Contractual arrangements and enforcement in transition agriculture: Theory and evidence from China

Food Policy

Volumn 33, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 570-575

  Guo, Hongdong ^a   Jolly, Robert W ^b  

^a ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

China; Contract enforcement; Transition agriculture

Indexed keywords

AGRICULTURAL POLICY; AGRICULTURAL PRICE; AGROINDUSTRY; CONTRACT FARMING; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; FOOD POLICY; PRIVATIZATION; SMALLHOLDER; THEORETICAL STUDY;

ASIA; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST; ZHEJIANG;

EID: 55049126699     PISSN: 03069192     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.foodpol.2008.04.003     Document Type: Article

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