An agency theory of transactions without contract enforcement: The case of China

China Economic Review

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 1-14

  Tao, Zhigang ^a   Zhu, Tian ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^b HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Agency; China; Contract enforcement; D23; Economic transition; Interfirm transactions; K12; P31; P52

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008073457     PISSN: 1043951X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1043-951X(01)00040-2     Document Type: Article

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