Courts and contract enforcement in transition agriculture: Theory and evidence from Poland

Agricultural Economics

Volumn 31, Issue 2-3 SPEC. ISS., 2004, Pages 251-263

  Beckmann, Volker ^a   Boger, Silke ^b  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b Entwicklungsprojekte und Welternährung   (Germany)

Author keywords

Contract enforcement; Legal system; Transaction costs; Transition agriculture

Indexed keywords

CONTRACT FARMING; LAW ENFORCEMENT; LEGAL SYSTEM; TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY;

CENTRAL EUROPE; EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; EUROPE; POLAND; WORLD;

EID: 9644277163     PISSN: 01695150     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.agecon.2004.09.011     Document Type: Conference Paper

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