The physician-patient relationship revisited: The patient's view

International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 279-300

  Schneider, Udo ^a   Ulrich, Volker ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BAYREUTH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Bivariate probit panel; Health behavior; Physician patient relationship

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; ATTITUDE TO HEALTH; DECISION MAKING; DOCTOR PATIENT RELATION; EMPIRICAL RESEARCH; GERMANY; HEALTH BEHAVIOR; HEALTH CARE DELIVERY; HEALTH INSURANCE; HEALTH PERSONNEL ATTITUDE; HUMAN; ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT; PATIENT PARTICIPATION; PRIMARY HEALTH CARE; STATISTICAL MODEL;

ATTITUDE OF HEALTH PERSONNEL; ATTITUDE TO HEALTH; DECISION MAKING; DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE; EMPIRICAL RESEARCH; GERMANY; HEALTH BEHAVIOR; HUMANS; INSURANCE, HEALTH; MODELS, ECONOMETRIC; PATIENT PARTICIPATION; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONS; PRIMARY HEALTH CARE;

EID: 54949103549     PISSN: 13896563     EISSN: 15736962     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10754-008-9041-3     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. Advisory Council for the Concerted Action in Health Care. (2001). Appropriateness and Efficiency: Volume I: The Formulation of the Aims, Prevention, User Orientation and Participation, Report 2000/2001, Summary. n/a, Bonn.
2. Advisory Council for the Concerted Action in Health Care. (2003). Health Care Finance, User Orientation and Quality, Volume I: Health Care Finance and User Orientation, Report. n/a, Bonn.
3. Arrow K.J. (1963) Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American Economic Review 53: 941-973
4. Arrow K.J. (1985) The economics of agency. In: Pratt J.W., Zeckhauser R.J. (eds) Principals and agents: The structure of business. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, pp 37-51
5. Balia S., Jones A.M. (2008) Mortality, lifestyle and socio-economic status. Journal of Health Economics 27: 1-26
6. Björnsen, H. (2004). Off-farm labour participation of farm couple: A bivariate random coefficients approach. Discussion Paper, Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research.
7. Busse, R., & Riesberg, A. (2004). Health Care Systems in Transition: Germany. WHO Regional Office for Europe on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, Copenhagen.
8. Cooper R., Ross T.W. (1985) Product warranties and double moral hazard. Rand Journal of Economics 16: 103-113
9. Eggleston K.N. (1999) Incentives in health care payment systems. Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass
10. Evans R.G. (1974) Supplier-induced demand: Some empirical evidence and implications. In: Perlman M. (eds) The economics of health and medical care. Stockton Press, New York, pp 162-173
11. Fabbri, D., Monfardini, C., & Radice, R. (2004). Testing exogeneity in the bivariate probit odel: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to health economics, Department of Economics. University of Bologna.
12. Freedman D.M., Sigurdson A.J., Rjaraman P., Doody M.M., Linet M.S., Ron E. (2006) The mortality risk of smoking and obesity combined. American Journal of Preventive Medicine 31: 355-362
13. Gaynor M. (1994) Issues in the industrial organization of the market for physician services. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 3: 211-255
14. Greene W.H. (1998) Gender economics courses in liberal arts colleges: Further results. Journal of Economic Education 29: 291-300
15. Greene, W. H. (2001). Fixed and random effects in nonlinear models, Working Paper, EC-01-01. Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University.
16. Greene, W. H. (2002a). Convenient estimators for the panel probit model: Further results, Working Paper, EC-02-06. Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University.
17. Greene W.H. (2002b) Limdep Version 8.0, Econometric Modeling Guide Vol. 1. Econometric Software, New York
18. Greene, W. H. (2004). Interpreting estimated parameters and measuring individual heterogeneity in random coefficient models, Working Paper, EC-04-08. Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University.
19. Greene W.H. (2008) Econometric analysis (6th ed.). New Jersey, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River
20. Grossman M. (1972) On the concept of health capital and the demand for health. Journal of Political Economy 80: 223-255
21. Holly A., Gardiol L., Domenighetti G., Bisig B. (1998) An Econometric model of health care utilization and health insurance in Switzerland. European Economic Review 42: 513-522
22. Jones A.M. (2000) Health econometrics. In: Culyer A.J., Newhouse P. J. (eds) Handbook of health economics (Vol 1A). Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 265-344
23. Jones A.M., Koolman X., von Doorslaer E. (2006) The impact of supplementary private health insurance on the use of specialists in European countries. Annals d'Economie et de Statistiques 83(84): 249-275
24. Knapp L.G., Seaks T.G. (1998) A hausman test for a dummy variable in probit. Applied Economics Letters 5: 321-323
25. Knaus, T., & Nuscheler, R. (2002). Incomplete risk adjustment and adverse selection in the German Public Health Insurance System, Discussion Paper FS IV 02-27. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.
26. Leonard K.L., Zivin J.G. (2001) How to compensate physicians when both patient and physician effort are unobservable. Department of Economics, Columbia University, New York
27. Long J.S. (1997) Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables. Sage, Thousand Oaks
28. Ma C.A., McGuire T.G. (1997) Optimal health insurance and provider payment. American Economic Review 87: 685-704
29. Maddala G.S. (1983) Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
30. McGuire T.G. (2000) Physician agency. In: Culyer A.J., Newhouse J.P. (eds) Handbook of health economics (Vol. 1A). Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 461-536
31. National Research Council (1989). Diet and health: Implications for reducing chronic disease risk. Washington DC: National Academy Press.
32. Pauly M.V. (1968) The economics of moral hazard: Comment. American Economic Review 58: 531-537
33. Pohlmeier W., Ulrich V. (1995) An econometric model for the two-part decision process in the demand for health. Journal of Human Resources 30: 339-361
34. Richard S. (1996) Information problems in the market for medical services. In: Picot E., Schlicht A. (eds) Firms, markets, and contracts: Contributions to neoinstitutional economics. Physica, Heidelberg, pp 200-219
35. Ryan M. (1994) Agency in health care: Lessons for economists from sociologists. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 53: 207-217
36. Schneider U. (2004) Asymmetric information and the demand for health care - the case of double moral hazard. Journal of Applied Social Science Studies 124: 233-256
37. StataCorp. (2001) Stata Statistical Software: Release Stata Statistical Software, Release 7.0. StataPress, College Station, Texas
38. Verbeek M. (2008) A guide to modern econometrics (3rd ed.). Wiley, Chichester
39. Wilde J. (2000) Identification of multiple equation probit models with endogenous dummy regressors. Economics Letters 69: 309-312
40. World Health Organization. (2003). Diet, Nutrition and the Prevalence of Chronic Diseases. WHO Technical Report Series 916, Geneva.
41. Zweifel P., Breyer F. (1997) Health economics. University Press, Oxford New York
42. Zweifel P., Manning W.G. (2000) Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care. In: Culyer A.J., Newhouse J.P. (eds) Handbook of health economics (Vol. 1A). Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 409-459
43. Zweifel P., Lehmann H., Steinmann L. (2002) Patching up the physician-patient relationship: Insurers vs. GovernmentsasComplementaryAgents. In: Lindgren B.(eds) Individual decisions for health. Routledge, London, pp 207-233