Failed Century of the Child: Governing America's Young in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge University Press, 2003);
3. Anthony Platt, Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency (University of Chicago Press, 1967).
4. Tanenhaus, Juvenile Justice in the Making (see note 1).
5. Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966). The Kent guidelines were an amalgam of administrative rules and norms of everyday practice. States quickly adopted the Kent guidelines into law.
6. Time, "The Youth Crime Plague," July 11, 1977;
7. Newsweek, "The Drug Gangs," March 28, 1988;
8. William J. Bennett, John DiIulio Jr., and John P. Walters, Body Count: Moral Poverty and How to Win America's War against Crime and Drugs (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
9. David Garland, Punishment and Welfare (University of Chicago Press, 1990);
10. Jonathan Simon, Governing through Crime (Oxford University Press, 2007);
11. Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and Punishment in America (University of Chicago Press, 1996);
12. Michael Tonry, Thinking about Crime: Sense and Sensibility in American Penal Culture (Oxford University Press, 2004).
13. Barry C. Feld, Bad Kids: Race and the Transformation of the Juvenile Court (Oxford University Press, 1999);
14. Simon Singer, Recriminalizing Delinquency: Violent Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice Reform (Cambridge University Press, 1996).
15. Singer, Recriminalizing Delinquency (see note 6);
16. Jeffrey Fagan and Franklin E. Zimring, eds., Changing Borders of Juvenile Justice: Transfer of Adolescents to the Criminal Court (University of Chicago Press, 2000).
17. Feld, Bad Kids (see note 6).
18. Andrea McGowan and others, "Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating the Transfer of Juveniles from the Juvenile Justice System to the Adult Justice System: A Report on Recommendations of the Task Force on Community Preventive Services," Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 56, no. RR-9 (November 30, 2007): 1-11;
19. Donna Bishop, "Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal System," Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 27 (2000): 81-167.
20. See Fox Butterfield, All God's Children: The Bosket Family and the American Tradition of Violence (New York: Harper Perennial, 1995), for a detailed account of the shooting, its political context, and the legislative reaction.
21. See, also, Merrill Sobie, "The Juvenile Offender Act: Effectiveness and Impact on the New York Juvenile Justice System," New York Law School Law Review 27 (1981): 677-91.
22. Martin Roysher and Peter Edelman, "Treating Juveniles as Adults in New York: What Does It Mean and How Is It Working?" in Major Issues in Juvenile Justice Information and Training, ed. J. C. Hall and others (Columbus, Ohio: Academy for Contemporary Problems, 1981).
23. New York Penal Law § 30.00. Connecticut and North Carolina, at that time, were the others. Connecticut has since raised the age of majority for nearly all juvenile offenders to eighteen. Connecticut General Statutes §1-1d;
24. North Carolina General Statutes § 7B-1501(7).
25. Roysher and Edelman. "Treating Juveniles as Adults" (see note 11);
26. Sobie, "The Juvenile Offender Act" (see note 10).
27. Barry Feld, "The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference That It Makes," Boston University Law Review 69 (1988): 821-952.
28. The family court has jurisdiction over delinquency cases in New York State.
29. A fourteen-year-old offender in New York who snatches a chain from another person could be charged with robbery in the third degree and remain in the family court; if there was any use of force or threat, the offender could be charged with robbery in the second degree and fall subject to the Juvenile Offender Law, regardless of prior record or impact on the victim. The discretion lies solely with the prosecutor, whose decision is not reviewable. Similar differences exist under the JO Law for assault in the second degree.
30. See Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, "Program Report," Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States 1994-1996, p. 41 (www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/reform.pdf [October, 1997]).
31. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, "Juvenile Justice Bulletin," State Legislative Responses to Violent Juvenile Crime: 1996-1997 Update, p. 2 (www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172835.pdf [November, 1998]).
32. In 1998, Indiana lowered the age from sixteen to ten. During this time, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia set no minimum age at which a judge may transfer a juvenile to criminal court. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, "Report," Trying Juveniles as Adults in Criminal Court: An Analysis of State Transfer Provisions, pp. 15-16 (www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172836.pdf [December, 1998]).
33. See Donna Lyons, National Conference of State Legislatures, "State Legislature Report," 1995 Juvenile Crime and Justice State Enactments 20, no.17 (November 1995). In 1995, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia added offenses for discretionary or mandatory juvenile prosecution in adult criminal court. Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Nevada, and Ohio enacted laws that made transfer permanent - so called "once waived, always waived" legislation - regardless of the outcome of the case in criminal court. Other states lowered the age at which juveniles may be prosecuted in criminal court. For instance, Idaho passed legislation providing for waiver of juveniles under age fourteen who commit certain felonies. Nevada lowered from sixteen to fourteen the age at which juveniles are subject to discretionary judicial waiver. West Virginia also lowered from sixteen to fourteen the age of discretionary transfer for certain juveniles charged with serious crimes. However, only two states took the simpler step of lowering the age of majority for all adolescent offenders. New Hampshire and Wisconsin lowered the maximum age of original juvenile court jurisdiction from seventeen to sixteen.
34. Richard E. Redding and James C. Howell, "Blended Sentencing in American Juvenile Courts," in Changing Borders of Juvenile Justice, eds. Fagan and Zimring (see note 7).
35. See also Barry C. Feld and Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz, "The Back-Door to Prison: Waiver Reform, 'Blended Sentencing,' and the Law of Unintended Consequences," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 91, no. 4 (2001): 997-1072.
36. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
37. See, for example, Barry C. Feld and Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz, "The End of the Line: An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 86, no. 2 (1996): 449-92.
38. For a review, see Redding and Howell, "Blended Sentencing" (see note 19).
39. Feld and Podkopacz, "The End of the Line" (see note 21).
40. Patricia Torbet and others, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, State Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime, p. 3 (www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/statresp.pdf [July, 1996])).
41. Jeffrey Fagan and Valerie West, "The Decline of the Juvenile Death Penalty: Scientific Evidence of Evolving Norms," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 95 (2005): 427.
42. Bishop, "Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal System" (see note 9).
43. David Rosen, Philadelphia Defender Association, personal communication. Representation for these youth is provided by each county. Not every jurisdiction has the resources to provide defense representation that can motion for reverse waiver, and disparities arise when access to services is limited by economic resources. See Laval S. Miller-Wilson and Patricia Puritz, Pennsylvania: An Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of Representation in Delinquency Proceedings (www.jlc.org/File/publications/ paassessment.pdf [October 2003]).
44. Jeffrey Fagan, "Separating the Men from the Boys: The Comparative Impacts of Juvenile and Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism of Adolescent Felony Offenders," in Sourcebook: Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders, eds. James C. Howell and others (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1995).
45. Stephen J. Morse, "Immaturity and Responsibility," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 88 (1998): 15.
46. Franklin Zimring, "Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility," in Youth on Trial: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice, edited by Robert Schwartz and Thomas Grisso (University of Chicago Press, 2000).
47. Barry C. Feld, "Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 88 (1997): 68. Feld advanced the concept of a "youth discount" on adult sentences, standardizing immaturity strictly by age.
48. N. Dickon Reppucci, "Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice," American Journal of Community Psychology 27, no. 3 (1999): 307-26;
49. Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth Scott, "Less Guilt by Reason of Adolescence," American Psychologist 58, no. 12 (2003): 1009-18.
50. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid. The Court's majority also said these same qualities are the reasons why juveniles are not permitted to vote, serve on juries, or marry without parental consent. It effectively contradicted Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Stanford and recent empirical work emphasizing variability in developmental trajectories for different decisional competencies. See Steinberg and Scott, "Less Guilt by Reason of Adolescence" (see note 31).
53. Ibid.
54. Brief of American Psychiatric Association as Curiae at 2-3, in Roper v. Simmons 543 U.S. 551 (No. 06-633).
55. Ibid.
56. See the article by Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth Scott in this volume for a review of the scientific evidence on child and adolescent development and culpability.
57. See the article by Edward Mulvey and Anne-Marie Leistico in this volume.
58. Elizabeth Cauffman and Laurence Steinberg, "(Im)Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable than Adults," Behavioral Sciences and the Law 18 (2001): 741-60.
59. But see Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), in which Justice Powell, writing for the majority, set aside controversial social science evidence on predictions of dangerousness and said that judges were best suited to make these determinations.
60. For example, New York and North Carolina set the age of majority at sixteen; youth in criminal court in those states should not be part of an estimate of the transferred population. But youth excluded by statute at age sixteen in other states should be measured as part of the transferred population.
61. Bishop, "Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal System" (see note 9).
62. Campaign for Youth Justice, The Consequences Aren't Minor: The Impact of Trying Youth as Adults and Strategies for Reform (Washington: Campaign for Youth Justice, 2007).
63. The authors cited two sources: Charles Puzzanchera and others, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Court Statistics 1999 (www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/201241.pdf [July, 2003]),
64. and Howard Snyder and Melissa Sickmund, National Center for Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report (www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/toc.html [September, 1999]).
65. See, for example, Kevin Strom and others, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, "Special Report," State Court Processing Statutes 1990-94, Juvenile Felony Defendants in Criminal Courts (www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/jfdcc.pdf [September, 1998]).
66. But as juvenile drug arrests rose during the early part of the decade, the number of waived drug cases rose. Judicial waivers for drug offenses declined in number beginning in 1992, though the rate remained stable.
67. Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims (see note 44), p. 236.
68. Ibid., p. 237.
69. Data were unavailable to determine whether those sentenced to prison were incarcerated in adult or juvenile facilities. See Campaign for Youth Justice, The Consequences Aren't Minor (see note 44), citing statistics from the California Board of Corrections and the California Department of Corrections.
70. This figure is cited, for example, in Campaign for Youth Justice, The Consequences Aren't Minor (see note 44), p. 21, note 4,
71. quoting a 2005 report by the Coalition for Juvenile Justice, Childhood on Trial: The Failure of Trying and Sentencing Youth in Adult Criminal Court (www.appa-net.org/resources/pubs/docs/CJJ-Report.pdf [2005]).
72. Donna M. Bishop, "The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Juvenile Justice Processing," in Our Children, Their Children: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Differences in American Juvenile Justice, edited by Darnell Hawkins and Kimberly Kempf-Leonard (University of Chicago Press, 2005).
73. See the article by Alex Piquero in this volume.
74. Kevin Strom, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, "Special Report," Profile of State Prisoners under Age 18, 1985-97 (http://ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pspa1897.pdf [February, 2000]).
75. Campaign for Youth Justice, The Consequences Aren't Minor (see note 44).
76. Puzzanchera and others, Juvenile Court Statistics 1999 (see note 44), p. 44.
77. Feld, Bad Kids (see note 6).
78. Bishop relied on the State Courts Processing System (SCPS), which includes all cases processed in the criminal courts and disaggregates by age.
79. Feld, Bad Kids (see note 6).
80. Janet Lauritsen's careful review of the evidence using multiple data sources to confirm patterns observed in arrest records suggests that offending rates for non-white youth may in fact be higher for violence and weapons charges, but not for drug crimes. See Janet Lauritsen, "Racial and Ethnic Differences in Juvenile Offending," in Our Children, Their Children, edited by Darnell Hawkins and Kimberly Kempf-Leonard (see note 51). This is important in the discussion of racial disparity, since drug crimes are one of the most commonly waived offenses for black youth, according to Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims (see note 44), pp. 176, 187. Instead, Bishop, "The Role of Race and Ethnicity" (see note 51), suggests that racial disparities in police contacts and arrests per crime may be the case, based on strategic decisions about where and how to deploy police, and observed biases in police decision making. See also Bishop, "Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal System" (see note 9).
81. See, for example, Geoffrey Alpert, John MacDonald, and Roger Dunham, "Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making during Citizen Stops," Criminology 43 (2005): 407-34.
82. See also Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, "Street Stops and Broken Windows: Race, Terry and Disorder in New York City," Fordham Urban Law Journal 28 (2000): 457.
83. Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan, and Alex Kiss, "An Analysis of the New York City Police Department's 'Stop-and-Frisk' Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias," Journal of the American Statistical Association 102 (2007): 813-23.
84. Joshua Correll and others, "The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals," Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 83 (2002): 1314-29;
85. Anthony G. Greenwald and others, "Targets of Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003): 399-405;
86. E. Ashby Plant and B. Michelle Peruche, "The Consequences of Race for Police Officers' Responses to Criminal Suspects," Psychological Science 16 (2005):180-83;
87. E. Ashby Plant and others, "Eliminating Automatic Racial Bias: Making Race Non-Diagnostic For Responses to Criminal Suspects," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 41 (2005): 141-56.
88. For a thorough review of studies on racial profiling, sentencing, and police shootings, see R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt, and Lee Ross, "Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society," California Law Review 94 (2006): 1169-90.
89. See also Sandra Graham and Brian S. Lowery, "Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes about Adolescent Offenders," Law & Human Behavior 28 (2004): 483-504;
90. George Bridges and Sara Steen, "Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms," American Sociological Review 63 (1998): 554-70.
91. Jennifer Eberhardt and others, "Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes," Psychological Science 17 (2006): 383-87;
92. William Pizzi, Irene V. Blair, and Charles M. Judd, "Discrimination in Sentencing on the Basis of Afrocentric Features," Michigan Journal of Race and Law 10 (20075): 327-55.
93. Roysher and Edelman, "Treating Juveniles as Adults in New York" (see note 11).
94. Feld, "The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense" (see note 14);
95. L. K. Gillespie and M. D. Norman, "Does Certification Mean Prison? Some Preliminary Findings from Utah," Juvenile and Family Court Journal 35 (1984): 23-34;
96. and Dean J. Champion, "Teenage Felons and Waiver Hearings: Some Recent Trends, 1980-1988," Crime and Delinquency 35 (1989): 577-85.
97. See, for example, M. Houghtalin and G. L. Mays, "Criminal Dispositions of New Mexico Juveniles Transferred to Adult Court," Crime and Delinquency 37 (1991): 393-407;
98. see also Charles W. Thomas and Shay Bilchik, "Prosecuting Juveniles in Criminal Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 76 (1985): 439-79.
99. Peter W. Greenwood, Allan Abrahamse, and Franklin Zimring, Factors Affecting Sentencing Severity for Young Adult Offenders (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1984).
100. Barry C. Feld, "Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform," Minnesota Law Review 79 (1995): 965-1128; Feld, Bad Kids (see note 6).
101. See Donna M. Bishop and others, "The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Does It Make a Difference?" Crime and Delinquency 42 (1996): 171-91.
102. Aaron Kupchik, Jeffrey Fagan, and Akiva Liberman, "Punishment, Proportionality, and Jurisdictional Transfer of Adolescent Offenders: A Test of the Leniency Gap Hypotheses," Stanford Law and Policy Review 14 (2003): 57-83.
103. See also Simon Singer, Jeffrey Fagan, and Akiva Liberman, "The Reproduction of Juvenile Justice in Criminal Court: A Case Study of New York's Juvenile Offender Law," in Changing Borders of Juvenile Justice, eds. Fagan and Zimring (see note 7).
104. Kupchik, Fagan, and Liberman, "Punishment, Proportionality, and Jurisdictional Transfer" (see note 70).
105. See Patricia Torbet and others, State Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime (see note 23);
106. Melissa Sickmund, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, "OJJDP Update on Statistics," How Juveniles Get to Criminal Court (www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/juvcr.pdf [October, 1994]);
107. Feld, Bad Kids (see note 6).
108. Cary S. Rudman, Jeffrey Fagan, and Eliot C. Hartstone, "Violent Youth in Adult Court: Process and Punishment," Crime and Delinquency 32 (1986): 75-96.
109. Feld and Podkopacz, "The End of the Line" (see note 21), studying 1986-1992 waiver in Hennepin County, Minnesota.
110. Fagan, "Separating the Men from the Boys" (see note 27).
111. Martin A. Forst, Jeffrey Fagan, and T. Scott Vivona, "Some Paradoxical Effects of the Treatment-Custody Dichotomy for Adolescents in Adult Prisons," Juvenile and Family Court Journal 40 (1989): 1-15.
112. Evidently, the success of waiver reform, which would return children to the juvenile court, depends on confidence in the programs of the juvenile court. Peter W. Greenwood, Changing Lives: Delinquency Prevention as Crime-Control Policy (Chicago University Press, 2006).
113. Data on file with author.
114. However, some criminologists, such as William Spelman, believe that there may be incapacitation effects from imprisonment, where active offenders are locked up and unable to commit new crimes on the streets, but that few would-be offenders are deterred from crime by the threat of incarceration. See, for example, William Spelman, "The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion," in The Crime Drop in America, edited by Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
115. Among inmates released between age eighteen and twenty-four, 75.4 percent were rearrested within three years, 52.0 percent were re-convicted, and 52.0 percent were returned to prison. Among inmates aged fourteen to seventeen at release, the rates were higher: 82.1 percent rearrested, 55.7 percent reconvicted, and 56.6 percent returned to prison. Patrick Langan and David Levin, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, "Special Report," Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994 (www.ojp. usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf [June, 2002]).
116. Robert J. Sampson and John H. Laub, Crime in the Making: Pathways and Turning Points through Life (Harvard University Press, 1993);
117. Richard Freeman, "Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and What Might We Do about It?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, no. 1 (1996): 25-42.
118. Simon I. Singer and David McDowall, "Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law," Law and Society Review 22, no. 3 (1988): 521-36.
119. Barry Glassner and others, "A Note on the Deterrent Effect of Juvenile vs. Adult Jurisdiction," Social Problems 31, no. 2 (1983): 219-21.
120. According to Singer, Recriminalizing Delinquency (see note 6), brochures were sent to public schools announcing the new law and its harsh consequences, and juvenile court judges routinely issued warnings about the serious punishment that awaited anyone who violated the new law. Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, "Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation," Oxford Journal of Criminal Law 24 (2004): 173-205.
121. E. L. Jensen and L. K. Metsger, "A Test of the Deterrent Effect of Legislative Waiver on Violent Juvenile Crime," Crime & Delinquency 40, no. 1 (January 1994): 96.
122. Robert Barnowski, "Changes in Washington State's Jurisdiction of Juvenile Offenders: Examining the Impact," available at www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/JuvJurisChange.pdf (2003).
123. Steven D. Levitt, "Juvenile Crime and Punishment," Journal of Political Economy 106 (1998): 1156-85.
124. David Lee and Justin McCrary, "Crime, Punishment, and Myopia," Working Paper W11491 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=762770.
125. Ibid. See also Jonathan Gruber, Risky Behavior among Youth: An Economic Analysis (University of Chicago Press, 2001).
126. Lee and McCrary, "Crime, Punishment, and Myopia" (see note 87).
127. 0 x OR]) where: RR = relative risk; OR = odds ratio to be converted; P0 = incidence of the outcome of interest in the unexposed population (that is, juveniles retained in the juvenile justice system).
128. See McGowan and others, "Effects on Violence" (see note 9), for specific citations of studies included in their analysis.
129. In a subsequent study, Fagan, Kupchik, and Liberman used a similar design with more counties and an expanded list of sampled offenses. Jeffrey Fagan, Aaron Kupchik, and Akiva Liberman, "Be Careful What You Wish for: Legal Sanctions and Public Safety among Adolescent Offenders in Juvenile and Criminal Court," Columbia Law School, Public Law Research Paper no. 03-61 (available at SSRN: http://ssrn. com/abstract=491202 [July, 2007]). Their results were similar to the Fagan study, "Separating the Men from the Boys" (see note 27). The more recent study was not included in the Task Force analysis, which included only published studies.
130. See Fagan, "Separating the Men from the Boys" (see note 27);
131. Fagan, Kupchik, and Liberman, "Be Careful What You Wish for" (see note 91);
132. Bishop and others, "The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court" (see note 69).
133. John C. Hagan and Kristin Bumiller, Making Sense of Sentencing: A Review and Critique of Sentencing Research, vol. 2 in Research on Sentencing: The Search for Reform, edited by Alfred Blumstein and others (Washington: National Academy Press, 1983), pp. 1-54;
134. see also Charles R. Tittle, Sanctions and Social Deviance: The Question of Deterrence (New York: Praeger, 1980);
135. Charles R. Tittle, "Evaluating the Deterrent Effects of Criminal Sanctions," in Handbook of Criminal Justice Evaluation, edited by Malcolm Klein and Kathie Teilmann (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980).
136. Lawrence Winner and others, "The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Reexamining Recidivism Over the Long Term," Crime and Delinquency 43 (1997): 548-63. The criteria were: (1) most serious offense for which the transfer was made, (2) the number of counts included in the bill of information for the committing offense, (3) the number of prior referrals to the juvenile court, (4) the most serious prior offense, (5) age at the time of committing the offense, (6) gender, and (7) race (coded dichotomously as white or non-white).
137. Paul R. Rosenbaum and Donald B. Rubin, "Reducing Bias in Observational Studies Using Subclassification on the Propensity Score," Journal of the American Statistical Association 79 (1984): 516-24.
138. Lonn Lanza-Kaduce and others, Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Transfer to Criminal Court Study: Final Report (www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/juveniletransfers.pdf [January, 2002]).
139. Fagan, "Separating the Men from the Boys" (see note 27); Fagan, Kupchik, and Liberman, "Be Careful What You Wish for" (see note 91).
140. The identification task to estimate propensity scores requires the selection of variables that approximate the matrix of information available to judges or prosecutors and the logic they use in deciding whether to transfer. The selection or propensity models estimated when researchers lack full information that is available to judges or prosecutors may be artifactual at best and, under extreme conditions, inaccurate. See, for example, Randall Salekin and others, "Juvenile Transfer to Adult Courts: A Look at Prototypes for Dangerousness, Sophistication-Maturity, and Amenability to Treatment through a Legal Lens," Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 8, no. 4 (2002): 373-410;
141. D. N. Brannen and others, "Transfer to Adult Court: A National Study of How Juvenile Court Judges Weigh Pertinent Kent Criteria," Psychology, Public Policy, and Law (forthcoming).
142. Bishop and Frazier, "Consequences of Transfer," in The Changing Borders of Juvenile Justice, edited by Fagan and Zimring (see note 7); Bishop, "Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal System" (see note 9).
143. Richard E. Redding, "The Effects of Adjudicating and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults," Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice 1, no. 2 (2003): 128-55.
144. David O. Brink, "Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer: How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes," Texas Law Review 82 (2004): 1555-85.
145. Elizabeth F. Emens, "Aggravating Youth: Roper v. Simmons and Age Discrimination," Supreme Court Review 2005: 51-102.
146. Lawrence Bobo and Devon Johnson, "A Taste for Punishment: Black and White Americans' Views on the Death Penalty and the War on Drugs," Du Bois Review 1 (2004): 151-80.
147. North Carolina is one of the nation's two remaining states that set the age of majority for criminal responsibility at sixteen. Connecticut legislators used the study commission model to create political space for reform and to build consensus among stakeholders during the three-year planning process.
148. Even as juvenile crime rates had begun their decade-long decline, inaccurate facts were cited to militate for yet tougher measures. For example, Representative Bill McCollum, chair of the House Subcommittee on Crime in the 106th Congress, argued for tougher transfer laws by stating that "in America, no population poses a greater threat to public safety than juvenile offenders." House Committee on the Judiciary, Putting Consequences Back into Juvenile Justice at the Federal, State, and Local Levels: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime, 106th Congress, 1999, p. 5.
149. Carl F. Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances: A Philosophy of Science and the Law (Oxford University Press, 1993).
150. See Zimring and Fagan, "Transfer Policy and Law Reform," in The Changing Borders of Juvenile Justice, edited by Fagan and Zimring (see note 7).
151. See also "Fagan, "Separating the Men from the Boys" (see note 27);
152. Fagan, Kupchik, and Liberman, "Be Careful What You Wish for" (see note 91)"; Feld and Podkopacz, "The Back-Door to Prison" (see note 19).
153. Katherine Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics (Oxford University Press, 1997).
154. See Bishop, "Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal System" (see note 9).